Lawanda R. Fernelius, Complainant, William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 29, 2000
05a00438 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 29, 2000)

05a00438

06-29-2000

Lawanda R. Fernelius, Complainant, William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Lawanda R. Fernelius v. United States Postal Service

05A00438

June 29, 2000

Lawanda R. Fernelius, )

Complainant, ) Request No. 05A00438

) Appeal No. 01984221

) Agency No. 4E-890-1111-95

) Hearing No. 340-96-3983X

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DENIAL OF REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

The complainant initiated a request to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC or Commission) to reconsider the decision in Lawanda

R. Fernelius v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01984221

(January 21, 2000).<1> EEOC Regulations provide that the Commission may,

in its discretion, reconsider any previous Commission decision where the

requesting party demonstrates that: (1) the appellate decision involved

a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or (2)

the appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,

37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405(b)).

The issue presented is whether the previous decision properly affirmed the

final agency decision (FAD). The FAD adopted the recommended findings and

conclusions issued by an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) without a hearing.

The AJ concluded that complainant had failed to establish discrimination

based on race (Caucasian), disability (situational anxiety), or reprisal

(prior EEO activity) when: (1) she was required to work overtime on

May 30, 1995 and ongoing; and (2) she was sent for a Fitness For Duty

(FFD) examination in August, 1995. In her request for reconsideration,

complainant argues that the AJ erroneously concluded that she was not an

"individual with a disability" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation

Act, notwithstanding that the agency physician who conducted her FFD

examination accepted the conclusion of her own health care provider that

she has been diagnosed with situational anxiety and "Post Traumatic Stress

Disorder, by history." Record of Investigation (ROI) Exhibit 3 at 1.

Complainant further argues that excessive absence could not have been a

factor on which management relied in sending her for an FFD examination

because she had a large balance of accrued annual and sick leave during

the relevant time.<2>

An individual with a disability is one who (1) has a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,

(2) has a record of such impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such

an impairment. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g).<3>

The AJ's recommended findings and conclusions incorrectly stated

that situational anxiety is "by definition a temporary condition."

The Commission recognizes that there may be cases wherein an individual's

situational anxiety is long-term, or where, although episodic, it is

sufficiently chronic to substantially limit complainant in a major life

activity. See, e.g., EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans With

Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities, question 8 (March 25,

1997).<4> Nonetheless, the prior decision properly affirmed the FAD

because on the factual record in the instant case, complainant failed to

demonstrate that her mental impairment did in fact substantially limit

her in a major life activity, "such as learning, thinking, concentrating,

interacting with others, caring for oneself, speaking, performing manual

tasks, or working." EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans With

Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities, question 3 (March 25,

1997); see also 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(i).<5> For example, with respect to

concentration and thinking, the only evidence of relevant limitation is

the assertion by complainant's personal health care providers that she

is under stress, and the agency physician's observation that she was in a

"very defensive and agitated state of mind" during the FFD examination.

We further note that as part of the EEO investigation, complainant

completed a questionnaire dated July 2, 1996 in which she identified

"working overtime" as the major life activity substantially limited by her

mental impairment.<6> "Working overtime" is not a major life activity

under the applicable statutory and regulatory authority. However,

"working" is recognized as a major life activity, which is to be analyzed

if no other major life activity is substantially limited by an impairment.

In order to be substantially limited in the major life activity of

working, the Commission's regulations require that an individual be

restricted from performing either a broad class of jobs or a broad range

of jobs in various classes. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(j)(3)(i). The inability

to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial

limitation on the major life activity of working. See Sutton v. United

Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).

Miller v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03A00066 (May 4,

2000). While from June through December, 1995, complainant took three

leaves of absence (one week, two weeks, and three months in duration,

respectively), the record is insufficient in this particular case

to establish that even during her leaves of absence complainant was

restricted from performing a broad class of jobs or a broad range of

jobs in various classes. Therefore, complainant did not demonstrate

that her mental impairment substantially limited her in the major life

activity of working.

Accordingly, the prior decision correctly affirmed the FAD's ultimate

conclusion that complainant is not an individual with a disability,

because complainant has failed to adduce sufficient evidence

establishing that her mental impairment substantially limited her in a

major life activity, or alternatively that she had a record of, or was

regarded as having, a substantially limiting mental impairment.

Accordingly, after a review of the complainant's request for

reconsideration, the previous decision, and the entire record, the

Commission finds that the request fails to meet the criteria of 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405(b), and it is the decision of the Commission to

deny the request. The decision in EEOC Appeal No. 01984221 remains

the Commission's final decision. There is no further right of

administrative appeal on the decision of the Commission on this request

for reconsideration.

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0400)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right

of administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the

right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District

Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this

decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN

THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

June 29, 2000

_______________ _____________________

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2Management's stated grounds for requesting the FFD examination were

excessive absenteeism, inability to perform job, and insufficient medical

documentation. See ROI Exhibit 2 at 2. The medical documentation

which complainant originally submitted was a handwritten note from her

physician, not on letterhead, which identified her condition as "stress."

ROI Exhibit 4 at 6.

3The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment. Since that time,

the ADA regulations set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 apply to complaints

of disability discrimination. These regulations can be found on EEOC's

website: www.eeoc.gov.

4"An impairment is substantially limiting if it lasts for more than

several months and significantly restricts the performance of one or more

major life activities during that time. It is not substantially limiting

if it lasts for only a brief time or does not significantly restrict an

individual's ability to perform a major life activity . . . . In addition,

some conditions may be long-term, or potentially long-term, in that

their duration is indefinite and unknowable or is expected to be at least

several months. Such conditions, if severe, may constitute disabilities."

EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans With Disabilities Act and

Psychiatric Disabilities, question 7 (March 25, 1997).

5Complainant did have various physical impairments for which she sought

accommodation as well, but those are not at issue here, inasmuch as she

contends that it was her request to be excused from overtime duty based

on her mental impairment which the agency failed to honor.

6The documentation submitted by her personal health care providers

advised that complainant could work up to forty hours per week, but as

an accommodation necessitated being relieved of overtime duties.