Leen, Fergus A. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 1, 2019

14052958 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 1, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/052,958 10/14/2013 Fergus A. Leen 01-6117-C3 3341
63710 7590 11/01/2019
INNOVATION DIVISION
CANTOR FITZGERALD, L.P.
110 EAST 59TH STREET (6TH FLOOR)
NEW YORK, NY 10022
EXAMINER
MOSSER, ROBERT E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3715
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/01/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
lkorovich@cantor.com
patentdocketing@cantor.com
phowe@cantor.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte FERGUS A. LEEN, SAM B. LAWRENCE,
DAVID G. MCNALLY, CLIVE HETHERINGTON,
DAVID M. MCDOWELL, and KEVIN R. O’NEAL
____________________

Appeal 2019-001847
Application 14/052,958
Technology Center 3700
____________________

Before JILL D. HILL, LEE L. STEPINA, and ARTHUR M. PESLAK,
Administrative Patent Judges.

STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 25–27 and 30–47. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Interactive
Games Limited. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s invention relates to adding an aspect of skill to games by
adding a level of predictability to the determination of the numbers on which
moves will be based. Spec. 1:10–11. Claims 25, 34, and 47 are
independent. Independent claim 25, reproduced below, illustrates the
claimed invention:
25. An apparatus comprising:
at least one processor of at least one computer, the at
least one processor being in electronic communication with an
electronic device comprising an electronic display device which
comprises a graphical user interface with an output display
portion and an input selection portion; and
at least one memory having instructions stored thereon
which, when executed by the at least one processor, direct the at
least one processor to:
determine a first sequence of move numbers
comprising a plurality of non-zero numbers, wherein a
first player of an electronic game advances a first time, in
a first turn of the first player, by a number of positions
corresponding to a move number of the first sequence of
move numbers;
cause to transmit over an electronic
communication network an electronic signal to cause to
activate at the output display portion of the graphical user
interface of the electronic display of the electronic device
of the first player, data representing a visual indication of
a number of positions corresponding to a move number
by which the first player of the electronic game selects to
advance in the first turn as part of the electronic game;
receive from the input selection portion of the
graphical user interface of the electronic display of the
electronic device of the first player, data representing an
indication of the number of positions corresponding to
the move number by which the first player selected to
advance in the first turn as part of the electronic game;
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automatically cause the first player to advance in
the first turn as part of the electronic game a number of
positions corresponding to the move number by which
the first player selected to advance in the first turn of the
electronic game;
cause to be displayed at the output display portion
of the graphical user interface of the electronic display
device data representing a visual indication of the
number of positions corresponding to the move number
by which the first player advanced in the first turn of the
electronic game;
after the first sequence is determined and after the
first player advances a first time by a number of positions
corresponding to a move number of the first sequence of
move numbers, cause to transmit over the electronic
communication network an electronic signal to cause to
enable an electronic device of the second player of the
electronic game to advance in a first turn of the second
player;
after the second player advances in a first turn of
the second player, cause to transmit over the electronic
communication network an electronic signal to cause to
enable the electronic device of the first player to advance
a second time, in a subsequent turn of the first player, by
a number of positions corresponding to another move
number of the first sequence of move numbers; and
cause to be displayed at the output display portion
of the graphical user interface of the electronic display
device data representing a visual indication of the
number of positions corresponding to the another move
number by which the first player advanced in the
subsequent turn of the first player, wherein each player
participates in the game by taking turns, and wherein one
or more move numbers of the first sequence of move
numbers is visible to a respective player at times during
the game other than the respective player’s turn, and
wherein a user participates in the game by taking turns,
and wherein move numbers are invisible to the user until
selected by the user upon the user’s turn, wherein the act
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of determining a first sequence of move numbers
comprises activating a random-number generator a
predetermined plurality of times.

REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Leen hereinafter “Leen ’623” US 7,021,623 B2 Apr. 4, 2006
Leen hereinafter “Leen ’141” US 8,105,141 B2 Jan. 31, 2012
Leen hereinafter “Leen ’691” US 8,556,691 B2 Oct. 15, 2013

REJECTIONS2, 3
I. Claims 25–27 and 30–47 are rejected on the ground of
nonstatutory double patenting as unpatentable over claims 1–26 of Leen
’623. Final Act. 3.
II. Claims 25–27 and 30–47 are rejected on the ground of
nonstatutory double patenting as unpatentable over claims 1–28 of Leen
’141. Final Act. 4.
III. Claims 25–27 and 30–47 are rejected on the ground of
nonstatutory double patenting as unpatentable over claims 1–31 of Leen
’691. Final Act. 5.
IV. Claims 25–27 and 30–47 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. Final Act. 6.

2 Although the heading of each of Rejections I–IV indicates that claims 25–
47 are rejected, we understand this to be a typographical error in that claims
28 and 29 are cancelled. See Appeal Br. 24 (Claims App.); see also
Response to Office Action filed Dec. 18, 2017.
3 In the event that further prosecution is pursued, we note that claim 41
improperly depends from itself. See Appeal Br. 27 (Claims App.).
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OPINION
Rejections I–III -- Non-Statutory Double Patenting
Appellant makes similar arguments for each of the double patenting
rejections (see Appeal Br. 19–20), contending that the Examiner “does not
show how any specific claim of the present application corresponds to any
specific reference claim.” Appeal Br. 19. Appellant asserts that the
Examiner also does not “set forth the obviousness analysis required.” Id. at
20.
Appellant requests that the rejections be held in abeyance (see Appeal
Br. 20). Because the rejections are not provisional and are made in view of
claims in issued patents, the rejections are ripe for resolution. We address
Appellant’s contentions below.
Although we appreciate that the Examiner provides a claim
comparison chart in the Answer that compares each of the limitations of one
of the claims on appeal, claim 25, to claim 1 of Leen ’623, claims 1 and 13
of Leen ’141, and claim 1 of Leen ’691 (see Ans. 4–23), as Appellant
correctly points out, no such comparison is made in the Final Office Action.
Nor is there any detailed analysis of the other rejected claims in either the
Final Office Action or the Answer. An appeal is taken from the decision of
the Examiner twice rejecting the claims. 37 C.F.R. § 41.31. As such, we
review the decision of the Examiner as set forth in the Office action from
which the appeal is taken, as modified by any advisory action and Pre-
Appeal Brief conference decision. 37 C.F.R. § 41.39(a)(1); see also 37
C.F.R. § 41.39(a)(2). As Appellant’s brief is in response to the Final Office
Action mailed February 8, 2018, which does not include any detailed claim
comparison, we cannot sustain Rejections I–III.
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Rejection IV – Patent Eligibility
Appellant makes arguments for the patent eligibility of claims 25–27
and 30–47 as a group. See Appeal Br. 12–17. We select claim 25 as the
representative claim, and claims 26, 27, and 30–47 stand or fall with claim
25. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. §101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs.
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
Id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical
formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental
processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
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determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].”’ Id. ((alteration in the original) quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer
implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.” Id.
In January of 2019, the PTO published revised guidance on the
application of §101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “Memorandum”).
Under Step 2A of that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, in Step
2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception.
See Memorandum.
Step 1 -- Statutory Category
Claims 25 and 34 recite an apparatus, therefore, these claims recite
machines. See Appeal Br. 22 and 24 (Claims App.). Claim 47 recites a
series of steps, and, therefore, is a process. See id. at 28.
Step 2A, Prong One -- Recitation of Judicial Exception
In determining that claims 25–27 and 30–47 are directed to a judicial
exception to patent eligibility, without significantly more, the Examiner
takes the position that these claims are directed to “determining and enacting
a sequence of moves to advance a player of a game . . . that is similar to the
concepts of game related processes that court[s] have previously found
abstract.” Final Act. 9 (citing Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F.
App’x. 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014) and In re Smith, 815 F.3d 816 (Fed Cir.
2016)).
Appellant does not specifically contest whether the claims are directed
to an abstract idea, and, instead, argues that, consistent with “the patent
eligibility guidelines published by the USPTO on May 4, 2016 and
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November 2, 2016,” “the claims clearly recite statutory subject matter,”
because they “improve computer performance.” Appeal Br. 12–14.
Claim 25 recites instructions that direct a processor to: 1) “determine
a first sequence of move numbers”; 2) “cause to transmit . . . data
representing a visual indication of a number of positions corresponding to a
move number”; 3) “receive . . . data representing an indication of the number
of positions”; 4) “automatically cause the first player to advance”; 5) “cause
to be displayed . . . data representing a visual indication of the number of
positions corresponding to the move number”; 6) cause to transmit . . . an
electronic signal . . . to enable . . . the second player . . . to advance”; and 7)
“cause to be displayed . . . data representing a visual indication of the
number of positions corresponding to the another move number.” Appeal
Br. 22–23 (Claims App.).
Following rules or instructions, and, specifically, providing rules of a
game such as the one recited in claim 25, amounts to managing personal
behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social
activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions), which is one of
certain methods of organizing human activity. See Memorandum, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52; In re Smith, 815 F.3d at 818. Such methods of organizing human
activity are abstract ideas. See In re Smith, 815 F.3d at 818. Thus, claim 25
recites an abstract idea, one of the judicial exceptions. See Alice, 573 U.S. at
216. Accordingly, the outcome of our analysis under Step 2A, Prong 1,
requires us to proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2. See Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54.

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Step 2A, Prong 2 -- Integrated Into a Practical Application
In Step 2A, Prong 2, we determine whether the recited judicial
exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception by: (a)
identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional
elements individually and in combination to determine whether they
integrate the exception into a practical application. See Memorandum. This
evaluation requires an additional element or a combination of additional
elements in the claim to apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a
manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that
the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. See id.
Appellant contends that claim 25 “is directed to improvements in
electronic communication that includes displaying on a graphical user
interface visual indicators based on user movement and selection.”
Appeal Br. 13. Appellant argues that claim 25 recites an improvement of the
prior art by helping “reduce or control the number of messages or commands
over the network.” Id. (citing Spec. 10:18–32). Specifically, Appellant
asserts that using the claimed techniques “help[s] reduce computer workload
including computer resources such as memory resources, processor
resources, and network resources such as network bandwidth.” Id. at 14.
Appellant also asserts that claim 25 is similar to claims found patent-eligible
in Core Wireless, because claim 25 “provides an improved interface which
may increase the efficiency of using the electronic devices.” Id. at 15
(emphasis omitted) (citing Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs.
MobileComm U.S.A., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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The Examiner responds that the Specification does not “recognize the
proposed advantage or fairly describe a modification in the number of
message or commands over the network . . . that would support the presence
of patent eligible subject matter based on the possible improvements to
computer performance.” Ans. 30. According to the Examiner, “Appellant’s
arguments, do not identify the proposed corresponding improvement to
technology that is reflected in the claimed invention and would mirror the
improvements over conventional user interface to cause a predictable and
expected increase the efficiency of using mobile devices identified in Core
Wireless.” Id.
We disagree with Appellant’s contentions regarding the alleged
improvement to a computer provided by claim 25. Appellant’s Specification
discloses that “system 400 comprises an input device 412, an output device
414, a processor 416, a database 418, and memory 420. Input device 412
may include a pointing device such as a mouse, a track pad, a keyboard, and
the like.” Spec. 11:6–9; Fig. 5. “Output device 414 may include a monitor,
a printer, and the like, or any combination of such devices.” Spec. 11:10–
11. “Memory 420 includes computer software that may be executed by
processor 416. The computer software may generally be identified by
modules in memory 20 . . . any appropriate software platform may be
utilized including functional or object-oriented programming.” Spec. 11:14–
20. “The computer software may be loaded into memory 420 from disk
storage (not explicitly shown). Disk storage may include . . . floppy disk
drives, hard disk drives, CD or DVD drives, magnetic tape drives, or any
other suitable storage media.” Spec. 11:21–24. “System 400 may be any
type of computer system[,] . . . may be an Internet- or Web-based
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system, . . . may operate as a stand alone system or may operate as a client-
server networked system[,] . . . may operate in a network environment such
as a LAN, WAN, intranet, extranet, or Internet.” Spec. 12:1–8. These
portions of the Specification do not describe any improvements in how these
computer components operate to improve the capacity or efficiency of
computer components.
The portion of the Specification upon which Appellant relies
discloses, in part, in one “embodiment, any of the methods described herein
may be employed, except that the numbers determined by the indicator are
not immediately revealed to the players . . . although, they would already be
determined.” Spec. 10:18–27. “If dominos were being used as an indicator,
for example, the dominos would be selected, but would remain face down
until a player chose one for a given move.” Id. at 10:30–32.
We agree with the Examiner that the portions of the Specification
upon which Appellant relies do not “support the presence of patent eligible
subject matter based on the possible improvements to computer
performance.” Ans. 30. That is, any assertion that claim 25 “reduce[s]
computer workload including computer resources such as memory
resources, processor resources, and network resources such as network
bandwidth,” is unsupported attorney argument. Appeal Br. 14. The above
noted portion of the Specification fails to describe an improvement over how
the above computer elements operate over other disclosed embodiments that
use the same computer elements but do not reveal the indicator, let alone
what the improvement is over the prior art. Moreover, although “the
efficiency of using the electronic devices” may increase, “relying on a
computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is
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insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Appellant’s assertion that the claims should be found patent-eligible
based on their similarity to those in Core Wireless is unavailing. The facts
of Core Wireless are distinguishable from the facts and arguments in the
cited record on appeal. The claim in Core Wireless was directed to “an
improved user interface for electronic devices, particularly those with small
screens” where the improvement was in “the efficiency of using the
electronic device by bringing together ‘a limited list of common functions
and commonly accessed stored data,’ which can be accessed directly from
the main menu.” Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1363. The Specification
supported these improvements over “the prior art interfaces [that] had many
deficits relating to the efficient functioning of the computer, requiring a user
‘to scroll around and switch views many times to find the right
data/functionality.’” Id. The Court found that the disclosure in the
Specification regarding the speed of a user’s navigation through various
views and windows was improved and that this disclosure “clearly indicates
that the claims are directed to an improvement in the functioning of
computers, particularly those with small screens.” Id.
That is not the case here. Appellant does not identify any disclosure
in the Specification demonstrating that claim 25 is directed to an
improvement to the display of an electronic device. The claims here are not
directed to an improved user interface and are not analogous to the claims in
Core Wireless, but instead “[use] conventional user interface methods to
display a generic index on a computer.” Id. at 1363; cf. Apple, Inc. v.
Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240–43 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting a user
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interface that generates and displays selectable user interface elements from
other selectable user interface elements does not transform an otherwise
abstract idea into eligible subject matter); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric
Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting use of a generic
computer element like a user interface is not patent-eligible subject matter);
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting a user interface that provides little more than an
unspecified set of rules for displaying and organizing elements does not
recite eligible subject matter).
As recognized by the Examiner, there is no indication that the claims
provide any “improvements over conventional user interface.” Ans. 30.
Indeed, the only additional elements recited merely implement the abstract
idea on generic computing elements (i.e., computer system, input device,
output device, memory device, and processor, shown in Figure 5). Such
apparatus, as recited here, does not provide a particular transformation (or
particular machine). In summary, claim 25 does not integrate the recited
judicial exception into a practical application. Thus, we proceed to step 2B.

Step 2B Well-Understood, Routine, Conventional Activity
In Step 2B, we determine whether the claim adds a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field. See Memorandum.
Appellant argues that displaying on a graphical user interface visual
indicators based on user movement and selection, is “not well-understood,
routine or conventional.” Appeal Br. 15–16. According to Appellant, the
Examiner “does not expressly support this rejection and therefore fails to
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meet” the USPTO guidelines of April 19, 2018. Id. at 16; see also
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
We disagree because Appellant’s Specification (11:4–12:8; Figure 5)
identifies the computing resources generically and discloses that they can be
“any type of comput[ing] system” (Spec. 12:1), thus indicating that
implementation of the abstract idea is performed using known computers.
We agree with the Examiner that the claimed user interface operates in its
ordinary and conventional capacity to perform the well-understood, routine,
and conventional functions of receiving and presenting data. Final Act. 10
(citing Spec. 5:5–16, 11:4–25, 12:1–8).
We also agree with the Examiner that “‘displaying on a graphical user
interface visual indicators based on user movement and selection’
represent[s] abstract elements of the claimed invention and accordingly
do[es] not impinge on the rejection of claims based on Berkheimer.” Ans.
31. That is, these limitations are not additional elements beyond the abstract
idea, but rather are directed to the abstract idea as noted previously. See
Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 (instructing that additional recited
element(s) should be evaluated in Alice/Mayo step two to determine whether
they (1) add specific limitation(s) that are not well-understood, routine, and
conventional in the field, or (2) simply append well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities previously known to the industry (citing MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)).
Appellant also argues that claim 25 does not “preempt all ways of
achieving the intended result.” Appeal Br. 17. However, as our reviewing
court has explained, “the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial
exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions on preemption
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are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc.
v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice, 573
U.S. at 216). Although “preemption may signal patent ineligible subject
matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility.” Id. Moreover, “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to
disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the [Alice/Mayo] framework,
. . . preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Id.; see also
OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362–63 (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all
price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the ecommerce
setting do not make them any less abstract.”).
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments in support of the
patent eligibility of claim 25, but find them unpersuasive. Independent
claim 34 (apparatus) and independent claim 47 (method) fall with claim 25.
Appellant provides no substantive explanation as to how any of the
dependent claims recites something significantly more than the methods of
organizing human activity recited in its respective independent claim. See
Appeal Br. 18. The dependent claims also fall with claim 25.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 25–27 and
30–47 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter.

DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 25–27 and 30–47 on
the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as unpatentable over claims 1–
26 of Leen ’623.
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We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 25–27 and 30–47 on
the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as unpatentable over claims 1–
28 of Leen ’141.
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 25–27 and 30–47 on
the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as unpatentable over claims 1–
31 of Leen ’691.
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 25–27 and 30–47 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to an abstract idea.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
25–27, 30–47 Non-Statutory
Double Patenting
25–27,
30–47
25–27, 30–47 101

25–27, 30–47
Overall Outcome 25–27, 30–47

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED