Kenneth J. Rowe, Complainant,v.Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 3, 2004
01A40863_r (E.E.O.C. Mar. 3, 2004)

01A40863_r

03-03-2004

Kenneth J. Rowe, Complainant, v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Kenneth J. Rowe v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01A40863

March 3, 2004

.

Kenneth J. Rowe,

Complainant,

v.

Anthony J. Principi,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A40863

Agency No. 200J-0506-2002101900

Hearing No. 220-A2-5306X

DECISION

Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint in which he claimed that the

agency discriminated against him on the basis of his age (59) when:

(1) in January 2002, he was not selected for the position of Nursing

Assistant, GS-0621-04/05 and (2) in February 2002, he was not selected

for the position of Program Support Assistant, GS-0303-05/06.

The agency investigated the complaint and thereafter referred the matter

to an Administrative Judge (AJ), pursuant to complainant's request

for a hearing. Without holding a hearing, the AJ issued a decision

finding no discrimination. The AJ found with regard to the Nursing

Assistant position, that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of age discrimination. The AJ reasoned that complainant failed

to show that he was qualified for the position and he failed to show

that a person(s) of similar qualifications, outside of his protected age

group was selected. The AJ noted that complainant was determined to be

ineligible for consideration for the position because he did not document,

in his application materials, one year of specialized experience at the

GS-4 level. The AJ further noted that complainant had been requested

to resubmit his job application to reflect the required specialized

experience, however, complainant declined to do so. With regard to

the Program Support Assistant position, the AJ found that the agency

articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its selection

decision. The AJ observed that the selecting official stated that he

decided to make his selection from the internal candidate certificate.

The AJ found that complainant failed to establish that the agency's

stated reason was pretextual and that his age was the basis for his

nonselection. The AJ noted that under agency regulations, a selecting

official has the right to select from any appropriate recruitment source.

The AJ further noted that the selection was made from the primary area

of consideration, internal candidates, and that complainant had been

referred from a secondary area of consideration, the Veterans Employment

Opportunities Act. On October 23, 2003, the agency issued a final order

implementing the AJ's decision.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment

is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of

burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case claiming

discrimination is a three-step process as set forth in McDonnell Douglas

Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973), and its progeny.

For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie

case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).

Although McDonnell Douglas is a Title VII case, its analysis is

also applicable to disparate treatment cases brought under the ADEA.

See Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1981).

This order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step

normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case,

need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue,

the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the

McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant

has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions

were motivated by discrimination. United States Postal Service Board of

Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department

of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900150 (June 28, 1990).

With regard to complainant not being selected for the Nursing Assistant

position, we find that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of age discrimination. The record reveals that complainant did

not establish that he was qualified for the position. Complainant

was determined by the Delegated Examining Unit to be ineligible for

consideration for the position because he did not document in his

application materials one year of specialized experience at the GS-4

level. Complainant does not contest the agency's position that he

was offered an opportunity to resubmit his application to reflect the

required specialized experience, but that he failed to do so.

With respect to complainant not being selected for the Program Support

Assistant position, we shall assume arguendo, that complainant has set

forth a prima facie case of discrimination on the alleged basis of age.

Complainant was one of four candidates referred for consideration. The

selecting official explained that after he reviewed the four candidates

forwarded to him, he made his selection from the two internal candidates.

The record reveals that agency regulations allow a selection official to

make a selection from any appropriate recruitment source. Complainant was

referred under a secondary area of consideration, the Veterans Employment

Opportunities Act. Here, the selecting official utilized the primary

area of consideration, internal candidates, to make his selection.

We find that the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for complainant's nonselection.

Upon review of complainant's arguments on appeal and elsewhere in

the record, we find that complainant has failed to establish, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's reasons for his

nonselection were pretextual and intended to mask discriminatory intent.

After a review of the record in its entirety, it is the decision of the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to affirm the agency's final order

finding no discrimination as a preponderance of the record evidence does

not establish that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

March 3, 2004

__________________

Date