John A. Clemons, Complainant,v.Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 27, 2012
0120092142 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 27, 2012)

0120092142

01-27-2012

John A. Clemons, Complainant, v. Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), Agency.




John A. Clemons,

Complainant,

v.

Janet Napolitano,

Secretary,

Department of Homeland Security

(Transportation Security Administration),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120092142

Hearing No. 520-2008-00169X

Agency No. HS-07-TSA-001248

DECISION

On April 17, 2009, Complainant filed a timely appeal with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) from the Agency’s

March 30, 2009, final order concerning his equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to

29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a).

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issue presented is weather Complainant was discriminatorily harassed

based on his race (African-American) from June 11, 2006 through July 10,

2007, when:

1. the Agency denied him pay for overtime worked from June 11-24 and

September 17-30, 2006;

2. the Agency denied him pay, including overtime and nighttime

differential pay from October 1 through 14, 2006, and sent him home and

charged him Absent Without Leave (AWOL) for a portion of October 1, 2006;

3. from June through December 2006, his supervisor habitually recorded

erroneous time information on him;

4. on November 21, 2006, his screening manager threatened to send him

home if he did not sign a letter converting him to limited duty status;

5. on December 21, 2006, the screening manager disregarded his safety

while he was a passenger in the manager’s car;

6. the Agency denied him his scheduled PASS 2007 training session;

7. his supervisor and screening manager wrote him up on December 21,

2006, and on January 3 and 22, February 19 and March 4, 2007;1

8. on January 8, 2007, the screening manager sent Complainant home for

refusing to sign a letter of reprimand;

9. on February 19, 2007, his successor screening manager wrote him up

for using unscheduled leave;

10. on April 4, 2007, a second supervisory screener counseled Complainant

about his attendance, and the successor screening manager approved this;

11. on June 6, 2007, the second supervisory screener counseled

Complainant about acting in a disrespectful manner to a co-worker,

which the successor screening manager approved;

12. on June 17, 2007, another supervisory screener counseled Complainant

about an unauthorized absence from his assigned duty station, which the

successor screening manager approved; and

13. on July 10, 2007, a different supervisory screener counseled him

about saying he did not remove shampoo from a plastic bag when he did so,

which a different screening manager approved.2

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as a Transportation Security Officer at the Agency’s LaGuardia

International Airport in Flushing, New York. On March 14, 2007, he

filed an EEO complaint, as amended, alleging the above claims.

Following an investigation, Complainant requested a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a

hearing finding no discrimination, which the Agency fully implemented.

On the pay incidents, the AJ found that Complainant did not identify

evidence showing he was entitled to the pay he was allegedly denied.

The AJ noted that Agency managers reviewed Complainant’s claims

about pay errors; and the record shows this resulted in favorable

pay adjustments. The AJ found that more importantly, Complainant did

not show that his screening supervisor was motivated by discriminatory

bias in erroneously recording Complainant’s pay. The AJ noted that

Complainant did not dispute his supervisor’s statement that he made

errors on other employees pay records.

On the counseling claims, the AJ found that Complainant failed to

show that non-discriminatory reasons for counseling, i.e., his lack

of cooperation and inappropriate behavior in refusing to acknowledge

counseling, were not the reasons for the counseling. The AJ also found

that Complainant was not disparately treated. On the remaining incidents,

the AJ found that they did not rise to the level of actionable harassment,

nor show that his race was a factor in them.

On appeal, Complainant reiterates arguments he made below.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal

and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them,

de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an

appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review

. . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.B. (November 9, 1999)

(providing that both the Administrative Judge’s determination to issue

a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, are subject to de

novo review). This essentially means that we should look at this case

with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate)

or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual conclusions

and legal analysis. See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A.

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or

she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. §�

�1614.109(g). An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision

without holding a hearing is not appropriate.

Based upon a review of the record, we find that there are no genuine

issues of material fact in dispute.

Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee’s

race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, or religion is

unlawful. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-1139 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

A single incident or group of isolated incidents will not be regarded as

discriminatory harassment unless the conduct is severe. Walker v. Ford

Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982). Whether the harassment

is sufficiently severe to trigger a violation of Title VII must be

determined by looking at all the circumstances, including the frequency

of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whether

it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.

Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993).

We agree with the AJ’s findings on the pay claims. The record showed

that multiple Agency officials met with Complainant to sort out his pay

issues, and this resulted in favorable pay adjustments. Complainant

states he is owed more, largely based on his personal records, but he

does not submit sign in/out sheets or overtime slips which could verify

his claims. It is uncontested that errors in pay are common, and we

agree with the AJ’s finding that Complainant did not show the errors

were discriminatory.

We agree with the AJ’s finding that the uncontested facts show that

most or all the counselings were warranted. For example, Complainant

was counseled for on September 28, 2006, walking out of a briefing

on overtime procedures, refusing to return when asked or discuss the

problem, and being argumentative; and was counseled on March 4, 2007,

for refusing to follow directions to change his post. In response

to the first counseling Complainant did not dispute what occurred,

rather, he argued about overtime. In response to the second counseling

Complainant did not dispute that the screening supervisor asked him to

change his post, rather, he argued that he declined to do so because he

was assigned his original post by the screening manager. The screening

manager stated checkpoints are staffed based on changing needs, and

indicated Complainant’s refusal to listen to the supervisor forced

her to directly tell Complainant to change his post. The uncontested

facts show these counselings were warranted.

The AJ found that Complainant did not show that it was incorrect to charge

him with AWOL on October 1, 2006. On October 1, 2006, Complainant’s

screening manager tried to give him a written counseling for what occurred

on September 28, 2006. Complainant refused to read the counseling and got

very agitated. He raised his voice and said “this is bull and I’m

not reading anything,” creating a disturbance in a public area where

there were passengers. He was told if he did not lower his voice he

would have no choice but to send him home. Complainant did not dispute

any of this, stating his screening manager wanted him to read and sign

the counseling, which “I refused to do, with much disagreement.”

Complainant went home. Three witnesses stated Complainant left of his own

volition, with two characterizing him as storming out. Complainant was

charged with 5½ hours of AWOL. While there is a dispute as to whether

Complainant left on his own volition, given the circumstances of his

departure, he has not shown race discrimination on the AWOL.

Complainant received a memorandum of counseling for the October 1, 2006,

incident for not conducting himself with professionalism and courtesy.

Language therein indicated it was not formal discipline and would not be

placed in Complainant’s official personnel file (OPF). The uncontested

facts show this counseling was warranted.

Regarding being sent home on January 8, 2007, the record shows that on

January 8, 2007, Complainant’s screening manager met with him for a

pre-decisional meeting because he was considering giving him a letter

of reprimand for an incident on January 2, 2007, where Complainant did

not follow an urgent direction to go to a certain post, but instead went

to another location. When questioned, Complainant got defensive, was

uncooperative, said this was redundant and going in circles, and was loud.

The screening manager asked Complainant to go to his checkpoint, and as

he was walking away he said “May God bless you because you’re really

going to need it.” The screening manager took this as a threat and sent

Complainant home. Complainant does not dispute what occurred on January

8, 2007. While he stated he was sent home for refusing to sign the

reprimand (actually a counseling), he did not dispute his supervisor’s

above account of what occurred. Given the above undisputed facts,

we find Complainant was sent home on January 8, 2007, because of his

actions, not discrimination. He reported to work the next day and worked.

Complainant received a letter of counseling dated February 19, 2007,

for use of unscheduled leave, including sick leave and tardiness.

While Complainant contended that he called in, he has not pointed to

facts showing the leave was scheduled in advance

On the PASS matter, the AJ found that Complainant qualified for PASS

in July 2006 within 30 days after he started working for the screening

supervisor he identified as responsible for the discrimination. This was

too late to get his associated bonus. Complainant’s supervisor

explained that because Complainant’s shift started at 5:30 PM, it

was difficult for assessors to complete related on-the-job training

(OJT) because there is only a short period of passenger flow. He also

stated that communication skills, meaning acting with courtesy, tact

and professionalism, is an integral part of PASS, and Complainant had

problems in this area. Complainant has not pointed to disputed facts

indicating hat the Agency’s explanations regarding PASS were pretext

to mask discrimination.

On the car incident, the record reflects that the screening manager

drove a few feet before he realized Complainant was not fully in the car

and/or his door was not closed. He then stopped. There is no evidence

this was deliberate.

We agree with the AJ’s finding that given that most or all of the

alleged incidents of harassment were not shown to be discriminatory,

any the remaining incidents were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to

rise to the level of an abusive work environment to constitute harassment.

The Agency’s final order is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is

within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for

an attorney with the

Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the

request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as

stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

January 27, 2012

__________________

Date

1 While the parties do not contest these dates, some appear to be

incorrect.

2 The AJ defined the harassment as consisting of incidents 1 through

9, but the Agency conceded that it included incidents 10 through 13.

The AJ also conceded this by listing the additional incidents on page

8 of his decision.

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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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