Joey Ray. Grover et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 12, 202014148129 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 12, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/148,129 01/06/2014 Joey Ray Grover 83414024 9414 28395 7590 03/12/2020 BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL 1000 TOWN CENTER 22ND FLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 EXAMINER MURPHY, JOSEPH B ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2435 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/12/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@brookskushman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JOEY RAY GROVER, JOEL FISCHER, AND JUSTIN DICKOW Appeal 2018-006278 Application 14/148,129 Technology Center 2400 Before KRISTEN L. DROESCH, LARRY J. HUME, and SCOTT E. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges. HUME, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant,1 Ford Global Technologies, LLC, appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–3, 5–13, and 15–20, which are all claims pending in the application. Appellant has canceled claims 4 and 14. See generally, Claims App. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2018-006278 Application 14/148,129 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 The claims are directed to a method and apparatus for driver notification handling. See Spec. ¶ 1. Exemplary Claim Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal (emphasis added to contested prior-art limitation): 1. A system comprising: a processor configured to: receive a notification request from an application executing on a device m wireless communication with a vehicle computing system (VCS); receive notification content and parameters; validate whether the application has permission to display a notification via the VCS; validate the notification content as a permitted content type; validate the parameters based on entity parameter-use permissions; and queue a notification for display following successful right, content and parameter validation. 2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed Jan. 22, 2018); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed May 30, 2018); Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Mar. 30, 2018); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed Aug. 25, 2017); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed Jan. 6, 2014). We further note our Decision on Appeal mailed Feb. 28, 2017 in which we affirmed the Examiner’s rejection. Appeal 2018-006278 Application 14/148,129 3 Prior Art The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in rejecting the claims on appeal: Menig et al. (“Menig”) US 6,289,332 B2 Sept.11, 2001 Westra et al. (“Westra”) US 2011/0296037 A1 Dec. 1, 2011 Lau et al. (“Lau”) US 2013/0067014 A1 Mar. 14, 2013 Park et al. (“Park”) US 2013/0086518 A1 Apr. 4, 2013 Rejections on Appeal R1. Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11–13, 15, 16, 18, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Menig and Park. Final Act. 4. R2. Claims 7 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Menig, Park, and Lau. Final Act. 9. R3. Claims 10 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Menig, Park, and Westra. Final Act. 10. CLAIM GROUPING Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 6–8) and our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of obvious Rejection R1 of claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11–13, 15, 16, 18, and 20 on the basis of representative claim 1. Appeal 2018-006278 Application 14/148,129 4 Remaining claims 7, 10, 17, and 19 in Rejections R2 and R3, not argued separately or substantively, stand or fall with the respective independent claim 1 or 11 from which they depend.3 ISSUES AND ANALYSIS In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 1–3, 5–13, and 15–20 and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by reference herein and adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s arguments. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claim 1 for emphasis as follows. 1. § 103 Rejection R1 of Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11–13, 15, 16, 18, 20 Issue 1 Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 6–8; Reply Br. 2–3) the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the 3 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Appeal 2018-006278 Application 14/148,129 5 combination of Menig and Park is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches or suggests a system that includes “a processor configured to,” inter alia, “validate whether the application has permission to display a notification via the [vehicle computing system] VCS,” as recited in claim 1? Principles of Law During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation when reading claim language in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard, we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the prior art would have suggested to the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Further, the relevant inquiry is whether the Examiner has set forth “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Appeal 2018-006278 Application 14/148,129 6 Analysis The Examiner finds Park teaches or suggests the disputed limitation because the “disclosed transmission of GetSupportedNotiTypes action command(s) and/or application register message(s) ultimately determines which notification(s) can be transmitted to/received by head unit, if any, thus determining or ‘validating’ whether a given notification of an application can be displayed.” Final Act 5 (citing Park ¶¶ 67–72) (italics omitted). Appellant contends: GetSupportedNotiTypes does not perform even the function the Examiner contends that it performs, let alone what is claimed. According to Park, GetSupportedNotiTypes “requests a list of notification types supported by the mobile device.” ([0068]). So, first of all, this is a message sent from the terminal point to the mobile device, not a process run on the vehicle that is validating whether an application has permission to do anything. Further, this command relates to functionality of a mobile device in general, not an application on a mobile device. Still further, all this command does is cause the mobile device to return a responsive list of possible notification types supported by the mobile device ([0072]), which is then displayed so a user can choose which notification types to be received from the mobile device through a head unit. The above command is used as part of a configuration process[] that eventually results in setting, on the mobile device, which sorts of notifications are to be transmitted to the vehicle. Appeal Br. 6 (emphasis in original). Appellant further argues, “there is never any validation of an application’s permission to display a message. Since the claims explicitly recite that the validation is done via the VCS, even if the Examiner is choosing to read the idea that the mobile device is filtering which messages Appeal 2018-006278 Application 14/148,129 7 are sent, such an interpretation still does not cover the claims at least because this would not be validation via the VCS.” Appeal Br. 7. “[A]ll the head unit receives in response is the types of notification the mobile device is capable of displaying, not a validation of whether the device has permission to display anything . . . . The Examiner has still failed to show how the combination validates whether a given application has permission.” Id. (emphasis in original). In response, the Examiner finds: Park achieves its provisioning method by initially configuring communication between the mobile device and vehicle head unit (said head unit being analogous to Appellant’s claimed “VCS”) through a series of steps — the first of which is requesting a list of notification types supported by the mobile device, via a “GetSupportedNotiTypes” action command. Id. at [0067]. See also Fig. 2, and Fig 5 at S520. Thereafter, the head unit displays the notification types supported, and a user may further select which of these supported notification types are to be displayed upon transmission by the mobile device, thereby “setting” which notifications will be permitted. Id. at [0094]– [0096]. Thus, the entire foregoing initialization or “set up” process disclosed by Park is how Park achieves its desired provisioning of a notification of a predetermined type — only those notifications that 1) are supported by the connected mobile device and 2) are selected by the user to be displayed, will be presented by the head unit. Conversely, if a notification is not of a predetermined type – that is, it is neither supported by the mobile device nor previously selected by the user to be displayed - then that notification would not have permission to be displayed via the head unit. Ans. 3–4. Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, we agree with the Examiner’s claim construction, i.e., the recited “validat[ion of] whether the Appeal 2018-006278 Application 14/148,129 8 application has permission to display a notification via the VCS” reads on Park’s configuration and provisioning process which determines whether a notification from an application is allowed to be presented to the head unit, i.e., the application is validated for display of notifications on the VCS. “Park therefore reasonably teaches to one of ordinary skill in the art its method to ‘validate whether [an] application has permission to display a notification via the VCS’ as recited in Appellant’s independent claim(s).” Ans. 4. Appellant additionally argues, “first of all, [GetSupportedNotiTypes in Park] is a message sent from the terminal point to the mobile device, not a process run on the vehicle that is validating whether an application has permission to do anything.” Appeal Br. 6. In response, the Examiner concludes, as a matter of claim construction, “claim 1 explicitly requires ‘a system comprising: a processor configured to . . . validate whether the application has permission to display . . . . [There is] nothing in the claim requires that ‘setting which sorts of notifications are to be transmitted’ occur at the VCS, or at the wireless device; that is, the locus of such functionality is not specified. Ans. 6 (italics omitted). Ans. 6. Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 1, nor do we find error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Appeal 2018-006278 Application 14/148,129 9 Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped claims 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11–13, 15, 16, 18, and 20 which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra. 2. Rejections R2 and R3 of Claims 7, 10, 17, and 19 In view of the lack of any substantive or separate arguments directed to obviousness Rejections R2 and R3 of claims 7, 10, 17, and 19 under § 103 (see Appeal Br. 8), we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims. Arguments not made are waived.4 REPLY BRIEF To the extent Appellant may advance new arguments in the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2–3) not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position in the Answer, arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellant has not shown. CONCLUSION The Examiner did not err with respect to obviousness Rejections R1 through R3 of claims 1–3, 5–13, and 15–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the cited prior art combinations of record, and we sustain the rejections. 4 Appellant generally argues the dependent claims are allowable in light of the purported allowability of independent claims 1 and 11. Appeal Br. 8. Appeal 2018-006278 Application 14/148,129 10 DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis / References Affirmed Reversed 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11–13, 15, 16, 18, 20 103 Obviousness Menig, Park 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11–13, 15, 16, 18, 20 7, 17 103 Obviousness Menig, Park, Lau 7, 17 10, 19 103 Obviousness Menig, Park, Westra 10, 19 Overall Outcome 1–3, 5–13, 15–20 FINALITY AND RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation