Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1978

236 N.L.R.B. 1299 (N.L.R.B. 1978)

KENWORTH TRUCKS OF PHILADELPHIA
Kenworth Trucks of Philadlephia, Incorporated and
Byron H. Turner and Daniel E. Kulp. Cases 4-CA-
8807-1 and 4-CA-8807-2
June 30, 1978
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND MURPHY
On March 16, 1978, Administrative Law Judge
Walter H. Maloney, Jr., issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed a brief in answer to the exceptions of
Respondent supporting the Decision of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions2 of the Administrative Law Judge, to
modify his remedy,3 and to adopt his recommended
Order.4
' Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to over-
rule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility
unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us
that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A 3, 1951). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 We adopt the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that Respondent
by engaging in surveillance of the Union's meeting of July 6, 1977, violated
Sec. I(aXI) of the Act. Although surveillance was not specifically alleged in
the complaint, an examination of the record shows that the issue was fully
litigated, the facts are not in dispute, and the General Counsel in the an-
swering brief argued in support of the Administrative Law Judge's findings
in this regard. See, e.g., Kux Manufacturing Corporalion and Continental
Marketing Corporation: A Joint Employer, 233 NLRB 317(1977), and Grana-
da Mills, Inc.. 143 NLRB 957, 958, fn. I (1963).
In a prior proceeding before us, we found Respondent had violated Sec.
8(aXI), (3), and (5) of the Act and the Third Circuit Courl of Appeals
subsequently enforced the 8(aXI) and (3) findings but refused to enforce the
8(aX5) finding. Kenworth Truck of Phladelphia, Inc., 229 NLRB 815 (1977),
enfd. in relevant part 395 F.2d 1213 (C.A. 3, 1979). The Administrative Law
Judge herein relied in part on the prior case as background evidence show-
ing the strong and continuing union animus which had included two other
instances of unfair labor practice firings. Respondent contends that the
Administrative Law Judge erred in noting its prior violations. We do not
agree, as the Respondent's prior unfair labor practices can be noted as
background. Southeast Texas Television Corporation. 226 NLRB 1340, 1341
(1976); Gerald F. Hinkle d/b/a Akron Novelty Manufacturing Company. 224
NLRB 998, fn. 4 (1976); Local Lodge No. 1424, International Association of
Machinists, AFL-CIO, et al. [Bryan Manufacturing Company] v. N.LR. B.
362 U.S. 411 (1960). However, without regard to the "background," the
record before us itself shows independent evidence of union animus suffi-
cient to support the Administrative Law Judge's finding in the instant case
that Respondent violated the Act.
See Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962), for rationale on
interest payments.
4 In the first paragraph of his recommended notice the Administrative
Law Judge inadvertently omitted certain necessary language. The substitut-
ed notice contains this language.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Kenworth Trucks of
Philadelphia, Incorporated, Chester, Pennsylvania,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the said recommended Order.
except that the attached notice is substituted for that
of the Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia, Incorporated, is
posting this notice to comply with the provisions of
an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.
The Order was issued following a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge in a case in which we were
found to have violated certain sections of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that they are
being discharged because they have given sup-
port to a labor organization.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that the Company
disapproves of their attendance at union meet-
ings.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with dis-
charge because they have given support to a
union.
WE WILL NOT keep union meetings under sur-
veillance.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in, or
activities on behalf of, Local Lodge 724, Inter-
national Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization. All of our employees are free to
become or to remain members of this labor or-
ganization or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT by any other means interfere
with, coerce, or restrain employees in the exer-
cise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of
the Act. These rights include the right to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own
236 NLRB No. 170
1299
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
choosing, and to engage in other concerted ac-
tivities for their mutual aid and protection.
WE WILL offer to Byron H. Turner and to
Daniel E. Kulp full and immediate reinstate-
ment to their former positions or, in the event
that those positions no longer exist, to substan-
tially equivalent employment, and WE WILL make
them whole for any loss of pay they may have
suffered by reason of the discriminations prac-
ticed against them, with interest.
KENWORTH TRUCKS OF PHILADELPHIA, INCOR-
PORATED
DECISION
FINDINGS OF FACT
Statement of the Case
WALTER H. MALONEY, JR.. Administrative Law Judge:
This case came on for hearing before me at Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, upon an unfair labor practice complaint,'
issued by the Regional Director for Region 4, which alleges
that the Respondent, Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia, In-
corporated, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended. More specifically,
the complaint alleges that the Respondent told an employ-
ee that his termination was promoted by his attendance at
a union meeting, told an employee that the company presi-
dent did not approve of employees attending union meet-
ings, and told an employee that he would lose his job if the
Union represented the Respondent's employees. The com-
plaint also alleges that the Respondent discharged Byron
H. Turner and Daniel E. Kulp because of their member-
ship in and support for the IAM. Respondent denies the
commission of individual violations of Section 8(a)( ),
states that Turner was discharged for poor workmanship,
and that Kulp was discharged for a variety of reasons.
Upon these contentions, the issues herein were joined.
The principal docket entries in this case are as follows:
Charges filed herein by Byron H. Turner and Daniel E. Kulp, individ-
uals, on July 18, 1977: consolidated complaint issued by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 4 on August 30, 1977; Respondent's answer filed on Sep-
tember 30, 1977; hearing held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on November
14, 1977; bnefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent on or
before December 19, 1977.
2 Respondent admits, and I find, that it was at all times material herein a
corporation organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylva-
nia, and engaged in the retail sale and servicing of trucks at a facility located
in Chester. Pennsylvania. During the preceding calendar year, the Respon-
dent, in the course and conduct of its business, sold and distributed prod-
ucts having a gross value in excess of $500.000 and performed services
valued in excess of $50,000 in States other than the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Accordingly, the Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Sec. 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Local Lodge
724. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO (herein sometimes called Union), is a labor organization within
the meaning of Sec. 2(5) of the Act.
I THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ALLEGED
The Respondent in this case was also respondent to a
complaint which was the subject of the Board's Decision
and Order dated May 20, 1977, and reported at 229 NLRB
815. In the earlier case, herein sometimes called Kenworth
I, the present Respondent was found guilty of a series of
individual violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It was
also found therein to have discharged two employees in
violation of the Act, and its illegal actions were deemed to
be of sufficient gravity that the Board set aside the results
of a representation election conducted among its service
employees and directed the Respondent to bargain with
the union which sought to represent those employees. The
events in this case took place within 3 months from the
issuance of the Board's Decision and Order in Kenworth 1.
Despite the fact that this case involves the same small bar-
gaining unit and some of the same individuals who were
part of the Kenworth I case, the Respondent urges that I
exclude from consideration in this case any of the animus
which was found in Kenworth 1, because Kenworth I is now
on appeal to the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. I decline the request.3
As more fully set forth in Administrative Law Judge
Davidson's decision in Kenworh 1, the Respondent oper-
ates a sales and service dealership for trucks. It employs
about 50-60 people. In 1975, the Union began an organiz-
ing drive limited to the Respondent's service department, a
department which employs approximately 15 men, includ-
ing truck mechanics, partsmen, helpers, and related classi-
fications of personnel.
A. The Discharge of Daniel E. Kulp
One employee in this bargaining unit was Daniel E.
Kulp, who was hired by the Respondent on September 29,
1976. He started work at $2.25 per hour washing trucks. He
was later transferred to the service department and worked
under Foreman Al Spinelli.4 Kulp was given the job of
mechanic's helper and was told to buy tools, which he did
at a cost to himself of $500. During the 9-1/2 months that
he worked in the service department, Kulp received pay
increases which ultimately brought him up to a rate of $3
per hour.
During his period of employment in the service depart-
ment, Kulp became friendly with Kevin Partridge, Thomas
Danks, and Richard Basileo, all of whom were known to
be union supporters.5 They often took breaks or ate lunch
3 One instance of animus recited in this record and going back beyond the
10(b) period in this case to a time before the issuance by the Board of its
decision in Kenworth I took place late in 1976 in a conversation between
Company President Paul Jones and employee Thomas Danks. Danks had
occasion to discuss with Jones the possibility of installing a pension plan at
the plant. Jones agreed that it was a good idea but that it could not be
implemented right away. In the course of this conversation, Jones told
Danks that he had spent $50,000 to keep the union out of the plant and that
he would spend an additional $50.000 to do so.
Spinelli's name appeared in the decision in Kenworth I He was a nonsu-
persisory employee at that time. At all times material in this case, he was the
supervisor of the used- and customer trucks section of the service depart-
ment.
5Partridge and Basileo testified for the General Counsel in Kenworrh I.
1300
KENWORTH TRUCKS OF PHILADELPHIA
together in the course of which intervals they frequently
talked about unionization. Kulp complained that Spinelli's
attitude toward him changed drastically and become quite
hostile. Instead of assigning him to do mechanical work,
Spinelli often gave him menial chores such as picking up
trash, cleaning the parking lot, and cleaning off garage
doors. On one occasion, he was working underneath a
Ford truck owned by the Chemical Leasing Corporation.
He was tightening the bolts on an oil pan. I credit Kulp's
corroborated testimony that Spinelli walked past where he
was working, saw Kulp's legs sticking out from underneath
the truck, and deliberately kicked him. He kept on walking
and then offered a sarcastic apology. Kulp complained to
Paul E. Jones, the president of the Company, about being
harrassed by Spinelli and Jones said that he would speak to
Spinelli about the complaint. Kulp also tried to transfer to
another section where he would be working under a differ-
ent supervisor, but he did not possess the skills necessary to
work in the body shop or the new-car section.
On one occasion, Kulp complained to Spinelli when he
was working in the steam bay that "If the union was here,
Al, you wouldn't be on my back." Spinelli replied, "Yes I
would. Nothing would change." On another occasion,
when he was emptying a trash can, Kulp made the same
comment to Spinelli and Spinelli gave the same reply, add-
ing that he would continue to treat Kulp in the same man-
ner if Kulp still had his job. He also told Kulp that he
would not move anywhere within the Company.
On July 6, the IAM held an evening meeting at a nearby
Holiday Inn. As discussed more in detail later, Kulp at-
tended, as did nearly everyone in the shop, including Spi-
nelli and Thomas J. McGlinchey, the supervisor in the
new-car section. A few days later, Kulp had occasion to
talk with Spinelli about the Union. He asked Spinelli what
he thought of the meeting, and Spinelli replied that the
Union was no good and that it would not do anything for
Kulp. Kulp replied that the union representatives told him
that they were going to try to get a pension plan at Ken-
worth. Spinelli then stated that the Union was not going to
do anything and that "that no good Tom Danks was feed-
ing" Kulp something.
About a week later, Spinelli fired Kulp. On July 14, the
day of Kulp's discharge, Spinelli told him during the shift
that he wanted to speak with him at the end of the day. At
the end of the shift Spinelli told Kulp that he would have
to let him go. Kulp asked him why and Spinelli replied,
"Your work. You're not going fast enough, you weren't
doing your jobs, and . . . your attitude [stinks]." Spinelli
also mentioned that Kulp had once returned to work late
from a break. Kulp gave Spinelli an argument and defend-
ed his lateness on the basis that he had started the break
late.
Kulp continued to give Spinelli an argument, in the
course of which he asked Partridge, who was standing
nearby, whether Patridge thought he had been doing a
good job. Partridge supported Kulp but Spinelli simply
said, "That's not my opinion." When Kulp continued to
Danks attended the hearing. Danks was also the subject of a hostile and
antiunion remark made to Kulp by Spinelli
raise his voice, Spinelli told him, "You better shut up be-
fore I punch you in the face."
B. The Juli 6 Union Meeting
The union meeting which Kulp attended on July 6 was
called by a union which, some 2-1/2 months earlier, had
become the beneficiary of a Board Order directed to the
Respondent requiring the Respondent recognize and bar-
gain with it. The Respondent was not bargaining because,
as noted previously, it was and is challenging the order in
the court of appeals. On the morning of the union meeting,
Danks and Partridge went to Jones, told him that the meet-
ing was taking place, and asked Jones if it would be per-
missible to tell each employee in the shop about the meet-
ing individually or whether they had to wait until
lunchtime to make a general announcement. Jones told
them to go ahead and speak to each employee. Having
heard about the meeting, Jones told his supervisors, Mc-
Glinchey and Spinelli. about it and suggested that they
attend and find out what the meeting was all about. They
did so and reported back to Jones what in general had
occurred. Most of the employees in the shop attended this
meeting, including Turner and Kulp.
C. The Discharge of Byron H. Turner
Byron H. Turner was hired on May 1, 1977, as a me-
chanic and worked for the next 2-1/2 months repairing
new- and used-trucks. His supervisor was McGlinchey.
Turner testified that, during this period of time, he received
no reprimands and no work was returned by the customer
for unsatisfactory workmanship. McGlinchey disagrees. As
noted above, Turner attended the union meeting on Wed-
nesday evening, July 6. On Friday morning, McGlinchey
summoned him to the office and told him that he had to let
him go. I credit Turner's testimony that he asked McGlin-
chey whether he was being fired or laid off and McGlin-
chey replied he never heard of a layoff. Turner then ask
him why he was being laid off. McGlinchey said he did not
know but that Paul Jones had simply told him to let Turner
go. McGlinche? expressed the opinion that Turner's atten-
dance at the union meeting had a lot to do with it. His
further statement was "I guess Paul Jones figures you were
headed in the wrong direction." Turner put up an argu-
ment. He said that the Company had been fighting the
Union 2 or 3 years and he had only been at the plant for 2
months. He denied that he had anything to do with the
Union other than attendance at the July 6 meeting and
added that the only reason he went was because the word
had been passed that he should go. I credit Turner's further
account that no mention was made during this final inter-
view of his job performance.
The following Monday Turner went to see Jones. He
asked if he was fired or laid off. Jones replied, "Fired." He
then asked Jones why he was being fired. Jones replied that
he had three or four reasons but could not think of any
right away. He added that Turner knew why, that Mc-
Glinchey told Spinelli, and Spinelli had told him. Turner
stated that McGlinchey had told him on Friday that he did
not know why Turner was being fired. Jones said that was
1301
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
incorrect, and that he was being fired because Spinelli had
reported that his work was unsatisfactory. Turner argued
that he had been in mechanics school and his work had
always been considered satisfactory in the past. Jones re-
plied that he was revamping the whole garage and that
others were going to be fired as well. As they parted, Jones
told Turner that, if they ever needed another driver to
bring trucks to the shop from different plants, he would be
glad to give Turner a call. To date no such work has been
offered.
Analysis and Conclusions
I. The independent allegations of violations of Section
8(a)(l) of the Act
(a) I have credited Turner's testimony that McGlinchey
told him that he was being fired because he attended a
union meeting and that Jones did not want to see new
employees start off on the wrong foot. These statements
are coercive in character and serve to restrain employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act. Moreover, they supply fresh evidence of continuing
animus and motivation behind Turner's discharge.
(b) Spinelli in the course of an argument told Kulp that
the Union would do him no good at the shop even if Kulp
still had a job there. This statement constitutes a threat
which violates Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
(c) The record reflects that two supervisors attended the
July 6 union meeting, did so at the suggestion of the com-
pany president, and then reported back to him what had
occurred. For some unexplained reason, this action was
not alleged in the complaint as a separate violation of the
Act. The facts relating to this incident are undisputed and
the question was fully litigated before me. Such conduct on
the part of the Respondent amounts to a classic and seri-
ous act of illegal surveillance of union activities, and I
would be remiss if I did not find it to be a violation. Ac-
cordingly, I conclude that, by engaging in surveillance of
the union meeting of July 6, the Respondent herein vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. The discharge of Daniel E. Kulp
In assessing the real reasons for both discharges which
are at issue in this case, attention must be drawn to the fact
that they occurred against a background of strong and
continuing animus, which includes two other proven in-
stances of illegal discharges of employees for union or con-
certed activities by this Respondent. Of immediate concern
in the Kulp case is that most, if not all, of the evidence
supporting the Respondent's position was supplied by Spi-
nelli, who was no more impressive in his testimony before
me than he was when he testified before Administrative
Law Judge Davidson in Kenworth .
Kulp was well known to Spinelli as a union supporter.
Not only did Kulp frequently consort with known union
supporters in the plant; he also had more than one acrimo-
nious discussion with Spinelli on the subject of unionism
and union benefits. The timing of the discharge also sug-
gests a discriminatory motive. Kulp had been employed for
more than 9 months at the Respondent's garage, and had
received three pay increases during that period of time. He
was fired about a week after attending a union meeting
which both Spinelli and McGlinchey attended.
Spinelli testified that Kulp was a slow worker and some-
times failed to empty the trash cans and clean the floors as
he was assigned to do. On one occasion, about a month
before his discharge, he was late getting back to work from
a morning coffeebreak. Kulp had a "chip on his shoulder"
and, as a mechanic's helper, did not like to be assigned to
wash trucks and to do plant cleanup work. On one occa-
sion, either a couple of days or a few days before he was
discharged, Kulp assertedly threatened to hit Spinelli with
a pipe if Spinelli came into the steam-room where he was
working. This latter incident was, in Spinelli's view, one of
the things which precipitated the discharge. Spinelli, who
made and executed the decision to fire Kulp, stated that he
basically discharged Kulp because he did not do his work
and had a bad attitude, and also because Spinelli had to be
on him constantly to tell him what to do next. When asked
what had happened on the Friday on which Kulp was dis-
charged that caused him to take action at that particular
time, Spinelli testified that nothing special happened on
that date to prompt him to fire Kulp and that he acted then
because of the "buildup" in Kulp's performance over a
period of time. In further examination, Spinelli testified
that it was the "pipe incident," in which Kulp threatened
him, which was the "last straw."
In the face of strong animus, bad timing, and a history of
illegal discharges, the vacillating testimony of a hostile and
unbelievable witness like Spinelli can afford the Respon-
dent little support. The giving of shifting reasons for a dis-
charge is, in and of itself, some evidence of discriminatory
intent. Had the pipe incident been the "last straw," as Spi-
nelli contends, it is wholly inexplicable that Spinelli should
not have taken some action immediately. However, Spinel-
li, who himself is prone to violent talk and physical abuse,
did not do so. Indeed, Spinelli testified that on the Friday
he fired Kulp, nothing special happened which caused him
to take action on that day. In light of these several factors
bearing upon Kulp's discharge, it is clear that the reasons
asserted for his removal were pretexts, and are not the first
pretexts this Respondent has resorted to in order to rid
itself of a union adherent. Accordingly, I conclude that, by
discharging Daniel E. Kulp because of his union sympa-
thies and activities, the Respondent violated Section 8(aX) )
and (3) of the Act.
3. The discharge of Byron H. Turner
Turner's discharge was effectuated in the same context
as was Kulp's. He was terminated under a belated claim of
poor workmanship by an employer who had once before
advanced a spurious claim of the same kind and character
in Kenworth i. This history suggests that the reasons ad-
vanced for Turner's Cdischarge be given close scrutiny.
Turner was fired 2 days after evidencing his interest in
the union by attending a union meeting which was also
attended by two supervisors. At the time of his discharge
Turner protested to McGlinchey that he was a new em-
ployee, that he had done very little for the Union, and that
1302
KENWORTH TRUCKS OF PHILADELPHIA
it was unfair to him to hold him responsible for a union
drive that began long before he was hired. It is true that
Turner was by no means a leading union adherent. How-
ever, the Act does not proscribe only the discharges of
leading union adherents. Turner had given evidence of his
interest in the union effort by his attendance at a meeting
and the Respondent was well aware of his presence on that
occasion. I have credited his account of the final interview
with McGlinchey at which time McGlinchey told him that
his attendance at the meeting was what probably caused
Jones to decide as he did. McGlinchey offered Turner no
other reason for the Respondent's precipitous action at the
time he fired him. When Turner asked Jones the reason.
Jones simply said he had three or four and could not think
of them offhand.
In light of these credited facts, only passing reference
need be given to the instances of asserted poor workman-
ship which were laid at Turner's doorstep. On the day of
his discharge, Spinelli took a truck out for a road test, dur-
ing which the truck overheated because coolant had not
been placed in the radiator. Turner and another mechanic.
Winfield, were assigned to work on the truck. Turner
worked on the rear suspension and Winfield worked on the
radiator. Turner helped Winfield pull a stud out of the
veritherm, which is attached to the radiator. The rest of the
radiator work was performed by Winfield. This incident is
relied on as the precipitating cause of a discharge effectuat-
ed because of poor workmanship, yet the responsibility for
the defect was plainly that of an employee, other than
Turner, who was not discharged. With respect to the im-
proper threading of tubes on trucks owned by the Erdner
Company, that problem arose weeks before the discharge.
Turner was told by McGlinchey that there was no pre-
scribed method of doing the work, that he should do it an,
way he could, and if the customer did not like it, the Com-
pany would simply have to change it. It is manifestly pre-
textual to premise a discharge for poor workmanship or a
customer complaint upon such events. The other instances
cited by the Respondent are even flimsier and more remote
than the radiator incident. Accordingly. I conclude that
Turner was discharged because of his interest in and his
sympathy for the Union and that the discharge violated
Section 8(aXl1) and (3) of the Act.
11 REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent herein has commit-
ted certain unfair labor practices, I will recommend that it
be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take other
actions designed to effectuate the purpose and policies of
the Act. Since the violations of the Act found herein in-
clude discriminatory discharges, they go to the heart of the
Act, so I will recommend to the Board a so-called broad
8(a)(1) order designed to suppress any and all violations of
that section of the Act. J. C. PenneV Comparn, Inc. (Store
#1814), 172 NLRB 1279, fn. 1(1968). 1 will further recom-
mend that the Respondent be required to offer full and
immediate reinstatement to Daniel E. Kulp and Byron fH.
Turner to their former or substantially equivalent posi-
tions, and to make them whole for any loss of pay or bene-
fits which they have suffered by reason of the discrimina-
tions practiced against them, to be computed in accor-
dance with the Woolworth formula.6 with interest thereon
calculated in accordance with the adjusted prime rate used
by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service for interest on tax
payments. Florida Steel Corporation. 231 NLRB 651 (1977).
I will also recommend that the Respondent be required to
post the usual notice, notifying its employees of their rights
and of the results of this case.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and upon the entire record herein considered as a whole,
and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I make the fol-
lowing:
C( ONt _USIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia. Incor-
porated, is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Local Lodge 724, International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging Byron H. Turner and Daniel E. Kulp
because they gave support or assistance to Local Lodge
724, International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers. AFL CIO, the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. By the acts and conduct set forth in Conclusion of
Law 3: by telling an emploxee he was discharged because
he attended a union meeting: by telling an employee that
the Respondent did not approve of its employees engaging
in union activities: b? engaging in surveillance of a union
meeting: and bi, threatening emplosees with discharge be-
cause they support a union, the Respondent herein vio-
lated Section 8(a)( 1) of the Act.
5. The unfair labor practices found herein adversely af-
fect commerce between the several States, within the mean-
ing of Section 2)6) and {7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and upon the entire record herein considered as a whole.
and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act. I make the fol-
lowing recommended:
ORDER '
The Respondent. Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia, In-
corporated. Chester, Pennsylvania. its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns. shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Telling employees that they are being discharged be-
cause theN have given support to a labor organization.
(b) Telling employees that the Respondent does not ap-
prove of their attendance at union meetings.
(c) Threatening employees with discharge because they
support a union.
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In the ecnit n1i cxcepil.n are filed .is prvsided hx S.c 1012 46 of the
Rules and Retldlll n.lf I (he Nationld I .abor Relat.ins Bard. Ihe fndindings
,conclullnin aind rccclinellded Order herein shall as prcscided in Sec
102 48 thf the Rlc d Rte id tlal.n he .adopted h, the B.oard and bhe.rme
it fdinde? n1 .Cll ttll.ll, alid Order, and li .ih1 e.tii.ns thereiro shall he
deemed .Iaied f, r ldi purp e.c
1303
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(d) Engaging in surveillance of union meetings.
(e) Discouraging membership in or activities on behalf
of Local Lodge 724, International Association of Machin-
ists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization, by discharging employees or otherwise dis-
criminaling against them in their hire or tenure.
(f) By any other means interfering with, coercing, or re-
straining employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to
them by the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the purposes and policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Byron H. Turner and to Daniel E. Kulp full
and immediate reinstatement to their former positions, or
in the event that their former positions no longer exist, to
substantially equivalent employment, without prejudice to
their seniority or to other rights which they formerly en-
joyed.
(b) Make whole Byron H. Turner and Daniel E. Kulp
for any loss of pay and benefits which they may have suf-
fered by reason of the discriminations found herein, in the
manner described above in the section entitled "Remedy."
(c) Post at its Chester, Pennsylvania, plant copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." s Copies of the no-
tice, to be furnished to the Respondent by the Regional
Director for Region 4 and duly signed by a representative
of the Respondent, shall be posted by the Respondent im-
mediately upon receipt thereof, and shall be maintained by
it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspic-
uous places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying all payroll
and other records necessary to analyze the amount of
backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 4, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Decision, what
steps it has taken to comply herewith.
8 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
1304