Karen F. Morris, Complainant,v.Mel R. Martinez, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 31, 2001
01981418 (E.E.O.C. May. 31, 2001)

01981418

05-31-2001

Karen F. Morris, Complainant, v. Mel R. Martinez, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Agency.


Karen F. Morris v. Department of Housing and Urban Development

01981418

May 31, 2001

.

Karen F. Morris,

Complainant,

v.

Mel R. Martinez,

Secretary,

Department of Housing and Urban Development,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01981418

Agency No. KC-95-05

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant

alleged that she was discriminated against on the bases of race (Black),

sex (female), age (50), and reprisal (prior EEO activity in 1992 and

1993 and participation in union grievance) when on March 16, 1995,

her supervisor gave her an oral admonishment and confirmed it with an

official reprimand on April 4, 1995.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as an Equal Opportunity Specialist, GS-12, at the agency's Office of Fair

Housing and Equal Opportunity in Kansas City, Kansas. Believing she

was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling and

subsequently filed a formal complaint on June 29, 1995. At the conclusion

of the investigation, complainant was informed of her right to request a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or alternatively, to receive

a final decision by the agency. On October 28, 1997, the agency issued

its final decision (FAD) finding no discrimination.

On appeal, complainant contends that the agency failed to meet

the appropriate time frames found in 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 regarding

the processing of her complaint. Further, complainant claims that

the investigation was inadequate and the FAD solely relied upon her

supervisor's statement and the statement of her two co-workers. Finally,

complainant states that the grievance she referred to as a basis for

discrimination involved claims of discrimination in violation of Title

VII and the ADEA. The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency

has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility

to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the

third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of

whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal

Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In response to complainant's claims of discrimination, the agency

presented evidence that complainant was given an oral admonishment which

was confirmed by the official reprimand when she refused to carry out

a directive from her supervisor. Since her supervisor considered

complainant's action to be insubordination and unacceptable, the

supervisor issued complainant the disciplinary action. We find that

the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its action.

Since the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for its action, the burden returns to the complainant to demonstrate

that the agency's articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

We find that complainant has failed to do so. Complainant argued

that the directive she refused to carry out was not a priority and she

merely reiterated her claims that her supervisor's action was based upon

vengeance. Beyond her conclusory statements that the action was due

to discrimination, there is no evidence in the file to show that this

was the case. Accordingly, we find that complainant has failed to show

that the agency's reasoning was pretext to mask unlawful discrimination

and/or retaliation.

The Commission further notes that complainant's contentions on appeal

are without merit. Complainant argued that the agency conducted an

inadequate investigation. The Commission notes that complainant failed

to provide any evidence which would raise an inference of discrimination.

Furthermore, we find that complainant failed to introduce evidence to show

that the agency's reasons for its actions were pretext for prohibited

discrimination. Therefore, after a careful review of the record,

including complainant's contentions on appeal, the agency's response,

and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision,

we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0900)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 31, 2001

__________________

Date