Iris C. Mizokami, Complainant,v.Hansford T. Johnson, Acting Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 23, 2003
05A30718 (E.E.O.C. May. 23, 2003)

05A30718

05-23-2003

Iris C. Mizokami, Complainant, v. Hansford T. Johnson, Acting Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


Iris C. Mizokami v. Department of the Navy

05A30718

05-23-03

.

Iris C. Mizokami,

Complainant,

v.

Hansford T. Johnson,

Acting Secretary,

Department of the Navy,

Agency.

Request No. 05A30718

Appeal No. 01A23207

Agency No. 97-00311-015

Hearing No. 370-98-X2586

DENIAL OF REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

Iris C. Mizokami (complainant) timely initiated a request to the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) to reconsider

the decision in Iris C. Mizokami v. Department of the Navy, EEOC

Appeal No. 01A23207 (April 3, 2003). EEOC Regulations provide that the

Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider any previous Commission

decision where the requesting party demonstrates that: (1) the appellate

decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact

or law; or (2) the appellate decision will have a substantial impact on

the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. See 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405(b). For the reasons set forth herein, complainant's request

is denied.

The issue presented is whether complainant was discriminated against on

the basis of sex when she was allegedly subjected to sexual harassment

(hostile work environment) between May and June 1997.

Complainant was employed as a Mechanical Engineer, GS-830-11, at Pearl

Harbor Naval Shipyard (the facility) in Honolulu, Hawaii. During the

relevant period, complainant worked in the Other Productive Work (OPW)

group at the facility. Complainant asserted that the �work leader�

(WL), who gave her assignments and provided appraisal input regarding

her performance in OPW, engaged in physical contact with her which

she found offensive. Believing she was a victim of discrimination,

complainant filed a formal complaint.

After the agency issued the report of investigation, complainant requested

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Following a hearing,

an AJ issued a decision finding no discrimination. The AJ found that,

although complainant established a hostile work environment claim when

she was harassed by WL, complainant nevertheless failed to report the

harassment to WL's supervisor, choosing instead to inform the union

steward. The AJ further determined that, once complainant reported the

harassment, the agency took prompt and immediate action to ameliorate

the situation. Ultimately, the AJ found that, because there was no

tangible employment action, the agency established an affirmative

defense in accordance with Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).

The AJ concluded that the agency was not liable for WL's conduct.

In its final decision, the agency implemented the AJ's decision.

Complainant filed an appeal from the final agency decision with

the Commission. In the previous decision, the Commission affirmed

the agency's decision, and found that the AJ's ultimate finding, that

unlawful employment discrimination was not proven by a preponderance of

the evidence, was supported by the record.

In her request for reconsideration (RTR), complainant contends, in

pertinent part, that: (1) the WL took a tangible employment action,

namely her dismissal from the OPW group; (2) the agency failed to

effectively respond and remedy her complaint of sexual harassment; and

(3) she made reasonable efforts to report the sexual harassment when

she contacted the EEO office.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings

by an AJ will be upheld if

supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is

defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. National

Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A

finding that discriminatory intent did not exist is a factual finding.

See Pullman - Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

The Commission finds that the AJ's decision properly summarized the

relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies,

and laws. In her RTR, complainant argues that a tangible employment

action was taken such that the agency cannot invoke the Faragher defense.

Specifically, she asserts that she was dismissed from the OPW group.

The record indicates, however, that during a meeting between complainant,

WL, and a union representative, concerning a �miscommunication� over

a work project, the parties reached a general agreement, initiated by

complainant, that complainant would return to her previous position.

At the time this meeting took place, complainant had yet to report the

harassment to anyone at the agency. Therefore, since complainant

voluntarily left the group, we find that there was no tangible

employment action. Complainant further maintains that the agency failed

to effectively respond and remedy her complaint of sexual harassment. We,

however, find that, once complainant notified the agency of WL's actions,

the agency investigated the allegations, directed WL to stay away from

complainant, and issued WL a letter of caution. Complainant notes that WL

frequented her workspace and made his presence conspicuous to complainant

after the agency directed him to stay away from her. She fails to present

evidence establishing that she informed management of WL's subsequent

actions, however, and it is undisputed that the physical contact stopped.

The Commission discerns no basis to disturb the AJ's decision. Therefore,

we find that the AJ's decision, finding no discrimination, was proper.

After a review of complainant's request for reconsideration, the previous

decision, and the entire record, the Commission finds that the request

fails to meet the criteria of 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(b), and it is the

decision of the Commission to deny the request. The decision in EEOC

Appeal No. 01A23207 remains the Commission's final decision. There is no

further right of administrative appeal on the decision of the Commission

on this request for reconsideration.

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0900)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right

of administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the

right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District

Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this

decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in

the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

____05-23-03______________

Date