01980784
10-08-1998
Ivory Medina, Appellant, v. John H. Dalton, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.
Ivory Medina, )
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01980784
)
John H. Dalton, )
Secretary, )
Department of the Navy, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
Appellant timely appealed the agency's decision declining to reinstate
appellant's complaint.<1> See 29 C.F.R. ��1614.402, .504(b); EEOC Order
No. 960, as amended.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue on appeal is whether appellant was sufficiently incapacitated
at the time she entered into a settlement agreement that the agreement
should be set aside.
BACKGROUND
A review of the record reveals that appellant filed an EEO pre-complaint
on July 29, 1996, alleging that she had been subjected to unlawful
discrimination on the bases of race (African-American), color (Black), and
sex (female). Appellant and the agency settled the complaint on August
8, 1996. By letter to the agency dated July 15, 1997, appellant alleged
that the settlement agreement should set aside and that the agency should
resume processing her complaint at the point where processing ceased.
Specifically, appellant asserted that at the time she entered into
the settlement agreement she was unable to comprehend the terms of the
agreement and its legal ramifications because of her mental instability.
In its final decision dated August 13, 1997, the agency declined
to reinstate appellant's complaint, finding that appellant was not
sufficiently incapacitated to justify setting aside the agreement.
The agency asserted that the psychological documentation submitted
by appellant did not show that she was incapable of understanding her
rights at the time she entered into the agreement. Accordingly, the
agency refused to invalidate the settlement agreement.
The record contains a copy of a July 30, 1996 hand-written diagnosis by
appellant's psychologist detailing appellant's psychological makeup at
that time. The diagnosis indicated that appellant's judgment was not
impaired, that there was no evidence of thought disorder, appellant's
cognition was intact, and that her insight was fair. Additionally,
the record contains a copy of a resolution appellant obtained for a
grievance she filed in September 1996.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties,
reached at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on
both parties. In addition, the Commission has held that a settlement
agreement constitutes a contract between the employee and the agency,
to which ordinary rules of contract construction apply. See Herrington
v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996).
Settlement agreements are contracts between the appellant and the agency,
and it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, not
some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states
that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
There are instances when an otherwise valid agreement may be
void, voidable, or reformable, depending on the circumstances: for
example, due to coercion, misinterpretation, or mistake. See Nemirow
v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01930062 (December 8, 1992).
Furthermore, settlement agreements must be entered into knowingly and
voluntarily. Mosley v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 634 F.2d 942
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981).
In the instant case, appellant was unable to provide sufficient evidence
showing that she was incapable of understanding the terms and consequences
of the settlement agreement at the time at which it was signed. Instead,
the psychological evidence appellant submitted indicates that there was no
evidence of thought disorder and that appellant's cognition was intact,
her insight was fair, and her judgment was not impaired. Moreover,
the record shows that appellant had sufficient capacity to initiate
a grievance during the same period of time. Based on the foregoing,
we find insufficient evidence to justify setting aside the settlement
agreement entered into by the parties.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the agency's decision not to reinstate appellant's complaint
is AFFIRMED for the reasons set forth herein.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action
is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult
an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction
in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date
you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT
IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT
HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
Oct. 8, 1998
______________________________
DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director
1The agency was unable to supply a copy of a certified mail return
receipt or any other material capable of establishing the date
appellant received the agency's final decision. Accordingly,
since the agency failed to submit evidence of the date of receipt,
the Commission presumes that appellant's appeal was filed within
thirty (30) days of receipt of the agency's final decision. See,
29 C.F.R. �1614.402.