LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 2, 2020

14307404 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/307,404 06/17/2014 Lewis Robert Varney 0447-US-U1-I4 4229
21398 7590 04/02/2020
Level 3 Communications, LLC
Attn: Patent Docketing
1025 Eldorado Blvd.
Broomfield, CO 80021
EXAMINER
CELANI, NICHOLAS P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2449
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patent.docketing@level3.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte LEWIS ROBERT VARNEY, LAURENCE R. LIPSTONE,
WILLIAM CROWDER, ANDREW SWART, and
CHRISTOPHER NEWTON
Appeal 2018-003701
Application 14/307,404
Technology Center 2400
Before IRVIN E. BRANCH, MICHAEL M. BARRY, and
SCOTT RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judges.
BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 5, 6, 8, 14–16, 18, 20–22, and 24–32,

1 We refer to the Specification, filed June 17, 2014 (“Spec.”); Final Office
Action, mailed July 27, 2017 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed November
1, 2017 (“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s Answer, mailed December 21, 2017
(“Ans.”); and Reply Brief, filed February 21, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
2 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Level 3
Communications, LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
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which are all of the pending claims. See Final Act. 1. A hearing was held
on January 27, 2020, and a transcript has been made of record. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to geographic location determination in a
content delivery framework. Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed
limitations emphasized in italics, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer-implemented method in a content delivery
network (CDN), wherein said CDN delivers resources on behalf
of subscribers to the CDN, the method operable on one or more
devices comprising hardware including memory and at least one
processor, the method comprising:
(A) receiving a request at a delivery service in said CDN,
said request being by or on behalf of a requesting client for a
resource associated with a subscriber to the CDN;
(B) said delivery service determining a particular
classification of an Internet Protocol (IP) address associated with
said requesting client, said determining using a database at said
delivery service that maps one or more ranges of IP addresses to
corresponding one or more discrete classifications, wherein said
one or more ranges of IP addresses correspond to various
geographic locations, and wherein, when the IP address
associated with the request is in a particular range of said one or
more ranges of IP addresses, then said particular classification is
the discrete classification corresponding to the particular range
in the database, wherein said one or more discrete classifications
are selected from the group comprising: accept, reject, modify,
and vary; and
then (C) said delivery service processing said request
based on said particular classification of said IP address
associated with said requesting client.
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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Kloninger
Pieper
Stolorz
Gupta
US 2004/0073596 A1
US 2007 /0250468 Al
US 2008/0147866 A1
US 2009/0164269 A1
Apr. 15, 2004
Oct. 25, 2007
June 19, 2008
June 25, 2009
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Appellant states the following:
Appeals have been filed or are being filed in the following
Applications that share a priority Application (Provisional
Application 61/737,072, filed December 13, 2012) with the
present Application: 13/715,590; 13/715,747; 13/802,093;
13/802, 143; 13/802,335; 14/088,356; 14/088,358; 14/088,367;
14/088,542; 14/105,915; 14/303,389; 14/307,380; 14/307,423;
14/307,411; and 14/578,402.
Appeal Br. 2.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 5, 6, 8, 14–16, 18, 20–22, and 24–32 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non–statutory
subject matter. Final Act. 3.
Claims 1, 5, 6, 8, 14–16, 18, 20–22, and 24–26 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Pieper and
Kloninger. Final Act. 4–9.
Claims 27–32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Pieper, Kloninger, and Gupta. Final
Act. 9–11.
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Claims 1, 5–6, 8, 14–16, 18, 20–22, and 24–26 stand rejected
alternatively under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination
of Pieper, Kloninger, and Stolorz. Final Act. 11.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments. We have considered in this Decision only those arguments
Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any other arguments Appellant
could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs are deemed to be
waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
To the extent consistent with our analysis herein, we adopt as our own
the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in (1) the action from
which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 3–11) and (2) the Examiner’s Answer
in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (Ans. 3–20) and concur with the
conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following for
emphasis.
35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014) (citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217−18 (citing Mayo Collaborative
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Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75−77 (2012)). In accordance
with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed
to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are
drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party
to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent-ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219−20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594−95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent-eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden,
56 U.S. 252, 267−68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson,
409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
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of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace
that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
PTO Guidance
The PTO provides guidance for 35 U.S.C. § 101. USPTO’s 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the
claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, and mental
processes); and
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(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP) § 2106.05(a)−(c), (e)−(h) (9th ed. 2018)).
84 Fed. Reg. at 52−55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and
(2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then
conclude the claim is directed to a judicial exception (id. at 54) and look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
Id. at 56.
Step 1: Does Claim 1 Fall within a Statutory Category?
There is no dispute that the claimed subject matter falls within a
35 U.S.C. § 101 category of patentable subject matter. See Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 53−54 (“Step 1”).
Step 2A(1):3 Does Claim 1 Recite Any Judicial Exceptions?
The Examiner finds that claim 1 is directed to “tailoring content based
on location,” an abstract idea, and therefore a judicial exception. Final Act.

3 The Guidance separates the enumerated issues (1) to (4) (see supra 6–7)
into the following Steps 2A(1), 2A(2), and 2B:
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3; see Ans. 5 (“The claims are directed to an abstract idea of filtering
content.”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d
1332, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (claims directed to “collecting, displaying, and
manipulating data” are abstract; see also BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs.,
Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An
abstract idea on ‘an Internet computer network’ or on a generic computer is
still an abstract idea”). We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an
abstract idea. Specifically, “tailoring content based on location” is a
“[m]ental process[]” that entails steps of “observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion,” which, under the Guidance is a judicially excepted abstract idea.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The focus of the asserted claims . . .
is on collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of
the collection and analysis”); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839

[T]he revised procedure . . . focuses on two aspects [of whether
a claim is “directed to” a judicial exception under the first step
of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2A)]: (1) [w]hether the
claim recites a judicial exception; and (2) whether a recited
judicial exception is integrated into a practical application.
[W]hen a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate
the exception into a practical application, . . . further analysis
pursuant to the second step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO
Step 2B) . . . is needed . . . in accordance with existing USPTO
guidance as modified in April 2018.[footnote omitted]
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (referencing, via the omitted footnote,
“USPTO Memorandum of April 19, 2018, ‘Changes in Examination
Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter
Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)’ (Apr. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-
20180419.PDF [ . . . ‛USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum’].”).
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F.3d 1089, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining as abstract the claims which
“here, are directed to collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse
and notifying a user when misuse is detected”). The following limitations of
claim 1 encompass the mental process:
(A) receiving a request . . . by or on behalf of a requesting
client for a resource associated with a subscriber . . .;
(B) determining a particular classification of an Internet
Protocol (IP) address associated with said requesting client, said
determining using a database at said delivery service that maps
one or more ranges of IP addresses to corresponding one or more
discrete classifications, wherein said one or more ranges of IP
addresses correspond to various geographic locations, and
wherein, when the IP address associated with the request is in a
particular range of said one or more ranges of IP addresses, then
said particular classification is the discrete classification
corresponding to the particular range in the database, wherein
said one or more discrete classifications are selected from the
group comprising: accept, reject, modify, and vary; and
then (C) processing said request based on said particular
classification of said IP address associated with said requesting
client.
Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, these elements recite a mental
process because a human can observe the request of limitation (A), if, for
example, the request is written on a piece of paper; use the recited database
of limitation (B) (which may be a simple index card box or merely a series
of printed spreadsheets) to make the “determining” of element (B) (i.e., an
evaluation); then perform the “processing” of step (C) by merely thinking
about the result or writing it on a piece of paper (i.e., “displaying” the
result).
We are not persuaded of error by Appellant’s argument that the
Examiner has oversimplified the claim and improperly described the claims
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at a high level of abstraction. Reply Br. 2–5, 7 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and Enfish,
LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Our
detailed analysis of the limitations under the current Guidance from above
avoid any shortcomings in the Examiner’s analysis.
For the foregoing reasons, claim 1 recites a judicial exception.
Step 2A(2): Are the Recited Judicial Exceptions
Integrated Into a Practical Application?
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that claim 1 does not
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–(h); see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53
(describing a “practical application” as a “meaningful limit on the [recited
judicial exceptions], such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the [exceptions]”); id. at 55 (setting out “exemplary
considerations . . . indicative [of] a practical application”). We have
considered the additional elements both individually and as an ordered
combination and determine that “the computer components . . . ‘ad[d]
nothing . . . that is not already present when the steps are considered
separately’” and simply recite implementing a mental process on a generic
computer. Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79).
Claim 1 recites additional elements of a “computer-implemented
method in a content delivery network (CDN)” that “delivers resources on
behalf of subscribers to the CDN, the method operable on one or more
devices comprising hardware including memory and at least one processor,”
and a “delivery service in said CDN.” These elements do not: (1) improve
the functioning of a computer or other technology; (2) are not applied with
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any particular machine (except for a generic computer); (3) do not effect a
transformation of a particular article to a different state; and (4) are not
applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the
claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Instead, these limitations
merely serve to narrow the recited abstract idea using generic computing
devices, which cannot impart patent-eligibility. See Spec. ¶ 1227
(describing the CDN as being implemented on “any general purpose or
special purpose computer device including one or more processors, memory,
etc.”); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716–17 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (determining that a general-purpose processor that merely executes
the judicial exception is not a particular machine).
Appellant’s arguments focus on limitations that we determine are part
of the judicial exception as discussed above; thus, these limitations are not
“additional elements” that can impart patent eligibility to the claim. See,
e.g., Appeal Br. 12–13; see also Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.24
(“USPTO guidance uses the term ‘additional elements’ to refer to claim
features, limitations, and/or steps that are recited in the claim beyond the
identified judicial exception.”).
Even assuming these limitations could be considered additional
elements, we are not persuaded the Examiner’s rejection is in error. For
instance, Appellant argues, “Enfish compels the conclusion that the claims,
viewed in light of the specification, are not directed to an abstract idea, and
thus cover patentable subject matter.” Appeal Br. 11; see id. at 10–11.
Appellant contends that, “like those in Enfish, [the claims] are directed on
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their face to an improvement to computer functionality itself.” Id. at 11.
Appellant argues, with reference to limitations (B) and (C), as follows:
Appellant’s claimed invention avoids the problems with prior
geographic databases. In particular, as noted in the application,
“[g]eographic databases are typically large (one current IPv4
database in standard form is more than 1 GB, uncompressed,
with about 9 million address ranges).” Specification ¶0634.
Because the claimed database has discrete classifications already
stored therein, the lookup process is much faster than a search of
a conventional geographic database. Spec. ¶0638. In addition,
the claimed implementation advantageously saves space (“This
results in a much smaller database . . . .” ¶ 0641; also ¶¶ 642,
645).
Appeal Br. 11.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Rather, we agree
with the Examiner’s analysis of the inapplicability of Enfish to the claims at
issue here. In particular, we agree with the Examiner that, unlike the claims
in Enfish, which resulted in a data structure that caused a computer to
perform its read operation more quickly, no such improvement to a
computer exists in the current claims. Ans. 8–14. The Examiner
determines, and we agree, that “the claims do not require a ‘better’ or ‘more
relevant’ response be returned at all” but “simply require a discrimination
(‘accept, reject, modify, or vary’) based upon location.” Id. at 9.
We also are unpersuaded of error by Appellant’s argument that “[t]he
presently claimed invention provides a solution to problems in computer
networks (specifically, in content delivery networks) . . . [that] are unique to
these kind of computer networks and did not and do not and cannot exist
outside of these networks.” Appeal Br. 8. Appellant contends that “[t]he
invention operates in a computer network (a content delivery network), and
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solves a problem that does not exist outside of computer networks,” and
“[t]he claimed invention recites the use of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses
and a mapping from one or more ranges of IP address to corresponding
discrete classifications.” Id. at 9 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com
et al., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); see also Reply Br. 11–12.
We disagree. The patent-eligible claim at issue in DDR Holdings
recited limitations for providing a composite web page based on a link
activation occurring at a remote computer, thereby addressing “a challenge
particular to the Internet.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257–58 (“We
caution, however, that not all claims purporting to address Internet-centric
challenges are eligible for patent.”). Here, the claims are operative in a
generic computer and, although the data processed is network-specific, this
does not make the claims “a challenge particular to the internet.” Id.
Nor are we persuaded of error because “[t]he query time and the space
requirements of the claimed approach make its use feasible.” Reply Br. 5.
Performance by computer of operations that previously were performed
manually or mentally, albeit less efficiently, does not convert a known
abstract idea into eligible subject matter. See Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun
Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1277–78 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“[R]elying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more
accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.”).
Appellant argues further that “[a]s in Finjan, the claimed database (or
file) at the delivery service enables a content delivery network to do things it
could not do before. Reply Br. 10. Appellant also argues that “[h]ere, as in
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Bascom, the discrete implementation of the content delivery provides a
technical improvement for content delivery in a CDN.” Id. at 11.
We find these arguments unpersuasive of error because Appellant
does not persuasively explain precisely what is improved with respect to the
functioning of the computer itself, rather than merely an allegedly new use
for generic computer and network infrastructure technology.
In view of the foregoing, we conclude claim 1 is directed to the
recited judicial exception—not to a practical application.
Step 2B: Does Claim 1 Recite Anything That Is
Beyond the Recited Abstract Ideas and Not Well-Understood, Routine,
Conventional (“WURC”)?
Because we find that the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we
next consider whether the claims include additional limitations, such that the
claims amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. We agree with
the Examiner that “[t]he claims do not include additional elements that are
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception
because they perform conventional data transfer over a network connection
and use conventional relationships to apply the abstract idea to a
conventional field of use.” Final Act. 3.
As we explained above, the additional limitations, individually and as
an ordered combination, merely narrow the recited abstract ideas using
generic computer components. See Spec. ¶ 1227. Accordingly, we find that
there are no additional limitations that cause the claims to amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea.
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35 U.S.C. § 103
Appellant argues the obviousness rejection of claims 1, 16, and 22
over the combination of Pieper and Kloninger collectively. Appeal Br. 12–
15. Appellant’s arguments amount to stating that neither Piper nor
Kloninger teaches or suggests various claim limitations but include limited
or no explanation, with one exception: Appellant argues that “Pieper does
not teach or suggest the claimed ‘database at said delivery service that maps
one or more ranges of IP addresses to corresponding one or more discrete
classifications . . .’” because “any classification of domains [by Pieper] is
done by the domain classifiers, remote and distinct from any delivery service
that will process a request.”). See, id. at 14. Appellant argues the alternative
rejection of these claims over the combination of Pieper, Kloninger, and
Stolorz on the same bases, adding that “Stolarz does not overcome those
noted deficiencies.” Id. at 15.
Appellant’s terse arguments do not persuade us of error, particularly
in view of the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments, which we
adopt. See Ans. 14–19.4 We also adopt the Examiner’s response (id. at 19–
20) to Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 27, 29, and 31 (Appeal
Br. 15–17). Appellant does not otherwise argue the obviousness rejections.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of
claims 1, 5, 6, 8, 14–16, 18, 20–22, and 24–32.

4 Notably, Appellant’s Reply Brief does not address the Examiner’s response
to Appellant’s arguments against the obviousness rejections.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In sum, we affirm the Examiner’s rejections as follows:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Bas
is
Affirmed Reversed
1, 5, 6, 8,
14–16, 18,
20–22, 24–
32
101 Eligibility 1, 5, 6, 8, 14–
16, 18, 20–
22, 24–32

1, 5, 6, 8,
14–16, 18,
20–22, 24–
26
103 Pieper, Kloninger 1, 5, 6, 8, 14–
16, 18, 20–
22, 24–26

27–32 103 Pieper,
Kloninger, Gupta
27–32
1, 5, 6, 8,
14–16, 18,
20–22, 24–
32
103 Pieper,
Kloninger,
Stolorz
1, 5, 6, 8, 14–
16, 18, 20–
22, 24–32

Overall
Outcome:
1, 5, 6, 8, 14–
16, 18, 20–
22, 24–32

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED