Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 28, 1947

72 N.L.R.B. 975 (N.L.R.B. 1947)

In the Matter of Joxrs & LAUw ILIN STEEL CORPORATION and UNITED
STEELWORKERS OF Aitii.RICA, C. I. 0.
Case No. 6-C-1050.-Decided February 08,1947
Mr. V. G. Stuart Sherman, for the Board.
Reed, Smith, Shaw and HeClay, by Messrs. John C. Bane, Jr., and
-Nicholas Ulkovic, and Mr. Alan D. Riester, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for
the respondent.
Messrs. Phillip 111. Curran and Frank Burke, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for
the Union.
Mr. Julius Topol, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On July 23, 1946, Trial Examiner Thomas S. Wilson issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the respondent filed
exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a statement in the nature
of a supporing brief.
On October 12, 1946, the Board, at Washington, D. C., heard oral
argument in which the respondent participated; the Union did not
appear.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner at the
hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the respondent's brief and exceptions, the contentions
advanced by the respondent at the oral argument, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner With the following additions and
modifications:
1. The Trial Examiner found that the respondent refused to bar-
gain with the Union on December 2, 1943, and at all times thereafter,
in violation of Section 8 (5) of the Act. We agree for the reasons
hereinafter set forth.
72 N L.R B,No 166
7 31 2 42-47-vol 72-63 975
976 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The respondent seeks to justify its refusal to bargain with the Union
as the exclusive bargaining representative of militarized guards at its
Pittsburgh Works during the period from December 2, 19430, to Decem-
ber 4, 1944, when the guards were demilitarized, on the grounds, inter
alia, that, by reason of their militarized status, the guards were not
employees of the respondent within the meaning of the Act, and that
the Union was disqualified from representing the guards because it
then represented the respondent's production and maintenance em-
ployees. The respondent urged these contentions in the representation
proceeding involving these guards which preceded the instant case,
and we found them to be without merit We have again considered
these contentions and hereby affirm our previous determinations that'
militarization of the guards did not alter their status as employees of
the respondent 2 and did not preclude the guards from representation
by an organization already representing the respondent's production
and maintenance employees.3 We note that Mr. Reynold's dissent
herein is based on the fact that the guards seek to be represented by
the sane organization as the rank-and-file, and that he would not object
if an independent union were involved. For 'reasons stated in the
recent Jones cC Laughlin foremen's decisions (66 N. L. R. B. 386; 71
N. L. R. B. 1261), we find no authority in the Act to draw the
distinction.
The respondent employed at its Pittsburgh Works, during the period
in question, about 11,500 employees. The respondent's plant-protec-
tion force, which bad been in existence for many years before 1943,
numbered about 120 men, of whom 16 exercised supervisory authority.
This supervisory force, which consisted of a captain of police, lieu-
tenant of police, 7 sergeants, and 7 corporals, trained new plant-protec-
tion personnel, assigned duties and gave instructions to them, and gen-
erally superintended the non-supervisory plant-protection personnel,
who were classified as privates or guards, in the performance of their
duties. It is this group of privates or guards alone which the Board,
in the representation proceeding, found to be an appropriate unit for
collective bargaining. They have no supervisory authority and are
not identified with management.
As before militarization, the respondent hired the guards and dis-
charged them, paid them their wages, and supplied them with uni-
forms and arms. The record is clear that during militarization the
guards in the unit performed no more than the normal duties of plant-
1 Matter of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 52 N. L R. B. 975. That decision
Was unanimous, Chairman Millis and Mr. Reilly having both joined Mr Houston in
reading the result.
See also, for example , Matter of Chrysler Corporation, Highland Park Plant, 44
N L R B 881 , Matter of Dravo Coi potation , 52 N L. R B. 322, Matter of Lockheed
Au craft Corporation, 61 N L R B 1336; Matter of Armour and Company, 63 N. L. R. B.
1200 , Matter of Wilson & Co , Inc , 67 N. L. R. B 662.
1 See cases cited in footnote 2, supra.
JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION 977
protection personnel, as they had done theretofore. The guards pa-
trolled assigned areas on plant property. In the course of patrol, it
was their duty to prevent loitering by employees and strangers, looting,
fires, and safety hazards, to inspect first-aid and fire equipment, to
enforce the respondent's rule prohibiting smoking by employees and
other of its rules and regulations, and to make periodic reports by
telephone.
Upon militarization; the guards signed an agreement with the United
States of America in which they agreed to support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, to discharge
faithfully their duties as civilian auxiliaries to the military police, to
protect war materials, premises. and utilities, and obey all orders issued
in connection therewith by the President or his duly authorized officer.
However, the military authorities exercised no direct control over the
respondent's guards in the day-to-day performance of their duties.
The military authorities issued "General Orders" for the "information
and guidance of the [militarized] guard forces at all privately owned
or operated facilities." These Orders emphasized generally the neces-
sity that guards perform the duties which had been assigned to them
by the plant operator, in a diligent and military" manner. The mili-
tary authorities, in addition, made inspections from time to time to
satisfy themselves that the respondent was supplying adequate pro-
tection to the plant. Other than that, control of the guards as to the
method and manner of performance of their work rested entirely in
the hinds of the respondent. Just as before militarization, the re-
spondent exercised this control over the guards through its supervisory
force, in the manner described above, and retained sole authority to
determine the terms and conditions under Which the guards were
employed. In view of the degree of control exercised by the respond-
ent over the guards and the respondent's undisturbed authority to
determine terms and conditions under which they worked during this
period, we find that during the period of militarization the relation-
ship of employer and employee existed between the respondent and
the guards 4
The respondent relies- upon the decision of the United States Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in N. L. R. B. v. E. C.
Atkins et Company I to support the contention that the guards were
4 See N L R B v Hearst Pubtications 7ncm poratel, 322 U S 111, enf'g 39 N L. 71 B.
3245 The Board takes official notice of the rules an(] regulations promulgated by the
war Department with respect to the employment relations of militarized guards. A direc-
tive of the War Department, Circular No. 15, dated March 17, 1943, stated in_part .
6 b (1) Basically, the militarization of plant guard forces does not change the
existing system of hiring, compensation, and dismissal , all remain primarily a
matter between the guards and the plant managements Guards in the employ of a
private employer may , as heretofore , be dismissed by that employer
147 F (2d) 730 (C C. A. 7 ), cert. granted , judgment vacated, and case remanded
to the Circuit Court of Appeals for consideration of the effect of intervening demilitariza-
tion of the guards on the Board's order, 325 U. S. 838 ; judgment reaffirmed , 155 F. (2d)
567 (C . C. A. 7).
978 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not its employees. We are of the opinion that the holding of the
court in that case, that the nulitarized guards there involved were not
employees within the meaning of the Act, is distinguishable. Thus,
a major consideration in the court's decision in the Atkins case was
the degree of control exercised by the mtlrtarv authorities over the
plant guards there involved. The court found that the military au-
thorities exercised complete control over the guards "even to the
minutest detail." Here, however, the Army exercised no such measure
of control during the period of militarization. As hereinabove de-
scribed, except for the issuance of General Orders, the military author-
ities here permitted control over the guards to remain in the hands
of the respondent. A second important factor relied on by the court
in the Atkins case was its view that the plant guard force there involved
had no existence prior to the tear emergency and was created solely
at the insistence of the military authorities. In the present case,.the
plant-protection force existed for many years before the war and con-
tinued to function after militarization at substantially the same
strenb h. Moreover, the duties performed by these guards were the
sane before, during, and after militarization. In any event, we
have appealed the Seventh Circuit's second holding in the Atkins
case.6 We believe that it failed to give sufficient weight to the fact
that the plant operator there retained sole authority to fix the wages
to be paid to the guards and a residual authority to determine their
working conditions. We are of the opinion that the retention of such
authority renders collective bargaining, at least as to such matters,
clearly appropriate.
The respondent further contends that the Board should deny the
Union status as exclusive representative of the guards because the
Union also represented the respondent's production and maintenance
employees.
The respondent argues that common representation of the two
groups of employees would subject the guards to conflicting claims
upon their loyalty and thereby result in a decline of efficiency on their
part in the performance of their duties and in the fulfillment of their
obligations to the Army. As we have stated in the past, membership
in a union does not, in our view, undermine the honesty of plant-
protection employees or their competence to perform their duties
satisfactorily. There can be no real conflict between the legitimate
demands of employees or their unions and the legitimate demands of
the employer or the demands of public authorities; conflicting loyal-
ties arise only where improper demands are made on the guards, and
our experience indicates that it is reasonable to assume that guards
6The Alt es case is now pending in the Supisine Court of the United States, certiorau
having been granted on December 23, 1946
JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION 979
will not yield to the illegitimate demand as against the legitimate one.
The remedy for inefficiency or willful disregard or neglect of duty on
the part of the guards lies, in any event, in the power of the respond-
ent to discipline or discharge them and in the power of the military
authorities to take all steps necessary to protect the paramount public
interest, rather than in denying statutory protection of the right of
plant guards, be they militarized or not, to organize and bargain
collectively.
In accordance with our practice, as set forth in the Dravo case,' we
found in the representation proceeding that a unit of militarized
guards, separate from production and maintenance employees and all
other employees not having public responsibilities, constituted an ap-
propriate unit for collective bargaining. Separating the bargaining
relations of the guards in this manner served to accommodate the bar-
gaining process to the situation presented by the militarization of the
plant guards. Moreover, the record herein amply indicates that the
Union, itself, recognized the peculiar problem arising from the mill-
tarized status of the guards. Thus, the record shows that, as a pre-
liminary step to insulate the bargaining relations of these employees,
the Union established a separate local for the guards; and they were
not permitted to affiliate with any other local. It further reveals that,
since the Union's certification as bargaining agent for the guards in
October 1943, all its efforts to negotiate a contract with the respondent
concerning these employees have been on a basis separate and apart
from collective bargaining negotiations between the Union and the
respondent with respect to other employees in the plant. The terms
of the proposed contract submitted by the Union as a basis for such
negotiations provide a clear indication of the Unions recognition of
the special status of militarized guards and of the problem raised by
their being represented by a labor organization that already repre-
sents other employees of the employers The denial of bargaining
rights to militarized plant guards will not solve this problem for the
respondent, inasmuch as it exists whether these guards bargain uidi-
T See footnote 2, supra
' The specific terms referred to read as folioiN s
A i t * M
It is realized by the parties hereto that the adequate and continuous protection
of the Corporation's Plant, Premises and Products is of paramount importance,
and each party agrees that there shall be no interference whatsoever in the main-
tenance of satisfactory Plant Protection so long as required by the Corporation.
and Plant Protection Employees covered by this agieement shall continue to per-
foini their duties irrespective of other unions of employees at the Coip. plant
when necessary to instinct Plant Protection Employees as to their duties in
connection with suspected plant sabotage or tinetery, and such instructions aic deemed
confidential by the Corporation or any Public Officer, such instructions and iufoinia-
tion shall be so delivered to Plant Protection Employees, and shall not be dis-
closed by them to the Union, Union Officers or others. Any such necessary instruc-
tions shall be given directly to each individual guard by a diiect representative of
the management Any Plant Protection Employees violating this rule will be
subject to discipline, up to and including dismissal [Emphasis added].
980 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
vidually or collectively. On the other hand, by permitting collective
bargaining within the framework of the regulations established by
the Government," the likelihood of a peaceful solution to this problem
is enhanced.
As indicated in the Trial Examiner's Intermediate Report, the
respondent's plant guards were demilitarized on December 4, 1944.
Thereafter, all guards who had not been previously deputized as spe-
cial patrolmen by the city of Pittsburgh were so deputized. All the
respondent's guards at its Pittsburgh Works were so deputized at the
time of the hearing herein. Despite demilitarization of the guards,
the respondent refused to bargain with the Union as the exclusive
representative of the guards on and after December 4, 1944. It seeks
to justify the refusal on the grounds that deputization of its guards
as special patrolmen by the city of Pittsburgh, like their previous
militarl'zatlon, deprived the guards of status as employees of the
respondent, and that, in any case, they should be precluded from
representation by the same labor oragnization that represents the
respondent's production and maintenance employees.
As the Trial Examiner stated in his Intermediate Report, the com-
missions as special patrolmen were issued for the convenience and on
the sole initiative of the respondent. No law required that the re-
spondent's plant guards be so deputized. The laws of Pennsylvania
merely authorize the issuance of such commissions upon the request of
any person having property to protect 10 As special patrolmen, the
guards take an oath "to perform and discharge all duties of the office
of Special Patrolman." Although the record does not disclose the
precise scope of these public duties, it reveals that the guards have
been required in the past to take into custody employees at the respond-
0 The Army's position with respect to the right of militarized guards to representation
by the same union that'represents rank and file employees is in accord with established
Board policy. Its position is set forth in a memorandum of the War Department,
dated July 10, 1943, which states in part :
• 0 4 #1 s
3 In the event that plant guards enrolled as Auxiliary Military Police desire to
be represented in collective bargaining with the management, they should be repre-
sented by a bargaining unit other than that representing the production and
maintenance workers. However, in such event, both bargaining units may be affiliated
with the same trade union local, provided they are, in fact, separate bargaining
units.
w a . * e
As set forth above, the Union went beyond the requirements as to separation of bar-
gaining units by establishing a separate local for the guards.
10 The attorney for the Board introduced into evidence the following extract from the
Pennsylvania statutes :
"The Superintendent of Police whenever directed by the Department of Public
Safety] sliall appoint and cause to be sworn in any number of additional patrolmen
to do duty at any place in the City designated by and at the charge and expense of the
person or persons who may ask for such appointment (No 166, an Act to
amend Article 369 of the Act approved the 7th day of March 1901 and entitled "An
Act for the Government of Cities of the Second Class," as amended, approved the 14th
day of May 1937).
JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION 981
ent's plant whose arrest had been requested by the city police or State
or Federal law enforcement agencies. The record also shows that the
primary responsibility for preventing and detecting destruction or
theft of the respondent's property rests with these guards rather than
with the regular city police. Nevertheless, it is clear that, as stated
above, the guards perform only the normal duties of plant-protection
personnel, described above in connection with their militarized status,
and are subject to the sole control and direction of the respondent.
Just as during and before the period of their militarization, they are
paid, armed, uniformed, trained, and assigned their duties and given
instructions with respect thereto by the respondent.- No person
other than members of the respondent's supervisory staff exercises any
control over either the training of the guards or the day-to-day per-
formance of their usual duties. The respondent has retained sole
authority to hire its guards subject to minimum qualifications set by
the city of Pittsburgh for special patrolmen'12 and the respondent
alone retains authority to discharge them.
Notwithstanding the obligations owed by the guards to the city of
Pittsburgh, it is clear that they did not cease to be in the employ of
the respondent merely because they were commissioned as special pa-
trolmen. The terms and conditions of the guards' employment are
determined by the respondent, either unilaterally or through indi-
vidual bargaining with the guards. They are, therefore, properly the
subject of collective bargaining. Accordingly, we conclude that, de-
spite deputization, the respondent's guards are its employees within
the meaning of the Act.
The respondent further contends that the deputized status of the
guards precludes them, as in the case of militarization, from repre-
sentation by the Union inasmuch as it already represents the respond-
ent's production and maintenance employees. The respondent
contends that it is against the public interest to permit guards having
public obligations to affiliate with the same union which represents
other employees and that, if the Union is permitted to represent the
guards, they will not properly protect the interests of management or
the public. We reject these contentions for the reasons stated above
in connection with our determination that statutory protection of the
right of plant guards to organize and bargain collectively during mili-
tarization does not jeopardize public or employer interests in the per-
formance of their duties."
"The duties of the guards, who were deputized as special city patrolmen before mili-
tarization , continued as described herein during the period of militarization and thereafter.
'2 They must be citizens of the United States and men of good character , having no
criminal record
13 See, for example , Matter of American Steel Foundries , 64 N. L . R B. 1172 , Matter of
Bethlehem Supply Company , 63 N L . it. B 937 ; Matter of Aluminum Company of America,
63 N. I, it. B. 828 ; Matter of Standard Steel Spring Company , 62 N L. R. B. 660.
982 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Under the circumstances, and upon the entire record in the case,
we are convinced and we hereby find that representation of the plant
guards by the Union in a separate unit creates no substantial impedi-
ment either to their fulfillment of their obligations as special patrol-
men or the proper performance of their duties to the respondent.
In any event, for the Board to withhold the protection of the Act
from these employees in their efforts to bargain collectively through
the Union will not avert the difficulties, if any, arising solely from
their already demonstrated allegiance to that organization. It is sig-
nificant that.the respondent does not contend that the guards have
at any time failed to protect the public interest or the respondent's in-
terest in the more than 21/2 years which elapsed since the guards chose
the Union as their bargaining representative.14 Should they at any
time in the future be derelict in the protection of those interests, the
respondent has recourse to its normal disciplinary authority to insure
the maintenance of its standards of work. The respondent relies on
N. L. B. B. v. Jones t Laughlin Steel Corporation, 154 F. (2d) 932
(C. C. A. 6), reaffirming 146 F. (2d) 718, involving plant guards at
another of the respondent's plants. The Court there held that the
Board had failed to give adequate consideration to the public interest
in concluding that guards commissioned as special city policemen may
be represented by the same labor organization representing produc-
tion and maintenance employees. We have in the instant case con-
sidered the public interest and have found that it does not preclude
such representation. In any event, the Supreme Court of the United
States has granted the Board's petition for certiorari to obtain a re-
view of that decision.
In the final analysis, we are presented with the question of whether
the Board has power under the Act to preclude employees from repre-
sentation by any particular labor organization. We do not believe
that we have the power to deny certification to the Union solely because
it represents the respondent's production and maintenance employees.
14 At the oral argument before the Board the respondent contended that proof of such
misfeasance of nonfeasance should not be requited It contended that the instant case is
analogous to those in which the Board, by reason of the fact that supervisory employees
controlled a labor organization, found it to be company dominated even though the super-
visors acted with integrity, obtained substantial benefits for employee adherents of the
labor organization, and did not actually neglect or iolate any duty to such employees in
the course of bargaining negotiations with the enrplo} er In such cases participation of
supervisors in the formation or administration of'a lank-and-file laboi organization inter-
feres with the full freedom of rank and file employees to select representatives for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining By reason of then nianagenient status, participation by
supervisors in collective bargaining negotiations tends to reader unlikely representation
of the interests of rank-and-file employees uncociced by management However, as indi-
cated above, in the present case mere representation of the guards by the same organization
representing other employees of the respondent does not, in our opinion, have any tendency
to induce militarized or deputized guards to neglect their duties or violate their obligations
to the respondent or to the public We therefore reject the respondent's contention
JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION 983
The Act speaks of representatives of the "employees own choosing,"
not our choosing.15
2. The respondent contends that it should not now, more than 21/',
years since the Board's-certification of the Union, be required to bar-
gain with the Union on the basis of a majority status then established.
The record contains no evidence indicating that the Union no longer
represents a majority of the guards. On the other hand, there is no
conclusive showing that the Union's majority status still exists. As-
suming, arguendo; that a loss of majority has occurred since the Board's
certification of the Union, we attribute such loss to the respondent's
unlawful refusal to bargain with the Union.16 In any event, we con-
clude, for the reasons stated in flatter of Karp Metal Products Co.,
Inc.,` that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to require the re-
spondent to bargain collectively with the Union.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the respondent, Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to recognize and to bargain collectively with United
Steelworkers of America, C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of
all its plant-protection employees at its Pittsburgh Works, excluding
lieutenants, sergeants, corporals, and all other supervisory employees
with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise
effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively recommend
such action, clerks, and all other employees, with respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment;
(b) Engaging in any other acts in any manner interfering with the
efforts of United Steelworkers of America, C. I. 0., to negotiate for or
represent the employees in the aforesaid bargaining unit as exclusive
bargaining agent.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of
America, C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of all its employees
in the aforesaid appropriate unit, with respect to rates of pay, wages,
15 Matter of Monsanto Chemical Company, 71 N L It B 11 , Matter of Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation, I esta - Shannoipin Coal Dwision, 66 N L It B 386
16 See International Association of Machinists v N L R B, 311 U S 72 , 82, enforcing
8 N L It B 621, Franbs•Broe Company Y N L R B , 321 U S. 702, enforcing 44
N L It B 898
n 51 N L It B 621, enforced without opinion on October 23, 1943 (C. C A 2).
984 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
hours of employment , or other conditions of employment , and if an
understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a signed
agreement ;
(b) Post throughout the Pittsburgh Works in Pittsburgh , Pennsyl-
vania , copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix A."",
Copies of said notice , to be furnished by the Regional Director for
the Sixth Region, shall , after being duly signed by the respondent's
representative , be posted by the respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and maintained by it for sixty ( 60) consecutive days there-
after, in conspicuous places , including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material.
MR. JAMES J. REYNOLDS , JR., dissenting :
I agree with my colleagues that the guards constituting the appro-
priate unit in this case are employees within the meaning of the Act
regardless of their quasi -military character or their status as special
patrolmen of the city of Pittsburgh . However, since they are required
to exercise monitorial duties over those employees already represented
by the petitioning union, and for the reasons stated iii my dissenting
opinion in the Matter of Monsanto Chemical Company, 71 N. L. R. B.
11, I do not believe the purpose of the Act will be effectuated by follow-
ing the majority view.
"APPENDIX A"
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with United Steelworkers
of America, C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of our
employees in the unit described below.
WE WILL NOT interfere in any other manner with the efforts
of United Steelworkers of America to bargain collectively with us.
WE WILL bargain collectively upon request with the above-
named union as the exclusive representative of all employees in
the bargaining unit described herein with respect to rates of pay,
hours of employment or other conditions of employment, and if
is In the event that this Oiler is enforced by a decree of a Circuit Court of Appeals,
there shall be inserted , before the words "A Decision and Order ," the words: "A DECREE
OF THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING "
JONES S LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION 985
an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement. The bargaining unit is:
All plant-protection employees at our Pittsburgh Works,
excluding lieutenants, sergeants, corporals, and all other
supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, dis-
charge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status
of employees, or effectively recommend such action, clerks,
and all other employees.
JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION,
Employer
Dated ----------------------- By--------------------- ------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered. defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Mr. W. G. Steal t Sliet aunt for the Board
Mr. Phillip M. Curran. for the Union
Messt s John C. Bane. Jr and Nicholas Unkovic, of Reed, Smith, Shaw and
McClay, and Alan D Riester, of Pittsburgh, Pa, for the respondent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a second amended charge duly filed by United Steelworkers of America,
C I 0, herein called the Union, on June 19, 1946, the National Labor Relations
Board, herein called the Board, by its Regional Director for the Sixth Region
(Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), issued its complaint dated June 19, 1946, against
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, herein called the respondent, alleging that
the respondent had engaged in, and was engaging in, unfair labor practices affect-
ing commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6)
and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act.
Copies of the complaint, accompanied by notice of hearing and copies of the
second amended charge. NNere duly served upon the respondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint alleged in substance :
(1) all plant protection employees at the Pittsburgh works of the respondent
at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, excluding lieutenants, sergeants, corporals, and all
other supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline,
or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively recommend
such action, clerks, and all other employees, constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of
the Act ; (2) since December 2. 1943, and at all times thereafter, the respondent
has refused to recognize and to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the respondent's employees in the unit designated
by the Board as appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining although a
majority of said employees in such appropriate unit by secret ballot conducted
on October 13, 1943, selected said Union as then collective bargaining representa-
tive and said Union was certified by the Board as such representative on October
27, 1943.
Thereafter the respondent filed its answer in which it admitted certain of the
allegations of the complaint but denied that it had committed any unfair labor
986 DECISIONS OF NATION AL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
practices. In substance the answer alleged that the Union was not "legally
qualified or legally competent" to be the exclusive representative of said plant
guards for the following reasons. (I) that the Union for many years has been
the exclusive representative of the production and maintenance employees at
the respondent's plant; (2) that all members of the plant guard force have been
sworn in and enrolled as special patrolmen on the Municipal Police Force of the
City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and are engaged in maintaining peace and
order at the respondent's plant; (3) that said plant guards or police are not such
"employees" within the meaning of the Act as can be represented by the Union.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on July 8,
1346, before the undersigned, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief
Trial Examiner. The Board, the respondent and the Union were represented by
counsel. Full opportunity to be heard and to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses. and to produce evidence hearing on the issues was afforded all parties. A
motion made by Board's coumel to contorin the pleadings to the pioof as to such
matters as dates, typographical errors and other minor Naiiances was allowed
without objection. A brief has been filed by the respondent
Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in
the manufacture and sale of steel and steel products with plants in the States
of Pennsylvania and Ohio. For a long period of time the respondent has caused
a substantial part of the raw materials used in the manufacture of its products
to be transported in interstate commerce from and thi ough the States of the
United States to its plant at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and the preponderant part
of the manufactured products to be sold, shipped and transported in interstate
commerce from its plant in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to, into, and through the
States of the United States other than the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The
respondent admits that it is engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
II 'IHE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Steelworkers of America, C I O. is a labor oiganizition admitting to
membership employees of the respondent.'
III. '1 HE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The refusal to bargain,
I The appropriate unit
On September 29, 1943, after an appropriate hearing, the Board found, in the
platter of Jones & Laughlin Steel Coi poi ation and United Steelworkers of America,
C. 1. 0., 52 N L R. B 975, that all plant protection employees at the Pittsburgh
Works of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, exclud-
ing lieutenants, sergeants, corporals and all other supervisory employees with
' Local 3150 of the Union was chartered exclusively for plant guard employees Produc-
tion and maintenance employees belong to other local unions affiliated with the same
International Union
TONES & LAUGHLIN , STEEL CORPORATION 987
authority to hire, promote, dischaige, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the
status of employees, or effectively recommend such action, clerks and all other
employees, constituted a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act
At the present hearing the respondent introduced evidence indicating that,
as of December 1944 the plant protection employees were demilitarized by the
United States Army and that thereafter all such employees had been deputized
as special patrolmen by the City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, thus reverting
to the same status they had enjoyed prior to their becoming militarized during
World War II The policy of the respondent in requiring that its plant protec-
tion employees become special patrolmen has been adopted by the respondent
for its own convenience The plant protection employees receive their salaries,
orders and training exclusively from the respondent under whose control they
are at all times
As the above noted change would not aliect in any way the appropriateness of
the unit found by the Board, the undersigned finds the appropriate unit to be
the same as that found by the Board in its Decision and Direction of Election dated
September 29, 1943.
2 The majority
On October 13, 1943. pursuant to the order of the Board dated September 29,
1943, an election was held among the employees in the above-found appropriate
unit at which a majority of said employees by secret ballot selected the Union
as then bargaining representative By older dated October 27, 1943, the Board
certified said Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in said
unit. As the respondent introduced no evidence at the present hearing tending
to impeach this certification or the majority status of the Union, the undersigned
finds that on October 27, 1943, and at all times thereafter, the Union has been,
and continues to be. the exclusive representative of all the employees in the
above-found appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with the
respondent with respect to rates of pay, wages; hours of employment and other
conditions of employment.
3 The refusal to bargain
At the present hearing the respondent stipulated that it had refused to bargain
with the Union as the exclusive representative of. the employees in the above-
found appropriate unit
This stipulation was fully in accord with the record. The respondent failed
to answer the written requests by the Union for a meeting at which to negotiate
an agreement for the employees in the appropriate unit These letters from
the Union were dated December 2, 20 and 28, 1943. Following a meeting with
the United States Conciliation Service, the Board and the Union, the respondent
wrote the Union on January 27. 1944, in part as follows:
It is the purpose of this letter to inform you that we see no occasion to
deviate from the position set forth in the representation proceeding and
we, thei efore, decline to grant recognition or commence bargaining.
There followed a period while the respondent and the Union were before the
National War Labor Board In answer to a request by the Union dated March
12, 1945, to bargain in accordance with the terms of a certain WLB Directive,
respondent wrote on March 22, 1945, that, as it had made effective the terms and
conditions ordered by WLB, there existed no "reason for further negotiations "
When the Union pointed out on March 26, 1945, that the said directive required
988 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the incorporation of said terms and conditions in a "signed agreement," the
respondent failed to answer.
On April 30, 1946, following the dissolution of WLB, the Union again wrote
the respondent requesting a meeting to negotiate an agreement for the Pittsburgh
plant guards. On May 6, 1946, the respondent replied in part as follows :
We respectively decline your invitation to bargain on behalf of plant guards.
In numerous cases having similar facts, the Board has held such conduct to
constitute a refusal to bargain with the duly certified representative of the
employees in an appropriate unit
The undersigned, therefore, finds that on December 2, 1943, and at all times
thereafter, the respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union
as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit and has
thereby interfered with, restrained and coei ced its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the respondent, set forth in Section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operation of the i espondent described in Section I, above,
have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, tiallic, and commerce
among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce
V THE REMEDY
Since it has been found that the respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of tact, and upon the entire record in
the case, the undersigned makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1 United Steelworkers of Amei ica , C 1 0, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2 All plant protection employees of the respondent at its Pittsburgh Works,
excluding lieutenants , sergeants , corporals , and all other supervisory employees
with authority to hire, promote , discharge , discipline. or otherwise effect changes
in the status of employees , or effectively recommend such action , clerks and all
other employees , constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
baigaining within the meaning of Section 9 ( b) of the Act
3. United Steelworkers of America , C 1 0, was on October 27 , 1943, and at
all times thereafter has been, the exclusive representative of all employees in
the atoresaid unit for the purposes of collective bargaining , within the meaning
of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
4 By refusing on December 2, 1943, and at all time,,, thereafter to recognize
and to bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of America , C. I. 0, as the
exclusive representative of all its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit,
the respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act.
5 By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the respondent has engaged in,
and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1)
of the Act.
JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION 989
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the
entire record in the case, the undersigned recommends that the respondent, Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corporation, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to recognize and to bargain collectively with United Steelwork-
ers of America, C I O , as the exclusive representative of all its plant protection
employees at its Pittsburgh Works, excluding lieutenants, sergeants, corporals,
and all other supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge,
discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively
recommend such action, clerks, and all other employees ;
(b) Engaging in like or related acts or conduct interfering with, restraining or
coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or assist United Steelworkers of America, C. I 0.,
or any other labor organization of their own choosing, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the undersigned finds will effec-
tuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request bargain collectively with United Steelwoikers of America,
C. I 0, as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the aforesaid
appropriate unit;
(b) Post throughout the Pittsburgh Works in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, copies
of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report, marked "Appendix A." Copies
of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Sixth Region, after
being signed by the respondent's representative, shall be posted by the respondent -
immediately upon the receipt thereof, and maintained by it for sixty (60) consec-
utive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to the employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced or covered by
any other material ;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Sixth Region in writing, within ten
(10) days from the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report, what steps
the respondent has taken to comply therewith.
It is further recommended that unless on or before ten (10) days from the
receipt of this Intermediate Report, the respondent notifies said Regional Director
in writing that it will comply with the foregoing recommendations, the National
Labor Relations Board issue an order requiting the respondent to take the action
aforesaid
As provided in Section 33 of Article II of the Rules and Regulations of the
National Labor Relations Board, Series 3, as amended, effective November 27,
1945, any party or counsel for the Board may, within fifteen (15) days from
the date of the entry of the order transferring the case to the Board, pursuant
to Section 32 of Article II of said Rules and Regulations, file with the Board,
Rochambeau Building, Washington 25, D. C, an of igmal and four copies of a
statement in writing, setting forth such exceptions to the Intermediate Report or
to any other part of the record or proceeding, (including rulings upon all motions
,or objections) as be relies upon, together with the original and lour copies of a
990 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
brief in support thereof Immediately upon the filing of such statement of ex-
ceptions and/or brief, the party or counsel for the Board filing the same shall
serve a copy thereof upon each of the other parties and shall file a copy with
the Regional Director. As further provided in said Section 33, should any party
desire permission to argue orally before the Board, request therefor must be
made in writing to the Board within ten (10) days from the date of the order
transferring the case to the Board. Any party desiring to submit a brief in
support of the Intermediate Report shall do so within fifteen (15) days from
the date of the entry of the order transfei ring the case to the Board, by filing
with the Board an original and four copies thereof, and by immediately serving
a copy thereof upon each of the other parties and the Regional Director.
THOMAS S WILSON,
Trial E:camiver.
Dated July 23, 1946.
"APPENDIX A"
NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notity our employees that:
AVE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with United Steelworkers of America,
C. I 0., as the exclusive representative of our employees in the unit de-
scribed below.
WE WILL NOT engage in any like or related acts or conduct interfering
with, restraining , or coercing our employees in the exercise of their right
to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to loin or assist UNITED
STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, C I 0, to bargain collectively thiough
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining of other mutual aid or protection.
All our plant protection employees are free to become or ieniain members
of this union.
WE WILL BARGAIN collectnely upon i equest with the above-nanied
union as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining
unit described herein with respect to rates of pay, hoots of employment or
other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is:
All plant protection employees of the respondent at its Pittsburgh
Works, excluding lieutenants, sergeants, corporals, and all other super-
visory employees with authoiity to hire, promote, discharge. discipline,
or otherwise effect changes in the status of einployee'i. or effectively
recommend such action, clerks. and all other employees
JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION
Employer.
Dated----------------------- By ---------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the (late hereof, and must
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.