Leonard DreyDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardFeb 2, 20222020006529 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 2, 2022) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/965,855 12/10/2015 Leonard L. Drey LLDPT06CIP 8261 49691 7590 02/02/2022 IP Strategies P.O. Box 6446 Asheville, NC 28816 EXAMINER SCHALLHORN, TYLER J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2176 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/02/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): thomas.champagne@ipstrategiespc.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte LEONARD L. DREY ____________ Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before THU A. DANG, ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, and JAMES HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judges. MANTIS MERCADER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Non-Final rejection of at least twice rejected claims 92-125 and 127-146 which constitute all the pending claims in application no. 14/965,855 (“the ’855 application”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Leonard L. Drey as the real party in interest (App. Br. 2). Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 2 THE INVENTION Appellant’s claimed invention is directed to content presentation including creating a document file including content presented to a user in sequential units on a display device. Abstract. A current version of the content is presented in which fewer than all units are viewable. Id. After a user performs a predetermined action, a subsequent version of the content is presented. Id. Unviewable units of content in the current version are viewable in a subsequent version. Id. Alternatively, a delimiter is inserted in the document file and after passing the delimiter while viewing content, the subsequent version is presented. Id. Independent claim 92, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal: 92. A method of governing content presentation, comprising: creating, by an author, a document file, wherein the document file is a computer readable file that includes content, wherein the content is divided into fixed strings, wherein each said string constitutes a single unit of the content, and wherein the units of content are arranged in sequence; presenting a first version of the plurality of versions of the content to a user, one said unit at a time in sequence, via an electronic display device, wherein the unit of content that is presented to the user at any time is a current unit of content corresponding to a current string of content, wherein the first version of the content includes a first number of units of content, of which all of the first number of the units of the content are viewable by the user when presented in sequence; stopping presentation of content after at least one complete said unit of content has been presented; performing, by the user, one of a first predetermined action and a second predetermined action, after presentation of the content has been stopped; Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 3 in response to each performance of the first predetermined action, presenting a subsequent sequential unit of the content to the user in place of the current unit of the content such that the subsequent unit becomes the current unit; in response to performance of the second predetermined action, presenting a second version of the content in place of the first version of the content, wherein the second version of the content has a second number of units of content, of which all of the second number of the units of the content are viewable by the user when presented in sequence, wherein the second version of the content is presented one said unit at a time; wherein the second number of the units of content include at least one of recurring units and added units, wherein the recurring units are identical to corresponding ones of the first number of the units of the content, and wherein the added units are at least one of different from any of the first number of the units of the content, and duplicates of the first number of the units of the content. Appeal Br. 103-104 (Claims Appendix). REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Greene US 2002/0198699 Al Dec. 26, 2002 Stoner US 2012/0200573 Al Aug. 9, 2012 Lorch US 2013/0185198 Al July 18, 2013 Newell US 2013/0209981 Al Aug. 15, 2013 Hunter US 2014/0259043 Al Sept. 11, 2014 Goodman, “The Complete HyperCard Handbook,” Second Edition. The Unicode Standard, Version 6.1, Chapter 2: General Structure. (pp 1−875)(1988). . Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 4 THE REJECTIONS The Examiner made the following rejections: 1. Claim 96 stands provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 47 and 91 of copending application no. 14/524,964 (“the ’964 application”). Non- Final Act. 5. 2. Claims 92-125 and 127-146 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite. 3. Claims 92-111 and 139-146 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Stoner in view of Lorch, further in view of Goodman. 4. Claims 112-120, 122-125, 127, 128, and 132-137 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Stoner in view of Lorch, Goodman, and further in view of Newell. 5. Claim 121 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Stoner in view of Lorch, Goodman, Newell, and further in view of Hunter. 6. Claims 129-131 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Stoner in view of Lorch, Goodman, Newell, and further in view of Greene. ANALYSIS We adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Answer and Non-Final Office Action and we add the following primarily for emphasis. We note that if Appellant failed to present arguments on a particular rejection, we will not unilaterally review those uncontested aspects of the rejection. See Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 5 Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential); Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (the Board may treat arguments Appellant failed to make for a given ground of rejection as waived). 1. Double Patenting Rejection of claim 96 The Examiner provisionally rejected claim 96 on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 47 and 91 of the ’964 application for the reason that, although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the claims recite essentially the same invention, using different wording (“redirecting” in response to the user having reached a certain “string number” versus “presenting a second version” in response to a user’s viewing a certain number of units of content). Non-Final Act. 5. Appellant argues that claim 47 of the ’964 application is a method of governing presentation to a user including the action of determining a string condition of the current string of content in the sequence, based on a string number of the current string. Appeal Br. 14. In the method of claim 47 of the ’964 application, in response to performance of the second predetermined action, a redirected sequential unit of the content is presented to the user in place of the current unit of the content if the string condition has a redirect value, and presentation of the content unit of the content to the user is continued if the string condition does not have a redirect value. Id. The redirected unit of the content is a unit of content that is any unit of Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 6 content in the document file designated by the redirect value regardless of the sequence. Id. Appellant argues that, in contrast, claim 96, which depends from claim 92, recites a method of governing content presentation. Id. According to the method of claim 92, a first version of a plurality of versions of content is presented to a user in a sequence of units. Id. In response to performance of a first predetermined action, a subsequent sequential unit of the content is presented to the user. Id. In response to performance of a second predetermined action, a second version of the content is presented in place of the first version of the content. Id. Thus, instead of redirecting presentation of the content from a current unit to a different unit in the same version as recited in claim 47 of the ’964 application, independent claim 92 and its dependent claim 96 of the current application recite replacing the first version of the content with a second version of the content. Id. The Examiner finds that the Specification of the ’964 application as it relates to claim 47, describes that a document may have multiple versions in the form of “interleaves” (or “units of content”), such that the difference between presenting a first version and a second version depends on which interleaves, if any, are displayed. Ans. 3 (citing Spec. 10-12).2 The Examiner finds that the second version may be accessed by performing a predetermined action (i.e., pressing a key) after a particular author-defined 2 The Examiner refers to the “’694 application” and the “’694 specification” but this is an inadvertent error because the application at issue is application 14/524,964 (“the ’964 application”). Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 7 point has been reached (Spec. 10:1-15)3; the second version may have a number of additional “strings” or pages in a row (Spec. 11:10-15). The Examiner finds that claim 47 of the ’964 application recites “presenting a redirected sequential unit of the content to the user in place of the current unit of the content if the string condition has a redirect value.” Ans. 4 (emphasis added). The Examiner notes that neither the term “string condition” nor “redirect value” appear in the Specification of the ’964 application, and are currently subject to a § 112(b) rejection for being indefinite. Id. The Examiner finds that the most likely interpretation, in light of the Specification, is that these terms are directed to the feature of requiring the user to have reached a certain point (certain number of “strings” or “units of content” viewed) before the second version may be viewed. Id. The Examiner finds that the “redirected sequential unit of content” is an interleaf of the second version, being presented “in place of the current unit,” which is the first version. Id. According to the Examiner, claim 96 of the instant application recites essentially the same subject matter in different words, and thus is anticipated by reference claim 47 of the ’964 application. Id. Rather than a “redirected unit” and “current unit,” the claims use the terms “second version” and “first version.” Id. Claim 92 further recites that the second version may be composed of units that are identical to the first version (“wherein the recurring units are identical to corresponding ones of the first number of the units”) or duplicates of the first version (“added units are at least one of . . . duplicates of the first number of the Units”) such that the claim encompasses 3 The Examiner cites to Specification page 11, but this is an inadvertent error as the relevant content appears in page 10. Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 8 embodiments where the first and second versions vary only by a single unit, or not at all. Id. The Examiner finds that this is contrary to Appellant’s assertion that the claims require “replacing all units,” the claim only requires that a second number of units is “presented in place” of the first number of units, but the two sets of units may not even be different units at all. Id. The Examiner further finds that claim 96 adds the limitation where the user must view a predetermined number of units of content before the second version will be displayed in response to the second predetermined action, and this is equivalent to the “string condition” and “redirect value” portion of claim 47 of the ’964 application. Id. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. Nonstatutory double patenting includes rejections based on anticipation, a one-way determination of “obviousness,” or a two-way determination of “obviousness.” See MPEP § 1504.06. Double Patenting rejections are based on a comparison of claims. In double patenting rejections, the disclosure of the patent or application may be relied upon only to define the claim. Id. At issue is whether the independent claim 92 limitation, from which claim 96 depends, reciting “in response to performance of the second predetermined action, presenting a second version of the content in place of the first version of the content” is anticipated or obvious over the claim 47 of the ’964 application limitation of “presenting a redirected sequential unit of the content to the user in place of the current unit of the content if the string condition has a redirect value.” See claims 47, 91 of the ’964 application. We agree with the Examiner’s finding because in both claim 92 and claim 47, content is replaced (i.e., “in place of” recited in both claims) and this is done in response to a predetermined action. We further agree with Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 9 Examiner that the “predetermined action” is equivalent to the “string condition” and “redirect value” portion of claim 47 of the ’964 application. See Ans. 4. The end result of redirection is the substitution of content. Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s argument regarding the version types as a distinction because, claim 92 recites two alternative versions, either identical or different by stating: wherein the second number of the units of content include at least one of recurring units and added units, wherein the recurring units are identical to corresponding ones of the first number of the units of the content, and wherein the added units are at least one of different from any of the first number of the units of the content, and duplicates of the first number of the units of the content. Claim 92 (emphases added). Thus, we do not agree with Appellant’s argument that instead of redirecting presentation of the content from a current unit to a different unit in the same version as recited in claim 47 of the ’964 application, claims 92 and 96 recite replacing the first version of the content with a second version of the content. See Appeal Br. 14. Accordingly we affirm the Examiner’s rejection under provisionally rejected claim 96 on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 47 and 91 of the copending ’964 application. 2. Indefiniteness of claims 92-125 and 127-146 The Examiner rejected claims 92 and 146, and dependent claims 93-125 and 127-145, because the recited the term “fixed string” does not appear in the Specification. Non-Final Act. 6. The Examiner finds that where Appellant acts as his or her own lexicographer to specifically define a Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 10 term of a claim contrary to its ordinary meaning, the written description must clearly redefine the claim term and set forth the uncommon definition so as to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the applicant intended to so redefine that claim term. See id. (citing Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The Examiner finds that because the term “string” is being used contrary to its ordinary meaning in the art, these related terms do not have a clear definition in the Specification, they are indefinite. Id. Appellant argues that the term “string” and “fixed string” are well known to those of skill in the art. Appeal Br. 17. Appellant argues that as noted throughout the Specification, content is presented to a user in a sequence of discrete units, and these units may be strings. Id. The terms, as used in the written description and claims, carry their ordinary meaning and are not indefinite. Id. In the Answer, the Examiner explains that “string” is a term commonly used in the computer-related arts, however the precise definition varies because different programming languages implement strings in different ways. Ans. 5. The Examiner provides the technical definition of “string” as “string: A data structure composed of a sequence of characters usually representing human-readable text.” Id. (citing Microsoft Computer Dictionary, 5th edition). The Examiner explains that, for example, in Java, strings are immutable, having both fixed length and fixed content, whereas other languages allow strings to be modified after creation. Id. The Examiner notes that “string” does not usually refer to data in a file, but rather to a data structure in memory during execution of a program. Id. Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 11 The Examiner further notes that in the response filed 27 September 2018, Appellant amended the claims to recite “fixed strings” instead of simply “strings” and this term does not appear in any technical dictionary and search results show widely varying usage. Id. The Examiner finds that based on a review of the accompanying arguments (remarks, p. 16), it appeared to be an attempt to overcome the Stoner reference, which uses variable pagination, such that the content that appears on each page may change depending on factors such as user-configurable font size. Id. However, the Examiner states that a person having ordinary skill in the art could interpret “fixed string” otherwise because it is unclear what aspect of the string is fixed, i.e., a fixed length, fixed content, both, or something else. Id. The Examiner further finds that while Appellant argues that the term should be given its ordinary meaning based on the Specification, one skilled in the art would not be able to discern its meaning because the Specification does use the term. Id. In its Reply, Appellant argues that the technical definitions provided by the Examiner regarding “string” and a string that is immutable being a “fixed string” as reasonable definitions. Reply Br. 10. We note that Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s finding that “string” does not usually refer to data in a file, but rather to a data structure in memory during execution of a program. See Reply Br. While Appellant agrees with the technical terms of the definitions “string” and “fixed string,” Appellant interprets these terms differently in the art rejections and states that Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 12 different versions of the content is made only on a unit-by-unit basis, with a unit defined as a string, and as the amount of content presented to the user at any one time in sequence; content is only presented to a user in discrete units; the amount of content that constitutes a unit defines the amount of content that can be presented to a user at any one time; content can recur between versions, but only as discrete units of content. Appeal Br. 26-27. This interpretation of data content contradicts data structure in memory. Thus, because it is unclear what is meant by the term “string” we cannot discern what is meant by the terms “fixed string”. Where, as here, a claim is “amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the [Examiner] is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211-12 (BPAI 2008) (precedential); see also In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (it “is the [A]pplicants’ burden to precisely define the invention, not the PTO’s”). Thus, we affirm the Examiner’s indefiniteness rejection of claims 92-125 and 127-146 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph as indefinite. 3. Rejection of claims 92-111 and 138-146 under 35 USC §l03(a) as unpatentable over Stoner in view of Lorch, further in view of Goodman. With respect to claim 92, Appellant argues that Stoner does not teach or suggest correspondence between different versions of the content is made only on a unit-by-unit basis, with a unit defined as a string, and as the Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 13 amount of content presented to the user at any one time in sequence; content is only presented to a user in discrete units; the amount of content that constitutes a unit defines the amount of content that can be presented to a user at any one time; content can recur between versions, but only as discrete units of content; and content can also be added from one version to the next, but again only as added discrete units of content, all as recited in claim 92. Appeal Br. 26-27. In particular, Appellant argues that Stoner makes available a document in which content can be locked or unlocked for presentation, and in which the locked content is arranged without regard to discrete units (pages or strings) of the presentation. Appeal Br. 28. The locked content is unlockable for viewing by the user, in the same version of content and again with no regard for discrete units of the presentation. Id. It might be presented where the markup tag is located, or at a different portion of the content, but not as a separate unit of the content, and is usually presented within a page (unit) of content in that same version. Id. Appellant further argues that Goodman teaches a handbook to HyperCard, such as information regarding HyperCard stacks. Appeal Br. 29. A HyperCard stack is a homogenous collection of information organized as a separate Macintosh disk file. Id. (citing Goodman pg. 20). A HyperCard will appear as having a particular size, depending on the size of the monitor used to view the HyperCard. Id. (citing Goodman pgs. 92-93). Only one HyperCard, which may extend beyond the visible dimensions of the display, may be viewed at a time. Id. (citing Goodman pg. 348). A keyboard can be used to navigate through a stack of HyperCards, either Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 14 sequentially or out of sequence to a specific card. Id. A menu bar can be used to hide screen objects from view. Id. Appellant argues that Goodman teaches the basics of navigating from the early days (1988) of hypermedia including aspects of navigating information provided on disks, but the handbook has little to do with the aspects of the invention as recited in claim 47. Id. Appellant argues that Goodman does not teach or suggest correspondence between different versions of content made only on a unit-by-unit basis, with a unit defined as a string and the amount of content presented to the user at any one time in sequence; content is only presented to a user in discrete units; the amount of content that constitutes a unit defines the amount of content that can be presented to a user at any one time; content can recur between versions, but only as discrete units of content; and content can also be added from one version to the next, but again only as added discrete units of content, all as recited in claim 92. Appeal Br. 29-30. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. “[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of [those] references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 425. “During examination, ‘claims . . . are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, and . . .. claim language should be read in light of the specification as it would be Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 15 interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.’” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). And the words of a claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed Cir 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted). The Examiner clarifies at the outset that central to the claimed invention is a document having a “first version” and “second version,” and in light of the Specification, these “versions” exist only in the sense that a single document may be presented one way or another way. Ans. 6. The Examiner explains that a document has a number of “units of content,” and a “first version” is effected by presenting a particular set of these units. Id. The “second version” is the display of a different set of these units, i.e., the first set plus additional units. Id. (citing Spec. 7:5-15). The Examiner notes that claim 92 recites “wherein the second number of the units of content include at least one of recurring units and added units, wherein the recurring units are identical to corresponding ones of the first number of the units of the content.” Ans. 6. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that the limitation of “recurring units” is not required by the claim, and the claim can be met by “added units” because the claim requires “at least one” of recurring or added units. See id. Thus, we do not agree with Appellant’s argument that Stoner makes available a document in which content can be locked or unlocked for presentation, and in which the locked content is arranged without regard to discrete units (pages or strings) of the presentation because the Examiner consistent with the Specification’s meaning of second version, which includes the same document with additional content and the claim that does Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 16 not require “recurring units” but can be met with added units. See Appeal Br. 28; Ans. 6; Spec. 7:5-15. The Examiner further finds, alternatively, that even if “recurring units” were required, Stoner teaches various examples of displaying one particular piece of content two ways, i.e., text may be unhighlighted in one display (“first version”) and highlighted in a second display (“second version”). Ans. 6 (citing Stoner para. 58). The Examiner further finds that Stoner further teaches that fixed pagination, such that each page has a pre-set amount of content, was known in the art. Ans. 6-7 (citing Stoner para. 8). With respect to Appellant’s argument that Stoner does not teach that the amount of content that constitutes a unit defines the amount of content that can be presented to a user at any one time, and presenting content in discrete units, Stoner teaches that the book may be displayed one page at a time (Stoner para. 51) and that effects can apply to an entire page (Stoner para. 55). Ans. 7. With respect to Appellant’s argument that Stoner does not teach that content can be added from one version to the next, as noted above, the “added units” are only added in the sense that they are newly displayed, and Stoner teaches various “locked” hidden content may be displayed (i.e., “added”) after certain criteria are met. Ans. 7 (citing Stoner para. 51, 55, 57). With respect to Appellant’s argument that describes Stoner, stating “pages are presented differently depend on unlocked content” and that “[u]nlocked material is not presented in a new version replacing the previous version” (Appeal Br. 27), the Examiner finds that the finding is consistent with Appellant’s own Specification, which states, that “[a] subsequent Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 17 version of the content is presented in response to passing the selected position by the user while viewing content, such that at least some of the unviewable units of content in the current version of the content are viewable in the subsequent version of the content.” Ans. 7 (citing Spec. 7: 5-15). The Examiner further finds that Stoner expressly teaches that a page may be displayed multiple ways or that a book may be displayed with additional content. Ans. 8 (citing Stoner paras. 54, 59, 60). With respect to Appellant’s attempt to distinguish Stoner by stating that Stoner only teaches a single version of a document (Appeal Br. 28), as explained above, Appellant’s own Specification discloses a single document with multiple “versions” only arising from how the “units” within the document are presented. See Ans. 8. We agree with the Examiner, that Stoner teaches unlocking content either on the same page, or elsewhere (Stoner paras. 59, 60) which amounts to presenting different “versions” of the same document consistent with Appellant’s Specification. See id. The Examiner clarifies that Lorch was relied upon for the teaching of measuring a user’s progress through content based on a number of pages (Lorch, para. 73) as opposed to the more broad teaching of Stoner, where progress is measured by a number of tags (Stoner, para. 53). Id. The Examiner also finds, and we agree, that Goodman teaches that the claimed “fixed strings” or “units of content” that are displayed “one said unit at a time” were known. Ans. 8. Goodman teaches the HyperCard, which is an early type of hypermedia document wherein collections of cards called “stacks” (Goodman, pg. 20) are browsed one card at a time (Goodman, pgs. 24-26). Id. The cards may be navigated in order, or cards may link to other cards arbitrarily (Goodman, pg. 185 et seq.). Id. The Examiner finds that Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 18 although Stoner teaches that presenting fixed pages was known in the art (Stoner, para. 8), Goodman is relied upon for teaching in detail the presentation of fixed units of content (i.e., cards) having author-configurable navigation (i.e., one card “replacing” the display of another when going from card to card). Id. at 8-9. With respect to claim 93, Appellant argues that Stoner does not teach redirecting presentation of content to a different unit of content in response to a third predetermined action. Ans. 9 (citing Appeal Br. 31). The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Stoner teaches “if the user clicks or touches that [link] text, the ancillary content is loaded.” or in other words, the user is redirected from the content having the link, to the ancillary content. Ans. 9 and see Stoner para. 54. With respect to claim 95, Appellant argues not understanding how locking or unlocking content relates to redirection of not-yet-presented content. Appeal Br. 33. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that if content has been previously locked, it has not been presented. Ans. 9. Furthermore, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that this claim encompasses the act of turning to the next page of a book, in the typical way of reading a book (electronic or otherwise), wherein the user reads from the first page and continues to each subsequent page, which has not yet been presented. Id. With respect to claim 96, Appellant argues that Stoner does not teach requiring a number of units of content to be viewed before presenting the second version. Appeal Br. 34. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Stoner teaches that a publisher may require a certain number of tags be passed and the content between these tags can be said to be a “unit.” Ans. 10, Non-Final Act. Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 19 (citing Stoner para. 53). We also agree with the Examiner that Lorch further teaches measuring a user’s progress based on the number of pages. Ans. 10 (citing Lorch para. 73). Appellant either relies on the dependency to claim 92 and/or does not substantively argue the Examiner’s rejection of claims 94, 97-102, 104-110, 144, 145, and 146. See Appeal Br. 32, 34-46, 53-54. Rule 41.37 “require[s] more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.” In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 94, 97-102, 104-110, 144, 145, and 146 for the same reasons stated above for claim 92. With respect to claim 103, Appellant argues again that the second version of content does not replace the first version of content. Appeal Br. 40. Appellant argues that the paragraphs cited by the Examiner including passing tags and a link to an external source may result in additional content, but this is not annotation content in a replacement version. Id. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. As we stated supra, with respect to claim 92, Appellant’s own Specification discloses a single document with multiple “versions” only arising from how the “units” within the document are presented. See Ans. 8. Stoner teaches unlocking content either on the same page, or elsewhere (Stoner paras. 59, 60) which amounts to presenting different “versions” of the same document consistent with Appellant’s Specification. Id. We further agree with the Examiner that Stoner teaches that the second number of the units of content includes Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 20 annotation content such as more detail about previously viewed text (Stoner para. 57) or biographies of characters in the book (Stoner para. 59). Non- Final Act. 13. With respect to claim 111, Appellant further argues that the trailer taught by Stoner is not content “that replaces original content.” Appeal Br. 46-47. We agree with the Examiner that “replaces” does not appear in the claim or its parent claim 92 which only states that the second version has the second units presented “in place of” the first units. See Ans. 13. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Stoner teaches that ancillary content may be embedded in the text of the book, or may be displayed separately (i.e., in place of) from it. Ans. 13 (citing Stoner para. 46). With respect to claim 138, Appellant argues that the video display of Stoner is not a “replacement version of content.” Appeal Br. 47. We agree with the Examiner that similar to claim 111, this is not a limitation required by the claim, and regardless, Stoner teaches a separate display of videos. See Ans. 13 (citing Stoner para. 46). With respect to claim 139, Appellant questions how placement of tags in the document of Stoner teaches added units interposed between recurring units. Appeal Br. 48. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Stoner teaches that tags may be placed anywhere in the document, and the tags define the additional content displayed (i.e., “added content”). Ans. 14. For example, an animation may be placed between areas of the document such that it is activated when transitioning to the second area. Id. (citing Stoner para. 55). The Examiner also finds, and we agree, that Goodman teaches that the claimed “fixed strings” or “units of content” that are displayed “one said unit at a time” were known. Ans. 8. Goodman teaches the HyperCard, which is Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 21 an early type of hypermedia document wherein collections of cards called “stacks” (Goodman, pg. 20) are browsed one card at a time (Goodman, pgs. 24-26). Id. The cards may be navigated in order, or cards may link to other cards arbitrarily (Goodman, pg. 185 et seq.). Id. The Examiner finds that although Stoner teaches that presenting fixed pages was known in the art (Stoner, para. 8), Goodman is relied upon for teaching in detail the presentation of fixed units of content (i.e., cards) having author-configurable navigation (one card “replacing” the display of another when going from card to card). Id. at 8-9. With respect to claim 140, Appellant argues not understanding how paragraph 53 of Stoner reads on the claimed feature of added units of content in a second version of content being disposed prior to units of content that are recurring from a first version of content. Appeal Br. 49. We agree with the Examiner that as with claim 139 addressed above, tags for additional content may be placed anywhere in the document, and therefore could be placed prior to some content. Ans. 14. The Examiner cites one example wherein an animation may be placed between areas of the document such that it is activated when transitioning to the second area. Ans. 14 (citing Stoner para. 55). In other words, the shattering page animation is placed in transitioning from the current page to the following page, wherein the shattering page occurs prior to progressing to the following content. See id. With respect to claim 141, as with claim 139 above, tags for additional content may be placed anywhere in the document in Stoner, and therefore could be placed after some content as discussed above, including Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 22 after a certain amount of content such as some recurring amount of content. See Ans. 14 (citing Stoner para. 55). With respect to claim 142, Appellant argues that it is unclear how the cited portion of Stoner applies to the claim. Appeal Br. 51. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that as discussed above, the “versions” differ only by their presentation, and therefore this claim simply recites that the second way of displaying the document displays one fewer unit of content. Ans. 15. The Examiner finds that Stoner teaches that content may be removed from display. Id. (citing Stoner para. 55). In other words, the shattering of the page removes a unit of content (i.e., a page). See id. Regarding claim 143, Appellant argues that the paragraph cited by the Examiner discloses that an animation can play in Stoner that appears to “shatter” the text on the page. Appeal Br. 52. Appellant argues that it is not understood how this disclosure reads on the claimed feature that a first version of a document can be replaced by a second version of a document, and the second version includes at least one unit of content that is modified from the first version. Id. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that as discussed above, the “versions” differ only by their presentation, and therefore this claim simply recites that the second way of displaying the document displays one unit differently than the first way. See Ans. 15. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Stoner teaches that content, such as text, may at first be static, and then become animated, and thus, the second version is modified from the first version by the page being animated. Id. (citing Stoner para. 55). Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 92-111 and 138-146 for the reasons stated above. Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 23 4. Rejection of claims 112-120, 122-125, 127, 128, and 132-137 under 35 USC §l03 as unpatentable over Stoner in view of Lorch, Goodman, and Newell Appellant does not substantively argue claims 112-116 and 118, but rather relies on their dependency for claim 92. See Appeal Br. 57-64, 67. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of these claims for the same reasons as stated supra with respect to claim 92. With respect to claim 117, Appellant argues that Stoner does not teach inserting at least one delimiter, stating that mark-up tags are instructions and not delimiters. See Appeal Br. 65. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that although mark-up tags can be said to act as instructions in some situations (i.e., as in Stoner, when the- reader interprets tags in the document to display additional content), mark- up tags also comprise delimiters (i.e., the opening and closing of angle brackets, see also Stoner Fig. 13 showing tags surrounded by left and right angle brackets), and tags are also themselves delimiters, as they indicate to which content (i.e., after or between tags) the tag applies. Ans. 18. The Examiner relies on the technical definition of a tag as “[m]arkup that delimits an element.” Id. (see footnote 3). The Examiner further finds, and we agree, that in one example of Stoner, a tag indicates which part of the book receives a shatter animation. Ans. 17 (citing Stoner para 55). Therefore, we agree with the Examiner, that mark-up tags as used by Stoner, are “delimiters.” Id. Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 24 With respect to claim 119, Appellant argues that the Stoner tags are not delimiters and further, although Lorch describes charging a fee to a user, the Examiner has not linked this change to a delimiter. Appeal Br. 68-69. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. We agree with the Examiner that Lorch teaches applying a fee for reading portions of an electronic book, wherein the book may be portioned in various ways. Ans. 18 and Non-Final (citing Lorch para. 73). The Examiner finds that Lorch does not expressly teach delimiting but Stoner teaches tags which are delimiters, as discussed above. See Ans. 18. We agree with the Examiner that the combined teachings of Stoner and Lorch teach or suggest the use of tags for performing such a function, as both are concerned with tracking the content the user read, including for the reason of applying a fee. With respect to claim 120, Appellant repeats the same arguments already addressed above and further argues that the Examiner’s citation to Lorch of a fixed dollar amount is “completely unrelated.” Appeal Br. 70. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. We give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We agree with the Examiner that the finding of a fixed dollar amount is consistent with Appellant’s own Specification describing a fee delimiter as “[s]uch a delimiter might be, for example, ‘space-space-vertical pipe- number-space,’ where the number can be varied by the author and indicates the fee assessed for passing the delimiter in tenths of a dollar.” Ans. 18 (citing Spec. 31:20-25). Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 25 With respect to claim 122, Appellant argues that Stoner does not teach stopping advancement of content because the user may choose to ignore a question or may answer it incorrectly, and continue reading the book. Appeal Br. 71-72. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. We agree with the Examiner that the claim does not specify the “content” to which advancing is stopped. Ans. 19. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that in Stoner, the user is stopped from advancing to the content locked behind answering the question correctly. Id. (citing Stoner para. 57). Appellant also argues that Stoner does not teach pausing the presentation for a selectable, discrete number of time units. Appeal Br. 72. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. We agree with the Examiner that Stoner teaches that a user may be limited in how often they can attempt a question, such as once per day (i.e., a “day” being a unit of time) thereby pausing presentation of the content (i.e., the question or the content behind it). Ans. 19. Regarding claim 123, Appellant argues that it is not disputed that touchscreen keys are known to exist, but what is claimed is a very particular action key activation sequence made in response to a delimiter reached while consuming content, the result of which is a redirection of presentation of the content to a particular unit of content in a particular version of the content. Appeal Br. 74-75. Appellant argues that Stoner does not teach these features. Appeal Br. 75. The Examiner finds that the “action key” broadly encompasses touch controls. Ans. 19. The Examiner cites to paragraph 41 for the teaching of selections that may be made with a touch screen. Non-Final Act. (citing para. 41). The Examiner finds that the sequence of keys recited in the claim Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 26 is extremely broad, put another way, the next unit is displayed in response to pressing the first action key, having pressed the first and second action keys any number of times greater than zero, at any point in the past. Ans. 19. Stoner teaches turning the pages of the book (i.e., a “first action key”) and selecting to view additional content (i.e., a “second action key”) after which the user can return to the book and continue reading (i.e., again the “first action key”). Id. (citing Stoner para. 46). The Examiner notes that although claim 123 depends from claim 117, it does not refer back to the “delimiter” therein. In its Reply, Appellant argues that the Examiner did not explain how turning a page and continuing to read correspond to a first action key, or offer details regarding any action keys disclosed by Stoner related to the claimed features. Reply Br. 16. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. At the outset, Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s finding that it is customary in e-books to turn pages with user input (see Ans. 19 (referring to Examiner finding with respect to claim 122); see also Stoner para. 54 stating that “the user indicates that he wishes to view the next page of the e-book”). The Examiner identifies the user input to turn pages as constituting the “first action key.” Ans. 19. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Stoner teaches selecting to view additional content by clicking on a pop up window 54, once the reader reaches a certain page or markup tag, which the Examiner identifies as a “second action key.” See Ans. 19 (citing Stoner para. 46). Once the animation is completed the user can click on the link “return to book” to return to the e-book and continue reading, which the Examiner identifies as again the “first action key.” Id. In other words, the Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 27 Examiner identifies as “first action key” the click action by the user that allows for normal reading of the e-book such as turning pages or returning to reading pages, and the “second action key” the click action for presenting additional content (i.e., unpresented content to the user). See Ans. 19. Furthermore, with respect to Appellant’s argument that what is claimed is a very particular action key activation sequence made in response to a delimiter reached while consuming content, the result of which is a redirection of presentation of the content to a particular unit of content in a particular version of the content (Appeal Br. 74-75), Stoner teaches the key activation 54 as shown in Figure 6 which the user clicks to get redirected to the additional content when the user reaches a particular markup tag (i.e., delimiter). See Stoner Fig. 6, element 54 and para. 46. With respect to claim 124, Appellant argues that it is not understood how multiple available links relate to a plurality of action keys. Appeal Br. 76. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that an “action key” is defined broadly by the Specification, and therefore selectable elements on a screen, such as links, fall within the meaning of “action key.” Ans. 20. Appellant’s Specification describes “action keys” as being selected/struck by the user to present additional content to the user such as digital photographs, movies, sound etc. See Spec. 17. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that the limitation of “wherein the second action key is one of a plurality of second action keys” is met by Stoner’s teaching of a page having multiple links which may be selected by the user. Non-Final Act. 20 (citing Stoner para. 54; see also Fig. 13 with multiple tags (i.e., links) on a single page). With respect to claim 125, Appellant argues that the cited portion of Stoner is completely unrelated to the claimed feature of activating an action Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 28 key after a predetermined number of units has been presented. Appeal Br. 78. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Stoner teaches unlocking content after reaching particular number of tags in a book and under Appellant’s broad meaning of “action key,” whatever user interface element used to view the unlocked content constitutes an “action key.” Ans. 20 (citing Stoner para. 53). We agree with the Examiner finding that between the tags is the content of the book (i.e., “units”) and the arrangement of the tags and the content is based on publisher preferences (i.e., “predetermined”). Ans. 20 (citing Stoner Fig. 13). Figure 13 is reproduced below: Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 29 Figure 13 shows tags integrated in the e-book wherein when each tag is triggered new content such as animation, tasks, ancillary content, videos, audio effects, website links are provided to the user. Fig. 13. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Stoner teaches a number of effects, including animation, ancillary content, video, Website links and/or audio effects. See Ans. 20 (citing para. 41); see also Fig. 13, Stoner para. 51. The Examiner also finds, and we agree, that Lorch also teaches tracking the number of pages read in a book (i.e., units). Ans. 20 (citing Lorch para. 165); also see Lorch para. 73 discussing tracking number of pages for various reasons. Regarding claim 127, Appellant argues that Stoner does not teach tracking a number of passed tags and the tags taught by Stoner tags do not constitute delimiters. Appeal Br. 79-80. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. As we discussed above the Stoner tags do constitute delimiters. See supra. We agree with the Examiner that Stoner expressly teaches that “when the processing engine detects that the user has reached a point in the e-book that contains a specific tag, a certain number of tags or a certain combination of tags, additional content may be unlocked.” Ans. 20 (citing para. 53). With respect to claim 128, Appellant argues that the Stoner tags are not delimiters and although Lorch describes charding a fee to a user based on several parameters, the Examiner has not linked this charge to a delimiter as claimed. Appeal Br. 81. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. “[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of references.” In re Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 30 Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of [those] references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 425. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Lorch teaches applying a fee for reading portions of an e-book, wherein the book may be portioned in various ways. Ans. 21; see also Non-Final Action (citing Lorch para. 73). Lorch teaches various ways of charging based on reading a number of pages or a certain portion of the e-book, and thus, necessarily there is some type of tracking to determine if those conditions are met. See Lorch para. 73. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that this necessitates identifying the portions in some way and although Lorch does not expressly teach delimiting with delimiters, Stoner teaches tags which are delimiters, as discussed above. Ans. 21. We agree with the Examiner that the combined teachings of Stoner and Lorch teach or suggest the use of tags as taught by Stoner for tracking the content the user has read for various reasons, such as unlocking other content as taught by Stoner or for charging the user as taught by Lorch. See Ans. 21; also see Stoner Fig. 13 and Lorch para. 73. With respect to claim 132, Appellant again argues that the Stoner tags are not delimiters, and although the Stoner tags can indicate ancillary content as disclosed in Stoner paragraph 54 cited by the Examiner, there is no suggestion that the tags are found in the first version of the content. See Appeal Br. 82-83. We agree with the Examiner that Appellant bases the argument on Stoner not teaching delimiters and not presenting different versions of content, both of which have been addressed above. See Ans. 21. Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 31 We agree with the Examiner’s findings that Stoner teaches tags (i.e., delimiters) which are present in the book (see Stoner, FIG. 13); that is, the tags are between the book content which is initially displayed to the user (i.e., the “first units” of the “first version”). Ans. 21 (citing Stoner para. 53-54). With respect to claim 134, Appellant argues states that it is not disputed that touch-screen devices exist that have many touch keys. Appeal Br. 86. Appellant asserts that Stoner does not suggest action keys in the context of the claim. Id. Rule 41.37 “require[s] more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.” In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 134 for the same reasons stated above for claim 92. With respect to claim 135, Appellant argues that Lorch teaches notifying a user when an account balance falls below a predetermined threshold, which is not the same as notifying a user when the charge is increased. Appeal Br. 87. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Lorch teaches that a user may be notified of a decreasing account balance gradually, such as by fading the book. Ans. 22 (citing Lorch para 139). “‘The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.’” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 416). “One of the ways in which a patent’s subject matter can be proved obvious is by noting that there existed at the time of invention a known problem for which there was an obvious solution Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 32 encompassed by the patent’s claims.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 419-20. The Supreme Court further recognized that “[w]hen there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp.” Id. at 421. Lorch teaches that the user is notified when the account balance is below a threshold, and thus notified of a decreasing balance. See Lorch para 139. It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art that the user could have been also notified of increasing charges as that would also cause the account to decrease, and this would be a predictable finite solution for the user to alerted to add more money to the account. See KSR at 421. Appellant does not separately argue claims 133, 136, and 137, but rather, relies on their dependency from claim 92. See Appeal Br. 84-85, 89, 90. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 112-120, 122-125, 127, 128, and 132-137 for the reasons stated supra. 5. Rejection of claim 121 under 35 USC §l03 as unpatentable over Stoner in view of Lorch, Newell, and Hunter Appellant does not separately argue claims 121, but rather, relies on its dependency from claim 92. See Appeal Br. 94-95. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 121 for the same reasons as stated supra. Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 33 6. Rejection of claims 129-131 under 35 USC §l03 as unpatentable over Stoner in view of Lorch, Newell, and Greene Appellant does not separately argue claims 129 and 130, but rather, relies on their dependency from claim 92. See Appeal Br. 98, 99. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 129 and 130 for the same reasons as stated supra. With respect to claim 131, Appellant argues that Greene teaches a written translation window 620 provided for displaying, not inserting, a textual translation of the media. Appeal Br. 101. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Greene teaches the user may upload a textual translation (Greene para. 55) for display in the blank area separate from the original media (Greene para. 56). Ans. 23. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 131. Appeal 2020-006529 Application 14/965,855 34 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 96 Nonstatutory Double Patent 96 92-125, 127-146 112(b) Indefiniteness 92-125, 127-146 92-111, 139-146 103 Stoner, Lorch, Goodman 92-111, 139-146 112-120, 122-125, 127, 128, 132-137 103 Stoner, Lorch, Goodman, Newell 112-120, 122-125, 127, 128, 132-137 121 103 Stoner, Lorch, Goodman, Newell, Hunter 121 129-131 103 Stoner, Lorch, Goodman, Newell, Greene 129-131 Overall Outcome 92-125, 127-146 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation