John P. Long, Complainant,v.Glenn L. McCullough, Jr., Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 27, 2004
01A31805 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 27, 2004)

01A31805

09-27-2004

John P. Long, Complainant, v. Glenn L. McCullough, Jr., Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority, Agency.


John P. Long v. Tennessee Valley Authority

01A31805

September 27, 2004

.

John P. Long,

Complainant,

v.

Glenn L. McCullough, Jr.,

Chairman,

Tennessee Valley Authority,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A31805

Agency No. 0216-2001027

DECISION

BACKGROUND

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

Complainant was an employee of the agency for about 28 years until

his termination in 1999. In June 1991, complainant accepted the

position of Operations Superintendent at Windows Creek fossil plant.

Subsequent to the acceptance, the agency hired Vice President (VP1)

from Florida Power and Light Company to take charge of the agency's

fossil fuel division. VP1 brought many managers from Florida with

him and began placing them within the agency including the Manager of

combustion turbines and distributive resources (Manager). In 1993, VP1

sought to replace complainant with his Florida employee. As a result,

in or about 1993, he filed and won an appeal with the Merit Systems

Protection Board against the agency involving the Vice Presidents of

the Fossil Power Group (VP1 and VP2).

In 1998, complainant was informed by VP1 that he would be subjected to a

reduction in force and replaced by a Florida employee. On March 2, 1999,

complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging discrimination in violation

of the ADEA. The matter was settled for a �substantial sum� on March

22, 1999. On June 6, 1999, complainant was terminated by a reduction

in force.

During 1999 and 2000, complainant worked as an independent contractor

in the power industry. In February 2000, he began working for General

Electric (GE) doing temporary jobs as a commissioning manager. On January

4 or 5, 2001, GE offered complainant a temporary job. He stated that

the GE Contact stated that the commissioning manager assigned to the

agency's Gallatin Fossil Plant was leaving to start a new job at the

agency's Lagoon Creek site. The GE Contact offered complainant two to

three week job finishing up �punch list� items and then he would go to

Lagoon Creek as �co-commissioning manager.�

On January 8, 2001, the GE Contact informed the representative of

Penpower, a subsidiary of GE, that he was told that complainant was a

�persona non gratis� with the agency. The Representative asked if this

precluded complainant's move to Lagoon Creek. The GE Contact stated that

his understanding of the agency's position was that complainant could

not be used at all on their projects and that they needed to replace

complainant on the remaining time he had at Gallatin and then on the

Lagoon Creek project as well. The same day, GE instructed complainant

to leave the Gallatin Plant immediately. Complainant stated that he

was informed by the Representative that he was a �persona non gratis�

and that he would not be allowed to work at agency sites in the future.

As a result, complainant indicates that he was not permitted to work

until GE assigned him to North Carolina in March 2001.

In March 2001, the representative contacted complainant to see if the

matter with the agency had been resolved because complainant was needed

as a deputy site manager. Complainant contacted the agency's new member

of management (VP3) who was below VP2 but above the Manager, about being

permitted on to an agency site. VP3 indicated that so long as GE took

responsibility and recommended him, the agency would not stand in the way.

However, VP3 did not contact the GE Contact or the Representative.

As a result, complainant lost the Lagoon Creek job.

Based on these incidents, complainant sought EEO counseling and

subsequently filed a formal complaint on February 16, 2001, alleging

that he was discriminated against on the basis of reprisal for prior EEO

activity when on January 8, 2001, an agency Manager notified GE that he

would not be allowed to work on any agency site then or in the future

resulting in his termination by GE.<1>

The complaint was initially dismissed the complaint for failure to state

a claim. The agency noted that complainant was a contractor and that GE,

not the agency, was the party that took action against him. Complainant

appealed the dismissal to the Commission. In Appeal No. 01A13290

(March 8, 2002), the dismissal was affirmed. Complainant requested

reconsideration arguing that the Manager informed GE that he was not

welcomed at the agency in reprisal for his prior complaint when he was

employed by the agency. We found in Request No. 05A30150 (November 5,

2002) that complainant failed to meet the criteria for reconsideration.

Nonetheless, following a clarification in the complainant's request for

reconsideration of the issue in the complaint, the agency reinstated the

complaint and directed that an investigation of the claim be undertaken.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision.

The FAD determined that the Manager had no awareness whatsoever of

complainant's prior EEO activity because he was not stationed at the

same location as complainant when he filed his prior complaint. Further,

the FAD noted that alleged reprisal occurred almost two years after the

EEO complaint was settled. Therefore, there was no causal connection

to raise an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, the FAD found

that complainant did not establish his prima facie case of retaliation.

Assuming complainant had established his prima facie case, the FAD

determined that the agency provided legitimate nondiscriminatory

reasons for its action. Namely, Manager stated that the agency had the

contractual right to approve and disapprove employees, work practices,

and equipment offered by contractors. Further, he indicated that the

agency would �swap out� employees who they felt did not meet the agency's

expectations. Manager averred that he never told GE that complainant

could not work on any agency job. He felt that complainant was not

qualified as a site manager at Gallatin. He claims that he made it clear

to GE that complainant could work in a subordinate role. VP3 averred that

he had heard that complainant had filed some kind of complaint of about

not being selected as a shift supervisor but he had no involvement on the

Lagoon Creek site. He also noted that he was not aware of complainant

being restricted from working at agency plants generally. VP2 stated

that he was not aware of complainant's prior complaint or settlement.

VP3 also said that complainant asked him to go over Manager's head to

VP2 about the Gallatin Plant but VP2 supported Manager's decision.

This appeal followed. On appeal, complainant contends that the FAD

incorrectly determined that he failed to establish his claim of unlawful

reprisal. He noted that the agency narrowly addressed the issue of his

job at the Gallatin Plant rather than being told that he was not allowed

to work on an agency site. Based on the contradictions in the file,

complainant asserts that the record supports his claim that the agency

retaliated against him because of his prior EEO activity. The agency

requests that we affirm its FAD.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Initially, we note that, based on complainant's clarification on his

request for reconsideration, the request for reconsideration in Request

No. 05A30150 was improvidently denied. In light of the foregoing,

the Commission finds that the decisions in 01A13290 and 05A30150 are

without force and effect.

In a reprisal claim, according to the burdens set forth in McDonnell

Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Exper. Biol., Inc. 425

F.Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd. 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying

McDonnell Douglas to claims of reprisal), and Coffman v. Department

of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473 (November 20, 1997),

complainant may establish a prima facie case of reprisal by showing

that: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) the agency was aware of

his protected activity; (3) subsequently, he was subjected to adverse

treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the protected

activity and the adverse action. Any adverse treatment that is based on

a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the complainant

or others from engaging in a protected activity is prohibited. EEOC

Compliance Manual Section 8, "Retaliation" No. 915.003 at p 8-13 (May 20,

1998). See also Whitmire, v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal

No. 01A00340 (September 25, 2000). The burden of production then shifts

to the agency to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

the adverse employment action. In order to satisfy his burden of proof,

complainant must then demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's proffered reason is a pretext for disability discrimination.

It is clear from the record that complainant participated in protected

activity in filing a prior EEO complaint alleging discrimination based

on age in 1999. In addition, the Manager designated complainant as a

�person non gratis� and would not allow him to work at any agency site

for GE. As a result, he was not permitted to work on the projects at

Gallatin and Lagoon Creek. Therefore, the only issues before us are

whether the agency official was aware of the prior EEO activity and

was there a causal connection between complainant's prior EEO activity

and the adverse action. The Manager averred that he was not aware of

complainant's prior EEO activity particularly because he was not stationed

at the same facility as complainant at the time of his prior complaint.

Complainant refutes the Manager's claim by noting that his complaints

were based on VP1's attempt to move complainant out of the agency in

order to make room for others from Florida, such as the Manager. Further,

all other management officials knew of complainant's prior EEO activity.

As noted, VP3 who also was not present in the same site as complainant

during the relevant time averred that he had heard of complainant's

prior EEO activity at a meeting. In addition, the Manager's secretary

(Secretary) stated in her affidavit that the Manager did say that

complainant had already gotten a lot out of the agency. Based on a

totality of the circumstances, the record shows that the Manager and

other management officials at the agency were aware of complainant's

prior EEO activity and of his substantial settlement agreement.

In addition, we find the comment from the Manager stating that complainant

had already received enough money from the agency was directly related

to the Manager's decision to remove complainant from the Gallatin

work site. Accordingly, we find that complainant has shown a causal

connection between his protected activity and the agency's statement

that complainant is a �persona non gratis.� Therefore, complainant has

met his burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation.

Now the burden shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Upon review, the agency only

provides a reason for having GE remove complainant from the Gallatin

site as noted above. In addition, the Manager denied every stating that

complainant was not welcome on any agency site.

Now that the agency has satisfied its burden, complainant must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the

agency were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.

That is, complainant may attempt to establish that he was the victim of

intentional discrimination and the trier of fact �may still consider

the evidence establishing the [complainant's] prima facie case �and

inferences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of whether the

[agency's] explanation is pretextual.'� Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Product, Inc. 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255,

n. 10). That is to say, a prima facie case of discrimination, combined

with sufficient evidence to find that the agency's reasoning is false,

shall allow the Commission to conclude that the agency's action was

discriminatory.

Upon review, we find that complainant has done so. In particular,

the Manager denied rejecting complainant from any agency site. However,

there are e-mails from the GE Contact and the Representative which clearly

indicate that the Manager did not want complainant on any agency site.

As to the issue of complainant's qualifications to work on the Gallatin

site, the Manager did not review complainant's credentials. Further, VP3

averred that if GE recommended complainant, it would not be questioned.

Despite GE's clear trust in complainant's ability and e-mails indicating

their attempts to get the agency to accept the assignment of complainant

to the Gallatin and Lagoon Creek sites, the Manager rejected complainant.

Upon review of the record, the Commission finds that the reasoning

provided by the Manager are not worthy of credence. Accordingly, we

find that complainant has established that the agency's reasons were

pretext and that the agency's action was unlawful retaliation.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we reverse the agency's final

decision and remand this case to the agency to take remedial actions in

accordance with this decision and Order below.

ORDER (C0900)

The agency is ordered to take the following remedial action:

Within thirty (30) days from the date on which the decision becomes

final, the agency shall consider taking disciplinary action against

the Manager. The agency shall report its decision. If the agency

decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken.

If the agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set

forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline.

The agency is directed to conduct training for the Manager who was found

to have retaliated against complainant. The agency shall address the

employee's responsibilities with respect to eliminating discrimination

in the workplace. The agency shall provide such training within ninety

(90) calendar days from the date on which the decision becomes final.

The agency shall not make any negative references, if any, to the removal

of complainant as a GE contractor from the Gallatin Fossil Plan project.

Any decisions in the future regarding complainant as a contractor to

the agency shall be made by persons other than the Manager.<2>

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying

that the corrective action has been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G0900)

The agency is ordered to post at its Gallatin Fossil Plant facility

copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being

signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted

by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days,

in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are

customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that

said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole

discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not

extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and

the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the

paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 27, 2004

__________________

Date

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An Agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") dated _____________________

which found that a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. has occurred.

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee

or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,

SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing,

promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions or privileges of

employment.

The Tennessee Valley Authority, Gallatin Fossil Plant, supports and will

comply with such Federal law and will not take action against individuals

because they have exercised their rights under law.

The Tennessee Valley Authority, Gallatin Fossil Plant, has been found

to have retaliated against a former employee. As a result, the agency

has been ordered by the EEOC to provide training regarding unlawful

retaliation to the responsible management official and to consider

disciplining the management official. The Tennessee Valley Authority,

Gallatin Fossil Plant, will ensure that officials responsible for

personnel decisions and terms and conditions of employment will abide

by the requirements of all Federal equal employment opportunity laws

and will not retaliate against employees who file EEO complaints.

The Tennessee Valley Authority, Gallatin Fossil Plant, will not in any

manner restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual

who exercises his or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by,

or who participates in proceedings pursuant to, Federal EEO law.

______________________________

Date Posted: ____________________

Posting Expires: ________________

29 C.F.R. Part 1614

1 As noted above, the record indicates that complainant was not fired

by GE. He was not permitted to work at any agency facilities but GE

was able to place him in another position in North Carolina in March 2001.

2We note that since this complaint was brought under the ADEA, neither

compensatory damages nor attorney's fees are available remedies.

See Falks v. Department of Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05960250 (September

5, 1996).