Joey Ray. Grover et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 12, 2020

14148129 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 12, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/148,129 01/06/2014 Joey Ray Grover 83414024 9414
28395 7590 03/12/2020
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
MURPHY, JOSEPH B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2435
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/12/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOEY RAY GROVER, JOEL FISCHER, AND JUSTIN
DICKOW
Appeal 2018-006278
Application 14/148,129
Technology Center 2400
Before KRISTEN L. DROESCH, LARRY J. HUME, and SCOTT E. BAIN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant,1 Ford Global
Technologies, LLC, appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting
claims 1–3, 5–13, and 15–20, which are all claims pending in the
application. Appellant has canceled claims 4 and 14. See generally, Claims
App. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
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Application 14/148,129

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The claims are directed to a method and apparatus for driver
notification handling. See Spec. ¶ 1.
Exemplary Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal (emphasis added to contested prior-art limitation):
1. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
receive a notification request from an application
executing on a device m wireless communication with a vehicle
computing system (VCS);
receive notification content and parameters;
validate whether the application has permission to
display a notification via the VCS;
validate the notification content as a permitted content
type;
validate the parameters based on entity parameter-use
permissions; and
queue a notification for display following successful
right, content and parameter validation.

2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
Jan. 22, 2018); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed May 30, 2018); Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Mar. 30, 2018); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,”
mailed Aug. 25, 2017); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed
Jan. 6, 2014). We further note our Decision on Appeal mailed Feb. 28, 2017
in which we affirmed the Examiner’s rejection.
Appeal 2018-006278
Application 14/148,129

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Prior Art
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in
rejecting the claims on appeal:
Menig et al. (“Menig”) US 6,289,332 B2 Sept.11, 2001
Westra et al. (“Westra”) US 2011/0296037 A1 Dec. 1, 2011
Lau et al. (“Lau”) US 2013/0067014 A1 Mar. 14, 2013
Park et al. (“Park”) US 2013/0086518 A1 Apr. 4, 2013
Rejections on Appeal
R1. Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11–13, 15, 16, 18, and 20 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Menig
and Park. Final Act. 4.
R2. Claims 7 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Menig, Park, and Lau. Final Act. 9.
R3. Claims 10 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Menig, Park, and Westra. Final
Act. 10.
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 6–8) and our discretion
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of obvious Rejection
R1 of claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11–13, 15, 16, 18, and 20 on the basis of
representative claim 1.
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Application 14/148,129

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Remaining claims 7, 10, 17, and 19 in Rejections R2 and R3, not
argued separately or substantively, stand or fall with the respective
independent claim 1 or 11 from which they depend.3
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not
advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other
issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 1–3,
5–13, and 15–20 and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by reference
herein and adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons
and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s
arguments. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments
regarding claim 1 for emphasis as follows.
1. § 103 Rejection R1 of Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11–13, 15, 16, 18, 20
Issue 1
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 6–8; Reply Br. 2–3) the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the

3 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of
dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they
depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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combination of Menig and Park is in error. These contentions present us
with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches
or suggests a system that includes “a processor configured to,” inter alia,
“validate whether the application has permission to display a notification via
the [vehicle computing system] VCS,” as recited in claim 1?
Principles of Law
During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation when reading claim language in light of the specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard,
we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the
words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way
of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description
contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
The test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the prior
art would have suggested to the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the
art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Further, the relevant
inquiry is whether the Examiner has set forth “some articulated reasoning
with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with
approval in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
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Analysis
The Examiner finds Park teaches or suggests the disputed limitation
because the “disclosed transmission of GetSupportedNotiTypes action
command(s) and/or application register message(s) ultimately determines
which notification(s) can be transmitted to/received by head unit, if any, thus
determining or ‘validating’ whether a given notification of an application
can be displayed.” Final Act 5 (citing Park ¶¶ 67–72) (italics omitted).
Appellant contends:
GetSupportedNotiTypes does not perform even the
function the Examiner contends that it performs, let alone what
is claimed. According to Park, GetSupportedNotiTypes
“requests a list of notification types supported by the mobile
device.” ([0068]). So, first of all, this is a message sent from the
terminal point to the mobile device, not a process run on the
vehicle that is validating whether an application has permission
to do anything. Further, this command relates to functionality of
a mobile device in general, not an application on a mobile
device. Still further, all this command does is cause the mobile
device to return a responsive list of possible notification types
supported by the mobile device ([0072]), which is then
displayed so a user can choose which notification types to be
received from the mobile device through a head unit.
The above command is used as part of a configuration
process[] that eventually results in setting, on the mobile device,
which sorts of notifications are to be transmitted to the vehicle.
Appeal Br. 6 (emphasis in original).
Appellant further argues, “there is never any validation of an
application’s permission to display a message. Since the claims explicitly
recite that the validation is done via the VCS, even if the Examiner is
choosing to read the idea that the mobile device is filtering which messages
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are sent, such an interpretation still does not cover the claims at least
because this would not be validation via the VCS.” Appeal Br. 7. “[A]ll the
head unit receives in response is the types of notification the mobile device
is capable of displaying, not a validation of whether the device has
permission to display anything . . . . The Examiner has still failed to show
how the combination validates whether a given application has permission.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
In response, the Examiner finds:
Park achieves its provisioning method by initially configuring
communication between the mobile device and vehicle head
unit (said head unit being analogous to Appellant’s claimed
“VCS”) through a series of steps — the first of which is
requesting a list of notification types supported by the mobile
device, via a “GetSupportedNotiTypes” action command. Id. at
[0067]. See also Fig. 2, and Fig 5 at S520. Thereafter, the head
unit displays the notification types supported, and a user may
further select which of these supported notification types are to
be displayed upon transmission by the mobile device, thereby
“setting” which notifications will be permitted. Id. at [0094]–
[0096]. Thus, the entire foregoing initialization or “set up”
process disclosed by Park is how Park achieves its desired
provisioning of a notification of a predetermined type — only
those notifications that 1) are supported by the connected
mobile device and 2) are selected by the user to be displayed,
will be presented by the head unit. Conversely, if a notification
is not of a predetermined type – that is, it is neither supported
by the mobile device nor previously selected by the user to be
displayed - then that notification would not have permission to
be displayed via the head unit.
Ans. 3–4.
Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, we agree with the
Examiner’s claim construction, i.e., the recited “validat[ion of] whether the
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application has permission to display a notification via the VCS” reads on
Park’s configuration and provisioning process which determines whether a
notification from an application is allowed to be presented to the head unit,
i.e., the application is validated for display of notifications on the VCS.
“Park therefore reasonably teaches to one of ordinary skill in the art
its method to ‘validate whether [an] application has permission to display a
notification via the VCS’ as recited in Appellant’s independent claim(s).”
Ans. 4.
Appellant additionally argues, “first of all, [GetSupportedNotiTypes
in Park] is a message sent from the terminal point to the mobile device, not a
process run on the vehicle that is validating whether an application has
permission to do anything.” Appeal Br. 6.
In response, the Examiner concludes, as a matter of claim
construction, “claim 1 explicitly requires ‘a system comprising: a processor
configured to . . . validate whether the application has permission to display
. . . . [There is] nothing in the claim requires that ‘setting which sorts of
notifications are to be transmitted’ occur at the VCS, or at the wireless
device; that is, the locus of such functionality is not specified. Ans. 6 (italics
omitted). Ans. 6.
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art
combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 1, nor do we
find error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness.
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Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claim 1, and grouped claims 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11–13, 15, 16, 18,
and 20 which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra.
2. Rejections R2 and R3 of Claims 7, 10, 17, and 19
In view of the lack of any substantive or separate arguments directed
to obviousness Rejections R2 and R3 of claims 7, 10, 17, and 19 under § 103
(see Appeal Br. 8), we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims.
Arguments not made are waived.4
REPLY BRIEF
To the extent Appellant may advance new arguments in the Reply
Brief (Reply Br. 2–3) not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position in
the Answer, arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the
Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s
Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellant has not shown.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err with respect to obviousness Rejections R1
through R3 of claims 1–3, 5–13, and 15–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the
cited prior art combinations of record, and we sustain the rejections.

4 Appellant generally argues the dependent claims are allowable in light of
the purported allowability of independent claims 1 and 11. Appeal Br. 8.
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Application 14/148,129

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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Basis /
References Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 5, 6, 8,
9, 11–13, 15,
16, 18, 20
103 Obviousness Menig, Park
1–3, 5, 6, 8,
9, 11–13, 15,
16, 18, 20

7, 17 103
Obviousness
Menig, Park,
Lau
7, 17
10, 19 103
Obviousness
Menig, Park,
Westra
10, 19
Overall
Outcome
1–3, 5–13,
15–20
FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED