Level 3 Communications, LLCDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 4, 202014120283 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 4, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/120,283 05/14/2014 Paul Farnsworth 0460-US-U1 7620 83579 7590 05/04/2020 LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC Attn: Patent Docketing 1025 Eldorado Blvd. Broomfield, CO 80021 EXAMINER LEVINE, ADAM L ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3625 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/04/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): patent.docketing@centurylink.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte PAUL FARNSWORTH, ERIC DAVID GUNDERSEN, YUNAS NADIADI, and PETER CLARK SNEE Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 Technology Center 3600 Before LINZY T. McCARTNEY, ADAM J. PYONIN, and JASON M. REPKO, Administrative Patent Judges. REPKO, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–4, 6–9, and 16–24. Appeal. Br. 5.2 An oral hearing was held on March 19, 2020. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a method for ordering telecommunication services. Spec. ¶ 2. The method collects provider data and designs a telecommunication package by considering different services, locations, infrastructure, pricing, among other things. Id. Claims 1 and 16 are independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below. 1. A method for processing telecommunications orders comprising: receiving, using at least one processor, provider data from a first provider member and a second provider member, the provider data including a plurality of attributes associated with one or more telecommunication packages, the plurality of attributes including infrastructure information, location information, and pricing information, wherein receiving the provider data comprises: 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to applicant as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). According to Appellant, “The real party in interest is Level 3 Communications, LLC of Broomfield, Colorado,” which is “a subsidiary of Century Link, Inc.” Appeal Br. 3. 2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the Final Office Action (“Final”), mailed November 15, 2017; the Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”), filed May 15, 2018; the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”), mailed September 10, 2018; and the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”), filed November 13, 2018. Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 3 providing a user interface for the first provider member and receiving a manual upload of provider data from the first provider member through the user interface; and automatically receiving provider data from the second provider member; aggregating the provider data by at least one of the plurality of attributes using the at least one processor; and storing the aggregated provider data in one or more databases. Appeal Br. 27 (Claims Appendix). REFERENCES The Examiner relies on the references found in the table below. Name Reference Date Carlin US 5,694,549 Dec. 2, 1997 Marsh US 6,574,465 B2 June 3, 2003 Caballero US 2007/0203799 A1 Aug. 30, 2007 REJECTIONS The Examiner rejects claims 1–4, 6–9, and 16–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to ineligible subject matter. Final 7–12. The Examiner rejects claims 1–4, 6–9, and 16–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Caballero and Marsh. Final 13–21.3 The Examiner rejects claims 21 and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Caballero, Marsh, and Carlin. Final 21–22. 3 In the Answer, the Examiner withdrew the § 103 rejection of claims 23 and 24. Ans. 3. Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 4 OPINION I. The Subject-Matter Eligibility Rejection A. Principles of Law Under § 101, patent-eligible subject matter is defined as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. But courts have long held that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70–71 (2012) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). These ineligible concepts are implicit exceptions to the statutory categories. Id. at 70. The Supreme Court articulated a two-step subject-matter eligibility test in Mayo and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). Alice/Mayo step one asks whether a claim is “directed to” a judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. In Alice/Mayo step two, we consider “the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). Step two is described as a search for an “inventive concept.” Id. The USPTO has published revised guidance on patent subject matter eligibility. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Step 1 of the USPTO’s eligibility analysis asks whether the claimed subject matter falls within the four statutory categories of invention. Id. at 53–54. Under Step 2A, Prong One of the Guidance, we determine if the claim recites a judicial exception, including particular groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 5 certain methods of organizing human activity, or mental processes). Id. at 52–53. If so, we then analyze the claim to determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application under Step 2A, Prong Two of the Guidance. Id. at 53–55; MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018). Only if the claim fails to integrate the exception and, thus, is “directed to” the judicial exception, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well- understood, routine, conventional activity in the field” or whether the claim simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. B. Overview of the Examiner’s Rejection and Appellant’s Arguments In the Examiner’s view, representative4 claim 1 is directed to a fundamental economic practice, which is an abstract idea. Final 9. According to the Examiner, the claims do not represent an improvement to technology because they recite no more than an abstract idea performed on a computer. See id. at 10. Thus, the Examiner concludes that claim 1 is not eligible for patent protection. As for the abstract idea, Appellant argues that “the claims include significant limitations that limit application of the claimed methods and systems to the technical realm of processing telecommunications orders 4 Appellant argues claims 1–4, 6–9, and 16–22 as a group. See Appeal Br. 9– 17; see also Reply Br. 2. We select claim 1 as representative of claims 1–4, 6–9, and 16–22. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 6 using multiple input means from a plurality of provider members.” Appeal Br. 12. In Appellant’s view, the claimed invention adds flexibility and has technical advantages compared to other methods for ordering services. Id. at 13. Regarding the inventive concept, Appellant argues that the claimed method is rooted in networking technology and “results in improvements to the functioning of the network.” Id. at 16. For these and other reasons, Appellant argues that claim 1 is eligible for patent protection. See id. at 9–17; Reply Br. 2–3. C. Step 1: Does the claim fall within a statutory category of invention? Under Step 1 of the USPTO’s eligibility analysis, we agree with the Examiner’s determination that the claimed subject matter falls within one of the four statutory categories of invention because claim 1 recites a process. Final 8; Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54. Indeed, claim 1 recites a series of steps. Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s determination here. See generally Appeal Br.; Reply Br. D. Step 2A, Prong One of the Guidance We next determine whether claim 1 recites a judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. “[A] claim recites a judicial exception when the judicial exception is ‘set forth’ or ‘described’ in the claim.” October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility 1 (USPTO Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (“October 2019 Update”). The Guidance synthesizes the key concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas into three primary subject-matter groupings: mathematical Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 7 concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, and mental processes. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. For the reasons discussed below, claim 1 recites an abstract idea that falls in the Guidance’s subject-matter grouping of organizing human activity, which includes commercial interactions, and also the grouping of mental processes. Id. In particular, claim 1 recites, in part, receiving, using at least one processor, provider data from a first provider member and a second provider member, the provider data including a plurality of attributes associated with one or more telecommunication packages, the plurality of attributes including infrastructure information, location information, and pricing information. Receiving a telecommunication package’s associated location, infrastructure, and pricing information is part of a commercial interaction. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 3. The commercial interaction here is between a telecommunication provider and an entity seeking to obtain its services. See id. For example, the recited providers can be cable companies, which provide cable-television packages along with internet access. Id. ¶ 18. As part of this interaction, the customer in the recited commercial interaction obtains information from two providers. See Appeal Br. 13 (describing collecting information). In this way, the recited step of receiving the provider data is part of a commercial interaction of obtaining services, which falls within the Guidance’s subject matter grouping of certain methods of organizing human activity. Claim 1 further recites, in part, “aggregating the provider data by at least one of the plurality of attributes using the at least one processor.” This step is also part of the commercial interaction. For example, the recited aggregating includes compiling information about location and pricing Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 8 information. Spec. ¶¶ 30–31. Consumers typically collect information when ordering telecommunication services, which is the commercial transaction recited here. See id. Also, the recited aggregating can practically be performed in the human mind or with the assistance of pen and paper. For instance, a person can mentally review prices and aggregate the data on paper. In this way, claim 1 also recites a mental process. Thus, claim 1 recites a concept that falls within the Guidance’s subject-matter grouping of mental processes in addition to the group covering certain methods of organizing human activity. For all the above reasons, claim 1 recites an abstract idea. E. Step 2A, Prong Two of the Guidance Because claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we now proceed to determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. When a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a practical application, the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception. Id. We use the term additional elements for claim features, limitations, or steps that the claim recites beyond the identified judicial exception. See id. at 55 n.24. In claim 1, the additional elements include (1) “providing a user interface for the first provider member and receiving a manual upload of provider data from the first provider member through the user interface;” (2) “automatically receiving provider data from the second provider member;” and (3) “storing the aggregated provider data in one or more databases.” Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 9 1. The User Interface and the Receiving Steps As for additional elements (1) and (2), the receiving function and the corresponding user interface for receiving data add “insignificant extra- solution activity to the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Courts have found that such activity may not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Id. For example, the Guidance explains that insignificant extra-solution activity includes “mere data gathering such as a step of obtaining information about credit card transactions so that the information can be analyzed” to detect fraudulent transactions. Id. at 55 n.31; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (analyzing the step of obtaining transaction data and determining that “such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability”); see also MPEP § 2106.05(g) (instructing examiners that “[a]n example of pre-solution activity is a step of gathering data for use in a claimed process”). In Appellant’s view, rather than using conventional, single-style input methods to receive provider input from multiple provider members, the present application provides added flexibility and technical advantages in that it is more easily adapted to the siloed information of multiple provider members. A plurality of attributes of the disparately collected provider information are then used to aggregate the provider information. For at least these reasons, claims 1 and 16 do not recite an abstract idea and recite patent-eligible subject matter. Appeal Br. 13. According to Appellant, the claims are like those to improved user interfaces that were found patent eligible by the Federal Circuit. Id. at 12–13 (discussing Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 10 We find Appellant’s argument unpersuasive because “[t]he mere combination of data sources . . . does not make the claims patent eligible.” FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, the recited user interface collects the data to be processed, without more. The addition of multiple data sources—i.e., multiple providers—does not change how the data is collected. Rather, the claim merely calls for using multiple sources. See id. When considering the claim as a whole, this does not impose any meaningful limitation on the claimed system. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370; see also MPEP § 2016.05(g) (collecting cases). Thus, the limitations to the receiving steps and the corresponding interface—considered individually and in combination with the other limitations—do not indicate that the claim integrates the abstract idea into a practical application. 2. The Storing Step Claim 1 recites, in part, “storing the aggregated provider data in one or more databases.” The MPEP instructs examiners that courts have recognized that the function of “[s]toring and retrieving information in memory” can be “insignificant extra-solution activity.” MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II)(collecting cases). Here, the recited storing step is not a technical improvement. For instance, the Federal Circuit found that a server used in its ordinary capacity to store images was not an improvement to computer functionality. In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 612–13 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cited in MPEP § 2106.05(f). Similarly, claim 1’s method uses a database in its Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 11 ordinary capacity to store the aggregated data. And the aggregation itself is part of the abstract idea. So the storing step “adds insignificant extra- solution activity to the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Thus, the storing step—considered individually and in combination with the other limitations—does not indicate that the claim integrates the abstract idea into a practical application. 3. The Combination Appellant argues that claim 1 falls in the technical realm of processing orders. Appeal Br. 12. In Appellant’s view, the claims are also rooted in networking technology. Id. at 16–17 (discussing Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). It is true that an improvement to technology or a technical field, for example, indicates that the claim may have integrated the judicial exception into a practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. But that is not the case here. Instead, the claim as a whole brings together information from several providers. Accord Appeal Br. 12–13 (discussing using different provider data). Collecting this information is part of the commercial interaction and the abstract mental process that we identified above. See supra § I.C. Thus, we are unpersuaded that, here, collecting information about services is a technical solution in the context of this claim. 4. Conclusion to Step 2A, Prong Two For the reasons above, we conclude that the recited judicial exception has not been integrated into a practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. Because claim 1 recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 12 exception into a practical application, it is “directed to” the judicial exception. Id. F. Step 2B of the Guidance To determine whether a claim provides an inventive concept, the additional elements are considered—individually and in combination—to determine whether they (1) add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field or (2) simply append well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Also, we reevaluate our conclusions about the additional elements discussed in the previous step. Id. As discussed in Step 2A, Prong Two, claim 1’s additional elements include (1) “providing a user interface for the first provider member and receiving a manual upload of provider data from the first provider member through the user interface;” (2) “automatically receiving provider data from the second provider member;” and (3) “storing the aggregated provider data in one or more databases.” 1. The User Interface and the Receiving Steps The Examiner finds that additional elements (1) and (2) are well- understood, routine, and conventional. Final 10–11. We agree. For example, the Federal Circuit determined that “sending a first set of electronic messages over a network to devices” was well-understood, routine, and conventional activity in the claims at issue in OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015), which was cited Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 13 by the Examiner. See Final 11. Also, the MPEP instructs examiners that courts recognize that receiving data over a network may be well‐understood, routine, and conventional when claimed generically. MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) (collecting cases). Here, the receiving steps are claimed generically. And as discussed above, the mere combination of data sources does not make claim 1 patent eligible. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1097. Apart from receiving data from a combination of sources, the recited user interface adds little to the abstract idea itself. Rather, the user interface and receiving steps recite no more than generic computer functions. Final 10. The Specification supports this conclusion. According to the Specification, “the computer system 1000 typically includes a modem, a network adapter, or any other type of communications device for establishing communications over the wide area network.” Spec. ¶ 52 (emphasis added). As for the user interface, the Specification discloses, one or more functionalities disclosed herein may be generated by the processor 1002 and a user may interact with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) using one or more user-interface devices (e.g., the keyboard 1016, the display unit 1018, and the user devices 106) with some of the data in use directly coming from on line sources and data stores. Id. ¶ 54. A system capable of executing the recited method is shown in Figure 10, which is reproduced below. Id. Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 14 Figure 10, above, shows an example computing system 1000 configured to implement the claimed method. Id. ¶ 16. System 1000 is little more than a generic computer executing software. Id. ¶¶ 49, 54. On this record, we agree with the Examiner that the recited user interface and receiving steps simply append well-understood, routine, and conventional activity previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Final 10–11. 2. The Storing Step The Examiner finds that “storing the aggregated provider data in one or more databases” is well-understood, routine, and conventional. Id. We agree. For instance, the Federal Circuit has recognized that a generic database may not satisfy the inventive-concept requirement. Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Also, the MPEP instructs examiners that courts recognize that storing Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 15 and retrieving information in memory may be well‐understood, routine, and conventional when claimed generically. MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) (citing Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363). Here, the recited “one or more databases” are claimed generically. In claim 1, the databases do no more than store the aggregated data. Indeed, the Specification broadly describes these databases. According to the Specification, In an example implementation, provider data, customer information, design data, consolidated quotes, a plurality of internal and external databases, source databases, and/or cached data on servers are stored as the memory 1008 or other storage systems, such as the disk storage unit 1012 or the DVD/CD- ROM medium 1010, and/or other external storage devices made available and accessible via a network architecture. Spec. ¶ 53. On this record, we agree with the Examiner that “storing the aggregated provider data in one or more databases” simply appends well- understood, routine, and conventional activity previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Final 10–11. 3. The Examiner’s Factual Determinations “Whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual determination.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The USPTO issued a memo on the Berkheimer decision. See Robert W. Bahr, Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 16 Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) (USPTO April 19, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer- 20180419.PDF (“Berkheimer Memo”). Here, Appellant argues that the Examiner does not address any of the findings required by the Berkheimer Memo. Reply Br. 3. We disagree. The Berkheimer Memo instructs examiners that the factual findings can be supported by “[a] citation to one or more of the court decisions discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s).” Berkheimer Memo 4. Here, the Examiner supports the findings by citing OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015), among other decisions. Final 11. The MPEP cites OIP in a discussion about how receiving data over a network and storing information can be well-understood, routine, conventional activity: The courts have recognized the following computer functions as well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. . . . Receiving or transmitting data over a network . . . Storing and retrieving information in memory. MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II). Although the Examiner also cites other cases, the citation to OIP here adequately supports the Examiner’s factual determinations about the recited functions. Final 11. Thus, Appellant’s arguments about the Berkheimer Memo are unpersuasive. See Reply Br. 3. Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 17 4. Appellant’s Arguments about BASCOM and Amdocs According to Appellant, “claims 1 and 16 recite ‘a specific, discrete implementation’ of any potential abstract idea involved in such claims and do not preempt all uses of such an idea.” Appeal Br. 15. Appellant argues that claim 1’s additional limitations are like those in BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Id. at 15–16. In Appellant’s view, “claim 1 requires a particular set of ordered actions to improve the operations of an electronic telecommunications order processing system.” Id. Appellant also makes similar arguments with respect to Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See id. at 16–17. Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. Specifically, the claims in BASCOM involved an inventive distribution of function between a local computer and a server. See 827 F.3d at 1350–51. The Federal Circuit noted that “[t]he inventive concept described and claimed in the ’606 patent is the installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end- users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user.” Id. at 1350. “Because the filtering tool on the ISP server contains each user’s customized filtering mechanism, the filtering tool working in combination with the ISP server can apply a specific user’s filtering mechanism to the websites requested by that user.” Id. at 1345. Unlike BASCOM, claim 1 does not recite an inventive distribution of function, for example. The computers in claim 1 simply execute the abstract idea, and the recited database stores data. By contrast, BASCOM’s filtering tool worked in combination with an ISP server. See BASCOM, 827 F.3d at Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 18 1345. Here, claim 1 is simply an “abstract-idea-based solution implemented with generic technical components in a conventional way.” Id. at 1351. As for Amdocs, Appellant does not sufficiently explain why claim 1 is “more rooted in networking technology.” Appeal Br. 16. Claim 1 from Amdocs recites processing network accounting information. But claim 1 here does not even recite a network. At best, claim 1 implicitly uses some generic network to receive data about telecommunication packages. As discussed above, courts recognize that receiving data over a network may be well‐ understood, routine, and conventional when claimed generically. See, e.g., MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) (collecting cases). Thus, Appellant’s arguments about BASCOM and Amdocs are unpersuasive. See Appeal Br. 15–17 G. Conclusion to Step 2B Considering all the additional elements discussed above, we reevaluate our conclusions about whether the recited additional elements integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Because the additional elements add nothing more than well- understood, routine, and conventional activity, those conclusions stand. Considering both our previous conclusions and the findings about well‐ understood, routine, and conventional activity, we determine that the claimed method does not use the additional elements in a way that indicates that the claim provides an inventive concept. Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 19 H. Summary Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the rejection of representative claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, we sustain the rejection. We also sustain the rejection of claims 2–4, 6–9, and 16–22, which are not argued separately. See supra n.3. I. Claims 23 and 24 Claim 23 recites, The method of claim 9, further comprising: providing a design user interface to facilitate the design of the consolidated quote, wherein the design user interface: displays a geographic map illustrating geographic locations where the first provider and the second provider provide the telecommunications packages; and enables a user to select locations on the geographic map to design the consolidated quote for the selected locations. Claim 24 recites similar limitations as a system with a server configured to perform these functions. The Examiner explains that claims 23 and 24 are directed to ineligible subject matter because (1) the claims are directed to a fundamental economic practice, which is an abstract idea, and (2) do not represent an improvement to technology because they recite no more than an abstract idea performed on a computer. See Final 12. Appellant argues, claims 23 and 24 (and the other dependent claims that have not been specifically addressed in the Office Action) add even more reasons why the claims recite significantly more than any abstract idea. As a nonexclusive example, as discussed further below, the advancements in user interface technology set forth in claims 23 and 24 are clearly not conventional, as the Office Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 20 Action fails to provide any reasonable evidence of such technology in the cited references. Appeal Br. 17. We find Appellant’s argument here unpersuasive because the Examiner explained on page 12 of the Final Rejection that the analysis presented on the preceding pages applies to claims 23 and 24. Also, as for Appellant’s argument about the cited references, we note that “[e]ligibility and novelty are separate inquiries.” Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appellant argues that the Examiner has not provided adequate support under the Berkheimer Memo. Reply Br. 3. For the reasons discussed above, we disagree. See supra § I.F.3. And as discussed above, the Examiner’s factual determinations are adequately supported by citations to the relevant case law. See, e.g., Berkheimer Memo 4. Appellant has not addressed why the Examiner’s citations (Final 11) are insufficient to support the factual determinations. Appellant argues that claims 23 and 24 are like those in Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). But we find this argument unpersuasive for the same reasons discussed above. See supra § I.F.4. In particular, “[t]he mere combination of data sources . . . does not make the claims patent eligible.” FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1097. Thus, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the rejection of claims 23 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 21 II. The Obviousness Rejection over Caballero and Marsh A. The Rejection In the rejection of claim 1 over Caballero and Marsh, the Examiner finds that Caballero receives provider data and aggregates by attribute. Final 13. According to the Examiner, the recited attributes—i.e., infrastructure, location, or pricing information—are non-functional descriptive material. Id. at 14. The Examiner finds that Caballero lacks the receiving steps and cites Marsh for these features. Id. at 19. B. Appellant’s Arguments In Appellant’s view, neither reference aggregates the data by the recited attributes. Appeal Br. 20–21. Appellant argues that the Examiner admits that Caballero lacks the recited provider data, which is part of the aggregation. Id. And Appellant argues that Marsh’s data collected through the DL process is not aggregated as recited in the claim. Id. at 21. C. Analysis Appellant’s arguments are persuasive. Claim 1 recites, in part, “aggregating the provider data by at least one of the plurality of attributes using the at least one processor,” and “the plurality of attributes including infrastructure information, location information, and pricing information.” For example, aggregating by location allows the interface to display telecommunication packages geographically. Spec. ¶ 31. For this limitation, the Examiner cites Caballero. Final 15. Caballero relates to processing telecommunication orders. Caballero ¶ 15. According Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 22 to the Examiner, Caballero aggregates information in an asset table. Final 15. Caballero’s asset table includes information about products installed at a customer’s premises. Caballero ¶ 15. Caballero defines attributes for products and services. Id. ¶ 133. For example, a telephone service’s attribute can be a telephone number. Id. ¶ 156. The Examiner also points out that a Service ID is stored as an attribute. Final 15 (citing Caballero ¶ 157). But the Examiner has not shown how Caballero teaches or suggests aggregating by infrastructure, location, or pricing information, as recited. See Appeal Br. 21. Instead, the Examiner states that the infrastructure, location, and pricing information have “no functional role” and “will not distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art.” Final 14. On this point, we disagree. Infrastructure, location, or pricing information has a role in the aggregation because the claim requires aggregating by that information. In this way, the recited attributes are functionally related to how the aggregation is performed. Thus, the Examiner erred by not giving these attributes patentable weight. The Examiner did not cite Marsh for aggregating by the attributes. Id. at 19. So Marsh cannot cure Caballero’s deficiencies in this regard. Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 and independent claim 16, which also recites the aggregation function as part of a system. We do not sustain the rejection of claims 2–4, 6–9, and 17–20, because they incorporate these limitations by their dependency. Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 23 III. The Obviousness Rejection over Caballero, Marsh, and Carlin Claims 21 and 22 depend from claims 1 and 16. In the rejection of claims 21 and 22, the Examiner adds Carlin to the combination of Caballero and Marsh. But the Examiner does not rely on Carlin to teach or suggest the limitations missing from the Caballero-Marsh combination. So, for the reasons discussed above, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 21 and 22. See supra § II.C. CONCLUSION Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–4, 6–9, and 16–24 is affirmed. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–4, 6–9, 16–24 101 Eligibility 1–4, 6–9, 16–24 1–4, 6–9, 16–20 103 Caballero, Marsh 1–4, 6–9, 16–20 21, 22 103 Caballero, Marsh, Carlin 21, 22 Overall Outcome 1–4, 6–9, 16–24 Appeal 2019-000932 Application 14/120,283 24 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation