L. J. Williams Lumber Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 24, 1951

93 N.L.R.B. 1672 (N.L.R.B. 1951)

1672 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees, although preference would be given an applicant who had
worked in the plant during previous seasons. In our opinion, the
seasonal employees lack a sufficiently regular and substantial tenure of
employment to entitle them to participate in the election, and accord-
ingly, we find that they are ineligible to vote 18
At the time of the hearing, the Employer had temporarily discon-
tinued operations for purposes of construction and expansion of the
plant, but expects to resume operations within a few months. We
shall, therefore, direct that an election be held at such time as the
Regional Director shall determine that production operations have
been resumed and that a representative and substantial number of the
working force has been employed, among the employees in the appro-
priate unit who are employed during the payroll period immediately
preceding the date of the issuance of a notice of election by the Regional
Director.19
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication in this
volume.]
1s The Heek,n Can Company, 88 NLRB 726.
1s Rathy Shoes, Inc, 88 NLRB 1035.
L. J. WILLIAMS, D/B/A L. J. WILLIAMS LUMBER COMPANY AND ADA W.
WILLIAMS, D/B/A VARNVILLE WOOD PRODUCTS COMPANY and PLYWOOD
AND VENEER WORKERS LOCAL UNIONS No. 3130 AND 3135, UNITED
BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, A. F. L.
Case No. 10-CA-993. April 24,1951
Decision and Order
On December 19, 1950, Trial Examiner Thomas S. Wilson issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondents
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report, and a supporting brief.
The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the Respondent's exceptions and brief, and the entire
record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following additions,
exceptions, and modifications.
1 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this proceeding
to a three -member panel [ Members Houston, Reynolds, and Styles].
93 NLRB No. 271.
L. J. WILLIAMS LUMBER COMPANY 1673
1. We find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Respondents inter-
fered with, restrained , and coerced their employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act , in violation of
Section 8 (a) (1) thereof , by their statements and conduct specifically
set forth in the portion of the Intermediate Report captioned "B.
Interference , restraint , and coercion."
2. The Trial Examiner found that the Respondents refused to
bargain collectively with the Union on February 7, 16, and 17, 1950.
At the hearing the Respondents admitted in substance that they had
unlawfully refused to bargain with the Union on behalf of all pro-
duction and maintenance employees in their two plants, provided
such a single unit was appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargining . On or about the dates referred to above, the Respondents
refused to meet with the Union assertedly for the reason that all
members of the Union's committee were not present . However, dur-
ing this period, the Respondents urged employees to refrain from
associating themselves with the Union or its bargaining committee
and induced at least one employee not to participate as a union com-
mitteeman by a promise of benefit.
The Board has previously determined that the two -plant unit was
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining .2 We agree
with the Trial Examiner for the reasons stated by him that the
changes in the Respondents ' operations made since that determination
as set forth in the Intermediate Report, do not make the two-plant
unit inappropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. Ac-
cordingly , we adhere to the Board 's previous determination that the
two-plant unit is an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining . Under the circumstances , we find, in agreement with
the Trial Examiner , that the Respondents refused to bargain collec-
tively with the union on or about February 7, 1950, and thereafter, in
violation of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
3. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondents unlaw-
fully discharged Joe Miller and Ernest Hill on October 26, 1949.
At one time Miller had acted as a supervisor of the Respondents'
wood crew . Thereafter, for at least 6 months before the discharges
took place , Miller and Hill worked together as a team under Foreman
Jake Wynn, hauling logs from the woods by means of a skidder truck.
In this work , one man operated the truck while the other fastened a
steel cable, which was wound around a drum set on the truck, to
the logs.
Sometime after July 1949, when the Union began to organize the
Respondents ' employees , L. J. Williams , the manager of both Re-
spondents , summoned the entire woods crew to the mill. There he
2 L J. Williams, et al., 87 NLRB 610.
1674 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
interrogated them as to how the Union got started and asked whether
any of them had signed union cards. The only reply Williams 're-
ceived was a negative one from Hill. Addressing Miller, Williams
then stated, "I do believe that black son-of-a-bitch knows all about it." 3
Sometime thereafter, but before their discharge, Miller and Hill
joined the Union and attended union meetings.
Thereafter, in August 1949, after Williams had seen Miller's auto-
mobile parked at the union hall, Miller was told by Williams that
he 'would not have made a previous loan of money to Miller had
Williams know that Miller was a union member. On a later occasion,
Williams met Miller and Hill in a public place and addressed Miller
as "the big union man." Thereafter, on October 21, just 5 days before
the discharges, Williams questioned Miller's son-in-law, Loyd Allen,
concerning attendance at the union meetings by Miller and Hill, and
Allen reported to Williams that Miller attended union meetings, but
that he, Allen, had no information with respect to this matter as to
Hill.
On the evening of October 26, 1949, Foreman Wynn notified Miller
and Hill that they were being laid off because there was not sufficient
work and advised them to find employment elsewhere. About 2 or 3
weeks later, Foreman Wynn offered to reemploy Hill at his old job, but
Hill rejected the offer.
The Respondents contend that they discharged Miller and Hill as
part of a reduction in force because there was no work for them.
Although there was a decline in the amount of work available which
compelled the Respondents to release other members of the woods crew
about this time, the record does not establish that there was no work
available for Miller and Hill or that the Respondents released them for
this reason. On the cgntrary, on the day following the discharges, the
Respondents hired a new employee, Levi, who worked as part of the
skidding team; and Foreman Wynn participated in production work
to complete the team.4 The felling and bucking crews were still at
'We do not adopt the Trial Examiner's comment contained in footnote 9 of the Inter.
mediate Report concerning Williams ' statement to Miller . Nor do we regard the comment
or any other conduct of the Trial Examiner as showing bias or prejudice on his part, as
the Respondents charge.
4 The Trial Examiner characterized Wynn's testimony that he worked on the skidder team
on October 27 as "suspect " for the stated reason that "Wynn was completely unable to
decide whether he had operated the skidder or had acted as hook tender." The testimony
of Wynn in question is as follows :
A. This fellow Levi is a good truck driver , and I had been trying to get him to
drive a truck ; so the next morning be come, and I didn't put him on the truck ;
particularly that morning , because I didn't have one right at the time. And through
me and him we operated the skidder ; while he loaded , operated the skidder, I
hooked to the dogs, ( sic) and while he operated-while I operated the skidder he
hooked the dogs, ( sic) and while the truck was gone he helped the man with the
mule, and hooking on.
It is sufficiently clear to us from the testimony that Wynn operated the truck part of
the time, while Levi acted as hook tender , and that when Levi operated the truck, Wynn
acted as hook tender. We therefore credit Wynn's testimony in this respect.
L. J. WILLIAMS LUMBER COMPANY 1675
work at the time of the discharge of Miller and Hill, with the result
that more logs were being prepared for hauling for a period of time
after the discharges, and during this period the Respondents continued
to operate the skidder truck formerly manned by Miller and Hill.
Indeed, Hill's old job was admittedly available for him atleast 2 or 3
weeks after his discharge.
Rather we are convinced that the Respondents discharged Miller and
Hill because of Miller's union activity and that Hill was an innocent
victim of the Respondents' unfair labor practice directed at Miller.
Miller was a member of the Union and attended union meetings. The
Respondents knew of Miller's union activity and objected to it. In-
deed, as stated in the Intermediate Report, the Respondent had warned
the employees that their plant would be closed if the Union won the
election and threatened to lay off the employees one by one with the
union men being discharged first until the plant was shut down. We
believe that the Respondents seized upon the reduction in force as a
pretext to rid themselves of Miller. However, this excuse could not be
made to appear valid unless the Respondents `also released Hill, as both
Miller and Hill worked as a team.' The Respondents thus discharged
both Hill and Miller, although, so far as appears, the Respondents had
no knowledge as to Hill's union activity. Having eliminated Miller
from employment, the Respondents later offered to rehire Hills How-
ever, although the Respondents increased their working force at least
as early as February 1950, they never recalled Miller.
The Respondents contend that, after the discharges, they permitted
Miller to cultivate a plot of ground located on a plantation managed by
the Respondents which was being developed as a game preserve and
that this fact militates against the General Counsel's contention that
the Respondents discharged Miller because of his union activity. We
do not regard this fact as controlling. The Respondents benefited
from Miller's cultivation of the land, as the crops attracted game life to
the preserve; and, in any event, as a planter, Miller was not an em-
ployee, and therefore the Respondents did not have to contend with
him as a union adherent.
Accordingly, we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Respond-
ents, by discharging Joe Miller and Ernest Hill, discriminated with
regard to their hire and tenure of employment to discourage member-
ship in the Union, in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, thereby
b Wynn admitted in his testimony that, when sometime later he was asked by Hill why
be was discharged , Wynn replied : " I told him just so, on account of I was going to lay
Joe Miller off, and he was with Joe Miller."
6 At the hearing the Respondents characterized Miller as an incompetent worker, but
admitted that he was not released for this reason . As stated above, Miller was at one
time employed by the Respondents as a supervisor . The record does not establish that
Miller was an incompetent worker or that the Respondents so regarded him before the
advent of the Union.
1676 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
interfering with, restraining , and coercing employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8
(a) (1) thereof.
4. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondents stopped
paying Jaines Henderson the sum of $15 a week for transporting
employees to and from work and evicted him from a company-owned
house because of his union activities . We also find that the Respond-
ents discriminated against Henderson because of his failure to make
accurate reports to Manager Williams of what transpired at union
meetings.
The Respondents contend that they stopped making these weekly
payments to Henderson because, contrary to a previous understanding,
he charged the employees for transporting them in addition to collect-
ing the weekly stipend from the Respondents , and because the Re-
spondents found that they could eliminate this expense by transport-
ing the employees in another truck which the Respondents operated on
a somewhat parallel route . These contentions have no merit. The
Respondents were not advised that Henderson was making an addi-
tional charge to the employees for transportation, if he was, until after
the Respondents had decided to stop paying Henderson the weekly
stipend. As to the second contention the record shows that, when the
Respondents discontinued their arrangement with Henderson , they did
not furnish other transportation to the employees ; on the contrary,
Henderson continued to transport the employees under an arrange-
ment with each passenger.
The Respondents contend that they evicted Henderson from the rent-
free house referred to above because Henderson did not farm the land
in accordance with a conservation program to attract quail . However,
as the Trial Examiner found, nothing was said to Henderson about
the necessity of farming the land at the time of his eviction, or any
time; the record establishes that the Respondents did not inform the
new tenant who replaced Henderson that the land must be farmed;
and at the time of the hearing, about 10 months later , there was no
more farming being done on the land in question than there had been
at the time of the eviction.
Indeed, Manager Williams admitted at the hearing that 2 days after
the election , which the Union won, he decided to stop paying Hender-
son the weekly stipend of $15 because of Williams ' "resentment against"
what he regarded as Henderson 's "treachery" in failing to give Wil-
liams accurate reports of union activities , as more fully set forth in the
Intermediate Report. On the same day when Williams decided to
penalize Henderson in this way for his shortcomings as a labor spy,
the Respondents gave Henderson notice to vacate the house.
Under the circumstances we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that
by discontinuing the weekly payments of $15 to Henderson for trans-
6
L. J. WILLIAMS LUMBER COMPANY 1677
porting employees and by evicting him from a rent-free house, the
Respondents discriminated with respect to his hire or tenure of em-
ployment to discourage membership in the Union, in violation of Sec-
tion 8 (a) (3) of the Act, thereby interfering with, restraining, and
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) thereof. -
The Remedy
The Trial Examiner recommended, inter alia, that the Respondents
offer Henderson immediate occupancy of his former, or equivalent, liv-
ing quarters on the same terms formerly accorded to Henderson before
the discrimination. The record shows that Henderson was discharged
about a month after the occurrence of the Respondents' discrimination
against him. So far as appears, the discharge was not an unfair labor
practice; and no such allegation is made. Under these circumstances,
and because it appears that Henderson was not, at the time of the hear-
ing, in the Respondents' employ, we shall modify this portion of the
Trial Examiner's recommendation by ordering the Respondents to offer
Henderson immediate occupancy of his former, or equivalent, living
quarters only in the event that Henderson has, since the date of the
hearing in this case, been reemployed by the Respondents and is
currently in their employ.
As stated above, after his discharge, Hill rejected an offer of rein-
statement. We shall, therefore, not order that he be offered reinstate-
ment and shall limit his award of back pay to the period from the time
of his discharge to the date on which he rejected reinstatement.
Order
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the. National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the Respondents, L. J. Williams, doing busi-
ness as L. J. Williams Lumber Company, and Ada W. Williams, doing
business as Varnville Wood Products 'Company, Varnville, South
Carolina, their agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from : '
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Plywood and Veneer
Workers' Local Unions No. 3130 and 3135, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, A. F. L., as the exclusive repre-
sentative of all production, maintenance, and yard employees'of L. J.
Williams Lumber Company and of Varnville Wood Products Com-
pany employed in their operations at Varnville, South Carolina, and
vicinity, including firemen, but excluding office, clerical, and profes-
sional employees, watchmen, guards, woods foreman, and all other
supervisors as defined in the Act.
1678 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Discouraging membership in Plywood and Veneer Workers'
Local Unions No. 3130 and 3135, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, A. F. L., by discriminating in regard to hire
and tenure of employment or conditions of employment of any of their
employees.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, and coercing
their employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or assist Plywood and Veneer Workers'
Local Unions No. 3130 and 3135, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, A. F. L., or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any
or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Plywood and Veneer
Workers' Local Unions No. 3130 and 3135, United Brotherhood of Car-
penters and Joiners of America, A. F. L., as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit hereinbefore
described with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment,
and other terms and conditions of employment.
(b) Offer to Joe Miller immediate and full reinstatement to his
former or a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to
his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for
any loss of pay which he may have suffered by reason of the Respond-
ents' discrimination against him in the manner described above and
in the section of the Intermediate Report entitled "The remedy".
(c) Make Ernest Hill whole for any loss of pay which he may have
suffered by reason of the Respondents' discrimination against him in
the manner described in the section of this Decision entitled "The
Remedy."
(d) Make whole James Henderson for any loss of remuneration
which he has suffered by reason of the Respondents' discrimination
against him, in the manner described in the section of the Intermediate
Report entitled "The remedy."
(e) Offer to restore James Henderson to his former or substantially
equivalent rent-free living quarters as provided hereinabove and in
the section of the Intermediate Report entitled "The remedy."
(f) Post at their plants in Varnville, South Carolina, copies of
the notice attached hereto marked Appendix A 7 Copies of said no-
' In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be inserted before the words, "A Decision and Order," the words, "A Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing."
L. J. WILLIAMS LUMBER COMPANY 1679
tice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region,
shall, after being duly signed by the Respondents' representatives,
be posted by the Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof and
maintained by them for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(g) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondents have taken to comply herewith.
Appendix A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization,
to form labor organizations, to join or assist PLYWOOD & VENEER
WORKERS' LOCAL UNIONS No. 3130 AND 3135, UNITED BROTHER-
HOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, A. F. L., or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activ-
ities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection.
WE WILL OFFER to Joe Miller immediate and full reinstatement
to his former or substantially equivalent position without preju-
dice to any seniority or other rights and privileges previously
enjoyed, and make Joe Miller and Ernest Hill whole for any
loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination.
WE WILL make whole James Henderson for any loss of remun-
eration which he has suffered by reason of discrimination against
him and offer to restore him to his former or substantially equiv-
alent rent-free living quarters, subject to such limitations as
provided.
WE WILL BARGAIN collectively with the above-named union as
the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining
unit described herein with respect to rates of pay, hours of em-
ployment, or other conditions of employment, and if an under-
standing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement. The bargaining unit is:
1680 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
All production, maintenance, and yard employees of L. J.
Williams Lumber Company and Varnville Wood Products
Company employed in their operations at Varnville, South
Carolina, and vicinity, including firemen, but excluding
office, clerical, and professional employees, watchmen, guards,
woods foreman, and all other supervisors as defined in the
Act.
All our employees are free to become or remain members of the
above-named union or any other labor organization. We will not
discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment against any employee because of member-
ship in or activity on behalf of any such labor organization.
L. J. WILLIAMS LUMBER COMPANY,
Employer.
By -------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
Dated----------------
VARNVILLE WOOD PRODUCTS COMPANY,
Employer.
By -----------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
Dated----------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Intermediate Report
William J. Rains, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Randolph Murdaugh, Esq., of Hampton, S. C., for the Respondent.
Francis X. Ward, Esq., of Indianapolis, Ind., and Messrs. J. A. Parker and
W. E. Mathes, Sr., of Hampton, S. C., for the Union.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a first amended charge duly filed on October 11, 1950,1 by Plywood and
Veneer Workers' Local Unions No. 3130 and 3135, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, A. F. L., herein called the Union, the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein respectively called the
General Counsel 2 and the Board, by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region
(Atlanta, Georgia), issued a complaint dated October 11, 1950, against L. J.
Williams, d/b/a L. J. Williams Lumber Company, and Ada W. Williams, d/b/a
Varnville Wood Products Company, herein respectively referred to as the Re-
spondents or as Respondent Williams and Respondent Varnville, alleging that
the Respondents , and each of them, had engaged in, and were engaging in, unfair
1 The original charge in this proceeding was filed on February 23, 1950.
2 This term specifically includes the attorneys for the General Counsel appearing at
the hearing.
L. J. WILLIAMS LUMBER COMPANY 1681
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1),
(3), and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint and the various
charges, together with notice of hearing thereon, were duly served on the
Respondents and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices. the complaint in substance alleged
that the Respondents, and each of them: (1) On or about February 9, 1950,'
refused, and had thereafter continued to refuse, to bargain in good faith with
the Union as the exclusive representative of the Respondent's employees in
the appropriate unit in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act; (2) discharged
and otherwise discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure-and terms and
conditions of employment of Joe Miller and Ernest Hill on or about October 26,
1949, and of James Henderson on January 12, 1950, in violation of Section 8 (a)
(3) of the Act; and (3) by various enumerated acts set forth in the complaint,'
interfered with, restrained, and coerced their employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed m Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section S (a) (1).
On October 24, 1950, the Respondent filed its answer wherein it admitted the
jurisdictional facts as to commerce but denied the commission of any unfair
labor practice other than the allegation in the complaint that the Respondents had
interrogated the employees as to their union membership and sympathies which
was admitted.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held oil October 31 and November 1, 1950, at
Hampton. South Carolina. before the undersigned, the Trial Examiner duly
designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel, the Re-
spondents, and the Union were represented by counsel. All parties participated
in the hearing and were afforded fall opportunity to be heard, to examine and
cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence pertaining to the issues
At the conclusion of the hearing the General Counsel and counsel for the Re-
spondents made short oral arguments but reserved the right to file briefs
thereafter with the undersigned. However, no briefs have been received.
Pursuant to permission granted at the hearing, the Respondent and the General
Counsel entered into a written stipulation which has been forwarded to the
undersigned. The undersigned hereby orders that this stipulation be marked
as Trial Examiner's Exhibit No. 1, admitted in evidence and made a part of
the record hereof.
Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENTS
L. J Williams is an individual doing business as L. J Williams Lumber
Company, and his wife, Ada W. Williams, is all individual doing business as
Varnville Wood Products Company, both having their principal office and place
of business at Varnville, South Carolina.
Respondent Williams, at all times material herein, has been engaged in busi-
ness as a manufacturer of pine lumber at a plant in Varnville, South Carolina
During the course and conduct of his business operation during the past calendar
year, which period is representative of all times material herein, he purchased
raw materials, consisting principally of logs, lumber, and mill supplies, valued
in excess of $100,000, approximately 10 percent of which, in value, or ginated
This date was added to the complaint by amendment at the hearing
943722-51-107
1682 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
outside the State of South Carolina and was shipped in interstate commerce to
Respondent Williams' plant. During the same period, Respondent Williams
sold finished products, consisting principally of rough and dressed pine lumber,
valued in excess of $250,000, approximately 90 percent of which, in value, was
sold and shipped to customers outside the State of South Carolina.
Respondent Varnville, at all times material herein, has been engaged in business
as a manufacturer of hardwood dimension stock at a plant in Varnville, South
Carolina. During the course and conduct of her business operations during the
past calendar year, which period is representative of all times material herein,
she purchased raw materials consisting principally of logs, lumber, and mill
supplies valued in excess of $50,000, approximately 10 percent of which, in
value, originated outside the State of South Carolina and was shipped in
interstate commerce to her plant. During the same period, Respondent Varn-
Ville sold finished products consisting principally of hardwood dimension stock,
valued in excess of $100,000, approximately 90 percent of which, in value, was
sold to customers outside the State of South Carolina.
The answer of the Respondents admits, and the undersigned finds, that the
Respondents are engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LA13OR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Plywood and Veneer Workers' Local Unions No. 3130 and 3135, United Brother-
hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, A. F. L., is a labor organization
admitting to membership employees of the Respondents.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The basic facts
The Union began organizing the employees of these two Respondents about
July 1949. On July 12 the Union requested the Respondents to recognize the
Union as the representative of said employees, but the Respondents, through
L. J. Williams, refused this request. On July 21 the Union filed a petition
for certification with the Board. On September 27 the Board held a public
hearing on this petition at which time both the Union and the Respondents
made their positions clear upon the record. At this time, as at all times since
this matter arose, the Respondents have claimed that the employees of each
Respondent constituted an appropriate unit and that a unit composed of the
employees of both Respondents was inappropriate.' On December 13, 1949, the
Board issued its Decision and Direction of Election wherein the Board made
the following finding contrary to the Respondents' contention:
In view of the close proximity and single ownership of plants and equip-
ment, and the common over-all management of both businesses, together
with the joint employment of some employees within the unit, we find
that the employees of the two companies may appropriately be joined in a
single unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
Accordingly, we find that all production, maintenance, and yard em-
ployees of Williams Lumber Company and Varnville Wood Products Com-
pany employed in their operations at Varnville, South Carolina, and vi-
During his testimony at the instant hearing, L. J. Williams remarked : "I find it
awfully hard to lie." He was again telling the truth. Thanks to his frank and honest
testimony the question of the appropriateness of the unit became, with the exception
of the cases of discrimination, really the sole issue in the case as Williams candidly
admitted practically all of the other charges.
L. J. WILLIAMS,LUMBER COMPANY 1683
cinity, including firemen , but excluding office clerical and professional em-
ployees, watchmen , guards, wood foreman , and all other supervisors as
defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
On January 10, 1950, the election so directed was held and won by the Union
by a vote of 60 to 4. The Union was thereupon duly certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent for the employees in the unit above described. On February
9, 16, and 17, 1950, the Respondents refused to bargain with the Union, again
raising the point that the unit determination of the Board was incorrect.
B. Interference, restraint, and coercion
Based either upon the affirmative testimony of L. J. Williams, or upon his
failure to deny testimony given by other witnesses, it is undenied, and the
undersigned therefore finds, that the Respondents interfered with, restrained,
and coerced their employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by
Section 7 of the Act, thus violating Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by the follow-
ing acts and conduct, among others which are not here found for the sake of
brevity :
(1) Williams, acting for and on behalf of both Respondents, interrogated the
employees of both Respondents as to their union membership and sympathy 5
(2) Williams, acting for and on behalf of both Respondents, also interrogated
Loyd ° Allen, while Allen was applying to him for a loan in order to pay the
hospital bills of his wife, as to the union membership of employees Miller and
Hill.
(3) Williams, acting for and on behalf of both Respondents, reminded the
assembled employees how, in the past, he had assisted them when they got into
trouble, lent them money to pay hospital bills, got them out of jail, and allowed
them to live in houses rent free, and then warned them that, if the Union won
the election, this assistance would cease.
(4) On or about August 7, 1949, when employee Joe Miller asked Williams
for a loan so that be could pay hospital bills for his daughter, Williams inquired
of Miller if he knew anything about the Union and, upon receiving a negative
answer, said that if Miller did not know anything about the Union, then Wil-
liams would lend him the money to help him and, in fact, did so. A few days
later, Williams again saw employee Miller accompanied by employee Hill and
called Miller "the big union man." Although Miller denied at that time that he
was the "big union man" as Williams had accused him of being, Williams said:
"But if I had known you had joined the union I would not have loaned you
money to get your daughter in the hospital."
(5) Williams, acting for and on behalf of both Respondents, told the em-
ployees individually, and also in a speech made to the assembled employees,
just before the election, that he would close the plant if the Union won the
election, and also that he would lay off the men one by one with the union men
being discharged first until he had closed the plant.'
(6) Williams, acting for and on behalf of both Respondents, in a speech to the
assembled employees on the, day prior to the election, after reminding the em-
ployees of all the financial and other assistance the Respondent had granted
This violation was admitted in the answer.
e So spelled in transcript.
Williams denied having ' made that part of the above statement referring to laying
off the union men first but , in view of the undenied portion of his statements, the
undersigned finds that Williams was mistaken in this denial.
943732-51-108 '
1684 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
e
to them in the past, advised all his "friends" not to vote in the election stating
that the others could vote for the Union
(7) Williams, acting for and on behalf of both Respondents, induced employee
James Henderson to attend the meetings of the Union and to report to him what
occurred at such meetings and he also interrogated various other employees
about the same matter, thus maintaining surveillance over the Union and its
activities.
(8) Williams, acting for and on behalf of both Respondents, after the Union
had won the election told his white employees that they could still defeat the
Union if they would all "fail to appear" as part of the Union's negotiating com-
mittee, and reminded employee Sinclair, who had previously agreed to be the
white representative on this negotiating committee, that he "had been in trouble
[in the past] and that if he retained -my -[Williams] friendship, there would
probably be a time when he would need me to get him out of trouble again."
Sinclair refused to participate on the union committee.
Although the above does not include all the incidents of interference, restraint,
and coercion shown in the record, those cited above are typical and are of such
a common variety of violation of Section 8 (a) (1) as to require neither discus-
sion nor citation of authority. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that, by the
above-mentioned incidents, the Respondents, and each of them, interfered with,
restrained, and coerced their employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the
Act.
C. The refusal to bargain
1. The appropriate unit
As stated heretofore the question of the appropriate unit is the real issue
in this case as far as the refusal to bargain is concerned. The Respondents at
the instant hearing agreed upon the record that, if the unit were found to be
appropriate, the Respondents were willing to concede both the majority repre-
sentation of the Union in that unit and its refusal of the Union's demand that
the Respondents bargain with it.
Following the public hearing of September 27, 1949, the Board issued its
Decision and Direction of Election in Case No. 10-RC-673 involving these
Respondents. In this Decision and Direction of Election the Board found, and
the undersigned agrees, as follows :
L J. Williams is the owner and manager of Williams, and is the general
manager of Varnville, which is owned by Ada W. Williams, his wife. Wil-
liams manufactures pine lumber; Varnville manufactures hardwood squares,
a product used by furniture manufacturers. Williams' plant consists of
three buildings, and Varnville's plant consists of five. All are located on a
single tract of land, and, together with their machinery and equipment, are
owned by Ada Williams. For his use of the buildings and machinery,
L. J. Williams pays his wife rent in the form of fuel, consisting of waste
lumber from his plant, for the steam boilers required by both companies.
8 Regarding this "advice" Williams testified as follows :
I was laboring under a misapprehension then. I thought the law meant what it
says, that the majority of the voters had to vote affirmatively for the union to come
in. But I found out later by some quirk of the language it doesn't mean exactly that.
Not being familiar with the legal intricacies of the Taft-Hartley law, Williams had made
the understandable mistake of reading the proviso of Section 8 (a) (3) instead of Section
9 (c) of the Act and, therefore, did not realize that, in a representation election, as is
generally the case in all other elections in the United States, a majority of the voters
casting ballots carry the election. Unfortunately, Williams had been reading the section
dealing with the elections regarding the rights to bargain for union-security clauses.
L. J. WILLIAMS LUMBER COMPANY -- 4685
Otherwise, there are no sales or exchanges of materials between the
companies.
The two companies share a single office building, as well as a single heat
and steam plant. They jointly employ one head bookkeeper and each pays
one-half of his salary. The assistant bookkeeper is employed by Williams
but spends about 10 percent of his time working for Varnville. The wages
of the firemen who fire the boilers and those of the watchmen and saw filer
are paid by the two companies in equal shares.
Each company, although under the general supervision of L. J. Williams,
is separately directed by a superintendent who has complete charge of all
the various operations of that company, including the hire and discharge of
its employees. Each superintendent pays the employees under his direction
with funds drawn upon a joint account carried by the two companies. The
checks, of different colors for each company, are signed by the superintendent
and countersigned by the head bookkeeper. Although there is no inter-
change of employees between the companies, the rates of pay and other
conditions of employment in the two concerns are the same.
In view of the close proximity and single ownership of plants and equip-
ment, and the common over-all management of both businesses, together
with the joint employment of some employees within the unit, we find
that the employees of the two companies may appropriately be joined in a
single unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.
At the instant hearing the Respondents were given the opportunity and, indeed,
encouraged to present any further evidence they might have which would
sustain their contention that the employees of the individual Companies con-
stituted separate bargaining units.
One distinct change in the operations has taken place since the hearing of
September 27. As of the date of the instant hearing, the operations of Re-
spondent Williams have been moved to a piece of property owned by Williams
in the town of Varnville about three-quarters of a mile from the plant of Re-
spondent Varnville where Respondent Williams has built a new plant. How-
ever, as of the time of the instant hearing Respondent Williams was still using
the' dry kiln at the Varnville plant because the new kiln at the plant of Re-
spondent Williams was still under construction. The machinery used by Re-
spondent Williams at the Varnville plant has been moved to its new location
at the newly constructed plant. What financial arrangements, if any, have
been made in regard to this machinery were not disclosed at the instant hearing.
At the time of the hearing of September 27, the woods crew under Foreman
Jake Wynn was on the payroll of Respondent Varnville because it was logging
hardwood. At the time of the instant hearing the same woods crew was on the
payroll of Respondent Williams because it was then logging pine wood All
logs produced by this crew are delivered at the sawmill located at the plant
of Respondent Varnville where they are cut into logs This lumber is then
distributed to each of the Respondents depending upon whether it is pine or
hardwood for further processing. A financial book transaction is thereupon
made between the Respondents in accordance with the distribution.
The labor employed by each of these Respondents is largely unskilled manual
labor being paid the minimum hourly rate of 75 cents per hour. Each of the
Respondents also employs a few skilled machine operators whose positions would
not be interchangeable between Respondents without further training. Other-
wise the labor would be interchangeable as it is almost exclusively unskilled.
There has been almost no interchange of employees between Respondents but
this is due largely, if not exclusively, to the necessity of keeping the finances of
1686 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 'BOARD
each Respondent separate because each superintendent is paid a salary plus a
percentage of the profits from his own operation. Some few of the employees,
such as the mechanic and maintenance employees, work for both Respondents
who divide the wages of these individuals between their respective operations.
In fact, the separation of these two enterprises historically resulted from
legal difficulties Williams had with the Wage and Hour Division enforcing the
Fair Labor Standards Act and because the management desired to take ad-
vantage of certain provisions of the income tax laws. For these reasons Wil-
liams deeded Respondent Varnville to his wife. It has been maintained in
order to determine the percentage of the profit which each of the two super-
intendents is to share. Thus the separation of the enterprises is exclusively
for management purposes. There is no functional reason for the separation.
The mere physical geographical separation of these two enterprises by a dis-
tance of three-quarters of a mile, under these circumstances, does not make the
unit, found by the Board to he appropriate, inappropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining , especially in view of the fact that the representatives of
the employees of each of the Respondents would be dealing with the same
individual, L. J. Williams, in the event that the employees of each enterprise
were to be considered to be a separate appropriate unit.
Therefore, the undersigned, in accordance with the prior decision of the Board,
finds that all production, maintenance, and yard employees of Williams Lumber
Company and Varnville Wood Products Company employed in their operations
at Varnville, South Carolina, and vicinity, including firemen, but excluding office
clerical and professional employees, watchmen, guards, woods foreman, and all
other supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
2. The refusal to bargain
On February 7, 16, and 17, 1950, the Respondents refused to bargain with
the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit above
found to be appropriate. At the hearing counsel for the Respondents admitted
that, if the unit found by the Board was the appropriate unit,'then the Respond-
ents would admit that they had refused to bargain with the Union.
Therefore, the undersigned finds that on February 7, 16, and 17, 1950, the
Respondents refused to bargain with the Union as the duly certified and exclu-
sive representative of the employees of the Respondents in the unit above found
appropriate in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
D. Discrimination in regard to tenure of employment
1. Joe Miller and Ernest Hill
Joe Miller worked for Respondent Varnville as a skidder operator for about
a year under Foreman DeLoach According to Williams, during that period
of time Miller to all intents and purposes supervised the woods crew because
DeLoach was not a good supervisor.
After DeLoach had been discharged, Miller was transferred to Respondent
'Williams' payroll and placed under Foreman Jake Wynn.
In southern logging operations a skidder is a truck upon which a drum and
motor are set. By means of winding a long steel cable around this drum, logs
are dragged out of the woods to a spot where they can be loaded upon a truck
and hauled to the mill. Skidder operations require a team of two men at
least-one to operate the motor and drum and the other, a hooker setter, who
fastens the cable by means of tongs to the log in the woods. In addition to these
L. J. WILLIAMS LUMBER COMPANY 1687
employees there are usually two others attached to a skidder crew-a signalman
and a man with a mule who drags the cable back into the woods for the next
log. The skidder is also used for loading logs on trucks, which operation also
requires at least two men-the drum operator and the loader.
Ernest Hill became the other member of the skidder crew with Miller. They
worked as a team for more than 6 months prior to their discharge on October
26, 1949, under Foreman Wynn. The work of a skidder team being dangerous
work requires skilled men despite the fact that the Respondents never paid
either Miller or Hill more than the minimum wage required by law.
Sometime after the union drive began in July, Williams had the woods crew,
including Miller and Hill, brought back to the mill early one evening so that
he could expound to them his opposition to the unionization of the Respondents'
employees. As the truck with the woods crew arrived at the mill, Williams
walked over and inquired of them if any of them knew how the Union got
started and if any of them had signed union cards. The only answer he received
was "No, sir" from Hill. Whereupon Williams turned to Miller and obviously
addressing him, said : "I do believe that black sonofabitch 9 knows all about it."
Sometime thereafter Miller and Hill both joined the Union and attended
union meetings.
In August Miller borrowed some money from Williams to pay hospital bills
incurred for his daughter. Sometime thereafter, as found above, after Williams
had seen Miller's automobile parked at the union ball, Williams informed Miller
that, if he had realized that Miller was a union member, he (Williams) would
not have lent Miller the money.10 On a subsequent occasion Williams met Miller
and Hill in a filling station in Varnville and called out: "Well, Joe Miller, the
big union man." No doubt, as Williams himself testified, this was a pleasantry
but it definitely indicated that Williams had Miller's union affiliations on his mind.
On Friday, October 21, Loyd Allen, Miller's son-in-law, borrowed some more
money from Williams in order to pay some hospital bills incurred on behalf of
his wife, Miller's daughter. Prior to giving Allen this money, Williams inquired
of him whether Miller and Hill attended union meetings. Allen acknowledged
that Miller did attend but stated that he did not know about Hill. Williams
thereupon lent him the money requested.
On Monday, October 24, the Ford skidder, which Miller operated, and the
International skiddeg both moved across a division fence into a new tract of
timber. This latter was a small tract of timber. About noon Wynn laid off
Miller and Hill on the ground that there was not enough work for them to do.
At this time the falling and bucking crews were at work but there were appar-
ently no logs to skid or load.
Miller and Hill worked full time on Tuesday and Wednesday skidding and
loading. The falling and bucking crews were still at work so that more logs
were being prepared throughout this whole period.
On Wednesday night Foreman Wynn laid off Miller and Hill on the ground
that he had to reduce his crew because there was not sufficient work. He in-
formed them that if they found other jobs, they should take them. A few of the
woods crew had been laid off prior to this time.
However, on Thursday morning the Ford skidder operated as usual on the job
as did the International skidder. But a new employee, one "Levi," was employed
9 Apparently a South Carolina colloquialism denoting friendship, for Williams testified
quite truthfully, the undersigned believes, that he had a high regard for Miller.
10 In view of the prerogative Williams had created of lending money to his old, regular
employees like Miller for such emergencies, a threat to refuse such a loan because of
the employees' union affiliations is definitely coercive and violative of Section 8 (a) (1)
of the Act as found above. Even prerogatives create responsibilities.
1688 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
by the Respondents for the first time and worked as a part of the skidder team.
Wynn, who obviously was not telling the truth, testified that Levi had been
working for the Respondents on the woods crew for the previous 3 or 4 weeks but
his testimony to this effect was corrected by the stipulation (TX Exhibit No. 1)
mentioned above which shows that Levi was first employed on, October 27.
Wynn's further testimony that he also worked on the skidder that Thursday was
also suspect, in the opinion of the undersigned, because Wynn was completely
unable to decide whether he had operated the skidder or had acted as the hook
tender. Both the Ford and the International skidders continued to work in this
operation for some time thereafter before the International skidder was sent
back to the mill for repairs where it was later used for loading purposes.
With the hiring of Levi on October 27, it is obvious that Miller and Hill were
not released in order to reduce the crew by two men as contended by the Re-
spondents. As Wynn testified that he had been satisfied with Hill's work and as
Miller was a good enough man to run the woods crew to all intents and purposes
under the former incompetent foreman, it becomes perfectly obvious that the Re-
spondents discharged Miller and Hill because the Respondents knew that Miller
was "a big union man" and in order to discourage union membership among the
Respondents' employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) and 8 (a) (1) of the
Act, and the undersigned so finds.
2. James Henderson
James Henderson had worked' for the Respondents for approximately 3 years.
During most of that time the Respondents had paid Henderson $15 per week for
transporting a number of the employees between their homes and the mill each
day.
The rest of the Henderson incident can best be told in the words of Williams
himself who testified as follows :
Q. What about James Henderson, Mr. Williams? Do you remember what
he said that you told him?
A. Well, James is the only person in this whole thing towards whom I
have the slightest feeling of animosity. And I do have a very distinct
feeling of animosity towards James. He was-I practically raised the
nigger. When his mother died I buried her, pay all expenses. After her
death his old daddy lived on my place, and he drew his old-age compensa-
tion, some compensation from the government, which was almost enough
money to see him through ; but on occasions he would run short ; I would
go up to the mill and there would be old Tom sitting on the log deck, and I
would go up and talk to him and the upshot of it was I would hand him
$40 or $50. And that continued for a good many years. And finally when
he died I paid his burial expenses. I advanced the total cost of his burial
expenses; and later I had two of the boys-old Jake didn't have sense
enough to make enough money to help bury his daddy, but the other two
boys did. And I made the other two boys stand a third of the cost of burying
the old nigger, and I paid the other third.
And when the matter of the union came up-well, later and further along
I built the house out of which I later moved James, especially for James;
built him a new house on my land at the time I owned it, and I gave him the
job of hauling those men, and continued it long after it was necessary, be-
cause of the friendly feeling that I had for the nigger, that I felt like I
wanted to do something for him because of past associations. And when the
matter of the union came up and I determined-had learned from the
attitude of my men that they were being told things that I should know,
L. J. WILLIAMS LUMBER COMPANY 1689
about, I cast about in my mind for somebody to keep me informed as to
what was going on. I felt it was up to me to try to find out to protect my
interests. I naturally- thought of James Henderson, and I went. to him
and Tasked-him to attend these meetings and that anything that was said
or happened at these meetings that would tend to hurt me, that I would
appreciate it if he would let me know about it. And he fell right into it
and agreed to it ; and he would go to the meeting and come back and tell
me a pack of lies, and then go to the other side and then tell them everything
I said. And then when I saw the nigger go in there and vote [ referring
to the Board-conducted election of January 10, 1950] I had a very normal,
human reaction to the situation.
Trial Examiner WILSON : That was the time when you thought it required
a majority of the whole crew to carry the election, Mr. Williams?
The Witness : That is right.
A. (continuing) And I knew when he went in there to vote that he had
gone against me. Well, my first impulse was to kick him off the job. I
mean forcibly. But I realized that would be a breach of the law. And
then I got to thinking about some way I could get back on him and I recalled
that he was drawing $15 a week which was a pure gift, an absolutely non-
essential expense. And I instructed Mr. Wynn to stop payment of that
$15.00.
Trial Examiner WILSON : As a means of "getting back" at him?
The Witness : Not because of his union activities, but in resentment against
his treachery.
Trial Examiner WILSON : In voting in the election?
The Witness : In double-crossing me prior to the election.
Trial Examiner WILSON : I see.
Q (By Mr. Murdaugh) Did you need his truck on the road, Mr. Williams?
A. I did not. It hadn't been needed for months.
Q. Did the fact he voted in the election and was engaging in union activ-
ity, was that the reason you cut the truck=off?
A. No.
Q. You said "treachery." Will you explain that?
A. Well, as I said, I had a very natural feeling of resentment against him.
He double-crossed me, lied to me, in spite of all the kindness I had extended
to him. And I knew that I could not-it would be foolish for me to do any-
thing that could be interpreted as retribution because of his union activity.
However, this was an outside matter, the hauling of the labor, and it was a
pure gift. I no longer felt friendly towards him, and I decided to save that
$15 a week rather than give it to him for nothing.
Q. He says you ran him out of the house, or the property.
A. Anything that happened on that property had entirely no relation to
union activities. We moved out the nonfarmers in an effort to get the prop-
erty farmed He was only one of several.
Two days after the election, January 12, 1950, Williams gave Henderson 1
week in which to get out of the house referred to above and threatened to have
the sheriff evict him unless he was out of the house by that time. At the same
time Williams inquired of Henderson if Henderson owed the Respondents any-
thing other than the $40 which Henderson had borrowed sometime previously.
When Henderson stated that that was all he owed the Respondents, Williams
informed him that he would apply the $15 which Henderson had already earned
that week for transporting the employees and would deduct $25 from the earn-
ings which he had made that week in order to liquidate his debt to the Respond-
1690 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ents. This loan when made was for $50 with repayment at a rate of $5 per week
which was being deducted from Henderson's weekly earnings. Nothing was
said about the necessity of farming the place at this, or any other, time.
On that same day, 2 days after the election, Foreman Wynn informed Hen-
derson that the Respondents would no longer pay him for hauling the employees
to the mill.
As already noted the Respondents contended that they evicted James Hender-
son from his house because of the fact that the property had been sold to a third
party with the intent that it should become a game preserve and that it would
be'necessary that there should be farming on the property in order to attract
the birds. The evidence is overwhelming that the Respondents informed neither
the persons evicted from the property nor those to whom they gave the houses
that the property must be farmed. The evidence is also overwhelming that there
is no more farming being done on the property than had been done in the
past. On this point it must be noted that the Respondents did not call the
manager of the plantation to attempt to corroborate Williams' testimony that
more farming was now being done. Williams admitted that he had not seen the
property for a long time. The undersigned considers his testimony on this point
to be worthless.
From this recital of the facts alone, it is clear that the Respondents dis-
criminated against James Henderson both in depriving him of his $15 a week
for transporting employees and in evicting him from a rent-free house because,
in the opinion of the Respondents, he failed to do their bidding in committing
the illegal act of spying upon the union activities for and on behalf of the
Respondents and in order to discourage union membership among the employees
of the Respondents in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondents set forth in Section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operation of the Respondents' business described in Section
I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have-engaged in, and are engaging in,
unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that they cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondents discriminated in regard to the hire
and tenure of employment of Joe Miller and Ernest Hill in order to discourage
union membership and activity among their employees. It will, therefore, be
recommended that the Respondents offer Joe Miller and Ernest Hill immediate
and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and make
whole Joe Miller and Ernest Hill for any loss of pay each of them may have
suffered by reason of the Respondents' discrimination against him. Consistent
with the Board's new policy in the method of computing back pay," it will be
recommended that the loss of pay be computed upon the basis of each separate
calendar quarter, or portion thereof, during the period from the discriminatory
discharge to the date of a proper offer of reinstatement. The quarterly periods,
11 F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289.
L. J. WILLIAMS' LUIVIBER COMPANY 1691
hereinafter called "quarters," shall begin with the first day of January, April,
July, and October. Loss of pay shall be determined by deducting from a sum'
equal tbcthat which each would normally have earned for each quarter or portion
thereof: his net earnings,' if any, in any other employment during that period.
Earnings in one particular quarter shall have no effect upon the back-pay
liability for any other quarter. It will also be recommended that the Re-
spondents make available to the Board, upon request, payroll and other records
to facilitate the checking of the amount of back pay due.
As the undersigned has also found the Respondents discriminatorily evicted
James Henderson from a company-owned house, it will be further recommended
that the Respondents offer Henderson immediate occupancy of his former, or
equivalent, living quarters on the same terms formerly accorded to Henderson
prior to the discrimination and, further, that the Respondents make Henderson
whole for any loss he may have suffered by reason of the discriminatory eviction,
by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he has had to pay
as rental for other living quarters from the date of eviction to the date he is
offered occupancy in the manner set forth above, plus such additional expenses as
he may have incurred during said period as a direct result of the eviction.
The undersigned has also found that the Respondents discriminatorily with-
drew from James Henderson the weekly payment of $15 per week for transport-
ing the Respondents' employees from their homes to the mill. There was some
hearsay testimony introduced at the hearing tending to show that Henderson,,
contrary to his arrangement with the Respondents, had charged the individual
employees whom he transported a weekly stipend for that purpose. The under-
signed, therefore, will recommend that the Respondents reimburse those em-
ployees who were transported to the mill by Henderson for any payments which
they may have made to Henderson for that service and pay the balance of the
remuneration which Henderson lost after January 12, 1950, by reason of the
Respondents' discriminatory withdrawal of the payment of $15 a week to
.Henderson.
Having found that the Respondents on February 9, 16, and 17, 1950, and at all
times thereafter, refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive
representative of their employees in the appropriate unit, it will be recom-
mended that the Respondents bargain collectively with the Union.
Upon the consideration of the entire record, the undersigned is convinced
that the Respondents' conduct indicates an attitude of opposition to the purposes
of the Act generally. In order, therefore, to make effective the interdependent
guarantees of Section 7 of the Act, thereby minimizing industrial strife which
burdens and obstructs commerce, and thus effectuate the policies of the Act, it
will be recommended that the Respondents cease and desist from in any man-
ner infringing upon the rights guaranteed to the employees in Section 7 of
the Act.
Upon the basis of foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record, the
undersigned makes the following:
CONcLusIONs OF LAW
1. Plywood and Veneer Workers' Local Unions No. 3130 and 3135, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, A. F. L., is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. All production, maintenance, and yard employees of L. J. Williams Lumber
Company and Varnville Wood Products Company employed in their operations
11 Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440.
1692 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
at Varnville, South Carolina, and vicinity, including firemen, but excluding office
clerical and professional employees, watchmen, guards, woods foreman, and all
other supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
3. Plywood and Veneer Workers' Local Unions No. 3130 and 3135, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, A. F. L., was on January
10, 1950, and at all times material herein has been, and now is, the exclusive
representative of all the employees in the above-described unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
4. By refusing on February 9, 16, and 17, 1950, and at all times thereafter,
to bargain with Plywood and Veneer Workers' Local Unions No. 3130 and 3135,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joinersof America, A. F. L., as the exclu-
sive representative of the employees in the above-described appropriate unit,
the Respondents have engaged in, and are engaging in, unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
5. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Joe
Miller and Ernest Hill by discharging each of them on October 26, 1949, and
by discriminating in regard to the conditions of employment of James Henderson
on January 12, 1950, thereby discouraging membership in Plywood and Veneer
Workers' Local Unions No. 3130 and 3135, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, A. F. L., the Respondents have engaged in and are
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of
the Act.
6. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondents have engaged
in and are engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8 (a) (1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended 'Order omitted from publication in this volume.]