James Whalen, Complainant,v.John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice, (Federal Bureau of Investigation) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 13, 2003
01A20945 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 13, 2003)

01A20945

01-13-2003

James Whalen, Complainant, v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice, (Federal Bureau of Investigation) Agency.


James Whalen v. Department of Justice

01A20945

January 13, 2003

.

.

James Whalen,

Complainant,

v.

John Ashcroft,

Attorney General,

Department of Justice,

(Federal Bureau of Investigation)

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A20945

Agency No. F-94-4644

Hearing No.160-98-8553X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant alleged that he was discriminated

against on the bases of disability (back injury) and reprisal (prior EEO

activity) when he was unfairly subjected to an investigation of several

incidents by the agency's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR).

Complainant also contends that the manner of the investigation was

improper and that, therefore, it was motivated by discrimination.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

formerly employed as a Special Agent at the agency's New York Office

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.<1> Believing he was a victim

of discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently

filed a formal complaint on December 5, 1994. At the conclusion of the

investigation, complainant was informed of his right to request a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) or alternatively, to receive a

final decision by the agency. Complainant requested a hearing and the

matter was assigned to an AJ. The AJ remanded the matter back to the

agency for a final decision on the merits due to complainant's failure

to prosecute his complaint.

In its final decision, the agency concluded that complainant was an

individual with a disability, based, in part, on the approval of his

application for disability retirement. The agency construed complainant's

allegations as asserting disparate treatment based on a disability and

not a denial of a reasonable accommodation. The agency concluded that

there were legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its investigation

of complainant's activities which were not proven to be a pretext for

discrimination. Specifically, the investigation was based on management's

doubts that complainant was impaired to the extent that he claimed.

The investigation was conducted to monitor whether complainant's

activities were inconsistent with his claim of a back injury.

In addition, the agency concluded that complainant did not prove the

investigation was done in reprisal for his protected activity. According

to the agency, the investigation was not initiated by complainant's

supervisor who had been named in an EEO complaint filed by complainant,

but by other officials in the agency who were not shown to have knowledge

of his protected activity. The agency found that complainant did not

establish that its reasons for conducting the investigations were due

to his protected activity, but rather, were because of his misconduct

on the job.

Complainant makes no additional statement in support of his appeal.

The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In analyzing a disparate treatment claim under the Rehabilitation Act,

where the agency denies that its decisions were motivated by complainant's

disability and there is no direct evidence of discrimination, we

apply the burden-shifting method of proof set forth in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Heyman v. Queens

Village Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent Program,

198 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1999); Swanks v. WMATA, 179 F.3d 929, 933-34

(D.C.Cir. 1999). Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental

Biology, 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st

Cir. 1976) (applying the McDonnell Douglas principles in a reprisal case)

, and Coffman v. Department of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473

(November 20, 1997);Whitmire v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal

No. 01A00340 (September 25, 2000).

The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with when the agency has

articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct.

See United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460

U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail,

complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's

Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley

v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November

13, 1997); Pavelka v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351

(December 14, 1995).

Applying these principles to the instant case, the Commission finds that

complainant failed to establish the agency's reasons for investigating

his activities were a pretext for discrimination based on his disability

and his protected activity.

We assume for purposes of our analysis of complainant's disparate

treatment claim based on a disability, that complainant is an individual

with a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.<2>

Complainant alleged that the agency acted with discriminatory intent

when it put him under surveillance beginning in November 1989 related to

allegations of his misuse of a FBI vehicle, and worker's compensation

fraud. At issue are the fruits of the agency's surveillance of

complainant's activities, including his improper use of a police parking

permit, eavesdropping on complainant's telephone conversation with his

lawyer and records obtained from the complainant's rental of a vehicle.

Complainant also contends the agency was motivated by discrimination when

the agency interviewed a special agent about complainant's psychological

condition in relation to allegations of sexual misconduct. Finally, at

issue is the agency's investigation of allegations by other employees

that complainant was improperly searching employees' desks and taking

documents.

We conclude from a review of the record that the agency's OPR

investigation was not motivated by discrimination on either basis.

According to complainant's own testimony, he described his dispute

with his supervisor concerning his refusal to assign him the use

of a government vehicle. Complainant acknowledged that his use of

a FBI vehicle on at least two occasions was without authorization.

Complainant also did not deny that he obtained and may have used an

expired New York City Police Department (NYPD) parking sticker without

proper authorization<3>. Despite his contention that the allegations

regarding the parking sticker were unsubstantiated, the evidence indicated

that a police parking permit was reported stolen from a FBI agent's

office which led to the investigation of complainant's activities. Thus,

complainant did not establish that the agency's reasons for investigating

his use of the NYPD parking sticker were a pretext for discrimination.

The record also revealed that complainant's ability to work after a

work-related car accident, was in dispute. According to the findings

of an EEOC AJ, the agency's physician contended that complainant's

medical condition could have been treated with surgery and that he was

able to work. This completely contradicted complainant's physician's

opinion that complainant was unable to work at all. During that time

period, the agency dispatched two special agents, who testified that

they were charged with the surveillance of complainant's activities

that may have been inconsistent with his claimed inability to work.

They testified that their investigations normally involved eavesdropping

on public conversations. The agency also argued that obtaining records

regarding his use of a rental car was done to examine complainant's

contention that he was unable to sit and drive for long periods of time.

Complainant contends that the agency was motivated by reprisal and

discrimination based on his disability but other than his bare assertions,

he did not offer any evidence to support this. That is, complainant

did not demonstrate that the agency did not have a legitimate purpose

to determine his ability to work and that it was more likely motivated

by discriminatory animus.

In addition, during the course of the agency's investigation, two clerical

employees gave statements that they observed complainant going through

other employee's desks and taking documents. These two employees

also stated that complainant made crude sexual comments and gestures

towards them and generally made them uncomfortable in his presence.

These employees' accounts corroborated the fact that the agency had

legitimate reasons for investigating allegations of complainant's sexual

misconduct and other misconduct issues while he was an employee.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the agency's

final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

January 13, 2003

__________________

Date

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

__________________

Date

______________________________

1Complainant retired on disability in 1990.

2We also note that an EEOC AJ concluded in an another disparate treatment

case that complainant is an individual with a disability. EEOC Complaint

No. 160-94-8182X Agency No. F-91-4297-O.

3According to the evidence, an FBI supervisor was permitted to use a

police parking permit while on government business.