0120055407
12-05-2006
Juanita M. Copeland, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Juanita M. Copeland v. United States Postal Service
0120055407
.
Juanita M. Copeland,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120055407<1>
Agency No. 4C-280-0045-03Hearing No. 140-2004-00189X
DECISION
Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint in which she claimed
that the agency discriminated against her on the bases of her race
(African-American), sex (female), age (dob 1/3/53) and in reprisal for
her previous EEO activity under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act when:
1. On October 1, 2002, complainant was pulled from a higher level detail
and replaced by a White male.
2. On November 5, 2002, complainant was removed from Mint Hill and
returned to Mt. Carmel.
3. On November 20, 2002, complainant was forced to sign a �Met
Expectations� merit rating.
4. On January 16, 2002, complainant became aware that her scheduled
absences were changed to unscheduled absences.
5. On October 1, 2002, and ongoing, complainant has been subjected to
harassment and disparate treatment in regard to her supervisory duties
and responsibilities.
6. Since May 6, 2003, during complainant's mid-year review and ongoing,
complainant continues to be subjected to ongoing harassment with regard to
not receiving any support to perform her job as Manager, Customer Services
at Carmel Station and her individual development plan was not addressed.
7. During October 2003, complainant was subjected to an improper audit.
8. On October 7 and 14, 2003, complainant was denied a National
Association of Postal Supervisors representative for an investigative
interview.
9. On unspecified dates, complainant was denied developmental assignments.
10. On unspecified dates, complainant was denied higher level pay.
Complainant claimed that the alleged actions constituted harassment.
The agency accepted the complaint and conducted an investigation.
Thereafter, the agency notified complainant of her right to elect either
a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) or a final action
issued by the agency. Complainant requested a hearing. On May 24, 2005,
the AJ issued an Order of Dismissal. The AJ stated that complainant had
not shown good faith efforts to participate in the hearing proceedings
and had failed to comply with several Orders.
In a final action dated July 15, 2005, the agency determined that no
discrimination occurred. With regard to the claim of harassment, the
agency determined that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case.
The agency also determined that complainant failed to establish a prima
facie case under each of the alleged bases. The agency stated that
complainant failed to prove that the harassment complained of affected
a term, condition or privilege of employment, and/or had the purpose
or effect of unreasonably interfering with her work environment and/or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.
With regard to claim (1), the Manager, Customer Services, stated that
complainant was removed from the detail at Independence Station based on
her request on or about October 1, 2002, to be considered for a detail
to Mint Hill Station or Idlewild. The Manager, Customer Services,
stated that the individual placed at Independence Station was assigned
there because he had a demonstrated track record of managing efficient
and productive work units. He further stated that this individual was
more qualified to fill the temporary vacancy due to his experience in
managing large carrier operations. With regard to claim (2), the agency
stated that complainant was returned to Carmel Station because another
employee returned from his detail and Mint Hill was his permanent duty
assignment. As for claim (3), the agency stated that complainant was
rated on her overall performance and based on that, she did not justify
a �Far Exceeds� merit rating. According to the agency, it did not
indicate to complainant at her mid-year review that she would be rated
as �Far Exceeds�. The Postmaster stated that only ten percent of EAS
evaluations are �Far Exceeds� because there is a cap at ten percent
of the �Far Exceeds� ratings. With respect to claim (4), the agency
stated that complainant's absences from November 22 to November 29, 2002,
were unscheduled absences because they were not requested and approved
in advance. According to the agency, if the leave for December 2 to
December 5, 2002, was documented as unscheduled, that should be changed
since the leave was requested and approved in advance.
As for claims (5-6), the agency stated that complainant was given
additional support staff when she said she was falling behind in her work.
The Manager, Post Office Operations, stated that he did not understand
why complainant would have felt humiliated during a telecom with him and
two other officials. According to the Manager, the purpose of the telecom
was to clarify a possible shortage in the Finance Unit. The Manager also
stated that although day-to-day supervision of the subordinate staff
is left up to the Station Managers, he and the Postmaster would review
the situation when Managers want to issue corrective or disciplinary
action to a subordinate supervisor. With regard to claim (7), the
agency stated that from August 20 to December 31, 2003, the Inspection
Service conducted approximately 53 audits on 22 different offices,
including two audits of Carmel Station. The agency stated that the
first audit performed at the Carmel Station was the financial procedures
review and the second audit was conducted after complainant informed the
Inspection Service that Carmel Station was at 100% compliance. The agency
determined that it articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
its actions. The agency determined that complainant failed to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that management's explanations are pretext
and that management's actions were actually motivated by a prohibited
discriminatory animus. Thereafter, complainant filed the instant appeal.
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of
burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case claiming
discrimination is a three-step process as set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973), and its progeny.
See Hochstadt v. Worcestor Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc.,
425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976)
(applying McDonnell Douglas to retaliation cases). See also Loeb
v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979) (requiring a showing that age
was a determinative factor, in the sense that �but for� age, complainant
would not have been subject to the adverse action at issue).
For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie
case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a
prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately
prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
This order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step
normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case,
need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue,
the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the
McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant
has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions
were motivated by discrimination. United States Postal Service Board of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department
of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900150 (June 28, 1990).
Harassment is actionable only if the incidents to which complainant
has been subjected were sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of complainant's employment and create an abusive
working environment. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993); Wibstad v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01972699
(August 14, 1998). To establish a prima facie case of hostile environment
harassment, a complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily
protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of
unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class;
(3) the harassment complained of was based on the statutorily protected
class; and (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment
and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the
work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
work environment. Humphrey v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal
No. 01965238 (October 16, 1998).
With regard to complainant's claim of disparate treatment, we will
assume, arguendo, that complainant has established a prima facie
case of discrimination on the bases of race, sex, age and reprisal.
The Commission finds that the agency articulated legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.
We find that complainant has not refuted the agency's stated reasons for
these alleged actions. Complainant has not shown that her credentials
were clearly superior to those of the White male who was assigned to
Independence Station. Complainant did not refute the agency's assertion
that she was reassigned from Mint Hill because that was the permanent
duty assignment for a White male who was returning there from a detail.
Complainant has not disproved the agency's assertion that only ten
percent of EAS employees received a �Far Exceeds� rating and that her
performance did not merit that rating. Complainant has not shown that
she was marked improperly with unscheduled absences in November 2002,
or that discriminatory intent rather than mistake was the reason she
received unscheduled absences during December 2002. We find that although
complainant felt that she was targeted at the telecom, the record instead
indicates that a financial problem existed, complainant was not singled
out, and that it was customary for the agency to address such problems
through this process. There is no sufficient persuasive evidence to
make a finding of discrimination with regard to the lower quantity of
supervisory staff afforded complainant. As for the audit, although
complainant may not have received the prior notice that other managers
received, it is clear that she knew several months prior to the audit
that Carmel Station was among the five offices considered �high risk�.
Therefore, it should not have been a surprise to complainant for her
office to be subject to an audit to ensure best practice compliance.
As for claims (9-10), we note that these claims are intertwined since
complainant alleges that she was denied higher level pay when she
was denied the developmental assignments. In light of complainant's
details to Mint Hill and Independence, we find no persuasive evidence
that complainant was denied developmental assignments and higher
level pay based on discriminatory intent. As for complainant being
denied representation during the investigative interview in claim (8)
and not having her individual development plan addressed, we find that
the alleged actions are not sufficiently severe to warrant a finding
that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. We find that
complainant failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that she
was discriminated against on the bases of race, sex, age or reprisal.
The agency's decision finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
December 5, 2006
__________________
Date
1Due to a new data system, your case has been redesignated with
the above referenced appeal number.