LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLCDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardApr 2, 202014307404 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/307,404 06/17/2014 Lewis Robert Varney 0447-US-U1-I4 4229 21398 7590 04/02/2020 Level 3 Communications, LLC Attn: Patent Docketing 1025 Eldorado Blvd. Broomfield, CO 80021 EXAMINER CELANI, NICHOLAS P ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2449 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/02/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): patent.docketing@level3.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte LEWIS ROBERT VARNEY, LAURENCE R. LIPSTONE, WILLIAM CROWDER, ANDREW SWART, and CHRISTOPHER NEWTON Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 Technology Center 2400 Before IRVIN E. BRANCH, MICHAEL M. BARRY, and SCOTT RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judges. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 5, 6, 8, 14–16, 18, 20–22, and 24–32, 1 We refer to the Specification, filed June 17, 2014 (“Spec.”); Final Office Action, mailed July 27, 2017 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed November 1, 2017 (“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s Answer, mailed December 21, 2017 (“Ans.”); and Reply Brief, filed February 21, 2018 (“Reply Br.”). 2 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Level 3 Communications, LLC. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 2 which are all of the pending claims. See Final Act. 1. A hearing was held on January 27, 2020, and a transcript has been made of record. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to geographic location determination in a content delivery framework. Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized in italics, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A computer-implemented method in a content delivery network (CDN), wherein said CDN delivers resources on behalf of subscribers to the CDN, the method operable on one or more devices comprising hardware including memory and at least one processor, the method comprising: (A) receiving a request at a delivery service in said CDN, said request being by or on behalf of a requesting client for a resource associated with a subscriber to the CDN; (B) said delivery service determining a particular classification of an Internet Protocol (IP) address associated with said requesting client, said determining using a database at said delivery service that maps one or more ranges of IP addresses to corresponding one or more discrete classifications, wherein said one or more ranges of IP addresses correspond to various geographic locations, and wherein, when the IP address associated with the request is in a particular range of said one or more ranges of IP addresses, then said particular classification is the discrete classification corresponding to the particular range in the database, wherein said one or more discrete classifications are selected from the group comprising: accept, reject, modify, and vary; and then (C) said delivery service processing said request based on said particular classification of said IP address associated with said requesting client. Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 3 REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Kloninger Pieper Stolorz Gupta US 2004/0073596 A1 US 2007 /0250468 Al US 2008/0147866 A1 US 2009/0164269 A1 Apr. 15, 2004 Oct. 25, 2007 June 19, 2008 June 25, 2009 RELATED PROCEEDINGS Appellant states the following: Appeals have been filed or are being filed in the following Applications that share a priority Application (Provisional Application 61/737,072, filed December 13, 2012) with the present Application: 13/715,590; 13/715,747; 13/802,093; 13/802, 143; 13/802,335; 14/088,356; 14/088,358; 14/088,367; 14/088,542; 14/105,915; 14/303,389; 14/307,380; 14/307,423; 14/307,411; and 14/578,402. Appeal Br. 2. REJECTIONS Claims 1, 5, 6, 8, 14–16, 18, 20–22, and 24–32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non–statutory subject matter. Final Act. 3. Claims 1, 5, 6, 8, 14–16, 18, 20–22, and 24–26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Pieper and Kloninger. Final Act. 4–9. Claims 27–32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Pieper, Kloninger, and Gupta. Final Act. 9–11. Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 4 Claims 1, 5–6, 8, 14–16, 18, 20–22, and 24–26 stand rejected alternatively under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Pieper, Kloninger, and Stolorz. Final Act. 11. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments. We have considered in this Decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any other arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). To the extent consistent with our analysis herein, we adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in (1) the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 3–11) and (2) the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (Ans. 3–20) and concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following for emphasis. 35 U.S.C. § 101 An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217−18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 5 Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75−77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent-ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219−20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594−95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent-eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267−68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 6 of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. PTO Guidance The PTO provides guidance for 35 U.S.C. § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, and mental processes); and Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 7 (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2106.05(a)−(c), (e)−(h) (9th ed. 2018)). 84 Fed. Reg. at 52−55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then conclude the claim is directed to a judicial exception (id. at 54) and look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Id. at 56. Step 1: Does Claim 1 Fall within a Statutory Category? There is no dispute that the claimed subject matter falls within a 35 U.S.C. § 101 category of patentable subject matter. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53−54 (“Step 1”). Step 2A(1):3 Does Claim 1 Recite Any Judicial Exceptions? The Examiner finds that claim 1 is directed to “tailoring content based on location,” an abstract idea, and therefore a judicial exception. Final Act. 3 The Guidance separates the enumerated issues (1) to (4) (see supra 6–7) into the following Steps 2A(1), 2A(2), and 2B: Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 8 3; see Ans. 5 (“The claims are directed to an abstract idea of filtering content.”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (claims directed to “collecting, displaying, and manipulating data” are abstract; see also BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An abstract idea on ‘an Internet computer network’ or on a generic computer is still an abstract idea”). We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an abstract idea. Specifically, “tailoring content based on location” is a “[m]ental process[]” that entails steps of “observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion,” which, under the Guidance is a judicially excepted abstract idea. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The focus of the asserted claims . . . is on collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis”); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 [T]he revised procedure . . . focuses on two aspects [of whether a claim is “directed to” a judicial exception under the first step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2A)]: (1) [w]hether the claim recites a judicial exception; and (2) whether a recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application. [W]hen a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a practical application, . . . further analysis pursuant to the second step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2B) . . . is needed . . . in accordance with existing USPTO guidance as modified in April 2018.[footnote omitted] Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (referencing, via the omitted footnote, “USPTO Memorandum of April 19, 2018, ‘Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)’ (Apr. 19, 2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer- 20180419.PDF [ . . . ‛USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum’].”). Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 9 F.3d 1089, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining as abstract the claims which “here, are directed to collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse and notifying a user when misuse is detected”). The following limitations of claim 1 encompass the mental process: (A) receiving a request . . . by or on behalf of a requesting client for a resource associated with a subscriber . . .; (B) determining a particular classification of an Internet Protocol (IP) address associated with said requesting client, said determining using a database at said delivery service that maps one or more ranges of IP addresses to corresponding one or more discrete classifications, wherein said one or more ranges of IP addresses correspond to various geographic locations, and wherein, when the IP address associated with the request is in a particular range of said one or more ranges of IP addresses, then said particular classification is the discrete classification corresponding to the particular range in the database, wherein said one or more discrete classifications are selected from the group comprising: accept, reject, modify, and vary; and then (C) processing said request based on said particular classification of said IP address associated with said requesting client. Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, these elements recite a mental process because a human can observe the request of limitation (A), if, for example, the request is written on a piece of paper; use the recited database of limitation (B) (which may be a simple index card box or merely a series of printed spreadsheets) to make the “determining” of element (B) (i.e., an evaluation); then perform the “processing” of step (C) by merely thinking about the result or writing it on a piece of paper (i.e., “displaying” the result). We are not persuaded of error by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner has oversimplified the claim and improperly described the claims Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 10 at a high level of abstraction. Reply Br. 2–5, 7 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Our detailed analysis of the limitations under the current Guidance from above avoid any shortcomings in the Examiner’s analysis. For the foregoing reasons, claim 1 recites a judicial exception. Step 2A(2): Are the Recited Judicial Exceptions Integrated Into a Practical Application? For the reasons that follow, we conclude that claim 1 does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–(h); see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53 (describing a “practical application” as a “meaningful limit on the [recited judicial exceptions], such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [exceptions]”); id. at 55 (setting out “exemplary considerations . . . indicative [of] a practical application”). We have considered the additional elements both individually and as an ordered combination and determine that “the computer components . . . ‘ad[d] nothing . . . that is not already present when the steps are considered separately’” and simply recite implementing a mental process on a generic computer. Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79). Claim 1 recites additional elements of a “computer-implemented method in a content delivery network (CDN)” that “delivers resources on behalf of subscribers to the CDN, the method operable on one or more devices comprising hardware including memory and at least one processor,” and a “delivery service in said CDN.” These elements do not: (1) improve the functioning of a computer or other technology; (2) are not applied with Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 11 any particular machine (except for a generic computer); (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular article to a different state; and (4) are not applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Instead, these limitations merely serve to narrow the recited abstract idea using generic computing devices, which cannot impart patent-eligibility. See Spec. ¶ 1227 (describing the CDN as being implemented on “any general purpose or special purpose computer device including one or more processors, memory, etc.”); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716–17 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (determining that a general-purpose processor that merely executes the judicial exception is not a particular machine). Appellant’s arguments focus on limitations that we determine are part of the judicial exception as discussed above; thus, these limitations are not “additional elements” that can impart patent eligibility to the claim. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 12–13; see also Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.24 (“USPTO guidance uses the term ‘additional elements’ to refer to claim features, limitations, and/or steps that are recited in the claim beyond the identified judicial exception.”). Even assuming these limitations could be considered additional elements, we are not persuaded the Examiner’s rejection is in error. For instance, Appellant argues, “Enfish compels the conclusion that the claims, viewed in light of the specification, are not directed to an abstract idea, and thus cover patentable subject matter.” Appeal Br. 11; see id. at 10–11. Appellant contends that, “like those in Enfish, [the claims] are directed on Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 12 their face to an improvement to computer functionality itself.” Id. at 11. Appellant argues, with reference to limitations (B) and (C), as follows: Appellant’s claimed invention avoids the problems with prior geographic databases. In particular, as noted in the application, “[g]eographic databases are typically large (one current IPv4 database in standard form is more than 1 GB, uncompressed, with about 9 million address ranges).” Specification ¶0634. Because the claimed database has discrete classifications already stored therein, the lookup process is much faster than a search of a conventional geographic database. Spec. ¶0638. In addition, the claimed implementation advantageously saves space (“This results in a much smaller database . . . .” ¶ 0641; also ¶¶ 642, 645). Appeal Br. 11. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Rather, we agree with the Examiner’s analysis of the inapplicability of Enfish to the claims at issue here. In particular, we agree with the Examiner that, unlike the claims in Enfish, which resulted in a data structure that caused a computer to perform its read operation more quickly, no such improvement to a computer exists in the current claims. Ans. 8–14. The Examiner determines, and we agree, that “the claims do not require a ‘better’ or ‘more relevant’ response be returned at all” but “simply require a discrimination (‘accept, reject, modify, or vary’) based upon location.” Id. at 9. We also are unpersuaded of error by Appellant’s argument that “[t]he presently claimed invention provides a solution to problems in computer networks (specifically, in content delivery networks) . . . [that] are unique to these kind of computer networks and did not and do not and cannot exist outside of these networks.” Appeal Br. 8. Appellant contends that “[t]he invention operates in a computer network (a content delivery network), and Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 13 solves a problem that does not exist outside of computer networks,” and “[t]he claimed invention recites the use of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and a mapping from one or more ranges of IP address to corresponding discrete classifications.” Id. at 9 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com et al., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); see also Reply Br. 11–12. We disagree. The patent-eligible claim at issue in DDR Holdings recited limitations for providing a composite web page based on a link activation occurring at a remote computer, thereby addressing “a challenge particular to the Internet.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257–58 (“We caution, however, that not all claims purporting to address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.”). Here, the claims are operative in a generic computer and, although the data processed is network-specific, this does not make the claims “a challenge particular to the internet.” Id. Nor are we persuaded of error because “[t]he query time and the space requirements of the claimed approach make its use feasible.” Reply Br. 5. Performance by computer of operations that previously were performed manually or mentally, albeit less efficiently, does not convert a known abstract idea into eligible subject matter. See Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1277–78 (Fed. Cir. 2012); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[R]elying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.”). Appellant argues further that “[a]s in Finjan, the claimed database (or file) at the delivery service enables a content delivery network to do things it could not do before. Reply Br. 10. Appellant also argues that “[h]ere, as in Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 14 Bascom, the discrete implementation of the content delivery provides a technical improvement for content delivery in a CDN.” Id. at 11. We find these arguments unpersuasive of error because Appellant does not persuasively explain precisely what is improved with respect to the functioning of the computer itself, rather than merely an allegedly new use for generic computer and network infrastructure technology. In view of the foregoing, we conclude claim 1 is directed to the recited judicial exception—not to a practical application. Step 2B: Does Claim 1 Recite Anything That Is Beyond the Recited Abstract Ideas and Not Well-Understood, Routine, Conventional (“WURC”)? Because we find that the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we next consider whether the claims include additional limitations, such that the claims amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. We agree with the Examiner that “[t]he claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because they perform conventional data transfer over a network connection and use conventional relationships to apply the abstract idea to a conventional field of use.” Final Act. 3. As we explained above, the additional limitations, individually and as an ordered combination, merely narrow the recited abstract ideas using generic computer components. See Spec. ¶ 1227. Accordingly, we find that there are no additional limitations that cause the claims to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 15 35 U.S.C. § 103 Appellant argues the obviousness rejection of claims 1, 16, and 22 over the combination of Pieper and Kloninger collectively. Appeal Br. 12– 15. Appellant’s arguments amount to stating that neither Piper nor Kloninger teaches or suggests various claim limitations but include limited or no explanation, with one exception: Appellant argues that “Pieper does not teach or suggest the claimed ‘database at said delivery service that maps one or more ranges of IP addresses to corresponding one or more discrete classifications . . .’” because “any classification of domains [by Pieper] is done by the domain classifiers, remote and distinct from any delivery service that will process a request.”). See, id. at 14. Appellant argues the alternative rejection of these claims over the combination of Pieper, Kloninger, and Stolorz on the same bases, adding that “Stolarz does not overcome those noted deficiencies.” Id. at 15. Appellant’s terse arguments do not persuade us of error, particularly in view of the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments, which we adopt. See Ans. 14–19.4 We also adopt the Examiner’s response (id. at 19– 20) to Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 27, 29, and 31 (Appeal Br. 15–17). Appellant does not otherwise argue the obviousness rejections. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 1, 5, 6, 8, 14–16, 18, 20–22, and 24–32. 4 Notably, Appellant’s Reply Brief does not address the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments against the obviousness rejections. Appeal 2018-003701 Application 14/307,404 16 DECISION SUMMARY In sum, we affirm the Examiner’s rejections as follows: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Bas is Affirmed Reversed 1, 5, 6, 8, 14–16, 18, 20–22, 24– 32 101 Eligibility 1, 5, 6, 8, 14– 16, 18, 20– 22, 24–32 1, 5, 6, 8, 14–16, 18, 20–22, 24– 26 103 Pieper, Kloninger 1, 5, 6, 8, 14– 16, 18, 20– 22, 24–26 27–32 103 Pieper, Kloninger, Gupta 27–32 1, 5, 6, 8, 14–16, 18, 20–22, 24– 32 103 Pieper, Kloninger, Stolorz 1, 5, 6, 8, 14– 16, 18, 20– 22, 24–32 Overall Outcome: 1, 5, 6, 8, 14– 16, 18, 20– 22, 24–32 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation