Keith C. Hullfish et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 31, 202013620853 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/620,853 09/15/2012 Keith C. Hullfish 19487.32.1.2.2 3069 107193 7590 03/31/2020 Keller Jolley Preece/Facebook 1010 North 500 East Suite 210 North Salt Lake, UT 84054 EXAMINER BIAGINI, CHRISTOPHER D ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3649 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/31/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@kjpip.com gjolley@kjpip.com ljohnson@kjpip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KEITH C. HULLFISH, CHARLES A. CAREY, MICHAEL R. LONGE, and JOE PARR Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 Technology Center 3600 Before JEREMY J. CURCURI, JOHN R. KENNY, and BARBARA A. BENOIT, Administrative Patent Judges. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1 and 21–42. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Facebook, Inc. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to “the delivery of an electronic message addressed to a telephone number.” Spec. 1:11–12. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method comprising: receiving, at a communication system server and from a mobile device associated with a user, an electronic message to deliver to an intended recipient via one or more user devices; determining, by at least one processor, that the electronic message includes multimedia content; accessing a user preference specifying a forwarding rule for messages including multimedia content; determining, by the at least one processor and based on the user preference, that the electronic message is to be forwarded to a messaging server and a media storage, wherein the messaging server is separate from the media storage; and forwarding, by the communication system server, a first instance of the electronic message to the messaging server and a second instance of the electronic message to the media storage. Appeal Br. 42 (Claims Appendix). REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Morris US 2003/0200268 A1 Oct. 23, 2003 Beyda US 2003/0229722 A1 Dec. 11, 2003 Ala-Luukko US 2004/0005881 A1 Jan. 8, 2004 Trossen US 2004/0111476 A1 June 10, 2004 Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 3 REJECTIONS Claims 1 and 21–42 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Final Act. 7–9. Claims 1 and 21–42 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Final Act. 9–12. Claims 1, 21–26, 28–37, and 39–41 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Trossen and Morris. Final Act. 12–22. Claims 27 and 38 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Trossen, Morris, and Beyda. Final Act. 22–23. Claim 42 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Trossen, Morris, and Ala-Luukko. Final Act. 24. OPINION The Judicial Exception Rejection of Claims 1 and 21–42 The Examiner determines the following: Each of independent claims 1, 32, and 39 is directed to the abstract idea of forwarding messages to various destinations based on user preferences. The idea is described in the “receiving,” “determining... that the electronic message includes,” “accessing,” “determining... based on the user preference,” and “forwarding” steps of claim 1 and the corresponding aspects of claims 32 and 39. This idea is similar to other ideas held as abstract by the courts. For example, as in TLI Communications LLC v. AV Automotive LLC (823 F.3d 607, 118 U.S.P.Q.2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2016)), where claims directed to recording, transmitting, and administering digital images were found to be ineligible, the instant claims merely use classification information to determine how to process received multimedia messages. As another example, as in Intellectual Ventures I v. Symantec Corp. ([838] F.3d [1307], 120 U.S.P.Q.2d 1353 (Fed. Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 4 Cir. 2016)), where claims directed to routing email messages based on specific criteria (rules) were found to be ineligible, the instant claims merely use rules to automate the distribution of received messages in a manner analogous to a post office or corporate mailroom. Final Act. 7–8; see also Final Act. 8–9 (determining that the claims are not directed to significantly more than the abstract idea); Ans. 3–11. An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 5 determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 6 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3 2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p df). 3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55. Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 7 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. Are the claims patent-eligible? Step 1 Claim 1 recites a method, which falls within the “process” category of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 32 recites a system, which falls with the “machine” category of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 39 recites a non-transitory computer readable storage medium, which falls within the “manufacture” category of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, we must determine whether the claims recite a judicial exception and fail to integrate the exception into a practical application. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. If both elements are satisfied, the claim is directed to a judicial exception under the first step of the Alice/Mayo test. See id. Step 2A—Prong One The Examiner determines claims 1, 32, and 39 are directed to an abstract idea. Final Act. 7–8. Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 8 Contrary to the Examiner’s determinations, we determine the claim limitations determined by the Examiner to recite an abstract idea do not correspond to certain methods of organizing human activity, mental processes, or mathematical concepts. In particular, claim 1 recites receiving, at a communication system server and from a mobile device associated with a user, an electronic message to deliver to an intended recipient via one or more user devices; determining, by at least one processor, that the electronic message includes multimedia content; accessing a user preference specifying a forwarding rule for messages including multimedia content; determining, by the at least one processor and based on the user preference, that the electronic message is to be forwarded to a messaging server and a media storage, wherein the messaging server is separate from the media storage; and forwarding, by the communication system server, a first instance of the electronic message to the messaging server and a second instance of the electronic message to the media storage. We disagree with the Examiner’s determination that these activities recite an abstract idea, pursuant to USPTO guidance. In the context of the invention, these steps describe a particular way of processing an electronic message, including in certain circumstances described in the claim, forwarding a first instance of the electronic message to the messaging server and a second instance of the electronic message to the media storage. We do not see how such steps amount to mental processes. For example, the process described by the claim “access[es] a user preference,” but is not describing the mental processes of the user such as “observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. That is, Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 9 the claim describes a sequence of actions that are based on a user preference, but does not describe user mental processes themselves. Similarly, we do not see how the claim steps amount to mathematical concepts or certain methods of organizing human activity. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Accordingly, we are persuaded by Appellant’s argument, with respect to Intellectual Ventures, that “determining whether an electronic message contains multimedia content, accessing a user preference specifying a forwarding rule for messages including multimedia content, and forwarding the electronic message to a messaging server and a media storage are, together, steps that a person cannot perform mentally.” Appeal Br. 18; see also Reply Br. 4. The Examiner does not sufficiently articulate why the claimed concepts fall within the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas of mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, or mental processes. See 84 Fed. Reg. 52. Further, we are not convinced that this is one of the rare circumstances where the claims recite an abstract idea that does not fall into one of the above subject matter groupings. Id. at 53. Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claims 21–31 depend from claim 1. We, therefore, also do not sustain the rejection of those claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Independent claims 32 and 39 recite similar language as claim 1. We, therefore, also do not sustain the rejection of independent claims 32 and 39 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claims 33–38 depend from claim 32, and claims 40– 42 depend from claim 39. We, therefore, also do not sustain the rejection of those claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 10 The Written Description Rejection of Claims 1 and 21–42 The Examiner finds claims 1 and 21–42 fail to comply with the written description requirement. Final Act. 9–12. In particular, the Examiner finds the limitation of “a user preference specifying a forwarding rule for messages including multimedia content” as recited in claim 1 lacks written description support. See Final Act. 10–11. The Examiner explains as follows: With respect to the second feature, although the specification describes the result of applying various user preferences (e.g., where “user preferences could be applied so that only messages originating from a registered phone number would be able to be forwarded,”), nowhere does the specification explain that these preferences include a “forwarding rule for messages including multimedia content” (emphasis added). Final Act. 11. The Examiner further finds that the limitation “determining . . . based on the user preference, that the electronic message is to be forwarded to a messaging server and a media storage” as recited in claim 1 also lacks written description support. Final Act. 10–11. The Examiner explains as follows: Describing that a message can be forwarded to a messaging server and a media storage, then describing that “user preferences can be applied so that only messages originating from a registered phone number would be able to be forwarded to the media storage” is not the same thing as describing that the preferences are used to make the determination to forward the message to both servers. Final Act. 11. With respect to these particular findings, Appellant presents the following principal arguments: Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 11 i. Appellant’s Specification describes “a user preference specifying a forwarding rule for messages including multimedia content” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 29–30 (citing Spec. 7:26–8:9); see also Reply Br. 9. ii. Appellant’s Specification describes “determining... based on the user preference, that the electronic message is to be forwarded to a messaging server and a media storage” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 31 (citing Spec. 7:26–28, 30–31); see also Reply Br. 9–10. In response to Appellant’s argument i, the Examiner explains “the specification at best describes a genus of forwarding rules which apply to messages in general (i.e., forwarding rules which apply equally to multimedia and non-multimedia messages). This is clearly not sufficient to support a claim to the much narrower species of forwarding rules which are ‘for’ multimedia messages.” Ans. 13. The Examiner further explains “the fact that some messages may be restricted based on the number of the sender is not enough to establish that the rules are specifically ‘for’ multimedia messages.” Ans. 13–14. In response to Appellant’s argument ii, the Examiner explains “[t]he preferences descried at p. 8, lines 1–5 only govern forwarding messages to the media storage—and do not describe a single user preference that controls forwarding to both the messaging server and the media storage.” Ans. 14. We do not see reversible error in the Examiner’s findings. Appellant’s Specification discloses “[t]he user preferences and the mapping between the telephone numbers and the IM identifiers are used by the dynamic message control server 208 to route the SMS messages according to the embodiments of the invention.” Spec. 7:26–28. Appellant’s Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 12 Specification further discloses “[i]n addition, user preferences could be applied so that only messages originating from a registered phone number would be able to be forwarded to the media storage 2l8. Alternatively, user preferences could also be applied to allow messages from any originating phone number to be forwarded to the media storage 218.” Spec. 8:1–5. Thus, the Specification describes that user preferences are used to route the SMS messages, and specifically describes that the user preferences are used to specify which (or all) originating phone numbers have their messages forwarded to the media storage. See Spec. 7:26–28, 8:1–5. Claim 1 requires “a user preference specifying a forwarding rule for messages including multimedia content” (emphasis added). However, the user preferences described in the Specification are not described as being specifically for messages including multimedia content, but rather are rules for all messages originating from particular phone numbers. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that such user preferences are for messages including multimedia content. See Reply Br. 9. In addition, claim 1 further requires “determining... based on the user preference, that the electronic message is to be forwarded to a messaging server and a media storage.” However, the user preferences described in the Specification are not disclosed as being for determining that the electronic message is to be forwarded to a messaging server and a media storage. The Specification merely describes the ability to send messages to both the messaging server and a media storage and describes user preferences specifying which originating phone numbers have their messages forwarded to the media storage. See Reply Br. 9–10. The combination of these disclosures, however, merely conveys that messages with multimedia content could be forwarded to both a messaging server and media storage, Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 13 not that the inventors had possession of that concept. Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under pre- AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Claims 21–31 depend from claim 1. We, therefore, also sustain the rejection of claims 21–31 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Independent claims 32 and 39 recite similar language as claim 1. We, therefore, also sustain the rejection of independent claims 32 and 39 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Claims 33–38 depend from claim 32, and claims 40–42 depend from claim 39. We, therefore, also sustain the rejection of claims 33–38 and 40–42 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. The Obviousness Rejection of Claims 1, 21–26, 28–37, and 39–41 over Trossen and Morris The Examiner finds Trossen and Morris teach all limitations of claim 1. Final Act. 13–14. In particular, the Examiner finds Trossen teaches most limitations of claim 1. Final Act. 13 (citing Trossen ¶¶ 10, 24–28, 30, 32–34, 58, 59, 65–67). In particular, the Examiner finds Morris teaches “wherein the messaging server is separate from the media storage”; and “forwarding... a first instance of the electronic message to the messaging server and a second instance of the electronic message to the media storage” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 14 (citing Morris ¶¶ 21, 26–28). The Examiner reasons as follows: It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to modify the system of Trossen Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 14 with the teachings of Morris in order to reduce the burden on the user associated with viewing full-size images directly in a mail client while still being able to use the mail client to notify the user that the images are available. Final Act. 14 (citing Morris ¶¶ 8–9) Appellant presents the following principal argument: Morris’s “[s]tripping and storing images from an email request for storing in an image cache and generating a new email message that includes links to the images in the image cache for sending to a recipient” and Morris’s alternative of “including links to scaled-down version[s] of the sent images to allow the recipient to view the album within an email program” do not teach the claim limitations. Appeal Br. 39. In contrast to Morris, in the claimed invention, “the electronic message, including the multimedia content (e.g., images) therein, is sent to two distinct locations: the messaging server and the media storage.” Appeal Br. 40. In response, the Examiner explains that the claim “language may be broadly but reasonably construed to permit the ‘instances’ to differ somewhat.” Ans. 19; see also Ans. 19–20 (discussing the embodiments in Morris). In reply, Appellant argues “one of ordinary skill in the art would understand a first instance of an electronic message and a second instance of the same electronic message to essentially be two copies of the same message, including identical message contents.” Reply Br. 11. We do not see error in the contested Examiner’s findings. We concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness. Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 15 We adopt the uncontested Examiner’s findings based on Trossen as our own. See Final Act. 13 (citing Trossen ¶¶ 10, 24–28, 30, 32–34, 58, 59, 65–67). Further, we agree with and adopt as our own the Examiner’s finding that Morris’s disclosure of Internet mail server 32 and photomail server 20 with a web photo album application 42 teaches “wherein the messaging server is separate from the media storage” as recited in claim 1. See Final Act. 14 (citing Morris ¶ 21); see also Morris ¶ 21 (disclosing Internet mail server 32 and photomail server 20). A computer dictionary defines “instance” as follows: “An object, in object-oriented programming, in relation to the class to which it belongs.” MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY 276 (5th ed. 2002). Under this computer definition, a first “instance” and a second “instance” of the same class must both be instantiated from the class, but are not required to be identical. Thus, we construe the claimed “first instance of the electronic message” and “second instance of the electronic message” as requiring that the first and second instances are illustrative of the same electronic message and created from the same electronic message, but not requiring that the first and second instances are identical. Given our claim construction, we agree with and adopt as our own the Examiner’s finding that Morris’s disclosure of a message being sent to photomail server 20 and a message being sent to Internet mail server 32 teaches “forwarding... a first instance of the electronic message to the messaging server and a second instance of the electronic message to the media storage” as recited in claim 1 because the message sent to photomail server 20 and the message sent to Internet mail server 32, although not Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 16 identical, are illustrative of the same electronic message (email request 19) and created from the same electronic message (email request 19). See Final Act. 14 (citing Morris ¶¶ 26–28); see also Morris ¶¶ 26 (“photomail server 20 receives the email request 19 from the photomail client 14... server 20 then sends the email message 31 to the Internet email server 32 for delivery to the designated recipient(s) 34”), 27 (“recipient user 34 receives the email message 31”), 28 (“the photomail server 20 creates an HTML email message 31 to send”). We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under pre- AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).We also sustain the rejection of claims 21–26, 28– 37, and 39–41, which are not separately argued with particularity. See Appeal Br. 37, 40. The Obviousness Rejection of Claims 27 and 38 over Trossen, Morris, and Beyda Appellant does not present separate arguments for claims 27 and 38. See Appeal Br. 40. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 27 and 38 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the same reasons discussed above with respect to claim 1. The Obviousness Rejection of Claim 42 over Trossen, Morris, and Ala- Luukko Appellant does not present separate arguments for claim 42. See Appeal Br. 40. Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 17 We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 42 under pre- AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the same reasons discussed above with respect to claim 1. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s overall decision to reject claims 1 and 21–42 is affirmed. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 21–42 101 Judicial Exception 1, 21–42 1, 21–42 112 Written Description 1, 21–42 1, 21–26, 28–37, 39– 41 103 Trossen, Morris 1, 21–26, 28–37, 39– 41 27, 38 103 Trossen, Morris, Beyda 27, 38 42 103 Trossen, Morris, Ala-Luukko 42 Overall Outcome 1, 21–42 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). Appeal 2018-004888 Application 13/620,853 18 AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation