Li, Faming et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 1, 2020

13569601 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/569,601 08/08/2012 Faming Li 20120009-US-NP 4880
144570 7590 06/01/2020
Ortiz & Lopez, PLLC/Conduent
P.O. Box 4484
Albuquerque, NM 87196-4484
EXAMINER
ZEROUAL, OMAR
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Conduent.PatentDocketing@conduent.com
docketing@olpatentlaw.com
klopez@olpatentlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte FAMING LI, ONNO ZOETER,
DANIEL H. GREENE, and YU-AN SUN
Appeal 2019-004205
Application 13/569,601
Technology Center 3600
Before ULRIKE W. JENKS, RACHEL H. TOWNSEND, and
CYNTHIA M. HARDMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
HARDMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Conduent
Business Services, LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to real time dynamic vehicle parking price
management methods. Claim 1, reproduced below (with bracketed lettering
added for reference to the claim limitations), is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A vehicle parking price management method, comprising:
[a] providing a vehicle parking price management system
in association with a parking facility comprising at least one
parking spot, the parking price management system further
comprising a parking management unit including at least one
occupancy sensor deployed in the parking facility providing
input to an occupancy feedback control module;
[b] pre-determining an assured price comprising an upper
bound on pricing that follows from a background schedule based
on historic parking data and estimating a demand for the parking
facility, wherein said assured price is proportional to said
demand based on said historic parking data and price for the
parking facility;
[c] determining a real time parking price for at least one
parking spot in said parking facility via input from an occupancy
feedback control module including input from the at least one
occupancy sensor to track occupancy and adjust a parking price
in real time based on a comparison of feedback from the
occupancy feedback control with an occupancy set point; and
[d] publishing and updating said assured price at
timescales larger than said real-time and presenting said assured
price to a user of the parking facility parked in said at least one
parking spot for a given duration via a graphical user interface
associated with the vehicle parking price management system
configured to accept payment input, with a real-time demand
based influence introduced as a discount to said assured price for
an ex-ante variant and an ex-post variant.
Appeal Br. 25 (Claims Appendix).
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REJECTION
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2.
OPINION
Appellant argues the claims together. See generally Appeal Br. We
select claim 1 as representative, and all claims stand or fall with claim 1. 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Principles of Law
1. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
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Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
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elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
2. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency
management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October
2019 Update at 1.
Under the Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–

2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the Guidance. USPTO, October
2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (“October 2019 Update”) (available
at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019
_update.pdf).
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(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong
Two”).3
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
Analysis
Claim 1 is directed to a “vehicle parking price management method.”
Appeal Br. 25 (Claims Appendix). A process (or method) is one of the four
categories of patent-eligible subject matter enumerated in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We thus proceed to Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Guidance to consider whether
the claim is directed to a judicial exception to patent eligibility.
1. Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1
In Step 2A, Prong 1, any “specific limitation(s) in the claim . . . [that]
recite[] an abstract idea” are identified. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
Claim 1, step [a] recites “providing a vehicle parking price management

3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–
55.
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system in association with a parking facility,” which includes, inter alia, “at
least one occupancy sensor deployed in the parking facility.” Appeal Br. 25
(Claims Appendix). Step [b] recites “pre-determining an assured price
comprising an upper bound on pricing . . . based on historic parking data and
estimating a demand.” Id. Step [c] recites “determining a real time parking
price” via input from, inter alia, the occupancy sensor. Step [d] recites
“publishing and updating said assured price” and “presenting said assured
price to a user . . . via a graphical user interface . . . configured to accept
payment input, with a real-time demand based influence introduced as a
discount to said assured price for an ex-ante variant and an ex-post variant.”
Id.
Thus, step [b] of the claimed method pre-determines an assured, upper
bound parking price based on historical data and estimated demand, whereas
step [c] determines a real time parking price based on, inter alia, feedback
from the occupancy sensor deployed in the parking facility. In step [d], the
assured price is presented to the user, “with a real-time demand based
influence introduced as a discount to said assured price.” We determine that
[b], [c], and [d] collectively recite determining a parking price and real-time
demand-based discount, and presenting that information to a user. These
limitations fall within the category of abstract ideas identified in the
Guidance as relating to “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity,”
which includes, inter alia, “fundamental economic principles or practices,”
“commercial or legal interactions (including . . . advertising, marketing or
sales activities or behaviors; [and] business relations).” Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52; see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359,
1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (concluding that claimed method of “offer-based
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price optimization” is an abstract idea “similar to other ‘fundamental
economic concepts’ found to be abstract ideas by the Supreme Court and
this court”). We therefore agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an
abstract idea, and thus proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the analysis to
determine whether the abstract idea is integrated into a practical application.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54; Ans. 6.
2. Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2
“[M]ere recitation of a judicial exception does not mean that the claim
is ‘directed to’ that judicial exception under Step 2A Prong Two.” October
2019 Update 10. Instead, if the claim as a whole integrates the judicial
exception into a practical application, the claim is not “directed to” a judicial
exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54; October 2019 Update 10. As in
the Mayo/Alice framework, we must look at the claim elements individually
and as an ordered combination to determine whether the additional elements
integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application, such as an
improvement in the function of a computer, or an improvement to other
technology or technical field. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
As explained in the October 2019 Update, “first the specification
should be evaluated to determine if the disclosure provides sufficient details
such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed
invention as providing an improvement.” October 2019 Update 12. Second,
“the claim must be evaluated to ensure that the claim itself reflects the
disclosed improvement.” Id. This analysis is performed “without reference
to what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity.” Id.
The Specification describes the invention as relating to a “real time
dynamic vehicle parking price management” method, which “reduces the
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parking price uncertainty while maintaining good occupancy performance
and increases an economic efficiency of the parking usage,” and “reduce[s]
‘cruising’ for parking.” Spec. ¶¶ 11, 13. The Specification indicates that
“[p]arking pricing schemes that use a pre-determined price profile can’t
catch the real time fluctuation in parking demand,” whereas a system that
uses “real-time occupancy feedback with a real-time controller results in a
price that varies in real time,” which “poses uncertainty for trip planning and
confusion for parking charge.” Id. ¶ 5. According to the Specification, the
improved system “present[s] an assured price via a graphical user interface
configured to accept payment input, with a real-time demand based
influence introduced as a discount to said assured price,” as recited in
claim 1, limitation [d]. An occupancy sensor deployed in the parking
facility, as recited in claim 1, limitation [a], provides input to determine the
real-time demand-based influence to the assured price.
We agree with the Examiner that “[t]he claim as a whole merely
describes how to generally ‘apply’ the concept of optimizing parking prices
in a computer environment.” Ans. 9. The graphical user interface
configured to accept payment and the sensor “are merely invoked as tools to
perform the abstract idea” of presenting a user an assured price which
represents an upper bound, and determining and introducing a discount that
reflects real time demand fluctuations. Id.
Appellant asserts that the claims “explicitly include an assertedly
inventive technology for performing the alleged abstract idea”—“namely the
parking management unit, and the unique method by which the management
module operates, as illustrated in Appellant’s FIGs. 3-6”—because “no prior
art rejections remain.” Appeal Br. 14. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s
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argument, because it conflates the § 101 analysis with analyses under §§ 102
and 103. The law is clear that it is not “enough for subject-matter eligibility
that claimed techniques be novel and nonobvious in light of prior art,
passing muster under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.” SAP Am., Inc. v.
InvestPic, LLP, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018). An improved
abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90 (holding that
a novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is,
nonetheless patent-ineligible).
Appellant further argues that like the claims found patent-eligible in
Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018), its
claims “do not claim a result, but rather include the inventive arrangement of
hardware and software, for accomplishing the result. This includes, the
claimed parking management unit, occupancy sensor, occupancy feedback
control module, graphical user interface, and payment input.” Appeal Br.
16; see also Reply Br. 4–5 (arguing that the claims “make[] of use . . . a
combination of hardware and software in a way that provides a practical
application of any alleged abstract idea[] to parking management systems”).
We are not persuaded. In Finjan, the court found the claims patent eligible
because the claimed virus scanning method resulted in an improvement in
computer functionality, namely generation of a security profile that newly
permitted protection against unknown computer virus, whereas prior art
methods recognized only known viruses. 879 F.3d at 1304. Nothing in
Appellant’s claim 1 is analogous to the innovation in Finjan, which resulted
in “a new kind of file that enables a computer security system to do things it
could not do before.” Id. at 1305. Here, in contrast, claim 1 merely recites
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the hardware and software elements as generic components upon which the
assured price and discount are determined and displayed.
Appellant also argues that like the claims found patent-eligible in
Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356
(Fed. Cir. 2018), its claims “recite a specific improvement over prior art
systems.” Appeal Br. 16; Reply Br. 8. In Core Wireless, the court found the
claims patent eligible because they specified “a particular manner of
summarizing and presenting information in electronic devices,” resulting in
an improved user interface for electronic devices. 880 F.3d at 1362–63.
Nothing in Appellant’s claim 1 is analogous to the improved user interface
in Core Wireless. For example, Appellant has not persuasively established
that the claimed graphical user interface constitutes the type of patent-
eligible improvement found in Core Wireless. Rather, the Specification
describes the improvement over prior art systems as “reduc[ing] the parking
price uncertainty while maintaining good occupancy performance and
increases an economic efficiency of the parking usage,” and “reduc[ing]
‘cruising’ for parking.” Spec. ¶¶ 11, 13. These improvements are achieved
by presenting a user with an assured, upper bound price and a discount to the
assured price based on real-time demand. Claim 1 thus presents a user with
improved price information. This is not analogous to improving a prior art
system with an improved user interface as in Core Wireless.
Appellant also argues that like the claims found patent-eligible in
Thales Visionix, Inc. v. U.S., 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017), “the present
claims similarly use a sensor, along with a number of other constituent
system elements, to provide a new and useful technique for managing a
parking facility.” Appeal Br. 16. We are not persuaded. In Thales Visionix,
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the court found the claims patent eligible because they “specif[ied] a
particular configuration of inertial sensors and a particular method of using
the raw data from the sensors in order to more accurately calculate the
position and orientation of an object on a moving platform.” 850 F.3d at
1349. Thus, the claims were not found eligible merely because they used a
sensor, but rather because of the “combination of sensor placement and
calculation based on a different reference frame.” Id. at 1348. On this
record, Appellant has demonstrated neither that the placement of the sensor
in a parking facility is unconventional, nor that use of the real-time demand
data from the sensor to determine a real-time parking price is
unconventional.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that claim 1 recites an abstract
idea relating to certain methods of organizing human activity, and that the
abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application.
3. Guidance Step 2B
Because claim 1 (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, we next determine
whether claim 1 adds specific limitation(s) beyond the judicial exception
that are not “well-understood, routine and conventional in the field” (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)), or whether they simply append well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56. We also consider whether the combination of steps are
performed “in an unconventional way and therefore include an ‘inventive
step,’ rendering the claim eligible at Step 2B.” Id.
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The Examiner found that the claims “do not include additional
elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception because [the] parking management unit, sensor, occupancy
feedback control module, [and] graphical user interface (claim 1) . . . [are]
recited [as] a generic computer that performs functions (i.e. providing,
determining and publishing) that are generic computer functions (i.e.
receiving, processing, and storing data, and receiving data over a network)
that are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously
known to the industry.” Final Act. 7. The Examiner further found that the
Specification “discloses generic computers and sensors performing routine
and conventional activities such as collecting, analyzing and publishing
data.” Ans. 9 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 35–40, 49).
We agree with the Examiner that considering the claim limitations
individually and as an ordered combination, claim 1 simply appends well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
The claimed parking management unit, occupancy sensor, occupancy
feedback control module, and graphical user interface configured to accept
payment are each described in the Specification at a high degree of
generality. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 35–40, 49.
Appellant argues that like the claims held eligible in Bascom, the
claimed methods and systems “provide an unconventional means for
providing parking management via ex-ante and ex-post variant assured price
adjustment.” Appeal Br. 21–22 (citing Bascom Global Internet v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, (Fed. Cir. 2016)). We are not persuaded. An
“inventive concept” may arise from one or more of the individual claim
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limitations, or from the ordered combination of the limitations. Bascom, 827
F.3d at 1349. However, “[a]n inventive concept that transforms the abstract
idea into a patent-eligible invention must be significantly more than the
abstract idea itself, and cannot simply be an instruction to implement or
apply the abstract idea on a computer.” Id.
Here, Appellant has not persuaded us that the steps in which the
assured price and real-time demand-based influence (discount) are generated
and then presented to the user on the graphical user interface, either
individually or as an ordered combination, are non-conventional, non-
generic, or operate in a unique and unconventional manner. We see nothing
in claim 1 that is analogous to the claim in Bascom, which, despite reciting
“generic computer, network and Internet components” (Bascom, 827 F.3d at
1349), as a whole recited a way “to filter content on the Internet” that was
found to improve performance of the computer system itself. Id. at 1351.
Here, in contrast, the abstract idea of optimizing price is implemented using
conventional components and functions generic to computers and sensors.
See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315,
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The ’002 patent does not provide an inventive
solution to a problem in implementing the idea of retrieving user-specified
information; it simply recites that the abstract idea will be implemented
using the conventional components and functions generic to electronic
mobile devices.”).
Appellant additionally argues that the Examiner’s rejection is “facially
invalid” because the Examiner incorrectly characterized the claimed sensor
as a both “computer” and “an instruction to apply an abstract idea.” Appeal
Br. 18; Reply Br. 9. We agree with Appellant that a sensor is neither a
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computer (although we note that computers contain sensors), nor an
instruction to apply an abstract idea. However, whether the sensor is a
classified as a computer or not does not affect the thrust of the rejection.
Indeed, the Examiner correctly recognized that “a review of the specification
. . . shows that the sensors recited by the claims are . . . generic sensors
recited at a high level of generality meant to apply the abstract idea in a
computerized environment by performing well understood, routine and
conventional functions of sensor.” Ans. 5–6 (citing Spec. ¶ 49). Paragraph
49 of the Specification, which the Examiner identified as “the only
paragraph to describe the occupancy sensors” (see Ans. 6), recites that “[t]he
occupancy/presence sensing devices 475 in a parking facility permits a
parking control engine to track the occupancy and adjust the price in real
time.” Spec. ¶ 49. The lack of detail provided in the Specification about the
sensors—including even with respect to the attribute to be sensed—indicates
that they are generic components. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 850
F.3d at 1331 (“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in implementation
details that it amounts to merely a generic component (software, hardware,
or firmware) that permits the performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to
retrieve the user-specific resources.”).
In the Reply Brief, Appellant for the first time argues that the
Examiner has not supported the finding that the claimed features (including
features recited in claims other than claim 1) are well understood, routine, or
conventional in accordance with the USPTO’s Berkheimer Memorandum.4

4 Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility,
Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) (April
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Reply Br. 11–14. Appellant did not raise this argument in its Appeal Brief,
and has not demonstrated any specific Examiner findings presented for the
first time in the Answer necessitating this specific new argument in rebuttal
in the Reply Brief. Accordingly, this argument is waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015); see also Ex Parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1474
(BPAI 2010) (informative) (“Any bases for asserting error, whether factual
or legal, that are not raised in the principal brief are waived.”).
However, even if we were to consider this argument, we find it
unpersuasive. The Berkheimer Memorandum provides for a “citation to an
express statement in the specification . . . that demonstrates the well-
understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s).” See
Berkheimer Memorandum 3. The Examiner has cited specific portions of
the Specification to support the Examiner’s determination. See, e.g., Final
Act. 7 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 35, 49); Ans. 5–6 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 35–40, 49).
Appellant has not persuasively explained why the Examiner’s
characterization of the computer functionality and sensor, based on the
description of those components in the Specification, is in error.
For the above reasons, under Step 2B, we are not persuaded that the
Examiner erred in determining that the limitations of claim 1, recited in
addition to the abstract idea and considered individually and as an ordered
combination, do not transform the claim into significantly more than the
abstract idea. Claim 1 is not significantly more than instructions to apply the
abstract idea of a certain method of organizing human activity using generic

19, 2018) (“Berkheimer Memorandum), available at https://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-20180419.PDF.
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computer and sensor components. Under precedent, that is not enough to
transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the rejection of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED