John C. Kenoyer, Appellant,v.Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 13, 1998
01981055 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 13, 1998)

01981055

11-13-1998

John C. Kenoyer, Appellant, v. Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Agency.


John C. Kenoyer v. Department of the Interior

01981055

November 13, 1998

John C. Kenoyer, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01981055

) Agency No. FNP-97-062

Bruce Babbitt, )

Secretary, )

Department of the Interior, )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Appellant timely appealed the agency's final decision not to reinstate

his complaints of unlawful employment discrimination that the parties

had settled. See 29 C.F.R. ��1614.504, .402(a); EEOC Order No. 960,

as amended.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues on appeal are whether the agency properly dismissed appellant's

complaint and whether the agency properly found no settlement breach.

BACKGROUND

The record indicates that appellant, a Park Ranger, GS-9, filed two

complaints, Agency Nos. FNP-95-011 and FNP-95-030, on October 13, 1994,

and November 15, 1994, respectively, which were subsequently consolidated

for processing. Therein, appellant alleged that he was discriminated

against based on age (57) and mental disability (emotional and stress

condition) when: on April 11, 1994, the Personnel Officer told him that

the Superintendent would downgrade his position to a GS-7 grade level and

reassign him to a "subject-to-furlough" position if he did not retire;

in May 1994, his position was not upgraded to the GS-11 grade level

via Ranger Futures; and management made no effort to assist, support,

or accommodate him in rehabilitating himself while the Superintendent

gave major consideration to accommodate another park employee.

The agency investigated the subject complaints, and appellant requested

a hearing before an Administrative Judge. Prior to the hearing, the

parties entered into a settlement agreement on November 13, 1996, which

provided, in pertinent part, that: appellant would continue to hold

his GS-9 position; he would be reimbursed for attorney's fees up to

$6,000; his sick leave would be restored; he would be paid a monetary

settlement of $10,000; and his clinically-documented disability would

be accommodated. The settlement agreement was signed by appellant,

his attorney, the Superintendent, and an agency representative.

By letters dated November 20 and 22, 1996, appellant requested the

reinstatement of the prior complaints for a hearing. Specifically,

appellant alleged that he was coerced into signing the settlement

agreement; he was under extreme duress when he signed the agreement;

and he did not even have an opportunity to read the agreement before

signing it.

By letter dated November 27, 1996, the agency responded to appellant

that the agreement was signed by him and his attorney, and it would

remain in full force and effect.

Thereafter, appellant contacted an EEO Counselor on February 5, 1997,

and filed the instant complaint dated April 17, 1997, alleging that he

was discriminated against based on age (over 40) and mental disability

(emotional stress) when:

(1) In the spring of 1994, management officials took concerted actions

to force him to retire;

(2) In the summer of 1994, and fall of 1995, he was provided with

misleading or false sworn testimony given to federal investigators to

cover-up wrong doing by agency officials in his prior complaints, Agency

Nos. FNP-95-011 and FNP-95-030, and his workers' compensation claim,

which had been accepted by the Department of Labor; and

(3) He was coerced into signing the November 13, 1996 settlement

agreement.

On October 17, 1997, the agency issued a final decision dismissing the

allegations in the complaint. The agency stated that the allegations

were, in substance, identical to the allegations raised in appellant's

prior complaints which were investigated and were resolved through the

settlement agreement. The agency indicated that appellant entered into

the settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily and he was bound by

the terms thereof. The record indicates that appellant retired from

employment with the agency effective November 3, 1997.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.504 provides that any settlement agreement

knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at any

stage of the complaint process shall be binding on both parties. If the

complainant believes that the agency failed to comply with the terms of

a settlement agreement, the complainant should notify the Director of

Equal Employment Opportunity, in writing, of the alleged noncompliance

with the settlement agreement, within thirty (30) days of when the

complainant knew or should have known of the alleged noncompliance.

The complainant may request that the terms of the settlement agreement

be specifically implemented or, alternatively, that the complaint be

reinstated for further processing from the point processing ceased.

The agency shall resolve the matter and respond to the complainant,

in writing. If the agency has not responded to the complainant, in

writing, or if the complainant is not satisfied with the agency's attempt

to resolve the matter, the complainant may appeal to the Commission for

a determination as to whether the agency has complied with the terms of

the settlement agreement or final decision.

In allegation (3), appellant indicated that he was coerced into signing a

settlement agreement. The record indicates that on November 13, 1996,

the parties signed the settlement agreement resolving appellant's

prior complaints, Agency Nos. FNP-95-011 and FNP-95-030. On November

20 and 22, 1996, appellant claimed that he was coerced into signing

the settlement agreement and asked the agency to reinstate the prior

complaints for a hearing. The record indicates that on November 27, 1996,

the agency informed appellant that the settlement agreement was valid,

enforceable and bound by the parties. The agency refused to reinstate

the prior complaints. Appellant, however, did not pursue his allegations

of breach again until February 1997, more than 30 days from the date he

first became aware of the alleged breach, i.e., that the agreement was

purportedly coerced. Therefore, we find that appellant failed to raise

his allegations in a timely manner and the agency properly declined to

reinstate appellant's complaint.

With regard to allegation (1), we find that appellant raised the same

claim, namely, management officials' taking concerted actions to force him

to retire in 1994, in the prior complaints, which were resolved through a

settlement agreement. Thus, we find that the agency properly dismissed

the subject allegation. With regard to allegation (2), we find that it

failed to state a claim, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a), since it

involved the agency's improper processing of appellant's prior complaints.

The Commission has held that allegations of improper processing do not

state separate processable claims. See Kleinman v. USPS, EEOC Request

No. 05940579 (September 22, 1994); Story v. USPS, EEOC Appeal No. 01965883

(March 13, 1997); EEO MD 110 (4-8). Therefore, we find that the agency

properly dismissed allegation (2) for the reasons set forth herein.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's decision dismissing appellant's complaint

for the reasons set forth herein and finding no settlement breach is

AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Nov. 13, 1998

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations