Jamestown Fabricated Steel & Supply, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 4, 2015

362 NLRB No. 161 (N.L.R.B. 2015)

362 NLRB No. 161
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Jamestown Fabricated Steel and Supply, Inc. and
Shopmen’s Local Union No. 470 of the Interna-
tional Association of Bridge, Structural, Orna-
mental & Reinforcing Iron Workers. Case 03–
CA–119345
August 4, 2015
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS JOHNSON
AND MCFERRAN
On November 6, 2014, Administrative Law Judge
Mark Carissimi issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, to
which the General Counsel filed an answering brief and
the Respondent filed a reply brief. The General Counsel
filed limited cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, to
which the Respondent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and

1 In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union, we
find that the Respondent was on notice of the contents of the Union’s
written demand for recognition on December 19, 2013, when Union
Representative Harry Ehrie hand-delivered the written demand to Su-
pervisor Malachi Ives, and not later as found by the judge. We further
find that the Respondent was precluded from refusing to recognize and
bargain with the Union by operation of the successor bar. See UGL-
UNICCO Service Co., 357 NLRB No. 76, slip op. at 8 (2011) (once a
successor’s obligation to bargain with the Union attaches, “the union is
entitled to a reasonable period of bargaining, during which time no
question concerning representation that challenges its majority status
may be raised . . . nor, during this period, may the employer unilaterally
withdraw recognition from the union based on a claimed loss of majori-
ty support, whether arising before or during the period”) (emphasis
added). For this reason, we find it unnecessary to address the judge’s
findings that the demand for recognition was timely and that the em-
ployees’ expressions of disaffection were tainted. See Crown Textile
Co., 335 NLRB 201, 202 (2001) (“The successor-bar doctrine . . . ap-
plies regardless of whether a decertification effort by employees is
initiated before or after the union has made a formal demand for recog-
nition from the successor.”).
Our concurring colleague would reject the successor bar and return
to MV Transportation, 337 NLRB 770 (2002). We note that no party
has argued that the Board should modify or overrule UGL-UNICCO in
this case. Contrary to our concurring colleague, and for the reasons
stated in FJC Security Services, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 115, slip op. at 1
(2014), we see no basis for departing from the successor bar doctrine
articulated in UGL-UNICCO.
to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in un-
fair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act, we shall order the Respondent to
cease and desist from engaging in such conduct and, as
explained in the remedy section of the judge’s decision,
to take certain steps to effectuate the policies of the Act.
For the reasons set forth in Caterair International, 322
NLRB 64 (1996), we find that an affirmative bargaining
order is warranted in this case as a remedy for the Re-
spondent’s unlawful refusal to recognize and bargain
with the Union. We adhere to the view that an affirma-
tive bargaining order is “the traditional, appropriate rem-
edy for an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain with the lawful col-
lective-bargaining representative of an appropriate unit
of employees.” Id. at 68.
In several cases, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has required that the
Board justify, on the facts of each case, the imposition of
such an order. See, e.g., Vincent Industrial Plastics v.
NLRB, 209 F.3d 727 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Lee Lumber &
Bldg. Material Corp. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454, 1462
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d
1243, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Vincent, supra at 738,
the court summarized its requirement that an affirmative
bargaining order “must be justified by a reasoned analy-
sis that includes an explicit balancing of three considera-
tions: (1) the employees’ § 7 rights; (2) whether other
purposes of the Act override the rights of employees to
choose their bargaining representatives; and (3) whether
alternative remedies are adequate to remedy the viola-
tions of the Act.”
Although we respectfully disagree with the court’s re-
quirement for the reasons set forth in Caterair, supra, we
have examined the particular facts of this case as the
court requires and find that a balancing of the three fac-
tors warrants an affirmative bargaining order.
(1) An affirmative bargaining order in this case vindi-
cates the Section 7 rights of the unit employees who were
denied the benefits of collective bargaining by the Re-
spondent’s refusal to recognize and bargain with the Un-
ion. At the same time, an affirmative bargaining order,
with its attendant bar to raising a question concerning the
Union’s continuing majority status for a reasonable time,
does not unduly prejudice the Section 7 rights of em-
ployees who may oppose continued union representation
because the duration of the order is no longer than is rea-

2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to
the Board’s standard remedial language for the violation found. We
shall substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as modified.
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sonably necessary to remedy the ill effects of the viola-
tion.
(2) An affirmative bargaining order also serves the
policies of the Act by fostering meaningful collective
bargaining and industrial peace. That is, it removes the
Respondent’s incentive to delay bargaining in the hope
of further discouraging support for the Union. Eliminat-
ing this incentive is particularly necessary here, where
the Respondent expressed to employees its intention that
the Jamestown facility would be “nonunion.” It also
ensures that the Union will not be pressured by the pos-
sibility of a decertification petition or by the Respond-
ent’s withdrawal of recognition to achieve immediate
results at the bargaining table following the Board’s reso-
lution of its unfair labor practice charges and issuance of
a cease-and-desist order.
(3) A cease-and-desist order, alone, would be inade-
quate to remedy the Respondent’s violation because it
would permit a decertification petition to be filed before
the employees have had a reasonable time to regroup and
bargain through their representative in an effort to reach
a collective-bargaining agreement. Such a result would
be particularly unjust in circumstances such as those
here, where the Respondent’s refusal to recognize and
bargain with the Union would likely have a continuing
effect, thereby tainting any employee disaffection from
the Union arising during that period or immediately
thereafter. We find that these circumstances outweigh
the temporary impact the affirmative bargaining order
will have on the rights of employees who oppose contin-
ued union representation. In order to provide employees
with the opportunity to fairly assess for themselves the
Union’s effectiveness as a bargaining representative, the
bargaining order requires the Respondent to bargain with
the Union for a reasonable period of time.
For all the foregoing reasons, we find that an affirma-
tive bargaining order with its temporary decertification
bar is necessary to fully remedy the allegations in this
case.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Jame-
stown Fabricated Steel and Supply, Inc., Jamestown,
New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns
shall take the actions set in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a):
“(a) Failing and refusing to bargain with Shopmen’s
Local No. 470 of the International Association of Bridge,
Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers (the
Union) as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of the employees in the bargaining unit.”
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a):
“(a) Recognize and, on request, bargain with the Union
as the exclusive representative of the employees in the
following appropriate unit concerning terms and condi-
tions of employment and, if an understanding is reached,
embody the understanding in a signed agreement. The
appropriate unit is as follows:
All production and maintenance employees employed
by Jamestown Fabricated Steel and Supply, Inc. at its
Jamestown, New York, facility; but excluding all office
clerical employees, draftsmen, engineering employees,
watchmen, guards, and supervisors.”
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 4, 2015
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER JOHNSON, concurring.
I concur with my colleagues in finding that, under ex-
tant law set forth in UGL-UNICCO Service Co., 357
NLRB No. 76 (2011), the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to recognize and bargain with
the Union, and that an affirmative bargaining order is
appropriate to remedy this violation. However, I write
separately to express my view that UGL-UNICCO was
wrongly decided. The facts of this case graphically illus-
trate the error of that decision and the need to reconsider
it when the issue is directly raised by a party in some
future case.
As more fully set forth in the judge’s decision, on No-
vember 6, 2013,1 the Respondent purchased the assets of
Jamestown Fabricated Steel, Inc. (JFS). At the time of
the sale, the Union represented a unit of four of JFS’s
production and maintenance employees. Thereafter, the
Respondent hired two former JFS unit employees, Travis
Tkach and Devin Marsh. During the relevant time peri-
od, Tkach and Marsh were the Respondent’s only two
production employees.
On December 19, Harry Ehrie, a union representative,
went to the Respondent’s facility to hand deliver the Un-
ion’s demand for recognition and bargaining. When

1 All dates are in 2013, unless otherwise noted.
JAMESTOWN FABRICATED STEEL AND SUPPLY, INC. 3
Ehrie arrived, he went into the shop to speak with Tkach
and Marsh. After identifying himself as a union repre-
sentative, Ehrie asked Tkach and Marsh some questions
and then gave each of them his business card before leav-
ing. Ehrie subsequently told Malachi Ives, the Respond-
ent’s supervisor and part owner, that he was delivering
the Union’s demand for recognition and handed Ives a
sealed envelope. After their conversation, Ives went to
his office. Tkach and Marsh entered Ives’ office as he
was opening the envelope from Ehrie. Tkach gave Ives
the business card that Ehrie had given him and said,
“You might want this, because I don’t.” Tkach also stat-
ed, “Fuck the Union. All they ever did was take money
out of my paycheck every month. The only time they
would come around was during negotiations or election
time.” Tkach added, “Why would I want to go back to
the Union making less money, because I’m making more
money now.” Marsh expressed similar sentiments, stat-
ing that the Union would take their money for union dues
and did not check on what the employees needed until it
was time to negotiate a new contract. Marsh added that
the Union just came in for “their votes.” Ives testified
that, in light of the statements by Tkach and Marsh, the
Respondent decided not to recognize the Union because
it did not want to disregard its employees’ sentiments
regarding representation.
In concluding that the Respondent violated the Act, my
colleagues rely on UGL-UNICCO Service Co., 357
NLRB No. 76 (2011), where the Board majority over-
ruled MV Transportation, 337 NLRB 770 (2002), and
reinstated the “successor bar” doctrine. In so doing, the
Board replaced the extant rebuttable presumption of an
incumbent union’s majority status in favor of an
irrebuttable presumption that could last a year, or more.
The result is that employees cannot petition to decertify
the incumbent union or to be represented by another un-
ion, and the successor employer cannot refuse to recog-
nize or withdraw recognition regardless of facts indicat-
ing that the union no longer maintains majority status or
support.
For reasons stated by dissenting Member Hayes in
UGL-UNICCO, supra, slip op. at 10–13, and more re-
cently by dissenting Member Miscimarra in FJC Security
Services, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 115, slip op. at 1–4
(2014), I disagree with the Board’s decision to overrule
the balanced, well-reasoned standard established in MV
Transportation, where the Board held that “an incumbent
union in a successorship situation is entitled to—and
only to—a rebuttable presumption of continuing majority
status, which will not serve as a bar to an otherwise valid
decertification . . . or other valid challenge to the union’s
majority status.” 337 NLRB at 770.
Applying UGL-UNICCO here, the Respondent is fore-
closed from refusing recognition of the Union based on
the Union’s actual loss of majority status. See Levitz
Furniture Co., 333 NLRB 717, 725 (2001) (an employer
may rebut the presumption of an incumbent union’s ma-
jority status only on a showing of actual loss of majori-
ty). In my view, this result offends the Section 7 rights
of employees. In this regard, I note that the Respondent
received proof of the actual loss of majority support for
the Union almost immediately after receiving the Un-
ion’s bargaining demand. As Ives was opening the enve-
lope containing the Union’s demand for recognition, the
Respondent’s only two employees, Tkach and Marsh,
both made statements to Ives that more than sufficed as
objective evidence of their adamant opposition to repre-
sentation by the Union’s support. The facts of this case,
where the only two bargaining unit employees unequivo-
cally disclaimed support for representation by the Union
within moments of its demand for recognition, under-
score the inequity of applying the successor bar doctrine
reinstituted in UGL-UNICCO to foreclose for an extend-
ed period employees’ exercise of the Section 7 right of
free choice on the fundamental question of collective-
bargaining representation.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 4, 2015
______________________________________
Harry I. Johnson, III, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to bargain with Shop-
men’s Local No. 470 of the International Association of
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron
Workers (the Union) as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain collective-
ly and in good faith with the Union as the exclusive rep-
resentative of our employees in the following appropriate
unit concerning terms and conditions of employment
and, if an understanding is reached, embody the under-
standing in a signed agreement. The appropriate unit is
as follows:
All production and maintenance employees employed
by Jamestown Fabricated Steel and Supply, Inc. at its
Jamestown, New York, facility; but excluding all office
clerical employees, draftsmen, engineering employees,
watchmen, guards, and supervisors.
JAMESTOWN FABRICATED STEEL AND SUPPLY,
INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/03-CA-119345 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or
by calling (202) 273-1940.
Jesse Feuerstein and Alicia Pender, Esqs., for the General
Counsel.
James Grasso, Esq., for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARK CARISSIMI, Administrative Law Judge. This case was
tried in Buffalo, New York, on June 9, 2014. Shopmen’s Local
Union No. 470 of the International Association of Bridge,
Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers (the Union
or Local 470) filed the charge on December 19, 2013,1 and the
General Counsel issued the complaint on March 24, 2014.

1 All dates are in 2013, unless otherwise indicated.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the follow-
ing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a corporation, is engaged in structural steel
fabrication at its facility in Jamestown, New York. Based on a
projection of its operations since about November 6, 2013, at
which time the Respondent commenced operations, the Re-
spondent will annually sell and ship from its Jamestown, New
York facility goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to
points outside the State of New York. The Respondent admits,
and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
I find that the Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The complaint alleges that the Respondent is a successor to
Jamestown Fabricated Steel, Inc. (JFS). The complaint further
alleges that since December 19, 2013, the Respondent has vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to recognize and bar-
gain with the Union as the collective-bargaining representative
of its employees.
Facts
Background
For a number of years, JFS operated a steel fabrication facili-
ty at 1034 Allen Street in Jamestown, New York, where it pro-
duced structural steel products including beams, stairs and rail-
ings. JFS was owned by Ron White, who was its president, and
Lee Luce.
Since at least 2000, the Union represented a unit of produc-
tion and maintenance workers employed by JFS at its Jame-
stown, New York facility. The most recent collective-
bargaining agreement between the Union and JFS was effective
by its terms from May 1, 2010, through April 30, 2012, and
was extended by mutual agreement through June 30, 2013. In
2013, JFS employed four bargaining unit employees, David
Spitzer, Jeff White, Devan Marsh, and Travis Tkach. Spitzer
was the union steward.
In performing fabrication work at the JFS facility, the em-
ployees utilized plate shears, bending brakes, drill presses,
welders, torches, and band saws. The customers of JFS were
primarily general contractors and individuals, such as farmers
and “do-it-yourselfers” who ordered a specialized product. All
of the customers were located in the Jamestown, New York
area. At times, unit employees made deliveries using a compa-
ny vehicle while, on occasion, a nonunit truckdriver would be
hired to make a delivery. Many customers would take delivery
of a manufactured item at the shop and transport it themselves.
In February 2013, Spitzer informed Anthony Rosaci, a gen-
eral organizer for the International Association of Bridge,
Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers (the Inter-
national Union), that Spitzer had heard a rumor that JFS was
closing. On February 27, Rosaci sent a letter to White indicat-
JAMESTOWN FABRICATED STEEL AND SUPPLY, INC. 5
ing that the Union understood that JFS was planning to cease
operations and asking a series of questions regarding its future
plans. After Rosaci did not receive a response to that letter, on
March 4, he sent another letter requesting a response to the
questions he had raised in his February 27 letter. Again, the
Union received no response
On March 15, Rosaci sent another letter to White requesting
a response to his previous questions and offering to meet to
discuss the impact on employees of the cessation of operations
by JSF. On March 26, 2013, Edward Wright, an attorney for
JFS, sent a letter to Rosaci indicating that JFS would cease
operations on April 30, 2013. This letter also responded to the
Union’s previous request for information.
On April 15, the Union and JFS agreed to extend the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement through June 30. On April 30, 2013,
JFS closed its facility and laid off its employees.
On June 17, the Union requested an update on the status of
JFS. On that same date, Wright replied by a letter indicating
that there had been no change in status. The letter further indi-
cated that the JFS had ceased operations as planned on April
30, 2013, and intended to sell the real and personal property “as
is” and “where it is.”
In August 2013, White contacted Tkach and asked him if he
would be willing to meet the potential owners of the JFS facili-
ty, Mel and Kyle Duggan, the owners of Duggan & Duggan, a
general contractor and a former customer of JFS. Tkach told
White he would be willing to meet with them and thereafter a
meeting was held between the four individuals at the Allen
Street facility in Jamestown. The Duggans informed Tkach
that the new company would use the same equipment that had
been used by JFS and asked him if he would be willing to help
get the facility cleaned up and operating. Tkach indicated he
would be willing to do so. There was no discussion about the
Union at this meeting.
The Respondent Begins Operations
On November 6, 2013, the assets of JFS were sold to the Re-
spondent, which is owned by the Duggans and Malachi Ives,
who has a 15 percent share. Shortly thereafter, the Duggans
and Ives met with Tkach at the Allen Street facility. Ives told
Tkach that he owned 15 percent of the Respondent and that he
would be the day-to-day supervisor of the operation. Ives of-
fered Tkach a job with the Respondent at $16 an hour, which
was $2.50 more than what Tkach earned at JFS. According to
Tkach’s credited testimony, Ives also informed Tkach that the
new operation would be a “nonunion shop.”2 The Respondent
began operation on November 12, 2013, with two employees,
Tkach and Mike Barry. Barry had not been employed by JFS.
At the end of October 2013, Tkach sent a text message to
former JFS employee Devan Marsh and informed him that the
business was going to be sold and encouraged him to send an
application to Ives at Duggan & Duggan. Marsh had another

2 Tkach testified pursuant to a subpoena from the General Counsel. I
found him to be a credible witness, his testimony was detailed and his
demeanor reflected certainty with regard to the matters that he testified
to. In addition, Tkach’s testimony on this point is uncontradicted. In
this regard, Ives testified that he had no disagreement with Tkach’s
testimony regarding this meeting (Tr. 141).
job and did not apply for a job with the Respondent at that time.
In late November or early December 2013, Marsh changed his
mind and submitted a resume to the Respondent. Ives contact-
ed Marsh and arranged an interview with him at the Allen
Street facility in mid-December. At the interview, Ives asked
Marsh if he knew how to operate the machinery that was in the
shop and Marsh replied that he did because he had operated all
of that equipment while working for JFS. Ives asked Marsh
what he earned at JFS and Marsh replied that he had earned
$10.30 an hour. Ives said that he would start Marsh at $11 per
hour. Ives told Marsh that before he hired him, he needed to
finalize Barry’s termination.3 Shortly after the interview, Ives
offered Marsh a job and he accepted. Marsh began working for
the Respondent in mid-December 2013. Marsh and Tkach
were the only two production employees at that time. At the
time of the hearing they remained the only two production em-
ployees.
The Respondent fabricates the same products that were made
by JFS and uses the same equipment that was in the Allen
Street facility when it was operated by JFS. The Respondent’s
production employees perform the same work that unit em-
ployees performed for JFS, including the fabrication of steel,
welding, and painting. The hours of work for the Respondent’s
employees are similar to the hours they worked at JFS. The
Respondent’s customers are the same as those of JFS.
On November 12, 2013, Harry Ehrie, a representative of the
International Union, was going to Jamestown on another matter
when Rosaciasked him to stop by the JFS facility to see if there
was any production going on, or whether JFS was selling off
any of its equipment. When Ehrie arrived, Ives came out and
spoke to him. Ehrie told Ives he was an ironworker but did not
identify himself as a union representative. Ives stated that he
was the new owner of the facility and that they had just begun
operations. Ehrie then left the premises and called Rosaci, who
requested that he go back and obtain as much information as
possible about the new operation. Ehrie returned but Ives was
no longer there. Ehrie spoke to White who stated that Ives was
the owner of the new company. Ehrie asked White what the
name of the new company was and White replied that it was
Jamestown Fabricated Steel and Supply.
On November 22, 2013, Rosaci sent a letter to White re-
questing an update on the status of JFS. On December 3,
Wright replied by a letter indicating, for the first time, that JFS
had been sold to the Respondent on November 8, 2013.
The Union’s Demand for Recognition and Bargaining
On December 18, Spitzer called Rosaci and informed him
that he stopped by the Respondent’s facility and saw Tkach and
Marsh working there and that they were using the same equip-
ment and doing the same work as when JFS operated the facili-
ty. After speaking to Spitzer, Rosaci called Local 470 and
asked if they would have one of their members stop by and ask
for a business card with the new owner or the manager’s name
on it, as Rosaci did not have that information. Local 470 ob-
tained a business card which they transmitted to Rosaci. Rosaci
then contacted Ehrie and told him that he was going to draft a

3 Barry was terminated on December 6, 2013.
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
letter demanding recognition that he would send to Ehrie.
Rosaci instructed Ehrie to hand deliver the letter the next day.
He also asked Ehrie to contact him immediately after the letter
was delivered and stated that he would then also fax the letter
to the Respondent.
The letter signed by Rosaci (GC Exh. 18) set forth the fol-
lowing:
Mr. Malachi Ives
Jamestown Fabricated Steel & Supply, Inc./JFSS, LLC
1034 Allen St.
Jamestown, NY 14701
BY HANDDecember 19, 2013
RE: Shopmen’s Local Union No. 470
Dear Mr. Ives:
Shopmen’s Local Union No. 470 represents your shop em-
ployees and your Company is hereby requested to recognize
Shopmen’s Local Union No. 470 as the exclusive representa-
tive and agent of the production and maintenance employees.
You are hereby requested to enter into negotiations with rep-
resentatives of this Union for the purpose of consummating a
mutually satisfactory collective-bargaining agreement cover-
ing the Company’s aforementioned employees. Kindly in-
form the undersigned as to whether your Company will rec-
ognize the Union and bargain.
The Union further insists that there cannot be any change
made with respect to the employment status, terms and condi-
tions of any bargaining unit employee except by mutual
agreement with this Union.
Sincerely,
Anthony J. Rosaci
General Organizer
After obtaining the above-noted demand for recognition and
bargaining from Rosaci on the evening of December 18, Ehrie
made a copy of it and placed it in an envelope. On December
19, Ehrie took the demand for recognition and bargaining to the
Respondent’s facility in Jamestown. When Ehrie arrived there
in the late morning he went into the office area but nobody was
there. Ehrie then went into the shop area and spoke to Tkach
and Marsh. Ehrie introduced himself and said that he was go-
ing to hand deliver to Ives a letter requesting recognition on
behalf of the Union as the representative of the employees.
Ehrie gave both employees his business card and wrote
Rosaci’s name and phone number on the back. He told the em-
ployees that Rosaci had asked that the employees call him and
he would give them further information about the Union’s posi-
tion. Ehrie then asked the employees what they were getting
paid. Tkach replied that they had been told in the office not to
say anything. When Ehrie asked whether they had health care
and a pension plan, Tkach told Ehrie that he would have to ask
in the office. Marsh did not respond to any of the questions
asked by Ehrie. Ehrie asked the employees for their contact
information but they did not give it to him. Ehrie then left and
went to another facility in Jamestown.
After approximately 20 minutes, Ehrie returned to the Re-
spondent’s facility. When he arrived, Ives was just getting out
of his vehicle in the parking lot. Ehrie approached Ives and
introduced himself. Ehrie told Ives that he was hand delivering
a letter of recognition from the Union and then gave Ives the
envelope containing the Union’s demand for recognition and
bargaining. According to Ehrie’s credited testimony, Ives re-
plied that he was “not going union.”4 Ehrie and Ives briefly
discussed the employees’ wages and Ehrie asked him about
employee health care and a pension. Ives replied that as busi-
ness improved, the Respondent would look into those issues.
Ehrie testified that during their conversation, Ives did not open
the envelope containing the Union’s demand for recognition
and bargaining.
After Ehrie left the Respondent’s facility, he called Rosaci
and informed him that he had hand delivered the demand for
recognition and bargaining to Ives. Immediately thereafter, at
11:39 a.m. Rosaci faxed the identical letter demanding recogni-
tion and bargaining to the Respondent that is noted above, ex-
cept that it did not contain the reference to hand delivery. (GC
Exh. 16.)
After Ehrie left the facility, Ives went to his office. As Ives
was opening the envelope containing the Union’s demand for
recognition and bargaining, Tkach and Marsh came into his
office. Tkach gave Ives the business card that Ehrie had given
him and said, “You might want this, because I don’t.” Tkach
also stated, “Fuck the Union. All they ever did was take money
out of my paycheck every month. The only time they would
come around was during negotiations or election time.” Tkach
added, “Why would I want to go back to the Union making less
money, because I’m making more money now.”
After Tkach had given Ives Ehrie’s business card, Marsh
gave Ives the business card that Ehrie had given him. Ives
asked Marsh what Ehrie had spoken to them about. Marsh
replied that he told Ehrie that he did not have time to talk to
him and that Tkach told Ehrie that any questions should be
directed to Ives. Ives then told the employees that if there were
any more visitors, they should send them in to see him. Marsh
then told Ives that the Union would take their money for union
dues and never come around to check on what employees need-
ed until contract time. Marsh added that the Union just came in

4 There is little variance between the testimony of Ehrie and Ives re-
garding the probative aspects of their brief meeting. However, Ives
testified that after Ehrie handed him the envelope containing the de-
mand for recognition and bargaining, Ives replied that “he was not a big
union guy.” To the extent the testimony of Ehrie and Ives conflicts on
this point, I credit Ehrie. Immediately after the meeting, Ehrie wrote
notes regarding the meeting. (GC Exh. 19.) Ehrie’s contemporaneous
notes indicate that after Ehrie handed Ives the Union’s demand for
recognition and bargaining, Ives replied that he “was not interested in
being union.” Since Ehrie’s trial testimony is substantially corroborat-
ed by his contemporaneous notes and because he appeared to have a
more distinct recollection of this meeting, I find this testimony to be the
more reliable version of what was said.
JAMESTOWN FABRICATED STEEL AND SUPPLY, INC. 7
for “their votes.” At the trial, both Tkach and Marsh testified
that this was the first time that either of them had expressed to
Ives their feelings regarding the Union.
On March 4, 2014, pursuant to a request from Rosaci, Ehrie
returned to the Respondent’s facility to see if Marsh or Tkach
were interested in speaking to the Union. When Ehrie arrived
at the facility he walked into the office. When Ives saw Ehrie,
he told him that he had nothing to say. As Ehrie walked out of
the facility he saw Marsh but did not speak with him.
There has been no further contact between the Union and the
Respondent since March 4, 2014. Ives testified that because of
the statements made to him by Tkach and Marsh regarding the
Union, the Respondent decided not to recognize the Union
because the Respondent did not want to act in a way contrary to
their desires.
The Contentions of the Parties
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent is a suc-
cessor to JFS and that the Union made a valid demand for
recognition which the Respondent has refused. The General
Counsel further argues that any evidence of employee disaffec-
tion with the Union became known only after the Respondent’s
bargaining obligation attached. In light of that, the General
Counsel asserts that the Respondent is precluded on relying on
evidence of disaffection pursuant pursuant to the Board’s “suc-
cessor bar” doctrine that was restored in UGL-UNICCO Service
Co., 357 NLRB No. 76 (2011). The General Counsel also con-
tends that the evidence regarding employee disaffection was
tainted by Ives’ statement that he intended to operate a nonun-
ion shop and therefore the Respondent was not privileged to
rely on such statements as a basis for its refusal to recognize
and bargain with the Union. Accordingly, the General Counsel
contends that the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with the
Union.
The Respondent contends that at the time it obtained a sub-
stantial and representative complement of employees and began
operations, a majority of those employees had not been em-
ployees of JFS. Its primary argument, however, is that the
Union’s oral demand for recognition on December 19, 2013,
was insufficient to establish an obligation to recognize and
bargain with the Union. The Respondent further contends that
by the time it became aware of the Union’s written demand for
recognition and bargaining, pursuant to Allentown Mack Sales
& Service v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998), it had a good-faith
reasonable belief of the Union’s lack of majority support based
on the expressions of disaffection regarding the Union made by
Tkach and Marsh. The Respondent therefore contends that it is
privileged to refused to acquiesce in the Union’s request for
recognition and bargaining.
Analysis
It is clear that the Respondent is a successor to JFS under the
standards applied by the Board. In Van Lear Equipment, Inc.,
336 NLRB 1059, 1063 (2001), the Board, citing its decision in
Hydrolines, Inc., 305 NLRB 416, 421 (1991), summarized the
test for determining successorship as follows:
An employer, generally, succeeds to the collective-bargaining
obligation of a predecessor if a majority of its employees,
consisting of a “substantial and representative complement,”
in an appropriate bargaining unit are former employees of a
predecessor and the similarities between the two operations
manifest a ‘substantial continuity’ between the enterprises.
Fall River Dyeing Corp v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 41–43 (1987),
citing, inter alia, NLRB v. Burns Security Services, 406 U.S.
272, 280 fn. 4 (1972)
With respect to the issue of substantial continuity between a
predecessor and successor, in Fall River Dyeing Corp., supra,
the Supreme Court identified the following factors as relevant:
[W]hether the business of both employers is essentially the
same; whether the employees of the new company are doing
the same jobs in the same working conditions under the same
supervisors; and whether the new entity has the same produc-
tion process, produces the same products and has basically
the same body of customers.
In determining whether there is substantial continuity be-
tween the two enterprises the Board considers the “totality of
the circumstances.” N.K. Parker Transport, 332 NLRB 547,
550 (2000).
In the instant case, the Respondent’s production process is
almost identical to that of JFS. In this regard the Respondent
produces the same fabricated steel products and uses the same
equipment as JFS. The production process is unchanged and
therefore the employees perform the same work in the same
manner as they did for JFS. Finally, the Respondent has the
same customers as JFS. The fact that the Respondent began
operations more than 6 months after the closure of the JFS fa-
cility does not detract from the fact that there was substantial
continuity between the two entities. In Tree-Free Fiber Co.,
328 NLRB 389 (1999), the Board held that there was substan-
tial continuity between two enterprises when there was a hiatus
of 16 months between the closure of the predecessor and the
commencement of operations by the successor. With respect to
supervision, the Respondent’s employees are supervised by
Ives and when they worked for JFS, the supervision was carried
out by one of the two owners. Thus, while the supervisors are
different individuals, supervision by the Respondent is per-
formed in the same manner as it was at JFS. Based on the fore-
going, I find that the Respondent is the successor to JFS.
The Respondent contends that at the time it obtained a sub-
stantial and representative complement of employees, a majori-
ty of those employees had not been represented by the Union at
the predecessor. I note that when the Respondent initially be-
gan operations on November 12, only one of its two production
employees had been formerly employed by JFS and represented
by the Union but, by mid-December, both of the Respondent’s
production employees had been previously employed by JFS
and represented by the Union. Thus, within a month of its
commencement of operations, and prior to the Union’s request
for recognition, the Respondent’s work force was composed of
two employees, Tkach and Marsh, both of which had been
previously represented by the Union at JFS. Since, at the time
of the hearing, the Respondent continued to employ two pro-
duction employees, it is clear that two employees constituted a
substantial and representative complement of its employees. I
8 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
find that the critical time for considering whether a majority of
the current employees had been formerly represented by a un-
ion is at the time that a union demands recognition and bargain-
ing. Prior to such a request being made, an employer has no
obligation to recognize and bargain with a union, regardless of
whether or not its work force is composed of a majority of em-
ployees who were formerly represented by a union at its prede-
cessor.
I note, in this regard, that in Hampton Lumber Mills-
Washington, 334 NLRB 195 (2001), the Board held:
A successor employer’s obligation to recognize the union at-
taches after the occurrence of two events: (1) a demand for
recognition or bargaining by the union; and (2) the employ-
ment by the employer of a “substantial and representative
complement” of employees, a majority of whom were em-
ployed by the predecessor.
The Board has further held that these two conditions need
not occur in a particular order. Cadillac Asphalt Paving Co.,
349 NLRB 6, 9 (2007); MSK Corp., 341 NLRB 43, 44 (2004).
Accordingly, I find that when the Union demanded recognition
and bargaining on December 19, the Respondent had hired a
substantial and representative complement of employees, a
majority of whom had been previously represented by the Un-
ion.
As noted above, however, the Respondent argues that the
Union’s oral demand for recognition made by Ehrie on Decem-
ber 19, was not a valid demand for recognition and bargaining
and therefore it is not obligated to honor it. In support of its
position, the Respondent relies on Sheboygan Sausage Co., 156
NLRB 1490, 1500–1501 (1966), and three decisions of the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, Williams Enterprises v. NLRB,
956 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1992); AT Systems West, Inc. v.
NLRB, 294 F.3d 136, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2002), and Prime Service,
Inc. v. NLRB, 266 F.3d 1233, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
As set forth in detail above, when Ehrie gave Ives the enve-
lope containing the Union’s written request for recognition and
bargaining, Ehrie told Ives that the Union was making a de-
mand for recognition.
The Board has found that an oral request is sufficient to con-
stitute a valid demand for recognition and bargaining. Cadillac
Asphalt Paving Co., supra at 10. I note that in Hampton Lum-
ber Mills-Washington, the Board held that an employer who
has hired a substantial and representative complement of em-
ployees, a majority of whom were represented by a union at the
predecessor, was obligated to recognize the union after “a de-
mand for recognition or bargaining by the union.” Id. at 195. In
my view, the Board’s language clearly indicates that either a
demand for recognition or bargaining is sufficient to trigger a
bargaining obligation in a successorship situation. In Hampton
Mills-Washington, the union’s letter, which was found suffi-
cient to establish a bargaining obligation on behalf of the suc-
cessor employer, requested recognition and did not specifically
request bargaining. Id. at 199. Accordingly, I find that, in the
instant case, Ehrie’s oral request for recognition, coming as it
did after the Respondent had hired a substantial and representa-
tive complement of its employees from the predecessor’s work
force, which had been represented by the Union, constituted a
valid request for recognition sufficient to establish an obliga-
tion to recognize and bargain with the Union. In making this
finding, I note that since the Respondent’s two production em-
ployees were performing the same work, with the same equip-
ment, and in the same manner as the predecessor, the Union
requested recognition in the historical and appropriate unit of
production and maintenance employees.
To the extent that, after the Board’s decision in Hampton
Mills-Washington, Sheboygan Sausage Co., supra, has any
continuing viability, I find it to be distinguishable. In that case,
the union sent a telegram to the employer requesting recogni-
tion on the basis of majority support demonstrated by authori-
zation cards. The Board found that the telegram was insuffi-
cient to trigger an obligation to bargain on behalf of the em-
ployer because it did not specifically request bargaining or
propose dates and times for a bargaining session. The Board
found this to be of particular significance because of the fact
that the union was also collecting authorization cards in order
to obtain a Board conducted election. The instant case involves
a successor situation, rather than an initial organizing campaign
where, along with a demand for recognition, authorization
cards were being solicited for the purposes of obtaining a
Board-conducted election. Obviously, in a successor situation
such as the instant case, the employees working for the succes-
sor have a history of representation by the union requesting
recognition. Thus, it would appear that there is not the same
necessity for the union to be so precise and specifically request
bargaining in addition to requesting recognition.
With respect to the Respondent’s reliance on the above-
noted decisions of the D.C. Circuit, with all due respect to the
circuit court, I am obligated to follow Board precedent unless
and until it is reversed by the Supreme Court. Pathmark Stores,
Inc., 342 NLRB 378 fn. 1 (2004); Waco, Inc., 273 NLRB 746,
749 fn. 14 (1984).
At the time that the Union made its oral demand for recogni-
tion on December 19, the Respondent had not yet been apprised
of any disaffection for the Union by its two production employ-
ees. That did not occur until shortly afterwards, when Ives
returned to his office and was opening the envelope containing
the Union’s written request for recognition and bargaining.
Thus, because the Respondent did not have any evidence re-
flecting a lack of support for the Union from its two production
employees prior to the Union’s valid oral demand for recogni-
tion on December 19, I find that it did not have a good-faith,
reasonable doubt that the Union lacked majority status at the
time of the Union’s demand for recognition. Accordingly, I
find Allentown Mack Sales & Service ,supra, to be distinguish-
able. In Allentown Mack, the respondent had purchased the
assets of a predecessor employer on December 20, 1990. Dur-
ing the period before and immediately after the sale, a number
of employees made statements to the new owners of the facility
suggesting that the incumbent union had lost support among
employees in the bargaining unit. The union requested recogni-
tion from the respondent on January 2, 1991. The Supreme
Court found that the statements made by employees prior to the
union’s demand for recognition established that the respondent
had a good-faith, reasonable doubt regarding the union’s major-
ity status at the time the union demanded recognition.
JAMESTOWN FABRICATED STEEL AND SUPPLY, INC. 9
Since, in the instant case, the Responded did not obtain evi-
dence regarding employee disaffection for the Union until
shortly after it made a valid demand for recognition, I find that
the Board’s decision in UGL-UNICCO Service Co. ,357 NLRB
No. 76 (2011), to be applicable. In UGL-UNICCO, the Board
overruled its decision in MV Transportation, 337 NLRB 770
(2002), and restored the “successor bar” doctrine that had orig-
inally been established in St. Elizabeth Manor, Inc., 329 NLRB
341 (1999). The Board held in UGL-UNICCO that an incum-
bent union is entitled to a “reasonable period of bargaining”
during which no question concerning representation that chal-
lenged its majority status may be raised through a petition for
an election filed by employees, by the employer, or by a union.
In addition, during this period an employer may not unilaterally
withdraw recognition from the Union based on a claimed loss
of majority support. Id., slip op. at 8.
In reestablishing the successor bar doctrine, In UGL-
UNNICO, slip op. at 3, the Board noted the following observa-
tion by the Supreme Court set forth in Fall River Dyeing Corp.:
[A]fter being hired by a new company following a layoff
from the old, employees initially will be concerned primarily
with maintaining their new jobs. In fact, they may be inclined
to shun support for their former union, especially if they be-
lieve that such support would jeopardize their jobs with the
successor or if they are inclined to blame the union for their
layoff or problems associated with it. Without the presump-
tion of majority support and with a wide variety of corporate
transformations possible, an employer could use a successor
enterpriseas a way of getting rid of a labor contract and ex-
ploiting the employees hesitant attitudes toward the union to
eliminate its continuing presence. [Id. at 40.]
Applying the successor bar doctrine to the instant case, once
the Respondent’s obligation to recognize and bargain with the
Union matured on December 19, 2013, based on Ehrie’s oral
demand for recognition, the Union was entitled to a reasonable
period of time of bargaining without challenge to its majority
status. Of course, the Respondent has refused to recognize and
bargain with the Union entirely and consequently no bargaining
has occurred at all between the parties. Thus, the expressions
of disaffection made by Tkach and Marsh shortly after the Un-
ion’s demand for recognition was made cannot serve as a basis
for the Respondent’s refusal to recognize and bargain with the
Union. On the basis of the foregoing, I find that the Respond-
ent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing
to recognize and bargain with the Union since December, 19,
2013.
Even if I were to find that Ehrie’s demand for recognition on
December 19, 2013, was not a valid demand for recognition, I
would still find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act by its refusal to recognize and bargain with
the Union. On the same day, as the oral demand for recogni-
tion, the Respondent received the Union’s letter requesting
recognition and bargaining, by both hand delivery and by fax.
Even under the rationale of the cases relied on by the Respond-
ent, there is no question that the written request for recognition
and bargaining is valid. In this respect, the letter requests not
only recognition and bargaining but also requests the Respond-
ent to inform the Union of its intentions.
The evidence establishes that the Respondent did not have
knowledge of the Union’s written demand for recognition and
bargaining until after Tkach and Marsh had made statements
suggesting that they no longer supported the Union. As noted
above, however, when Ives met with Tkach and confirmed his
hiring, shortly before the Respondent began operations on No-
vember 12, Ives told Tkach that the Respondent’s operation
would be “nonunion.”
In Advanced Stretchforming International, Inc., 323 NLRB
529, 530 (1997), the Board indicated that “A statement to em-
ployees that there will be no union at the successor employer’s
facility plainly coerces employees in the exercise of their Sec-
tion 7 right to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing and constitutes a facially unlawful condi-
tion of employment.” In so finding, the Board indicated that, as
noted above, during the time of transition between a predeces-
sor and successor employer, a union is in a particularly vulner-
able position and employees might be inclined to shun support
for their former union, especially if they believe that such sup-
port would jeopardize their jobs with the successor. Thus,
when Ives coercively told Tkach that the Respondent’s opera-
tion would be “nonunion” shortly before the Respondent began
operations, I find that Ives’ statement tainted Tkach’s expres-
sion of disaffection for the Union that he made on December
19. I also find that it is reasonable to infer that Tkach relayed
to Marsh the coercive statement made by Ives that the new
facility would be “nonunion.” The basis for such an inference
is that Tkach encouraged Marsh to apply for a job with the
Respondent. I find it hard to believe that he would have done
so without passing along the Respondent’s stated position with
regard to union representation of the employees it hired. Con-
sequently, I find that the Respondent is not entitled to rely on
the expressions of disaffection regarding the Union made by
Tkach and Marsh on December 19 as they were tainted by
Ives’coercive proclamation that the Respondent would be
“nonunion.”5 Accordingly, I also find, on this alternative basis,
that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union since De-
cember 19, 2013.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is the successor to Jamestown Fabricated
Steel and Supply, Inc.
2. Since December 19, 2013, Shopmen’s Local Union No.
470 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural, Or-
namental & Reinforcing Iron Workers (the Union) has been the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the

5 There is no allegation in the complaint that Ives’ November 2013
statement violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act. Consequently, I do not make
any findings or conclusions as to whether the statement constituted a
separate unfair labor practice. I note the complaint also does not allege
that by making this statement, the Respondent lost its right to unilater-
ally set the initial terms and conditions of employment of its employees
under NLRB v. Burns Security Services, 406 U.S. 272 (1972), and thus
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally changing
wages and benefits when it commenced operations. Therefore, I make
no findings or conclusions regarding this issue.
10 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
following appropriate unit:
All production and maintenance employees employed by
Jamestown Fabricated Steel and Supply, Inc. (the Respond-
ent) at its Jamestown, New York, facility; but excluding, all
office clerical employees, draftsmen, engineering employees,
watchmen, guards, and supervisors.
3. By refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union
since December 19, 2013, the Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
4. The above unfair labor practices affect commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2) (6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act. Having found that the Respondent has
violated and is violating Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I
order the Respondent to recognize and bargain in good faith
with the Union and, if an understanding is reached, to embody
such understanding in a collective-bargaining agreement.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended6
ORDER
The Respondent, Jamestown Fabricated Steel and Supply,
Inc., Jamestown, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with the
Union.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, recognize and bargain with the Union as the
exclusive representative of the employees in the following ap-
propriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employment
and, if an understanding is reached, embody the understanding
in a signed agreement. The appropriate unit is as follows
All production and maintenance employees employed by
Jamestown Fabricated Steel and Supply, Inc. at its Jame-
stown, New York, facility; but excluding, all office clerical
employees, draftsmen, engineering employees, watchmen,
guards, and supervisors.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Jamestown, New York, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”7 Copies of the notice, on forms provided

6 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
by the Regional Director for Region 3, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since December 19, 2013.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. November 6, 2014.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to bargain with Shopmen’s Lo-
cal No. 470 of the International Association of Bridge, Struc-
tural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers (the Union) as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our em-
ployees in the following appropriate unit:
All production and maintenance employees employed by
Jamestown Fabricated Steel and Supply, Inc. at its Jame-
stown, New York, facility; but excluding, all office clerical
employees, draftsmen, engineering employees, watchmen,
guards, and supervisors.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed

tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
JAMESTOWN FABRICATED STEEL AND SUPPLY, INC. 11
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, recognize and bargain collectively and
in good faith with the Union as the exclusive representative of
our employees in the appropriate unit set forth above concern-
ing terms and conditions of employment and, if an understand-
ing is reached, embody the understanding in a signed agree-
ment.
JAMESTOWN FABRICATED STEEL AND SUPPLY, INC.