Kenneth L. Johnston, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Capitol-Metro Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 8, 2002
01a12673 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 8, 2002)

01a12673

03-08-2002

Kenneth L. Johnston, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Capitol-Metro Area), Agency.


Kenneth L. Johnston v. United States Postal Service

01A12673

3/8/02

.

Kenneth L. Johnston,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Capitol-Metro Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A12673

Agency No. 4K-220-0121-99

Hearing No. 100-A0-8137X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the

following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant, a Clerk at the agency's Springfield,

Virginia facility, filed a formal EEO complaint on November 10, 1999,

alleging that the agency had discriminated against him on the bases of

race (African-American) and sex (Male) when he was allegedly the only

person assigned to distribute parcel post as of July 20, 1999, and was

allegedly not provided assistance in performing that function.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing,

finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant established a prima facie case of

race and sex discrimination because similarly situated employees, not

in complainant's protected class, were treated differently in that they

did not work as much parcel post duties as complainant. Furthermore,

the AJ found evidence that complainant was not always provided assistance

while working parcel post duties.

The AJ further concluded that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The AJ found that the

Supervisor, Customer Services, assigned complainant parcel post duties

more often than other employees because complainant's regular work

assignment as an accountable clerk, consisted of only two or three hours

of work per day. Furthermore, the Supervisor averred that complainant

was assigned parcel post duties because he had complained about working

at the window and distribution cases. The Supervisor also stated that

complainant was provided assistance in performing parcel post duties

when the schedules of other employees permitted it.

The AJ found that complainant did not establish that more likely

than not, the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext to mask

unlawful discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, the AJ found

that complainant failed to respond to the agency's contention that

complainant was assigned more parcel post duties because other employees

had assignments that necessitated eight hours of work per day.

On March 5, 2001, the agency issued a final decision order that

implemented the AJ's decision. On appeal, complainant restates arguments

previously made before the AJ in a Motion to Compel. Specifically,

he contends that he should have been permitted to interview witnesses

by tape recording their statements, and argues that the agency failed

to respond to his discovery requests and adequately develop the record.

In response, the agency restates the position it took in its FAD, and

requests that we affirm its final order.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment

is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

After a careful review of the record, we agree with the AJ that

complainant failed to present sufficient evidence that would establish

a genuine dispute of material facts existed. Despite complainant's

contention to the contrary, we find the record was adequately developed,

and agree with the AJ that the agency sufficiently responded to

complainant's discovery requests. Although depositions are an approved

discovery tool, the regulations do not provide for the interview of

witnesses in the manner described by complainant. We discern no basis

to disturb the AJ's decision. Therefore, after a careful review of the

record, including complainant's contentions on appeal, the agency's

response, and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this

decision, we affirm the agency's final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

3/8/02

Date