Jack K. Young, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 13, 2002
01992198 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 13, 2002)

01992198

02-13-2002

Jack K. Young, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.


Jack K. Young v. United States Postal Service (Pacific Area)

01992198

February 13, 2002

.

Jack K. Young,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Pacific Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01992198

Agency No. 4-F-950-0038-98

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Jack K. Young (�complainant�) is appealing a final agency decision (�FAD�)

issued by his employer, the United States Postal Service (�the agency�).

In this FAD, the agency concluded that it had not unlawfully discriminated

against complainant by requiring him to take a full hour lunch break

(instead of the half an hour he requested). Complainant believes this

agency action constituted discrimination on the basis of his disability

(partially amputated leg), and violated Section 501 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. (�the Rehabilitation

Act�).<1>

We, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (�EEOC� or

�the Commission�), accepted complainant's appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405(a). For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the agency.

We find that it complied with the relevant law, and that the FAD in

question should therefore be affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Complainant has a partially amputated leg, having sustained a war

injury while serving as a Green Beret in Vietnam. He currently wears a

prosthesis on his left leg below the knee. He has worked for the agency

with this prosthesis for many years in various capacities.

In March of 1995, he bid � and was selected � for a �box clerk� position

at the agency's facility in Morgan Hill, California. The hours for

the position were advertised as 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., with a one hour

lunch break. Complainant accepted and began serving in this new position.

He requested, however, that his lunchtime be shortened to half an hour,

and this request was granted.

Sometime in 1997, the Officer-in-Charge (�OIC�) of the Morgan Hill

facility concluded that the facility would function more efficiently if

its clerks all took one hour lunch breaks. Accordingly, OIC extended the

lunch break for all clerks to one hour. Those employees who previously

had taken a half an hour for lunch (including complainant) were thus

required to stay an extra half an hour at the end of their shifts.

Complainant informed OIC that requiring him to take a one hour lunch now

(and forcing him to stay later in the day) aggravated his disability.

Specifically, complainant told agency management that he only wore his

prosthesis at work (i.e., that he took it off as soon as he got home and

used crutches there). He explained that the longer he was required to

remain at work and wear his prosthesis, the more painful and complicated

his leg condition became. Complainant conceded that he had worked for

many years on shifts with one hour lunch breaks. Nevertheless, he also

alleged that his ability to withstand the longer work days had weakened

with age, and that the extended schedule would worsen his condition.

OIC asked complainant to attend a meeting to discuss his request

in greater detail. At this meeting (attended by OIC, complainant,

complainant's supervisor, and another agency manager), complainant

reiterated his need for the half an hour lunch accommodation.

OIC refused to provide this particular concession, but did offer other

accommodations instead. For example, OIC agreed to let complainant

take a one and one-half to two hour lunch break (so that complainant,

who lived close to the facility, would have time to go home over lunch

and rest his leg). Complainant rejected this alternative, however.

He also failed, despite the agency's request, to provide any medical

documentation substantiating his need for the shortened lunch hour,

specifically (or confirming his need for an accommodation, generally).

After it became clear that the agency would not allow him to take a half

an hour only for lunch, complainant filed his discrimination complaint.

The agency accepted this complaint for investigation, and ultimately

issued a FAD on the matter. In its FAD, the agency argued that it was

not required to grant whichever accommodation complainant preferred most,

and that it had offered an effective accommodation which complainant

had rejected. Therefore, the FAD concluded, it had not violated

the Rehabilitation Act or committed any sort of unlawful employment

discrimination.

On appeal, complainant claims that many clerks who had been subject to

the �one hour lunch� change were subsequently allowed to resume half

an hour lunches. He also says that another employee with an amputation

working as a clerk in his facility also takes a half an hour for lunch,

and that he is now the only clerk required, against his will, to take

a one hour lunch break.

Complainant therefore is asking us to order the agency to allow him to

take only a half an hour for lunch, and to overturn the agency's FAD

finding no discrimination.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

We are charged with reviewing this FAD under the de novo standard

of review. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). This essentially means that

in deciding this case, we are free to accept or reject the agency's

factual and legal conclusions at will. See Equal Employment Opportunity

Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (rev. Nov. 9, 1999)

(�EEO-MD-110�), at 9-15. Thus, we have carefully reviewed the entire

record before us in our attempt to discern whether a preponderance of the

evidence supports a finding of unlawful disability discrimination here.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). We find that it does not.

According to the Commission's regulations:

An Agency shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical

or mental limitations of an applicant or employee who is a qualified

individual with [a disability]<2> unless the agency can demonstrate that

the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its

program . . . . Reasonable accommodation may include, but shall not be

limited to: (i) Making facilities readily accessible to and usable by

individuals with [disabilities]; and (ii) Job restructuring, part-time

or modified work schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment

or devices, appropriate adjustment or modification of examinations,

the provision of readers and interpreters, and other similar actions.

29 C.F.R. �� 1614.203(c)(1), (2); cf. 29 C.F.R. �� 1630.2(o)(2)(ii),

1630.9(a).

In its FAD, the agency does not dispute that complainant is a qualified

individual with a disability. See Final Agency Decision Finding No

Discrimination (Dec. 18, 1998), at 4. It also has not claimed that

accommodating complainant would somehow impose an �undue hardship� on

its operations. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.15(d). Thus, the agency had an

undeniable duty to accommodate complainant's disability.

Consequently, the agency also had a duty to engage complainant in an

informal, interactive process to ascertain the nature of complainant's

condition, the work limitations it caused, and the type of accommodation

that would be necessary. See 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(o)(3) (�To determine

the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the

[employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the

[complainant]. This process should identify the precise limitations

resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that

could overcome those limitations.�) OIC and complainant's supervisor

satisfied this agency burden by meeting with complainant, hearing his

position and concerns, and discussing possible accommodations for his

condition. After doing so, the agency decided to reject complainant's

choice of accommodation in favor of a different one. While complainant

may have believed that this accommodation ultimately offered (i.e.,

allowing him to rest his leg during an even longer lunch) was undesirable,

his dissatisfaction alone is not determinative.

To be sure, the suggestions and preferences of an employee seeking

reasonable accommodation must be given great weight. See, e.g.,

Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Mar. 1, 1999) (web version)

(�Reasonable Accommodation Guidance�), at 6 (�[S]uggestions from the

individual with a disability may assist the employer in determining the

type of reasonable accommodation to provide.�); cf. Appendix to Part 1630

� Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(�ADA Interpretive Guidance�), at Section 1630.9 (�[T]he preference [in

reasonable accommodation] of the individual with a disability should be

given primary consideration.�) However, an employer is not required to

provide the precise reasonable accommodation an employee wants, so long

as the employer provides a reasonable accommodation that is effective.

See Reasonable Accommodation Guidance, at 8. The agency providing the

accommodation � not the employee � �has the ultimate discretion to choose

between effective accommodations . . . .� ADA Interpretive Guidance,

at Section 1630.9.

In this case, complainant apparently believed that the accommodation

ultimately offered would not in fact be an �effective� one.

See Complainant's Statement in Support of Appeal (Feb. 13, 1999)

(where he claims that �the �offer' to take a longer lunch would

be counter-productive as swelling often occurs and I can not wear

my prosthesis�). The agency therefore asked that he submit medical

documentation substantiating his need for this specific concession.

See id. (�I was asked to provide medical documentation . . . .�) This was

a permissible request. See ADA Interpretive Guidance, at Section 1630.9

(explaining that �[w]hen the need for an accommodation is not obvious,

an employer, before providing a reasonable accommodation, may require

that the individual with a disability provide documentation of the need

for accommodation�). Complainant refused to comply by submitting any

such medical documentation, however.<3> Consequently, the agency had no

way of knowing for sure whether the shorter lunch break, specifically,

was necessary to prevent or ameliorate complainant's alleged worsening

condition (or whether such condition was in fact worsening at all).

Its refusal to grant the half an hour lunch break exception was

therefore justified. See Reasonable Accommodation Guidance, at 7 (�If

an individual's. . . need for reasonable accommodation is not obvious,

and s/he refuses to provide the reasonable documentation requested by

the employer, then s/he is not entitled to reasonable accommodation.�);

see also Beck v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130,

1137 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that an employee's failure to respond to

an employer's request for information critical to a determination of an

appropriate reasonable accommodation sheltered the employer from liability

for failing to provide such accommodation); and Steffes v. Stepan Company,

144 F.3d 1070, 1073 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Beck, and providing largely

the same).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we conclude that no disability discrimination occurred

here, and that the FAD at issue must be affirmed.<4>

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations within thirty (30) calendar days of

receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt

of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405; see also EEO MD-110, at 9-18. All requests and arguments

must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036.

In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be

deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the

expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604.

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the

other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of the

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with the request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

Complainant has the right to file a civil action in an appropriate

United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the

date that complainant receives this decision. If complainant files a

civil action, complainant must name as the defendant in the complaint the

person who is the official agency head or department head, identifying

that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so

may result in the dismissal of complainant's case in court. �Agency� or

�department� means the national organization, and not the local office,

facility or department in which complainant works. If complainant files

a request to reconsider and also files a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of the complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If complainant decides to file a civil action, and if complainant does

not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, complainant may

request that the Court appoint an attorney to represent complainant and

that the Court permit complainant to file the action without payment

of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial

of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a

request for an attorney does not extend complainant's time in which

to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above entitled

(�Right to File A Civil Action�).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

February 13, 2002

__________________

Date

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

__________________

Date

______________________________

1The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was amended in 1992 to apply the standards

in the Americans with Disabilities Act to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment.

2A �qualified individual with a disability� is an �individual with a

disability� who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the

essential functions of the position in question without endangering the

health and safety of the individual or others and who, either (1) meets

the experience or education requirements of the position in question;

or (2) meets the criteria for appointment under one of the special

appointing authorities for individuals with disabilities. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.203(a)(6); see also 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m). An �individual with a

disability,� in turn, is one who (1) has a physical or mental impairment

which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life

activities; (2) has a record of such impairment; or (3) is regarded as

having such an impairment. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.203(a)(1); see also

29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g). A �physical or mental impairment� could be

(1) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,

or anatomical loss affecting one or more of various body systems (e.g.,

neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, cardiovascular,

reproductive, digestive, respiratory, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic,

skin, and endocrine); or (2) any mental or psychological disorder, such as

mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,

and specific learning disabilities. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.203(a)(2);

see also 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(h). �Major life activities� include functions

such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,

hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. See 29 C.F.R. �

1614.203(a)(3); see also 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(i).

3We sense from complainant's appeal statement that he felt he was being

singled out, since he was asked to provide medical information about

his need for a half an hour lunch break while other clerks were not.

However, we remind complainant that he was also the only one (as far

as we can tell) who was requesting a reasonable accommodation under the

Rehabilitation Act.

4We advise complainant to seek EEO counseling anew, however, if he

believes (as he now claims on appeal), that the agency is now allowing

non-disabled, similarly-situated employees to take a half an hour lunch

break and is still denying him this shorter break. Such an allegation

could constitute a claim of unlawful �disparate treatment.� Since this

issue was not formally raised by complainant during counseling for the

instant complaint (and was not accepted by the agency for investigation),

we have insufficient information to address the merits of it here.