Larry K. Davis, Complainant,v.Stephen A. Perry, Administrator, General Services Administration, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 29, 2002
01990539 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 29, 2002)

01990539

01-29-2002

Larry K. Davis, Complainant, v. Stephen A. Perry, Administrator, General Services Administration, Agency.


Larry K. Davis v. General Service Administration

01990539

01-29-02

.

Larry K. Davis,

Complainant,

v.

Stephen A. Perry,

Administrator,

General Services Administration,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01990539

Agency No. 96-1104

Hearing No. 100-97-7661X

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final decision

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29

U.S.C. � 621 et seq.; and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

(Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal

is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein is whether complainant has established by

preponderant evidence that the agency discriminated against him on the

bases of national origin (Native American), age (DOB: October 30, 1941),

and disability (limited sight in left eye) when he was not selected

under Vacancy Announcement K96-16163 (VA) as a Supervisory Contract

Specialist, GS-14.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that complainant was a Contract Specialist, GS-13,

at the agency's Federal Systems Integration and Management Contracting

Center in Falls Church, Virginia. He applied for the position of

Supervisory Contract Specialist but was not selected for the position.

Complainant believed that the Selectee had been �groomed� by his Immediate

Supervisor (Supervisor) for the position. Believing he was a victim

of discrimination, complainant filed a formal EEO complaint with the

agency on October 7, 1996, alleging that the agency had discriminated

against him as referenced above. At the conclusion of the investigation,

complainant received a copy of the investigative report and requested

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a

decision without a hearing, finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish prima facie

cases of disability and national origin discrimination. Specifically,

the AJ found that complainant failed to demonstrate that he was a

qualified individual with a disability and that the agency was aware

of his national origin. The AJ concluded that complainant established

a prima facie case of age discrimination because the Selectee, not in

his protected class, was selected for the position at issue. The AJ

further concluded that complainant did not rebut the agency's legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. The AJ found that the agency

did not select complainant because the position required the selling

of services to customers and there were numerous customer complaints

about him. The agency's final decision implemented the AJ's decision.

Complainant appealed.

On appeal, complainant contends that the AJ erred in issuing summary

judgment in favor of the agency.<1> In particular, complainant argues

that the agency's assertion that complainant deals poorly with customers

is a misstatement. Further, complainant believes that the agency has

stonewalled the discovery process and he would like a hearing so he may

face his accusers. In response to the appeal, the agency requests that

we affirm its final decision.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Summary Judgment

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where

a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary

standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of

material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court does not

sit as a fact finder. Id. The evidence of the non-moving party must

be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences

must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. A disputed issue of

fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder

could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F. 2D 103,

105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to

affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by

weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate.

An AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

On appeal, complainant contends that the agency officials �lied� when they

averred to his alleged inability to get along with clients. The record

clearly indicates that complainant had strained relations with the

Supervisor whom he referred to as the �Queen,� and the Recommending

Official (RO) who referred to complainant as a �Spoiled Jerk.�<2>

Without further evidence, we find that complainant's mere assertion

that the agency officials lied is insufficient to establish a genuine

issue of material fact as to his conduct. Therefore, upon review of

the record, the Commission finds that the AJ correctly determined that

summary judgment was appropriate.

Disparate Treatment

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency

has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility

to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the

third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of

whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal

Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Initially, we will assume, for the sake of the case at hand, that

complainant has established his prima facie cases of national origin, age,

and disability discrimination. Upon review, we find that the agency has

met its burden of articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for its action. The RO indicated in his affidavit that he reviewed

the applications and, based on personal knowledge of the candidates,

selected the top three including the Selectee. Complainant was not one

of the three. The RO noted that he needed someone who could sell the

agency's services to its customers and felt that the Selectee could

do so. The RO also referred to the Selectee as being industrious in

getting the job done and as being diplomatic as compared to complainant.

The RO provided the Selecting Official (SO) the list of the top three

candidates and provided an assessment of each. The SO agreed with

the RO's recommendation and selected the Selectee for the Supervisory

Contract Specialist position. Therefore, upon review, we find that the

agency has provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action.

The burden now returns to complainant to demonstrate that the agency's

reason is pretext for discrimination. Complainant argues that the

Selectee was groomed or pre-selected for the position in question.

Upon review of the record, we find that complainant fails to provide any

evidence that the agency pre-selected the Selectee in a discriminatory

manner. Further, complainant failed to demonstrate that the RO made his

recommendation or that the SO made his selection based on complainant's

national origin, age, and/or alleged disability. Accordingly, the

Commission finds that complainant has failed to show that the agency's

action was motivated by a discriminatory animus.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the agency's

final decision adopting the AJ's decision finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole

discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not

extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and

the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the

paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

___01-29-02_______________

Date

1 The Commission notes that, in his appeal,

complainant requested that an attorney be appointed to represent him in

connection with the case herein. However, the EEOC Regulations do not

provide for the appointment of attorneys by the Commission.

2 Complainant also referred to the Selectee as the �Prince,� since

he was the Supervisor's heir apparent. He indicated in his affidavit

that the Supervisor was aware of the name-calling and was going to

take disciplinary action against him for his actions. See Report of

Investigation(ROI), Complainant's Affidavit.