Leah R.,1 Complainant,v.Alex M. Azar II, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services (National Institutes of Health), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 5, 20190120182781 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 5, 2019) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Leah R.,1 Complainant, v. Alex M. Azar II, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services (National Institutes of Health), Agency. Appeal No. 0120182781 Hearing No. 510-2016-00444X Agency No. HHS-NIH-NICHD-082-15 DECISION On September 13, 2018, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s August 14, 2018 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Contract Specialist, GS-1102-12, in the Acquisition Services Branch (ASB) in the Agency’s Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) in Bethesda, Maryland. The ASB Chief (S1) was Complainant’s first-level supervisor, and the Office of Acquisitions Director (S2) was Complainant’s second-level supervisor. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120182781 2 On August 11, 2015, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of sex (female), disability (Adjustment Reaction with Anxiety and Depression), and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity (June 24, 2015 notice to management she planned to contact EEO Office) when: 1. on June 11, 2015, the Agency denied Complainant’s request to extend her temporary telework agreement, 2. from January 2015 to July 2015, the Agency denied Complainant reasonable accommodation, 3. about January 2015, the Agency denied Complainant’s request for lateral movement, hardship transfer and/or change in work duties, and 4. since December 2014, the Agency denied Complainant’s request for protection from workplace violence and harassment. The Agency accepted Complainant’s complaint for EEO investigation. During the EEO investigation, Complainant stated that she was the victim of domestic abuse2 and the Agency made her choose between physically returning to an unsafe workplace or losing her job. Complainant stated that she alleged sex as a basis because her status as a domestic abuse victim was the sole reason for her need to telework and she has been removed because she was accused of bringing drama to the workplace. She stated that S2 set an arbitrary date to end her telework agreement. Complainant stated that she performed her essential functions well remotely, and S1 and her colleagues were able to reach her via email, telephone, or instant messenger as necessary. She added that she attended meetings via telephone conference or video conference. Complainant stated that the Agency has not allowed her to work since June 29, 2015. Complainant stated that she requested an extension to or permanent status of her remote telework agreement. Also, Complainant stated that she requested alternatives so that she could continue working and S2 minimized the importance of her requests. Complainant stated that the Agency never engaged in an interactive process with her. 2 Complainant stated that her husband was violent toward her. She stated, in October 2014, the state of Maryland granted her an Interim Protective Order and then a Temporary Order of Protection from her husband. Complainant stated, in November 2014, she sought shelter assistance because she felt threatened. Complainant noted that her husband worked as an Information Security Analyst contractor in the Office of the Chief Information Officer at NICHD. Complainant stated that she went to Puerto Rico for family support and asked to work remotely while there. Complainant last worked on-site at the Bethesda facility on November 14, 2014. Complainant alleged that her husband threatened and stalked her, and that she noticed attempts to break into her personal email accounts from the Agency Internet Protocol (IP) address. Complainant alleged that her husband also sent investigators, friends, and detectives to her office to inquire about her whereabouts. 0120182781 3 The Office of Acquisitions Director, S2, stated that she was unaware of Complainant’s medical condition until Complainant requested Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave and after she denied Complainant’s request to extend her telework agreement beyond June 2015. S2 stated that Complainant requested reasonable accommodation after June 27, 2015. S2 stated that Complainant submitted medical documentation to support her accommodation request to Occupational Medical Services (OMS) and she later learned that Complainant has Anxiety. S2 stated that she was unaware of any prior EEO activity for Complainant until an EEO Counselor contacted her regarding the instant pre-complaint. S2 stated, in a letter dated January 21, 2015, Complainant alleged that her husband sent third parties to the Bethesda office to check on her location and that he was hacking into her computer. S2 stated that she advised Complainant to contact the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) for her harassment concerns and the Office of Information Technology (OIT) regarding allegations of security violation. S2 stated, initially, Complainant’s immediate supervisor, S1, stated that Complainant “needed to get away to be with her family in Puerto Rico” and they entered a telework agreement for December 2014 to January 29, 2015. (Complainant was to return to work on February 2, 2015.) S2 stated, in January 2015, S1 informed her that Complainant requested an extension of her telework agreement due to circumstances involving her husband. S2 stated that she extended the telework agreement to June 29, 2015 and informed Complainant that the Agency needed her back in the office and her working remotely could not continue indefinitely. S2 stated that Complainant’s presence in the office was needed for the fourth quarter of the fiscal year and that her colleagues covered her absence by meeting with her customers at times. S2 stated that she knows Complainant contacted the Agency workplace violence program (Civil), but is unsure of the actions it took as to Complainant’s claims. S2 stated that management was “attentive and sensitive” to Complainant’s concerns and, if she returned to Maryland, would have put security mechanisms in place to prevent her husband’s access to the building and created limited access to Complainant’s work-suite. S2 noted that Complainant’s husband worked at a different Agency facility. S2 stated, in a June 24, 2015 letter, Complainant asked for modified work arrangements because she did not feel safe to return to the Bethesda facility. S2 stated that she referred Complainant to local police and informed her about submitting medical documentation for reasonable accommodation to OMS. S2 stated there was limited staff to address existing workload and Complainant could research other positions within the Agency if she needed to transfer. S2 informed Complainant that she would support her request for a hardship transfer if she submitted one. S2 stated that she conducted a USAJOBS search and sent the results to S1, who then sent them to Complainant. S2 stated, by letter dated July 23, 2015, OMS determined that Complainant’s medical documentation did not establish a medical condition to justify her request for telework extension. On July 30, 2015, S2 approved FMLA for Complainant and advised her of other leave options. S2 acknowledged that there are two other female Contract Specialists who work remotely from Tennessee and Michigan and whose telework agreements are reviewed annually. S2 stated the nature of their work is more policy, whereas, Complainant’s is more in- person customer service and fast-paced. S2 stated that the other two employees also have to come into the office periodically and as-needed. 0120182781 4 S1 stated that she learned that Complainant was diagnosed with Anxiety when Complainant applied for FMLA in Summer 2015. S1 stated that she learned of Complainant’s allegations last summer as well. S1 stated, in November 2014, Complainant informed her of domestic issues with her husband and a need to stay with family in Puerto Rico. S1 stated that Complainant asked her to keep her issues confidential and she referred to them as “personal issues” when she discussed with S2. S1 stated that Complainant was an excellent employee and had an ad-hoc telework agreement in place so she felt that a remote agreement was feasible temporarily. S1 stated that she and Complainant communicated daily under the initial agreement and Complainant was “conscientious and responsible” about her work assignments. S1 acknowledged that Complainant expressed concern about her husband accessing her personal email account and her work instant messaging system, and sending third parties to inquire about her location. S1 stated that she was aware, if Complainant returned to work in Maryland, S2 was going to implement additional security measures. She stated that she is not aware of any domestic violence against Complainant in the workplace. S1 stated that she knew the remote teleworking could not become permanent due to the nature of Complainant’s position. S1 stated that Complainant’s position required some in-person communication with customers and the need for Complainant to conduct meetings. S1 added that Complainant’s colleagues were picking up the slack, which added to their workload. S1 stated that Complainant also missed some in-person training. S1 stated that it was important for Complainant to return to work the fourth quarter of the fiscal year and it was clearly conveyed to her. S1 stated that S2 looked online for other positions for Complainant. A Human Resources Specialist (HR1) stated, in January 2015, Complainant contacted her about the Agency’s Civil program, which promotes civility and appropriate behavior in the workplace. HR1 stated that the actions Complainant alleged did not occur in the workplace so the Agency did not have jurisdiction to address so she referred Complainant to the Montgomery County Family Justice Center, which helps victims of domestic violence. HR1 stated that Complainant wanted her concerns to remain confidential so as not to provoke behavior by her husband. HR1 advised Complainant that Civil is not a confidential resource. HR1 stated that she learned that the protective order Complainant held was lifted and Complainant was instructed to return her infant son to Maryland. HR1 stated that an Office of the Director staff person informed her that Complainant’s husband was counseled about “proper use of [Agency] systems.” HR1 stated that it was her belief “that [Complainant’s] managers were doing everything they reasonably could and exercising maximum flexibility to help her work through this situation.” In pertinent part, the record contains the following documents: ▪ a Temporary Telework Agreement (to work from Puerto Rico) dated December 12, 2014 through January 13, 2015; ▪ an email dated January 21, 2015 from Complainant to S2 asking to extend or make permanent her telework agreement for the safety of her and her infant son; 0120182781 5 ▪ a Temporary Telework Agreement dated January 30, 2015 through June 29, 20153; ▪ a request for reasonable accommodation dated June 24, 2015, citing “a temporary medical disability of depression and anxiety which currently restricts my ability to work in Maryland;” ▪ a memorandum dated June 27, 2015, in which S2 denied Complainant’s request citing “an undue hardship on [Complainant’s] colleagues . . . struggling to meet the demands of their own workload;” ▪ a June 29, 2015 request for medical leave of absence under FMLA; ▪ an FMLA Certification of Health Care Provider dated July 24, 2015, citing “Adjustment Reaction Disorder with Anxiety & Depression” and “unable to concentrate & perform at optimum level when she experiences episodes of anxiety & panic attacks;” ▪ a note from Psychiatrist dated July 6, 2015, stating “Patient can continue working same hours and days but in another environment It is not recommended to work with her ex-husband who works in the same institute, . . . his harassments and stalking;” ▪ a Review of Medical Documentation dated July 23, 2015, stating “the medical documents available for review are insufficient to establish a medical basis for the continued need for [Complainant] to avoid her assigned workspace . . . in Maryland;” ▪ FMLA approval dated July 30, 2015, for twelve weeks of leave (through September 21, 2015); ▪ FMLA Entitlement dated September 22, 2015, authorizing Complainant to utilize leave without pay until October 13, 2015 and stating that increased security mechanisms will be implemented for her return to Maryland; and ▪ Decision on Proposal to Remove dated August 16, 2016, charging “Failure to Follow Supervisor’s Instruction” and “Absence Without Leave (AWOL).”4 Following the EEO investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of the right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) or an immediate final agency decision. Complainant timely requested a hearing. 3 In a letter dated January 30, 2015, S2 stated: “We expect you to return to your permanent duty station . . . no later than June 29, 2015. The June 29, 2015 date will not be extended regardless of the circumstances.” 4 We note, on September 30, 2016, Complainant filed an appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) regarding her removal from employment. Complainant also challenged the actions alleged in (1) through (4) of the instant complaint. MSPB identified the appeal as Docket Number DC-1221-17-0003-W-1. On November 10, 2016, for Docket Number DC-1221-17-0003-W-1, MSPB issued an Initial Decision dismissing the appeal. MSPB stated that Complainant filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel and had not exhausted the remedy under that process for her removal or the four actions herein. We note that Complainant filed an EEO complaint regarding (1) through (4) on August 11, 2015. 0120182781 6 The assigned AJ determined that the complaint did not warrant a hearing and, on April 24, 2018, issued a decision without one. Specifically, the AJ stated that the Agency provided Complainant more than six months of remote telework and leave, and planned to accommodate Complainant with increased security and limited access to Complainant’s work suite if she returned to Maryland. Further, the AJ stated, “t]he Agency offered reasonable actions to protect [Complainant] in the workplace,” and Complainant was not entitled to her accommodation of her choice, i.e., reassignment or indefinite telework. Subsequently, on August 14, 2018, the Agency issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. The instant appeal from Complainant followed. On appeal, Complainant stated that genuine issues of material fact exist and that a summary judgment decision was inappropriate. Complainant stated that S1 was pleased with her performance and it was not until January 2015 that S2 informed her that her telework status was a burden on the office. Complainant stated that it was rare that she needed to have in-person contact with customers and there were two coworkers who had permanent, out-of-state telework agreements. Complainant stated that the Agency could have restructured her position and reassigned her as an accommodation. Complainant stated that there was a connection between her disability and the denial of reasonable accommodation. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Anderson at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson at 255. An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep't of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). In the instant case, we find the AJ properly issued a decision without a hearing. 0120182781 7 We find the material facts are not in dispute and that after drawing all reasonable inferences in Complainant's favor, Complainant fails to establish she was discriminated against by the Agency. Reasonable Accommodation Under the Commission's regulations, an agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability unless the agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o) and (p). After receiving a request for reasonable accommodation, the employer should engage in an informal process with the disabled individual to clarify what the individual needs and identify the appropriate reasonable accommodation. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation), EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (October 17, 2002); see also, Abeijon v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0120080156 (Aug. 8, 2012). Protected individuals are entitled to reasonable accommodation, but they are not necessarily entitled to their accommodation of choice. Castaneda v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01931005 (February 17, 1994). Assuming, without finding, that Complainant is an individual with a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, we find that Complainant has not shown that the Agency failed to reasonably accommodate her. Complainant stated that she was the victim of domestic abuse and the Agency made her choose between physically returning to an unsafe workplace or losing her job. Complainant stated that she worked in Bethesda, Maryland, but because of her status as a domestic abuse victim she needed to telework from Puerto Rico. Complainant stated that she and her infant son moved to Puerto Rico for family support. Complainant stated that her husband is an Information Technology contractor with the Agency and he hacked her personal email and Agency instant messaging account, and sent third parties to ask her coworkers about her location. Complainant stated that she developed Anxiety due to her circumstances and could not return to Maryland. Complainant stated that her immediate supervisor was pleased with her remote performance and she was available via email, telephone, instant messenger, and videoconference. Complainant stated that she requested an extension to or permanent status of her remote telework agreement or alternatives so that she could continue working from Puerto Rico, but the Agency denied her requests. The record shows, on June 24, 2015, Complainant requested reasonable accommodation citing “a temporary medical disability of depression and anxiety which currently restricts my ability to work in Maryland.” On June 27, 2015, S2 denied Complainant’s request citing “an undue hardship on [Complainant’s] colleagues . . . struggling to meet the demands of their own workload.” On June 29, 2015, Complainant requested a medical leave of absence under FMLA. In July 2015, Complainant provided a Psychiatrist note stating “Patient can continue working same hours and days but in another environment. 0120182781 8 It is not recommended to work with her ex-husband who works in the same institute, . . . his harassments and stalking.” She also provided FMLA Certification, stating “Adjustment Reaction Disorder with Anxiety & Depression” and “unable to concentrate & perform at optimum level when she experiences episodes of anxiety & panic attacks.” S2 stated that she was unaware of Complainant’s medical condition until Complainant requested FMLA leave, and, by that point, the Agency had already granted Complainant about six months of full-time telework (between December 2014 and June 2015). S2 stated that she extended the telework agreement to June 29, 2015 and informed Complainant that the Agency needed her back in the office for fourth quarter of the fiscal year. S2 stated that Complainant’s full-time telework burdened her coworkers who had to pick up the slack for in-person interactions in her absence. S2 stated that she advised Complainant to contact local police and EAP for her harassment concerns and OIT regarding allegations of security violation. S2 stated that management was “attentive and sensitive” to Complainant’s concerns and, if she returned to Maryland, would have put security mechanisms in place to prevent her husband’s access to the building and limit individual access to Complainant’s work-suite. S2 noted that Complainant’s husband worked at a different Agency facility. S2 stated, in a June 24, 2015 letter, Complainant asked for modified work arrangements because she did not feel safe to return to the Bethesda facility. S2 informed Complainant that she would support her request for a hardship transfer and conducted a USAJOBS search, which S1 sent to Complainant. S2 stated, by letter dated July 23, 2015, OMS determined that Complainant’s medical documentation did not establish a medical condition to justify her request for telework extension. However, the Agency approved FMLA for twelve weeks of leave through September 21, 2015 and then authorized Complainant to utilize leave without pay until October 13, 2015. The Agency stated, if Complainant returned to Maryland to work, it would increase security mechanisms to prevent her husband’s access to the building and individual access to her work- suite. Complainant did not return to Maryland, and, in August 2016, the Agency decided to remove Complainant from employment for “Failure to Follow Supervisor’s Instruction” and “Absence Without Leave (AWOL).” We find that the Agency did not discriminate against Complainant based on disability when it did not provide her with permanent, full-time telework from Puerto Rico. See EEOC Work At Home/Telework as a Reasonable Accommodation Factsheet (as revised December 20, 2017). Nor do we find the Agency discriminated against her when it did not provide Complainant lateral movement, hardship transfer or change in work duties. We remind Complainant that she is not entitled to the accommodation of her choice. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation, question 9. Further, granting a leave of absence, utilizing paid or unpaid leave, is a form of accommodation. See Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation, question 16. 0120182781 9 Disparate Treatment and Harassment A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For Complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency’s actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Dep’t of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Dep’t of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990). Complainant stated that she was a domestic abuse victim, her husband was an Information Technology contractor for the Agency, and she felt stalked and harassed by him. The Agency and Complainant reached a temporary agreement for her to work remotely from Puerto Rico, from December 2014 to the end of January 2015 and then until the end of June 2015. Complainant stated that she did not feel comfortable returning to her home work-location in Bethesda and asked for an extension or permanent modification of her telework agreement. Complainant presented medical documentation that she could perform the duties of her position but suffered Anxiety if faced with returning to Maryland. The Agency stated that Complainant could not continue to telework as her position necessitated some in-person engagement with customers and her coworkers had to cover some of her responsibilities during her absence. The Agency stated, during the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, staff had to report to the homesite. After the full-time telework agreement ended, the Agency granted Complainant leave under FMLA for twelve weeks and allowed her to use unpaid for three weeks. The Agency stated that the nature of the positions of two other female Contract Specialists who teleworked from other states was different and more policy-oriented. The record supports that contention. Further, management stated that it referred Complainant to external resources, such as local police, EAP, OIT, and Civil to address her concerns regarding her husband. The Agency noted that no domestic violence took place in the workplace so it lacked the jurisdiction to address it. 0120182781 10 The Agency stated, if Complainant returned to her Maryland worksite, it would prevent her husband from accessing the building and limit individuals’ access to her work-suite. We find, beyond her bare assertions, Complainant has produced no evidence that the Agency’s actions were based on discriminatory animus. Further, to the extent that Complainant is claiming that she was subjected to harassment, we conclude that a finding of harassment is precluded by our determination that Complainant failed to establish that the Agency’s actions were motivated by discriminatory animus. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the final agency decision finding no discrimination. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. 0120182781 11 Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations November 5, 2019 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation