Lewis Claytor, Appellant,v.Bill Richardson, Secretary, Department of Energy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 30, 1998
01974562 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 30, 1998)

01974562

10-30-1998

Lewis Claytor, Appellant, v. Bill Richardson, Secretary, Department of Energy, Agency.


Lewis Claytor v. Department of Energy

01974562

October 30, 1998

Lewis Claytor, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01974562

) Agency No. 97(99)HQ/EM

Bill Richardson, )

Secretary, )

Department of Energy, )

Agency. )

_______________________________________)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) from the final agency decision concerning his equal

employment opportunity (EEO) complaint, which alleged discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �621 et seq. The appeal is

accepted by the Commission in accordance with the provisions of EEOC

Order No. 960.001.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether the agency properly dismissed one issue

of appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim.

BACKGROUND

In a complaint dated February 19, 1997, appellant, then a Supervisory

Engineer, GS-15, alleged that the agency discriminated against him

on the bases of race (Black), color (black), age (54), and reprisal

(prior EEO activity): (1) by delaying the processing of his travel and

training requests, and by ordering that the calculation of his travel

expenses be changed from actual cost basis to per diem basis; and (2)

when a management official in the Office of Environmental Management

suggested in correspondence addressed to appellant that his travel might

be canceled due to budget problems, and commented that she hoped that

things were going well with appellant while he was serving a detail.

On April 22, 1997, the agency issued a final agency decision (FAD

1) dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim. However,

FAD 1 addressed only Issue 2 of the complaint. On May 29, 1997, the

agency issued FAD 2 in which it rescinded FAD 1; accepted Issue 1 for

investigation; and again dismissed Issue 2 for failure to state a claim.

It is from this decision that appellant now appeals.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

An agency must accept a complaint from any aggrieved employee who believes

that he or she has been discriminated against by that agency because

of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability.

29 C.F.R. ��1614.103, 1614.106(a). While the Commission's regulations do

not define the term "aggrieved employee," the term has been interpreted

to mean an employee who suffers a present harm or loss with regard to a

term condition, or privilege of employment for which there is a remedy.

Diaz v. Dept. of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049 (April 21,

1994). In order to state a claim under the Commission's regulations,

"an employee must show an injury in fact." Id. (citing Hackett v. McGuire

Bros., 445 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1971). More specifically, "an employee

must allege and show 'a direct, personal deprivation at the hands of

the employer,' that is, a present and unresolved harm or loss affecting

a term, condition, or privilege of his/her employment." Id. (citing

Hammonds v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05900863 (October 31,

1990); Taylor v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05900367 (June 2,

1990). An agency must dismiss a complaint which fails to state a claim

pursuant to section 1614.103 or section 1614.106(a) of the Commission's

regulations. 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a).

In the instant case, the agency properly dismissed Issue 2 for failure to

state a claim. The action complained of in Issue 2 was, in part, that a

manager commented to appellant that his travel might be canceled because

of budget problems. There is, however, no evidence that appellant's

travel in fact was canceled. Appellant argues on appeal that the prospect

that his travel might be canceled caused him to forgo career opportunities

requiring travel, but fails to provide specific information regarding

even a single incident where this occurred. Appellant also argues on

appeal that uncertainty about his travel budget caused him anxiety,

which could be construed as a claim for compensatory damages. However,

the Commission has held that where, as here, an allegation fails to

render a complainant aggrieved, a prayer for compensatory damages will

not serve to render the complainant aggrieved. E.g., Girard v. Dept. of

the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940379 (September 9, 1994).

The second part of Issue 2 was that the same manager commented that

she hoped things were going well with appellant while he was serving

a detail. There is nothing about this comment on its face which

could be construed as injurious. Appellant stated during counseling

that he felt this comment was the manager's way of telling him not to

return to the position he had occupied prior to his detail. Even if

this interpretation were considered reasonable, the comment was not

accompanied by any concrete action. The Commission has held that a

remark or comment, unaccompanied by concrete action, is not a direct

and personal deprivation sufficient to render an individual aggrieved.

Gens v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request No. 05910837 (January 31,

1992); Fuller v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05910324 (May 2,

1991) (the mere verbal exchange between an appellant and his supervisor,

without some showing of injury in fact, does not show that appellant

is aggrieved); Simon v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05900866

(October 3, 1990) (citing McCann v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request

No. 05880867 (January 27, 1989)).

CONCLUSION

Based upon a thorough review of the record, and for the foregoing reasons,

it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to

AFFIRM the final agency decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �l6l4.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from

the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil

action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY

(30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or

to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil

action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON

WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT

PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may

result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department"

means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or

department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the

administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Oct. 30, 1998

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations