Kelly A. Scott

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 5, 1951

93 N.L.R.B. 654 (N.L.R.B. 1951)

654 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, and present a ready and effective means of destroying self-
organization among its employees. Because of Respondent's unlawful conduct
and since there appears to be an underlying attitude of opposition on the part
of Respondent to the purposes of the Act to protect the rights of employees gen-
erally," the undersigned is convinced that if Respondent is not restrained from
committing such conduct, the danger of their commission in the future is to be
anticipated from Respondent's conduct in the past, and the policies of the Act
will be defeated. In order, therefore, to make effective the interdependent
guarantees of Section 7 of the Act, to prevent a recurrence of unfair labor prac-
tices, and thereby minimize industrial strife which burdens and obstructs com-
merce, and thus effectuate the policies of the Act, the undersigned will recom-
mend that Respondent cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record
in the case, the undersigned makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. American Federation of Labor is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)
(1) of the Act.
3. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Eliza-
beth Victor and thereby discouraging membership in American Federation of
Labor, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication in this volume.]
11 See May Department Stores Company, etc. v. N. L. It. B., 326 U. S. 376.
KELLY A . Scorr and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS,
DISTRICT LODGE No. 727. Case No. 21-CA-753. March 5, 1591
Decision and Order
On November 29, 1950, Trial Examiner Howard Myers issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that he cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent,
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report, and a supporting brief.
The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
1 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Houston, Reynolds,
and Styles].
93 NLRB No. 98.
KELLY A. SCOTT I 655
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the Respondent's exceptions and brief, and the entire
record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trail Examiner, with the following additions,
exceptions, and modifications :
1. The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent operates his
business of distributing new Hudson automobiles at retail under an
exclusive franchise in a specified territory. This is not precisely so.
The Respondent's franchise agreement with the wholesale distributor
provides that the wholesaler or anyone else designated by the whole-
saler may sell new Hudson automobiles within the territory. How-
ever, although that factor is not determinative, we note that for many
years before the unfair labor practices found here, the Respondent
has in fact been, and still is, the exclusive retail dealer in new Hudson
automobiles in this territory. What is controlling is the fact that the
franchise in question ultimately associates the Respondent with a
Nation-wide producer and distributor of automobiles, and that the
franchise provides certain controls as to the Respondent's capital re-
quirements, place of business, hours, service facilities, personnel, signs,
and local area advertising. Under the circumstances, we find that
here, no less than in the Baxter Bros. case (91 NLRB 1564), the
Respondent's business is an integral part of a multistate business, and
that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction over
the Respondent.
2. We find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent refused
to bargain in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
The Respondent contends, among other things, that the complaint
should be dismissed because, after the refusal to bargain, the Union
lost its majority status by virtue of the fact that two employees who
had previously authorized the Union to act as their bargaining rep-
resentative quit the Respondent's employment for reasons having no
connection with any unfair labor practice. We find no merit in this
contention. It is clear, as the Trial Examiner found, that the Union
represented a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit at
the time of the refusal to bargain, and that is the determinative fact.2
2 Earl Severin, Inc., 90 NLRB 86 Nor can it be said that the Respondent's refusal
to bargain was predicated on any good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority at that time.
It is true that on May 14, 1950, subsequent to the refusal to bargain, the Union and the
Respondent had a conference in which the union representative stated that the unfair
labor practice charge in this proceeding might not have been filed if the Respondent had
consented to the holding of an election, and the Respondent replied: ". . . Go ahead and
have your damn election." We do not find in this incident or in any other conduct dis-
closed by the record any evidence that the Respondent on April 14, 1950, refused to
recognize the Union because it in good faith doubted the Union's majority.
656 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Nor is the alleged loss of majority subsequent to the refusal to bargain
determinative of the remedy to be orderd. This Board has held
with court approval that the only means by which a refusal to bargain
can be effectively remedied is an affirmative order requiring the em-
ployer to bargain with the Union which represented a majority at
the time of the refusal to bargain.3 It is immaterial that in this
case the alleged loss of majority is predicated on the nondiscriminatory
quitting of two employees. Here, no less than in cases where the
alleged loss of majority results from withdrawals from the union,
it must be presumed that, but for the Respondent's illegal refusal
to bargain, the Union would have been able to retain its majority
among those remaining in the Respondent's employ.4
Order
Upon the entire record in the case and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Kelly A. Scott,
his agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing , upon request, to bargain collectively with Inter-
national Association of Machinists, District Lodge No. 727, as the
exclusive representative of all mechanics, lobe men, parts men, body
and fender men, painters, service mechanics, maintenance men, and
working foremen at the Respondent's Van Nuys, California, auto-
mobile sales establishment, excluding guards, professional employees,
clerical employees, salesmen , and supervisors as defined by the Act.
(b) In any other manner interfering with the efforts of the above-
named Union to bargain collectively with the Respondent.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with International Associa-
tion of Machinists, District Lodge No. 727, as the exclusive repre-
sentative of all the employees in the above-described appropriate unit,
and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in
a signed agreement.
(b) Post in his plant at Van Nuys, California, copies of the notice
attached hereto and marked Appendix A 5 Copies of said notice, to
be furnished by the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region,
shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent, be posted by the
3 N L R B. v Lora!lard Co , 314 U S 512
4 See, for example, N L R B v Franks Bros. Co , 321 U. S. 702
1 In the event that this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be inserted before the words . "A Decision and Order ," the words : "A Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing "
KELLY A. SCOTT 657
Respondent immediately upon receipt thej^eof land be maintained by
him for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region, Los
Angeles, California, in writing, within ten (10) days from the date
of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
Appendix A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, I hereby notify my employees that :
I WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of INTER-
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, DISTRICT LODGE No. 727,
to bargain collectively with me, or refuse to bargain with said
union as the exclusive representative of my employees in the
bargaining unit described herein.
I WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with the above-named
union, as the exclusive representative of the employees-in the
bargaining unit described herein with respect to grievances, labor
disputes, rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
terms and conditions of employment, and if an understanding
is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
The bargaining unit is:
All mechanics, lube men, parts men, body and fender men,
painters, service mechanics, maintenance men, and working
foremen, excluding guards, professional employees, clerical
employees, salesmen, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
KELLY A. SCOTT,
Employer.
By ---------------------
(Representative) (Title)
Dated--------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
George H. O'Brien, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Carter & Potruch, by Messrs. Frederick A. Potruch and James M. Nicoson, 'for
the Respondent.
E. M. Skagen, Esq., for the Union.
943732-51-43
658 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge duly filed -on April 14, 1950, by International Association of
Machinists, District Lodge No. 727, herein called the Union, the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board, herein respectively called the General
Counsel and the Board, by the Regional Director for the Twenty-First Region
(Los Angeles, California), issued his complaint on August 18, 1950, alleging
that Kelly A. Scott, Van Nuys, California, herein called the Respondent, had
engaged in, and was engaging in, unfair labor practices affecting commerce,
within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the
Act.
Copies of the complaint and the charge, together with notice of hearing thereon,
were duly served upon the Respondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged, in substance,
that on and since April 14, 1950, the Respondent has refused to bargain collect-
ively.with the Union although the Union had been selected and designated the
collective bargaining representative by the Respondent's employees- in a 'certain
appropriate unit.
On August 30, 1950, the Respondent duly filed an answer denying the com-
mission of the alleged unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Los Angeles, California, on October
3, 4, and 5, 1950, before Howard Myers, the duly designated Trial Examiner.
The Respondent and the General Counsel were represented by counsel ; the Union
by a representative thereof. The parties participated` in the hearing and were
afforded full opportunity to be heard , to examine and cross -examine 'witnesses,
and to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues.
At the conclusion of the General Counsel's case-in-chief, counsel for the Re-
spondent moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of proof. The motion was
denied. He then moved to dismiss the allegations of the complaint with respect
to the appropriateness of the unit and the Union's majority status therein.
Decision thereon was reserved. The motions are hereby denied. The Respond-
ent called no witnesses and rested its case at the conclusion of the General
Counsel's case. The parties waived oral argument and then were advised that
they might file briefs or proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, or both,
with the undersigned on or before October 20, 1950.1 Briefs have been received
from counsel for the Respondent and for the General Counsel.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Kelly A. Scott owns and operates a plant and offices in Van Nuys, California,
where he is engaged in the service, sale, and distribution of automobiles, operat-
ing under an exclusive franchise for the entire city of Van Nuys from Hudson
Sales Corporation, Los Angeles, California, which, in turn, by agreement with
Hudson Motor Car Company, Detroit, Michigan,` the manufacturer of Hudson
automobiles, is the exclusive distributor of new Hudson automobiles in Southern
California, wherein Van Nuys is located. Hudson,'Sales Corporation's territory
also covers parts of Arizona and Nevada.
'At the request of Respondent ' s counsel the time was extended to November 15, 1950:
KELLY A. SCOTT 659
During 1949, the Respondent purchased from Hudson Sales Corporation new
Hudson automobiles valued at $241,619.14 and parts and accessories valued at
$29,917.91. During the said year, the Respondent's sales of new automobiles
amounted to $312,806 81, and his sales of parts and accessories amounted to
$47,029.91.
During the first 6 months of 1950, the Respondent's purchases of new auto-
mobiles, parts, and accessories from Hudson Sales Corporation amounted to
$288,959 97.
All new Hudson automobiles, and accessories attached thereto, sold by the
Respondent, are manufactured in Detroit, Michigan, and are shipped from there
to Hudson Sales Corporation in Los Angeles, California, which delivers them to
the Respondent.
Practically all the parts and accessories sold by or used by the Respondent
are shipped from Detroit, Michigan, to Hudson Sales Corporation which delivers
them to the Respondent.
The Respondent, besides its used car department, also maintains a service and
repair department which services the cars of its new car customers and other
local customers.
All the Respondent's sales of automobiles, both new and used, parts, and
accessories, are made either locally or within the State of California.
Counsel for the Respondent contended at the hearing, and in his brief, that
the complaint, with respect to jurisdiction, should be dismissed because the
Board should not assert jurisdiction over the Respondent herein since all the
purchases and sales of the Respondent were made within the State of California.
For the reasons stated by the Board in Baxter Bros., 91 NLRB 1564, the
contention is without merit. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that during all
times material herein the Respondent was, and now is, subject to the jurisdiction
of the Board and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board to
assert jurisdiction over the Respondent.
11. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Association of Machinists, District Lodge No. 727, is a labor
organization admitting to membership employees of the Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Refusal to Bargain Collectively with the Union
A. The appropriate unit
The complaint alleged that the appropriate unit comprises all the Respondent's
"mechanics, tube men, parts men, body and fender men, painters, service
mechanics, maintenance men and working foremen, excluding guards, pro-
fessional employees, clerical employees, and supervisors as defined by, the Act."
The Respondent's answer denied the allegation but no evidence was offered in
support of the denial.
According to the credible testimony of John Foote and Delmar A. Gordon,
two representatives of the Union, they, together with Daniel Sharp, a union
member, called upon the Respondent on April 14, 1950, at his place of business
in Van Nuys and there Gordon, after introducing himself, Sharp, and Foote to
the Respondent, informed the Respondent that the Union represented a majority
of his production and maintenance employees and then requested him to bargain
collectively with the Union as representative of those employees. The Re-
spondent replied by ordering Gordon, Sharp, and Foote off his premises, adding
that he did not want to discuss anything with them. It is clear therefrom that
660 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Respondent raised no question as to the appropriateness of the unit in
which the Union claimed representation.
Upon the entire record in the case, the undersigned is of the opinion and finds,
as alleged in the complaint and in accord with Board decisions,' that all the
Respondent's mechanics, lube men, parts men, body and fender men, painters,
service mechanics, maintenance men, and working foremen, excluding guards,
professional employees, clerical employees, salesmen, and supervisors as defined
by the Act, at all times material herein constituted, and now constitute, a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9 (b) of the Act.
B. Representation by the Union of a majority in the appropriate unit
At the hearing herein, there was introduced in evidence by the General Coun-
sel a list prepared by the Respondent containing the names of all the Respond-
ent's employees in the unit hereinabove found appropriate. The list shows
that on April 14, 1950, the Respondent had in his employ nine persons in the
said unit.' On behalf of the General Counsel there were offered and received in
evidence seven signed cards ' each reading as follows :
Authorization for Representation under the National Labor Relations Act
I, - the undersigned , employee of -------------------- employed at
-------------------- Dept. No. -------- Clock No. -------- Shift No.
-------- Plant No. -------- Home address -------------------- City
-------------------- Tel. No. ---------
hereby authorize the International Association of Machinists to represent
me as any exclusive Collective Bargaining Agent with respect to wages,
hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, in accordance
with the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.
The full power and authority to act for the undersigned as described
herein supersedes any power or authority heretofore given any person or
organization to represent me.
This does not oblige me financially in any way.
Date -------------------- ----------------------------------------
Signature of employee
----------------------------------------
Please print name
The six cards bore the respective signatures of six persons in the appropriate
unit. One card is dated March 28, 1950; two are dated April 11, 1950; and
2 Rowan Motor Company , 90 NLRB No 156 ; Sheeley Motor Sales Co , 89 NLRB 1376 ;
Fuller Automobile Co , 88 NLRB 1452
3 The undersigned excludes Philip Arana from the unit The record clearly shows that
before, on , and after April 14 , 1950, Arana was a supervisor with authority to hire and
fire
* This number includes the card of Arana . Respondent 's counsel contended at the
hearing , and in his brief, that because Arana signed an authorization card and attended
the meeting of April 13 , the Union did not represent an uncoerced majority at the time
it made its demands for recognition In support of his contention , counsel relies on the
Wells, Inc. case, 68 NLRB 545. The facts in that case are clearly distinguishable from
those here present The record herein unmistakably shows that Arana signed the card
and attended the meeting at the behest of certain nonsupervisory employees of the
Respondent and that his supervisory status was well known to them. At the meeting,
Arana informed Gordon, the spokesman for the Union, of his supervisory status and
admittedly there was discussion as to his eligibility to participate in an election if the
Respondent demanded that the Union be certified by the Board before he would recognize
the Union as the collective bargaining representative of his employees There is no
evidence that his action in signing an authorization card and attending a union meeting
had the slightest coercive or persuasive effect on the nonsupervisory employees
KELLY A., SCOTT 661
three are undated. The cards, after being signed, were mailed to the Union.
One bears the postmark of March 28, 1950, and the remaining five were mailed
on April 11, 1950.
There is no dispute that each of the six persons whose names appear on the
cards signed the cards voluntarily and without any coercion on the behalf of
the Union or by any of its representatives. The Respondent, however, main-
tains that the Union at no time represented the majority of the employees in
the appropriate unit because none of the signers of the cards signed them with
the intention of designating the Union as his collective bargaining representative.
Each of the six signers testified in substance that he signed the card so as to
gain admission to a union meeting in order to ascertain whether it would be
beneficial for him to join the Union ; that he did not intend thereby to designate
the Union his collective bargaining representative; and that he did not read
the card prior to affixing his signature thereto ; and that after attending a
meeting at the union hall on April 13, 1950, at which, among those things, the
said six elected a shop steward from among themselves, he decided that he did
not wish to become affiliated with the Union. Each admitted, however, that at
no time did he inform the Union of his decision not to affiliate with it, or request
the return of the authorization card which he had signed, or revoke the desig-
nation of the Union as his collective bargaining representative. Furthermore,
there is no evidence that any of the said six persons informed the Respondent
that he had repudiated the Union as his representative.
The record clearly indicates, and the undersigned finds, that for about a month
prior to the signing of the card by Joseph Slackie on March 28, 1950, and mailing
it to the Union the following day, the Union had been passing out to the Re-
spondent's employees handbills and authorization cards similar to those in evi-
dence ; that during that period the employees had discussed among themselves
the Union, the handbills, and the cards ; and that it was the spontaneous,
voluntary action of the employees to sign the cards when they did ; and that
when they signed the cards it was their clear intention to designate the Union
as their collective bargaining representative. Their testimony that they signed
the cards without reading them and for the purpose of 'gaining admission to a
union meeting or to secure a Board election is patently and knowingly false.
Their demeanor on the witness stand clearly indicated to the undersigned that
they were, and each of them was, withholding the true facts. The designations
are clear and unequivocal and nothing therein could have led the signers thereof,
or any other reasonable persons, to believe that the cards had to be signed
in order for them to gain admission to a union meeting or to obtain a Board
election.
Under the circumstances, the undersigned finds that the said six persons by
signing the said authorization cards duly designated the Union as their col-
lective bargaining representative. The undersigned further finds, upon the
basis of the foregoing and upon the entire record, that the Union was on April
11, 1930, and at all times thereafter has been, the duly designated representative
of a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit, and that, by virtue of
Section 9 (a) of the Act, was, on April 11, 1950, and since that date has been,
the exclusive representative of all the employees in the said unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment 6
6 The Mengel Company, 80 NLRB 705, 724 ; Vulcan Forging Company , 85 NLRB 621 ;
West Fork Out Glass Company, 90 NLRB 944; Appalachian Electric Power Co., 140 F.
2d 217 ;- Botany Worsted Mills, 133 F. 2d 876; Motor Valve & Manufacturing Co., 149
F. 2d 247.
662 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
C. The refusal to bargain
As found above, Gordon, Foote, and Sharp called upon the Respondent on
April 14, 1950, and demanded that he recognize and deal with the Union as
the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the Respondent's employees.
According to the credible testimony of Foote, the following ensued at that
meeting:
When we first walked in the door, Mr. Scott looked up and asked what
he could do for us. He said, "Hello, gentlemen, what can I do for you?"
Mr. Gordon did most of the talking. In fact, he did all the talking. He
handed Mr. Scott his personal card with name and occupation on the card.
He then introduced himself and then he introduced Mr Sharp and myself.
He said, "We represent a majority of your employees and we come to ask
you to bargain with us on wage, hours, and working conditions."
When Mr. Gordon finished asking him to bargain on wages, hours, and
working conditions, Mr Scott said, "Ask your God damn mechanics how they
would like me to shut the shop down, and I can do it before you can even
tell me what you came here to say."
And Mr. Gordon again asked Mr. Scott if he would bargain with us on
wages, hours, and working conditions, at which time Mr. Scott said, "Take
your damn mechanics elsewhere and organize them. I need a bunch of
union mechanics like I need a hole in the head."
Mr. Gordon then asked Mr. Scott, "Do you then refuse to talk with us on
this subject, Mr. Scott?" To which Mr. Scott replied, "Get the hell off my
property. I don't want to talk to you about anything."
Mr. Gordon then said, "I am sorry you feel that way, Mr. Scott," and so
we took our exit and left.
Scott, the Respondent, admitted on the witness stand that when Gordon
requested that he recognize the Union as the collective bargaining agent of
its employees, he replied that Gordon "represented the biggest pile of crap I
ever looked at and to move himself from my premises."
Upon the basis of the foregoing, and upon the entire record in the case, the
undersigned concludes and finds that on April 14, 1950, and at all times material
herein, the Respondent failed and refused to bargain collectively with the duly
designated representative of a majority of his employees in the unit hereinabove
found appropriate, in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act, thereby inter-
fering with, restraining, and coercing his employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 thereof.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the Respondent described in Section I, above,
have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and such of them as have been found to constitute
unfair labor practices, tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, it will
be recommended that he cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
RICHMOND, DRY GOODS COMPANY, INC. 663
Having found that the Respondent has refused to bargain, in violation of
Section 8 (a) (5) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act, the undersigned will recommend that
the Respondent cease and desist from engaging in such conduct. The under-
signed will further recommend that the Respondent, upon request, bargain col-
lectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of all the employees
in the unit hereinabove found appropriate.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record
in the case, the undersigned makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Association of Machinists, District Lodge No. 727, is a labor
organization, within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. All the Respondent's mechanics, lube men, parts men, body and fender
men, painters, service mechanics, maintenance men, and working foremen, ex-
cluding guards, professional employees, clerical employees, salesmen, and
supervisors as defined by the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
3. International Association of Machinists, District Lodge No. 727 was on
April 11, 1950, and at all times relevant thereafter has been, the exclusive repre-
sentative of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing, within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
4. By refusing on April 14, 1950, and thereafter to bargain collectively with
International Association of Machinists, District Lodge No. 727, as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit, the Respondent has
engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices, within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
5. By the said refusal the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced
his employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,
and thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication in this volume.]
RICHMOND DRY GOODS COMPANY , INC. and RETAIL CLERKS INTER-
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 157, AFL, PETITIONER
RICHMOND DRY GOODS COMPANY, INC. and WAREHOUSE EMPLOYEES
UNION LOCAL No. 322, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
CHAUFFEURS , WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL,
PETITIONER . Cases Nos . 5-RC-730 and 5-RC-789. March 5, 1951
Decision and Order
Upon petitions duly filed, a consolidated hearing was held before
'Dudley S. Knox, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made
93 NLRB No. 87.