Karen T. King-Ellis, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southwest Area) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 4, 2005
01a51124 (E.E.O.C. May. 4, 2005)

01a51124

05-04-2005

Karen T. King-Ellis, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southwest Area) Agency.


Karen T. King-Ellis v. United States Postal Service

01A51124

May 4, 2005

.

Karen T. King-Ellis,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Southwest Area)

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A51124

Agency No. 330-A3-8099X

Hearing No. 4G-770-0508-02

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal

is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons,

the Commission affirms the agency's final order.

The record reveals that at the time of the alleged discrimination,

complainant, an Acting Manager at the agency's University Station

in Houston, Texas, filed a formal EEO complaint on October 4, 2002,

alleging that the agency discriminated against her on the basis of sex

(female) when she learned on August 26, 2002, that management had not

selected her for the position of Station Manager at the Sage Station.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). Following the hearing, the AJ issued a

decision finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant established a prima facie case of sex

discrimination because the person who was selected to the position was

male and therefore not in complainant's protected class. The AJ further

concluded that the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions. The AJ found that a review board consisting of

one male and two female supervisors recommended four applicants to the

area manager/selecting official, also a female.<0> The AJ determined that

all four applicants had extensive experience as supervisors and acting

managers and that all received the same instructions for the interview.

However, in addition to his experience in Operations and his expertise

managing VIM rooms, the selectee, according to the selecting official,

had had an exceptional interview due to his �great communication skills.�

AJ Decision at 4. Complainant had a good interview, but the selecting

official noted that she needed to work on her communication skills. Id.;

see also Memorandum of Comparative Analysis, dated 8/19/02, attached

as Exh. 4. Ultimately, the hiring decision turned on the applicants'

communication ability as the Sage Station is one of the busiest offices

in the area, and they needed a person who could communicate well with

customers as well as employees. Id. at 5 (citing Hearing Tr. 185).

The AJ found that complainant did not establish that more likely

than not, the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext to mask

unlawful discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, the AJ found that

complainant �failed to provide any evidence other than bare allegations�

of discrimination. Id. at 7. By not offering any evidence that the

non-selection was based on her sex, complainant could not meet her burden

of proof. The agency's final order, dated October 4, 2004, implemented

the AJ's decision.

On appeal, complainant restates arguments previously made at the hearing.

Complainant takes particular issue with the fact that the selecting

official found complainant's communication skills to be inadequate.

Complainant argues that the AJ erred in accepting this as the agency's

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not selecting complainant

to the position. She questions how the selectee, who had been only a

carrier for most of his postal service career, could be deemed to have

better skills than she, when she used her communication skills to train

other postal employees in a Learning Through Discussions class that

she taught while on detail with the National Management Association.

See Appeal Statement at 3. Furthermore, complainant points out that

the selecting official's decision to add a fourth applicant to her list

of potential candidates, when that fourth applicant turned out to be the

selectee and when none of the review board members knew that he was added,

is an �obvious discriminatory act.� Id.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings

by an Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.� Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations

Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951 (citation omitted). A finding regarding

whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding.

See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's

conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether

or not a hearing was held.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and

that the AJ's decision properly referenced the appropriate regulations,

policies, and laws. Applying the substantial evidence review standard,

the Commission will give deference to an AJ's post-hearing factual

findings based on evidence in the record. EEO Management Directive 110,

as revised, Nov. 9, 1999 (MD-110), at 9-16. A credibility determination

of an AJ based on the demeanor or tone of voice of a witness will be

accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts

the testimony of the witness or the testimony otherwise so lacks in

credibility that a reasonable fact-finder would not credit it. See id.

We further note that the agency generally has broad discretion to

set policies and carry out personnel decisions, and should not be

second-guessed by the reviewing authority absent evidence of unlawful

motivation. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 248, 259 (1981); Vanek v. Dep't of the Treasury, EEOC Request

No. 05940906 (Jan. 16, 1997); Kohlmeyer v. Dep't of the Air Force,

EEOC Request No. 05960038 (Aug. 8, 1996). The EEOC does not have the

authority nor the capacity to stand as the super-personnel department

for the Postal Service. Personnel decisions which are idiosyncratic

or suspect, however, are subjected to heightened scrutiny. See Loeb

v. Textron Corp., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012, n.6 (1st Cir. 1979). Deviations

from standard procedures without explanation or justification are

sufficient to support an inference of pretext. See Hovey v. Dep't of

Hous. & Urban Dev., EEOC Appeal No. 01973965, (Aug. 31, 2000); Monroe

v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950248 (Aug. 8, 1996); Craig

v. Y&Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80 (3rd Cir. 1983).

We find no evidence that the selecting official's decision not to

select complainant is idiosyncratic or suspect. Therefore, we will not

second-guess it. We find it perfectly reasonable and not unusual that

the agency would want a station manager with exceptional communication

skills, particularly where the manager is to oversee a very busy office

and is to have much contact with both customers and employees.

As for complainant's argument on appeal that the selecting official's

request to add a fourth person to the list of candidates for a final

interview was an �obvious discriminatory act,� when that fourth candidate

ultimately became the selectee, we find nothing obviously discriminatory

in that decision. In fact, the evidence on the record shows that the

selecting official did not know who that fourth person would be. As such,

complainant has failed to prove through substantial evidence that the

decision was discriminatory. The agency's final order is hereby AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 4, 2005

__________________

Date

0 1The facts show that the review board initially recommended three

applicants to the selecting official: complainant and two other males.

For reasons not elaborated on the record, the selecting official

requested that an additional applicant be referred to her. This other

applicant was also male and he ultimately obtained the job.