John P. Stein, et al., Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 31, 2005
01a45446 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 31, 2005)

01a45446

08-31-2005

John P. Stein, et al., Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


John P. Stein, et al. v. United States Postal Service

01A45446

August 31, 2005

.

John P. Stein, et al.,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A45446

Agency No. 4-H-335-0181-02

Hearing No. 150-AO-8821X

DECISION

On August 12, 2004, complainant as class agent, filed a timely appeal with

this Commission from the agency's Notice of Final Action dated July 15,

2004, dismissing his class complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

on the bases of disability and age, in violation of Section 501 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

791 et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

On September 9, 2002, complainant, as agent, filed a class complaint

wherein he alleged that he and members of the class were the victims of

unlawful employment discrimination on the bases of disability and age.

Complainant suffered an on-the-job injury on March 22, 2002. Upon his

return to work on March 28, 2002, complainant produced a letter from

his physician, indicating among other matters, that he could not use his

�right upper extremity� for overhead activities. Complainant was informed

to report to Bulk Mail, wherein a dispute arose between complainant and

two agency officials regarding the definition of the term �extremity.�

Complainant claimed that agency management refused to adhere to his

restrictions; that an agency Acting Supervisor was permitted to have

access to confidential information; and that she questioned complainant

about his medical condition, thereby creating a hostile work environment.

In a statement made during pre-complaint processing, complainant noted

that his physician faxed a clarification of the term �upper extremity�

at approximately 6:00 pm on March 28, 2002, when management informed

complainant's union steward that it �would honor the doctor's letter.�

The agency forwarded the complaint to the EEOC's Miami District Office

for a determination regarding class certification. On July 7, 2004, an

EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) issued a decision denying class complaint

certification on the grounds that it did not meet the requirements of

29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(2). Specifically, the AJ found that the complaint

failed to satisfy the criteria of commonality, typicality, numerosity

and adequacy of representation.

A class complaint is a written complaint of discrimination filed on

behalf of a class by the agent of the class alleging that: (i) the class

is so numerous that a consolidated complaint of the members of the class

is impractical; (ii) there are questions of fact common to the class;

(iii) the claims of the agent of the class are typical of the claims

of the class; and (iv) the agent of the class, or if represented, the

representative, will fairly and adequately protect the interests of

the class. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(d)(2).

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(d)(2) provides that a class

complaint may be dismissed if it does not meet the prerequisites of

a class complaint under 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(a)(2) or for any of the

procedural grounds for dismissal set forth in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.1614.107.

Class complainants are not required to prove the merits of their claims at

the class certification stage; however, they are required to provide more

than bare allegations that they satisfy the class complaint requirements.

Mastren, et al. v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05930253

(October 27, 1993).

Commonality

The purpose of the commonality and typicality requirements are to ensure

that class agents possess the same interests and suffer the same injury as

the members of the proposed class. General Telephone Co. of the Southwest

v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156-57 (1982). The putative class agent must

establish an evidentiary basis from which one could reasonably infer

the operation of an overriding policy or practice of discrimination.

Garcia v. Department of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 07A10107 (May

8, 2003). Generally, this can be accomplished through allegations of

anecdotal testimony from other employees who were allegedly discriminated

against in the same manner as the class agent, and evidence of specific

adverse actions taken. Id. Belser v. Department of the Army, EEOC

Appeal No. 01A05565 (December 6, 2001)(citing Mastren, EEOC Request

No. 05930253). Factors to consider in determining commonality include

whether the practice at issue affects the whole class or only a few

employees, the degree of centralized administration involved, and the

uniformity of the membership of the class, in terms of the likelihood that

the members treatment will involve common questions of fact. Garcia, EEOC

Appeal No. 07A10107 (citing Mastren, et al., EEOC Request No. 05930253).

In order to have a class complaint certified, the class agent must

establish that there are questions of fact common to the class.

General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982).

The AJ found that while complainant claims that the agency has created a

hostile work environment for injured employees, he fails to identify in

what ways individuals over forty or with physical or mental disabilities

are being discriminated against. The AJ indicated also that complainant

makes broad claims regarding limited duty employees, claiming that a

hostile work environment has adversely affected the health condition

of injured employees. However, the AJ again found that complainant

failed to identify what agency actions in particular created a hostile

work environment. Complainant failed even to identify the ages and

disabilities of the potential class members. The AJ concluded therefore,

that the complainant was unable to demonstrate that there are questions

of fact common to the class members.

Typicality

Regarding typicality, the AJ determined that as with the naming of facts

common to the class, little information has been provided as to which

issues affect which class members. The AJ was unable to determine from

the evidence submitted, that the claims of the class agent are typical

of those of the class.

Numerosity

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(a)(2)(i) requires that a class be

so numerous that a consolidated complaint of the members of the class

is impractical. This regulation is patterned on Rule 23(a)(1) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court has indicated that

the numerosity requirement of Rule 23 imposes no absolute limit for the

size of a class complaint, but rather, requires an examination of the

facts of each case. See General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318,

330 (1980). Thus, although courts are reluctant to certify a class with

30 or fewer members, there are no specific numerical cut-off points.

See Harris v. Pan American World Airways, 74 F.R.D. 24, 23 F.R. Serv. 2d

1335, 1349 (ND. Cal. 1977).

Here, exclusive of complainant, the record is devoid of any evidence

identifying class members. Complainant suggests that the number

of potential class members with claims typical to his is in the

thousands. The AJ found that despite the opportunity to conduct discovery,

complainant has yet to identify potential class members, and makes only

general statements regarding how many employees injured on the job have

been affected by the agency's allegedly discriminatory conduct. The AJ

concluded that complainant's general statement that all injured employees

constitutes a class is insufficient to meet the numerosity requirement.

Adequacy of Representation

In order to maintain a class action, the class agent must claim that the

agent of the class, or, if represented, the class agent's representative,

will be able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

class. Here, the AJ found that neither the class representative nor

the class agent is capable of representing the interests of the class.

The class representative has played no substantive role in the instant

complaint, other than submitting his change of address in September 2003.

The AJ noted instead, that the submissions in this matter, including

complainant's brief, come from the complainant. The AJ concluded that

because the representative has not been active in this matter, he is

not deemed capable of adequately protecting the interests of the class.

On July 15, 2004, the agency issued a final order which adopted the AJ's

decision not to certify the class complaint. After careful review of

the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's decision summarized the

relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulation, policies,

and laws. We discern no basis to disturb the AJ's finding that the

class complaint be dismissed for failure to meet the requirements of

29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(a). We note that dismissal of the class complaint

does not preclude members of the class from proceeding with individual

complaints. The agency's final order properly advised the class agent

that the complaint is filed as an individual complaint of employment

discrimination.

It is the decision of this Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final action

for the reasons stated herein.

Individual Complaint

The agency issued a final decision dated August 4, 2004 dismissing

complainant's individual complaint of discrimination for failure to state

a claim in accordance with EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1).

The Commission determines that the individual complaint fails to state a

claim under the EEOC regulations because complainant did not show that he

suffered a harm or loss with respect to a term, condition, or privilege

of employment for which there is a remedy. The Commission acknowledges

that generally, an allegation that the agency discriminatorily forced

the complainant to work outside of medical restrictions would state

a claim. However, the specific circumstances of this case reflect that

complainant's own claim, as elucidated in his statement made during

pre-complaint processing, reveals that the agency agreed to honor

his medical restrictions on the same day as his request. Moreover,

complainant's allegation, on its face, does not amount to a claim

that the agency's conduct was so severe or pervasive as to alter the

conditions of his employment. To the extent that complainant's instant

appeal is from the agency's decision dismissing his individual complaint,

the Commission finds that the agency's decision to dismiss the complaint

for failure to state a claim was proper.

Accordingly, the agency's final decision dismissing complainant's

individual complaint for failure to state a claim is AFFIRMED for the

reasons set forth herein.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Stephen Llewellyn

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

August 31, 2005

__________________

Date