International Business Machines CorporationDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 21, 202015263703 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 21, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/263,703 09/13/2016 Corville O. Allen AUS920120398US3 8834 106325 7590 05/21/2020 IBM Corp. - Fishkill Drafting Center 11501 Burnet Road Austin, TX 78758 EXAMINER HWA, SHYUE JIUNN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2156 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/21/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): fdciplaw@us.ibm.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte CORVILLE O. ALLEN, SCOTT ROBERT CARRIER, and ERIC WOODS ___________ Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 Technology Center 2100 _________________ Before JEAN R. HOMERE, JAMES B. ARPIN, and SCOTT RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judges. ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–24, all of the pending claims. Final Act. 2, 4.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as International Business Machines Corporation. Appeal Br. 1. 2 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed July 23, 2018) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed January 14, 2019); the Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed February 22, 2018) and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed November 14, 2018); and the Specification (“Spec.,” filed September 13, 2016). Rather than repeat the Examiner’s findings and determinations and Appellant’s contentions in their entirety, we refer to these documents. Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s claimed methods, computer program products, and computer systems “relate[] to the fields of producing visual representation of textual information, and especially to complex works of literature.” See Spec. ¶ 1. As noted above, claims 1–24 are pending. Claims 1, 11, and 18 are independent. Appeal Br. 8 (claim 1), 10 (claim 11), 12 (claim 18) (Claims App.). Claims 2–10 depend directly or indirectly from claim 1, claims 12– 17 depend directly or indirectly from claim 11, and claims 19–24 depend directly or indirectly from claim 18. Id. at 8–14. Claim 1 recites “[a] method for visualizing literary elements as a graph.” Id. at 8. Claim 11 recites “[a] computer program product for visualizing literary elements as a graph comprising: a computer readable storage memory device storing program instructions for causing a processor to” perform functions, substantially as recited in claim 1. Id. at 8, 10. Claim 18 recites “[a] computer system for visualizing literary elements as a graph comprising: a processor; and a computer readable storage memory device storing program instructions for causing the processor to” perform functions, substantially as recited in claim 1. Id. at 8, 12. The Examiner relies on the same findings and arguments in rejecting claims 1, 11, and 18 (Final Act. 4–6), and Appellant does not contest the rejection of any independent or dependent claim separately (Appeal Br. 7).3 3 Applicant states that it “reserves the right to present arguments directed to traversing individual rejections of dependent claims in a later proceeding before the USPTO, such as in a continuation application, amendment in the present application, or future Appeal. Appeal Br. 5. Nevertheless, Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 3 Claim 1 is representative. 1. A method for visualizing literary elements as a graph comprising: receiving, by a computer system, a set of meta-data records representing the contents of an existing digital work of literature, wherein each meta-data record comprises a significance value for a literary element and a relationship of the literary element to one or more items selected from the group consisting of a character, and a literary plot device, and a position where the literary element occurs within a literary plot of the work of literature; graphing, by a computer system, the literary elements, characters and plot devices in a sequential graph having a first axis corresponding to a progression of the literary plot within the work of literature, a second axis orthogonal to the first axis corresponds to significance level, and a plurality of points located within the sequential graph as a function of the occurrence position and significance level for each literary element; and rendering, by a computer system, the sequential graph to an output of the computer system. Id. at 8. Therefore, we focus our analysis on independent claim 1. REJECTION The Examiner rejects claims 1–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as directed to patent ineligible subject matter without significantly more. Final Act. 4–9. We conduct a limited de novo review of the appealed rejection for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Unless otherwise indicated, we adopt the Appellant is not permitted to reserve arguments. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 4 Examiner’s findings in the Final Action and the Answer as our own and add any additional findings of fact for emphasis. For the reasons given below, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection. ANALYSIS Patent Ineligible Claims A. Section 101 An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). According to the Court, concepts determined to be abstract ideas and, thus, patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 5 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). In Diamond v. Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. at 191 (citing Benson and Flook). Nevertheless, the Court noted that “[i]t is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.” Id. at 187; see also BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Even if the individual components were known, “an inventive concept can be found in the ordered combination of claim limitations that transform the abstract idea of filtering content into a particular, practical application of that abstract idea” (emphasis added).). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we next “must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (some quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 6 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. B. Office Patent Eligibility Guidance In an effort to achieve clarity and consistency in how the Office applies the Court’s two-part framework, the Office published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019).4 In Step One of our analysis, we look to see whether the claims fall within one of the four statutory categories identified in § 101. Id. at 53 (“Examiners should determine whether a claim satisfies the criteria for subject matter eligibility by evaluating the claim in accordance with the criteria discussed in MPEP5 2106, i.e., whether the claim is to a statutory category (Step 1) and the Alice/Mayo test for judicial exceptions (Steps 2A and 2B).”). Under the guidance, we then look to whether the claim recites: (1) Step 2A – Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) Step 2A – Prong Two: additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). 4 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, 2 (October 17, 2019) (“Note, the feedback received was primarily directed to examination procedures and, accordingly, this update focuses on clarifying practice for patent examiners. However, all USPTO personnel are expected to follow the guidance.”). 5 All Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) citations herein are to MPEP, Rev. 08.2017, January 2018. Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 7 See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Revised Step 2A”). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See id. at 56 (“Step 2B: If the Claim Is Directed to a Judicial Exception, Evaluate Whether the Claim Provides an Inventive Concept.”). C. Step One – Claims Directed to Statutory Categories Independent claim 1 and its associated dependent claims are directed to a method, i.e., a “process”; independent claim 11 and its associated dependent claims are directed to a computer program product, i.e., a “manufacture”; and independent claim 18 and its associated dependent claims are directed to a computer system, i.e., a “machine.” Appeal Br. 8– 14 (Claims App.). The Examiner and Appellant do not dispute that the claims are directed to statutory categories. Thus, on this record, claims 1–24 are directed to recognized statutory categories. D. Two-Part Alice/Mayo Framework 1. Step 2A, Prong One – Claims Recite an Abstract Idea Applying the first part of the Alice/Mayo framework (Step 2A), the Examiner finds, claims 1, 11, and 18 [are] directed to collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 8 analysis. This is done via generic software program executing on a processor “receiving”, “graphing”, and “rendering” and visualizing process with intangible data to search, organize and output of sequential graph. Final Act. 2; see id. at 4–5; Spec. ¶ 6. In particular, the Examiner finds: The underlying abstract idea is not meaningfully different than those concepts found by the counts to be abstract, such as collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis, as identified in Electric Power Group, LLC, v. Alstom[, 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)], collecting, displaying, and manipulating data as identified in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Financial Corp.[,850 F.3d 1332 (Fed Cir. 2017)]. Final Act. 2–3; see Electric Power Group, 830 F.3d at 1353 (“The focus of the asserted claims, as illustrated by claim 12 quoted above, is on collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis.”); but see Appeal Br. 6 (discussing Electric Power Group). As noted above, claim 1 recites “[a] method for visualizing literary elements as a graph.” Appeal Br. 8 (Claims App.); see id. at 10 (claim 11 recites “[a] computer program product for visualizing literary elements as a graph”), 12 (claim 18 recites “[a] computer system for visualizing literary elements as a graph”). The method comprises the steps of (1) receiving an existing set of meta-data records representing the contents of an existing digital work of literature (“Receiving . . . a set of meta-data records representing the contents of an existing digital work of literature, wherein each meta-data record comprises a significance value for a literary element and a relationship of the literary element to one or more items selected from the group consisting of a character, and a literary plot device, and a position where the literary element occurs within a literary plot of the work of Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 9 literature”); (2) graphing literary elements, characters and plot devices6 according to their progression in the literary plot and their significance value drawn from the meta-data, in a sequential graph having a first axis corresponding to the plot progression and a second axis orthogonal to the first axis corresponds to significance level (“graphing . . . the literary elements, characters and plot devices in a sequential graph having a first axis corresponding to a progression of the literary plot within the work of literature, a second axis orthogonal to the first axis corresponds to significance level, and a plurality of points located within the sequential graph as a function of the occurrence position and significance level for each literary element”); and (3) displaying the graph (“rendering . . . the sequential graph”). Id.; see Final Act. 4–5. As also noted above, claims 11 and 18 recite substantially the same limitations. The Office explains: If a claim recites a limitation that can practically be performed in the human mind, the limitation falls within the mental processes grouping, and the claim recites an abstract idea. The use of a physical aid (i.e., the pen and paper) to help perform a mental step (e.g., a mathematical calculation) does not negate the mental nature of this limitation. For instance, Example 45 (Controller for Injection Molding) illustrates how a claim that encompasses a human performing a step mentally with a physical aid recites a mental process. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.[, 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011),] provides another example. In that case, the court determined that the claimed step of “constructing a map of credit card numbers” was a limitation that was able to be performed “by writing down a list of credit card transactions made from a particular IP address.” In making this determination, the court looked to the specification, which disclosed that the claimed map was nothing more than a listing 6 E.g., Spec. ¶¶ 29 (describing “literary elements”), 36 (describing “extraction of characters”), 54 (describing “plot devices”). Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 10 of several (e.g., four) credit card transactions. The court determined that this step was able to be performed mentally with a pen and paper, and therefore, qualifies as a mental process. While a claim limitation to a process that “can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” qualifies as a mental process, a claim limitation that “could not, as a practical matter, be performed entirely in a human’s mind” (even if aided with pen and paper) would not qualify as a mental process. October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility at 9 (footnotes omitted). Here, the steps describe receiving existing metadata from existing literary works and graphing orthogonal plots of information (i.e., plot timeline and assigned significance value) contained in the metadata. See Spec. Figs. 1a–1c (significance on vertical axis and timeline on horizontal axis); ¶¶ 8 (Figs. 1a–1c depict “a black-and-white format the visualization output”), 29–34 (describing Figs. 1a–1c), 45 (graphing according to “known line plotting methods”). We find nothing in the recited steps of claims 1, 11, and 18, other than the recited “computer system” itself, that could not be practically performed in the human mind or by the human mind with the aid of a pencil or pen and paper. Ans. 8; see Spec. ¶¶ 6 (“Human-generated and machine-generated meta-data may be ingested equally well by the method.”), 36 (“The extraction of characters, character relationships, and plot devices, as well as the determination of significance levels of one or more literary elements is typically performed manually or automatically prior to beginning (201) the visualization generation process.”), 44 (“Lastly, the visualization is rendered, such as by creating a digital image or movie file (.JPG, .PIC, .GIF, .MOV, .MP3 files, etc.), which may then be printed to paper for application to a book cover or inside leaf page, or shown in a computer screen relative to the work of literature under consideration.”); but Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 11 see Appeal Br. 6–7. Thus, we are persuaded the claims recite “[m]ental processes—concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).” 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. We agree with the Examiner’s assessment of the recited abstract idea. 2. Step 2A, Prong Two – Abstract Idea Not Integrated Into Practical Application Under the Guidance, having determined that the claims recite an abstract idea, we now determine if additional elements in the claims integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). Claim 1 expressly recites use of “a computer system” and suggests a display or some other means of rendering the graph. In addition, claim 11 recites “a computer readable storage memory device,” and claim 18 recites that the computer system comprises a processor and a computer readable storage memory device. The Specification discloses that various computer components in Appellant’s claimed method, computer program product, and computer system are generic computer components performing generic computer functions. Spec. ¶¶ 10, 35, 57, 59–61. The Specification does not disclose any specific software for plotting the metadata, and orthogonal plotting is a generic method of data presentation. Id. ¶¶ 6, 36, 44, 45. Further, the Specification explains that the received metadata may be unsegmented or pre-segmented. Id. ¶ 37. Thus, considered individually or as an ordered combination, we are not persuaded that these components recite a particular machine. See MPEP § 2106.05(b); 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 12 n.27. Further, applying the second part of the Alice/Mayo framework,7 the Examiner finds “the claims do no more than automat[e] existing, conventional methods.”8 Ans. 5–6; see Final Act 3; MPEP § 2106.05(f); 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.30. In addition, the Examiner finds, “[t]here is no indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of a computer or improves any other technology. Their collective functions merely provide conventional computer implementation.” Final Act. 6. As the Specification 7 We acknowledge that some of the considerations at Step 2A, Prong Two, properly may be evaluated under the second part of the Alice/Mayo framework (Step 2B of the Office guidance). See Ans. 10–11. For purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate those considerations under the first part of the Alice/Mayo framework (Step 2A of the Office guidance). See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 nn.25, 27–32. 8 It is well settled . . . that automating conventional activities using generic technology does not amount to an inventive concept. See Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2358 (explaining that “if a patent’s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to implement an abstract idea on ... a computer, that addition cannot impart patent eligibility”) (internal alteration, citation, and quotations omitted); Intellectual Ventures[ I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA)], 792 F.3d [1363,] 1367 [(Fed. Cir. 2015)] (“claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer [does not] provide a sufficient inventive concept”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”). LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App’x 991, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 13 makes clear, neither the hardware nor the software elements of the claimed methods, computer program products, or computer systems affect an improvement in computer technology. Instead, considered individually or as an ordered combination these additional elements do not more than their known functions in the claimed invention. See Spec. ¶¶ 6, 10, 35–37, 44, 45, 57, 59–61. Here, the claimed methods, computer program products, or computer systems present the received information in a particular way; that does not demonstrate an improvement in computer technology. See MPEP § 2106.05(a); 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.25. Appellant disagrees and contends that, like the invention recited in Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the claim achieves an improvement in computer technology. Appeal Br. 6; see Ans. 6–7. In Enfish, our reviewing court found, “the self-referential table recited in the claims on appeal is a specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory.” Id. at 1339. Unlike the claims in Enfish, however, the pending claims recite the steps at a high level of generality and are focused on the manipulated metadata itself, rather than the technical elements by which the metadata is manipulated. We are not persuaded that the claimed methods, computer program products, or computer systems recite improvements in computer technology similar to those found in Enfish. Appellant further contends that the Examiner improperly rejects the claims as directed to a “generic software program.” Appeal Br. 5–6. However, Appellant misunderstands the Examiner’s rejection. The Examiner explains that claims directed to software have been rejected as directed to patent ineligible subject matter without significantly more. Final Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 14 Act. 2; Ans. 4. That finding does not express a presumption against the patentability of claims describing software applications. See Reply Br. 2. Instead, here, the Examiner finds, claims 1, 11, and 18 [are] directed to collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis. This is done via generic software program executing on a processor “receiving”, “graphing”, and “rendering” and visualizing process with intangible data to search, organize and output of sequential graph. Final Act. 2 (emphasis added). As noted above, the Specification does not disclose otherwise. See Spec. ¶¶ 6, 36, 44, 45. As the Examiner finds: Further, the software may be employed to execute one or more application programs to accomplish the computerized methods (paragraph 0064) that is merely automating procedures that patent attorneys would have to do manually anyway. The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. Final Act. 3. Thus, it is the use of generic software to perform the recited steps, not the fact that the method may be accomplished in software, which is relevant to the Step 2A, Prong Two, analysis. In view of Appellant’s claim recitations and the Specification’s disclosure, and consistent with the Examiner’s findings, we are persuaded the rejected claims do not recite: (i) an improvement to the functioning of a computer; (ii) an improvement to another technology or technical field; (iii) an application of the abstract idea with, or by use of, a particular machine; (iv) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing; or (v) other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment. Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 15 See MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Thus, we conclude that the additional elements of the rejected claims do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application and that the claims are directed to abstract ideas. 3. Step 2B – Not Significantly More Than the Abstract Idea Because we determine that the claims recite an abstract idea and do not integrate that abstract idea into a practical application, we now consider whether the claims include additional limitations, such that the claims amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Applying the second part of the Alice/Mayo framework, the Examiner finds, the claims 1, 11, and 18 recites the additional limitations of “located within the sequential graph” is stated at a high level of generality and its broadest reasonable interpretation comprises only analyze data through the use of some unspecified generic computers and interface which has been used routinely in the past with respect to visualizing literary elements as a graph. Generic computer components recited as performing generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities amount to no more than implementing the abstract idea with a computerized system. Thus, taken alone, the additional elements do no amount to significantly more than the above identified judicial exception (the abstract idea). Looking at the limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually. Final Act. 5–6. The Specification makes clear that these components and their functions, considered individually or as an ordered combination, are well-understood, routine, and conventional. See Spec. ¶¶ 6, 10, 35–37, 44, 45, 57, 59–61. Appellant contends that the Examiner fails to provide sufficient evidence that these elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan, as required by our reviewing court in Berkheimer v. HP Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 16 Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Appeal Br. 6–7; Reply Br. 1–2. Nevertheless, as the Office has explained: A citation to an express statement in the specification . . . that demonstrates the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s). A specification demonstrates the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of additional elements when it describes the additional elements as well- understood or routine or conventional (or an equivalent term), as a commercially available product, or in a manner that indicates that the additional elements are sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe the particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). USPTO Memorandum of April 19, 2018, ‘‘Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)’’ 3–4 (Apr. 19, 2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo- berkheimer-20180419.PDF. Here, we are persuaded that the Specification adequately demonstrates that the components of the claimed methods, computer program products, or computer systems are well-understood, conventional, and routine. On this record, we agree with the Examiner that independent claim 1, as well as independent claims 11 and 18 that are not argued separately, are directed to an abstract idea and fail to recite “significantly more” than the identified abstract idea. Thus, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in determining that the independent claims are patent-ineligible, and we sustain the rejection of those claims. E. Remaining Claims As noted above, each of claims 2–10, 12–17, and 19–24 depends directly or indirectly from independent claim 1, 11, or 18. As noted above, Appeal 2019-002227 Application 15/263,703 17 Appellant challenges the rejection of dependent claims 2–10, 12–17, and 19–24 for the same reasons as their base claims. Because we are not persuaded the Examiner erred with respect to the patent ineligibility rejection of claim 1, 11, or 18, we also are persuaded the Examiner erred with respect to the rejection of claims 2–10, 12–17, and 19–24. For this reason, we also sustain the rejection of those claims. DECISION 1. The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter without significantly more. 2. Thus, on this record, claims 1–24 are not patent eligible. CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–24. In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–24 101 Eligibility 1–24 No time for taking any action connected with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation