Janet Taylor, Complainant,v.Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, Department of the Treasury (Internal Revenue Service), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 5, 20190120182228 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 5, 2019) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Janet Taylor, Complainant, v. Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, Department of the Treasury (Internal Revenue Service), Agency. Appeal No. 0120182228 Agency No. IRS-17-0016-F DECISION On June 22, 2018, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s June 1, 2018, final decision (FAD) concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision. ISSUES PRESENTED Whether the Agency properly held that Complainant failed to establish that she was discriminated against on the bases of race (African-American), sex (female), and reprisal for prior EEO activity when: 1. Between about April 28 and October 15, 2016, her manager often came to her desk or demanded that she come to the manager’s office; monitored Complainant’s work; presented Complainant with inaccurate phone and paper reviews; and on October 13, 2016, pressured Complainant to contact the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA Agent); and 2. On October 13, 2016, Complainant received a Release/Recall Score and Rank that resulted in Complainant being denied conversion to permanent status and released from duty on October 14, 2016. 0120182228 2 BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Seasonal Contact Representative (CR), GS-0962-05 at the Agency’s Wage and Investment Division facility in Kansas City, Missouri. Complainant contends that she was subjected to harassing behavior from her manager between late April and mid-October 2016. She reported that her manager subjected her and her work to more scrutiny than the other CRs on her team; often approached her cubical to observe her activities; frequently called Complainant into her office for private meetings; and sometimes stared at Complainant “with hate in her eyes.” Additionally, Complainant stated that she was never asked to serve as a back-up Team Lead; was given a managerial directive on or about March 31, 2016; issued an excessive leave memorandum on September 1, 2016; and repeatedly asked to contact the TIGTA Agent on October 13, 2016. Complainant also asserts that many of the embedded reviews, performance feedback, progress reports, and inventory audits her manager issued inaccurately portrayed the quality of her work. Since these reviews were then used to prepare an appraisal rating that determined Complainant's Release/Recall ranking, which defines seasonal employee's order for layoffs and return to pay status, and her potential for conversion to permanent status. On or around October 13, 2016, Complainant's manager assigned Complainant a Release/Recall number of 419 with a rating score of 2.60 and no seniority. On October 14, 2016, Complainant was denied conversion to permanent status and released from duty. On November 14, 2016, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her as articulated in the statement of Issues Presented above. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge. Complainant timely requested a hearing but subsequently withdrew her request. Consequently, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. The instant appeal followed. Complainant did not submit a brief or contentions on appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). 0120182228 3 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Disparate Treatment In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging discrimination is a three-step process. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973); see Hochstadt v. Worcestor Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976), aff’d 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to retaliation cases). Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 804 n.14. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination based on race, sex, and reprisal for prior EEO activity; we find that the Agency articulated legitimate, non- discriminatory reasons for its alleged discriminatory actions, and the record is void of any evidence that any of the Agency’s actions were motivated by discriminatory animus. Additionally, we find that some of Complainant’s allegations were not supported by the record. For example, Complainant’s allegation that she was repeatedly asked to contact the TIGTA Agent, did not occur as stated. Complainant’s manager asked her to contact the TIGTA Agent because the Agent had left two messages for Complainant and she failed to return his call. The record reflects that Complainant’s manager regularly reviewed and met with all employees to give performance feedback, and that this same process was used with Complainant. While Complainant received both good and bad evaluations based on her work product, and only objected to critical assessments. Complainant’s Manager explained that she reviewed Complainant’s work to ensure accuracy and met with Complainant specifically to provide feedback concerning mistakes that needed correction as part of a performance Action Plan. There were three other employees on Complainant’s team who struggled and required additional one-on-one training and enhanced review. The record is clear that the Agency’s workforce demands changed over time and were dictated by the periodic workload fluctuations. These changes directly impacted the personnel decisions of releasing and recalling seasonal employees. The factors impacting individual release/recall rankings are based on the seasonal employee’s type of appointment, Agency entry on duty date (i.e., seniority), and specific skill sets. 0120182228 4 Complainant’s entire team was comprised of seasonal employees, all were placed in non-pay status on October 14, 2016, and none were converted to permanent status that year. The record reflects that several GS-08 employees who joined the team in 2011, cross-trained on several programs, and consistently earned 4 and 5 rankings, had still not achieved conversion to permanent status. In sum, our review of the record confirms the Agency’s assertion that its decisions were based on its determination of how best to effectively manage the workplace and its assessment of Complainant’s performance and conduct in the workplace. Nothing in the record, or submitted on appeal by Complainant, demonstrate that the actions were in any way motivated by discriminatory animus. The Commission has long held that an Agency has broad discretion to set policies and carry out personnel decisions and should not be second-guessed by the reviewing authority absent evidence of unlawful motivation. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259; Vanek v. Dep’t of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940906 (January 16, 1997). Harassment In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [complainant’s] employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment.” See also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services. Inc., 23 U.S. 75 (1998). The Court explained that an “objectively hostile or abusive work environment [is created when] a reasonable person would find [it] hostile or abusive” and the complainant subjectively perceives it as such. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. Whether the harassment is sufficiently severe to trigger a violation of Title VII must be determined by looking at all the circumstances, including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. at 23. An abusive or hostile working environment exists “when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of the victim’s employment.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. Usually, unless the conduct is pervasive and severe, a single incident, or group of isolated incidents, will not be regarded as discriminatory harassment. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982); Frye v. Dep’t of Labor, EEOC Request No. 05950152 (Feb. 8, 1996); Backo v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05960227 (June 10, 1996). An alteration to an employee’s working conditions exists if a tangible, discrete employment action is taken, e.g., hiring, firing, transfer, promotion, non-selection, or the Agency’s actions were sufficiently severe and/or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. The harasser’s conduct is evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in a complainant’s circumstances. Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994). 0120182228 5 The Agency concluded that Complainant failed to establish a claim of harassment because she failed to show that that she was subjected to severe or pervasive treatment such as to create an unlawful work environment on any basis. Instead, the incidents complained of here appear to have been reasonable actions of Complainant’s supervisor and other management officials taken in the course of discharging their supervisory responsibilities. The incidents identified were in the nature of common interactions and employment actions that would occur between a supervisor and a subordinate employee in the workplace. We agree with the Agency’s findings in the FAD that the incidents, considered together and taken as a whole, do not rise to the level of a discriminatorily hostile workplace. CONCLUSION After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision because the preponderance of the evidence of record does not establish that discrimination occurred. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. 0120182228 6 Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations November 5, 2019 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation