Japan Science and Technology Agency

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 15, 2021

2020006387 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 15, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/430,724 03/24/2015 Kazuyuki Aihara 1451305.258US9 9508
21874 7590 07/15/2021
LOCKE LORD LLP
P.O. BOX 55874
BOSTON, MA 02205
EXAMINER
NEGIN, RUSSELL SCOTT
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1631
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/15/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patent@lockelord.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte KAZUYUKI AIHARA, LUONAN CHEN, RUI LIU, ZHIPING
LIU, and MEIYI LI
____________

Appeal 2020-006387
Application 14/430,724
Technology Center 1600
____________

Before DONALD E. ADAMS, JEFFREY N. FREDMAN, and
RACHEL H. TOWNSEND, Administrative Patent Judges.

ADAMS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 33–40 and 46 (Appeal Br. 2). We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “Japan
Science and Technology Agency” (Appellant’s April 30, 2020, Appeal Brief
(Appeal Br.) 2).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s disclosure “relates to devices, methods, and programs for
detecting a biomarker candidate that could be an index for a symptom of a
biological object based on measurement data on a plurality of factors
obtained by measurement on the biological object.” (Spec.2 ¶ 1).
Appellant’s independent claims 33, 38, and 46 are reproduced below:
33. A method for detecting a pre-disease state by detecting an
emergence of dynamic network biomarker (DNB) as an early-
warning signal indicating the pre-disease state of a biological
object to be measured, comprising the following steps:
[A] acquiring, by an acquisition unit, high-throughput data on
a plurality of factors of the biological object to be measured;
[B] classifying the factors into clusters based on a correlation
of time-dependent changes of the high-throughput data for each
factor;
[C] calculating each clusters’ maximum composite index
value, wherein the composite index value is a product of:
[D] (i) a first index that is an average of the absolute values
of Pearson's correlation coefficients of the high-throughput data
for each factor in the cluster,
[E] (ii) a second index that is an average of the absolute
values of Pearson's correlation function of the high-throughput
data for the factors inside the cluster with the high-throughput
data for the factors outside the cluster, and
[F] (iii) a reciprocal of a third index that is an average
standard deviations of the high-throughput data for each factors
in the cluster;
[G] choosing one of the clusters that has the maximum
composite index; and

2 Appellant’s March 24, 2015, Specification.
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[H] detecting the pre-disease state if the factor in the chosen
cluster is identified as the DNB by significance analysis.
(Appeal Br. 17 (annotated to facilitate discussion below).)
38. A non-transitory computer readable medium storing a
program causing a computer to execute a process for detecting–
a pre-disease state by detecting dynamic network biomarker
(DNB) as an early-warning signal indicating the pre-disease
state of a biological object to be measured,
[A] wherein the program causes the computer to execute the
following steps:
[B] acquiring high-throughput data on the a plurality of
factors of the biological object to be measured;
[C] classifying the factors into clusters based on a correlation
of time-dependent changes of the high-throughput data for each
factor;
[D] calculating each subnetwork’s cluster’s maximum
composite index value, wherein the composite index value is a
product of:
[E] (i) a first index that is an average of the absolute values
of Pearson's correlation coefficients of the high-throughput data
for each factor in the cluster,
[F] (ii) a second index that is an average of the absolute
values of Pearson's correlation function of the high-throughput
data for the factors inside the cluster with the high-throughput
data for the factors outside the cluster, and
[G] (iii) a reciprocal of a third index that is an average
standard deviations of the high-throughput data for each factors
in the cluster; and
[H] detecting the pre-disease state if the factor in the chosen
cluster is identified as the DNB by significance analysis.
(Id. at 18–19 (annotated to facilitate discussion below).)
46. A device for detecting a pre-disease state by detecting
dynamic network biomarker (DNB) as an early-warning signal
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indicating the pre-disease state of a biological object to be
measured, comprising:
[A] an acquisition unit configured to acquire high-throughput
data on a plurality of factors of the biological object to be
measured;
[B] a classification unit configured to classify the factors into
clusters based on a correlation of time-dependent changes of the
high-throughput data for each factor;
[C] a calculation unit configured to calculate each cluster's
maximum composite index value, wherein the composite index
value is a product of:
[D] (i) a first index that is an average of the absolute values
of Pearson’s correlation coefficients of the high-throughput data
for each factor in the cluster,
[E] (ii) a second index that is an average of the absolute
values of Pearson’s correlation function of the high-throughput
data for the factors inside the cluster with the high-throughput
data for the factors outside the cluster, and
[F] (iii) a reciprocal of a third index that is an average
standard deviations of the high-throughput data for each factors
in the cluster;
[G] a choice unit configured to choose one of the clusters that
has the maximum composite index; and
[H] a detection unit configured to detect the pre-disease state
if the factor in the chosen cluster is identified as the DNB by
significance analysis.
(Id. at 19–20 (annotated to facilitate discussion below).)

Claims 33–40 and 46 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

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ISSUE
Does the preponderance of evidence of record support Examiner’s
finding that Appellant’s claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter?
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
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mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
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features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency
management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October
2019 Update at 1.
Under the Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)
(9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Guidance — Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at
54–55.
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Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
ANALYSIS
Appellant’s independent claims 33, 38, and 46 are reproduced above.
Appellant’s claims 34–37 depend directly or indirectly from Appellant’s
claim 33. Appellant’s claims 39 and 40 depend directly or indirectly from
Appellant’s claim 38.
(Step 1)
We first consider whether the claimed subject matter falls within the
four statutory categories set forth in § 101, namely “[p]rocess, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54;
see 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appellant’s independent claim 33 is directed to a
method, i.e., a process. Appellant’s independent claim 38 is directed to a
non-transitory computer readable medium, i.e., a product. Appellant’s
independent claim 46 is directed to a device, i.e., a machine. Thus,
Appellant’s claims 33, 38, and 46 are directed to statutory subject matter.
Therefore, we proceed to the next steps of the analysis.

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(Step 2A, Prong 1)
The method of Appellant’s claim 33 comprises the steps of:
[B] classifying the factors into clusters based on a correlation
of time-dependent changes of the high-throughput data for each
factor;
[C] calculating each clusters’ maximum composite index
value, wherein the composite index value is a product of:
[D] (i) a first index that is an average of the absolute values
of Pearson's correlation coefficients of the high-throughput data
for each factor in the cluster,
[E] (ii) a second index that is an average of the absolute
values of Pearson's correlation function of the high-throughput
data for the factors inside the cluster with the high-throughput
data for the factors outside the cluster, and
[F] (iii) a reciprocal of a third index that 1s an average
standard deviations of the high-throughput data for each factors
in the cluster;
[G] choosing one of the clusters that has the maximum
composite index; and
[H] detecting the pre-disease state if the factor in the chosen
cluster is identified as the DNB by significance analysis.
The non-transitory computer readable medium of Appellant’s claim
38 stores a program that [A] causes a computer to execute the following
steps:
[C] classifying the factors into clusters based on a correlation
of time-dependent changes of the high-throughput data for each
factor;
[D] calculating each subnetwork’s cluster’s maximum
composite index value, wherein the composite index value is a
product of:
[E] (i) a first index that is an average of the absolute values
of Pearson's correlation coefficients of the high-throughput data
for each factor in the cluster,
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[F] (ii) a second index that is an average of the absolute
values of Pearson's correlation function of the high-throughput
data for the factors inside the cluster with the high-throughput
data for the factors outside the cluster, and
[G] (iii) a reciprocal of a third index that is an average
standard deviations of the high-throughput data for each factors
in the cluster; and
[H] detecting the pre-disease state if the factor in the chosen
cluster is identified as the DNB by significance analysis.
The device of Appellant’s claim 46 comprises:
[B] a classification unit configured to classify the factors into
clusters based on a correlation of time-dependent changes of the
high-throughput data for each factor;
[C] a calculation unit configured to calculate each cluster's
maximum composite index value, wherein the composite index
value is a product of:
[D] (i) a first index that is an average of the absolute values
of Pearson’s correlation coefficients of the high-throughput data
for each factor in the cluster,
[E] (ii) a second index that is an average of the absolute
values of Pearson’s correlation function of the high-throughput
data for the factors inside the cluster with the high-throughput
data for the factors outside the cluster, and
[F] (iii) a reciprocal of a third index that is an average
standard deviations of the high-throughput data for each factors
in the cluster;
[G] a choice unit configured to choose one of the clusters that
has the maximum composite index; and
[H] a detection unit configured to detect the pre-disease state
if the factor in the chosen cluster is identified as the DNB by
significance analysis.

We agree with Examiner’s finding that the classification, choosing,
and detection steps, as well as the units, i.e. generic computer components,
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that implement these steps in Appellant’s device claim 46, are mental
processes (see Final Act.5 4–5; Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52). We also
agree with Examiner’s finding that the calculation steps, as well as the unit,
i.e. generic computer component, that implements these steps in Appellant’s
device claim 46, are mathematical concepts (see Final Act. 4–5; Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52). See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin.
Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[A]n invention directed to
collection, manipulation, and display of data was an abstract process”); see
also Digitech Image Techs., LLC. v. Elecs. For Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d
1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Without additional limitations, a process that
employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to
generate additional information is not patent eligible”); CyberSource Corp.
v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The mere
manipulation or reorganization of data . . . does not satisfy the
transformation prong”). Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (“[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.”).
We find no error in Examiner’s finding that Appellant’s claim 1
recites judicial exceptions (see Final Act. 4).
(Step 2A, Prong 2)
Having determined that Appellant’s claims recite a judicial exception,
the Guidance requires an evaluation as to whether the claim as a whole
integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the
exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.

5 Examiner’s January 30, 2020, Final Office Action.
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As discussed above, the classification, calculating, choosing, and
detection limitations of Appellant’s claims are abstract ideas, specifically
mental processes or mathematical concepts. Looking, however, at the claim
as a whole, we find that the method of Appellant’s claim 33 comprises the
additional step or limitation of [A] acquiring, by an acquisition unit, high-
throughput data on a plurality of factors of the biological object to be
measured. The non-transitory computer readable medium of Appellant’s
claim 38 stores a program that [A] causes a computer to execute the
additional step of [B] acquiring high-throughput data on the a plurality of
factors of the biological object to be measured. The device of Appellant’s
claim 41comprises the additional step or limitation of [A] an acquisition unit
configured to acquire high-throughput data on a plurality of factors of the
biological object to be measured.
The foregoing additional element, i.e. acquisition, or mere data
gathering, step, however, adds insignificant extra-solution activity to the
judicial exception and, therefore, fails to integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(g).
(Step 2B)
Having determined that Appellant’s claims: (1) recite a judicial
exception and (2) do not integrate that exception into a practical application,
the Guidance requires that we evaluate whether Appellant’s claims: (a) add
a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-
understood, routine, conventional” in the field or (b) simply appends well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
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industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
On this record, we find no additional limitations that are not the
judicial exceptions or insignificant extra-solution activity discussed above.
Thus, we find that Appellant’s claims do not add a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in this field as required by the Guidance.

Claim 33:
Appellant contends that the method set forth in its claim 33 integrates
the recited judicial exception into a practical application because it “assist[s]
accurate and efficient detection of a DNB as an early-warning signal, which
is an improvement to other technology or technical field, the field of medical
examination” (Appeal Br. 8). In support of this assertion, Appellant directs
attention to limitations, which as discussed above, are abstract ideas (see id.
at 8–9; see also Reply Br. 4). Claim limitations describing the excluded
subject matter cannot satisfy the second step of the Alice analysis. See BSG
Tech. LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It
has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible
concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that
renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”).
Thus, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that its claim 33,
when considered as a whole, integrates the recited judicial exception into a
practical application of the exception.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that “Examiner failed
to evaluate under Step 2B (inventive concept) to determine the subject
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matter eligibility of claim 33” (Appeal Br. 10). In support of this assertion,
Appellant directs attention to limitations, which as discussed above, are
either abstract ideas or extra-solution activity (see Appeal Br. 10–11). Claim
limitations describing the excluded subject matter cannot satisfy the second
step of the Alice analysis. See SAP, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“No matter how much of an advance in the finance field the claims recite,
the advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, with no plausibly
alleged innovation in the non-abstract application realm. An advance of that
nature is ineligible for patenting.”); BSG Tech., 899 F.3d at 1290 (“It has
been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept
to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the
invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”); Berkheimer v.
HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring)
(“Berkheimer. . . leave[s] untouched the numerous cases from [the Federal
Circuit] which have held claims ineligible because the only alleged
‘inventive concept’ is the abstract idea.”).
For the reasons discussed above, unlike the eligible claim in Diehr in
which the elements limiting the exception are individually conventional, but
taken together act in concert to improve a technical field, the claim here does
not invoke any of the considerations that courts have identified as providing
significantly more than an exception. Even when viewed as a combination,
the additional elements fail to transform the exception into a patent-eligible
application of that exception. Thus, Appellant’s claim 33, as a whole, does
not amount to significantly more than the exception itself. Therefore, we are
not persuaded by Appellant’s contentions regarding Diehr (see Appeal Br.
11; see also Reply Br. 6).
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For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s
contentions regarding Berkheimer (see id. at 11–12; see also Reply Br. 5–6).
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s
contention that Examiner ignored the Office’s Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance (see Reply Br. 4–5).

Claims 38 and 46:
For the reasons set forth above, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s
contention that “[f]or the reasons discussed above with respect to claim 33,
applicant respectfully submits that claims 38 and 46 are integrated into a
practical application of the judicial exception under Step 2A, and therefore,
claims 38 and 46 are allowable” (Appeal Br. 13).
We are also not persuaded by Appellant’s contention “that claims 38
and 46 are allowable in view of Enfish v. Microsoft, 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)” or Appellant’s contentions regarding Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat
Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Appeal Br. 13–15; see also
Reply Br. 6–7). As Finjan makes clear, “[i]n cases involving software
innovations, th[e] inquiry often turns on whether the claims focus on the
specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a
process that qualifies as an abstract idea for which computers are invoked
merely as a tool.” Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327,
1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2016)) (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration
original). As discussed above, on this record, the limitations recited in
Appellant’s claims 38 and 46 are abstract ideas or an insignificant extra-
solution activity. To the extent that a computer is utilized in Appellant’s
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claims 38 and 46, the computer is invoked merely as a tool. See Finjan, 879
F.3d at 1303.

Dependent Claims:
For the reasons set forth above, having found no deficiency in the
rejection of Appellant’s claims 33 and 38, we are not persuaded by
Appellant’s contention that “for the reasons discussed above with respect to
claims 33 and 38, the rejection of claims 34-37, 39, and 40 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 are improper and should be reversed” (Appeal Br. 15).
For the reasons set forth above, we find no error in Examiner’s
rejection of claims 33–40 and 46 on this record (see generally Final Act. 4
(identifying judicial exceptions in each claim on Appeal)). Because
Appellant failed to identify a limitation in any dependent claim that
overcomes the rejection on this record, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s
contention that Examiner failed to establish a prima facie case on this record
(see id.). To the extent that Appellant invites this Panel to supplement the
deficiencies in Appellant’s briefing, we decline. See Gross v. Town of
Cicero, III., 619 F.3d 697, 702 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Judges are not like pigs,
hunting for truffles buried in the record.”).

CONCLUSION
The preponderance of evidence of record supports Examiner’s finding
that Appellant’s claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter.

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
33–40, 46 101 Eligibility 33–40, 46

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2019).

AFFIRMED