International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving and Picture Technicians Artists and All

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 28, 2020

369 N.L.R.B. 34 (N.L.R.B. 2020)

369 NLRB No. 34
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees,
Moving Picture Technicians, Artists and Allied
Crafts of the United States, its Territories and
Canada, Local 720, AFL–CIO, CLC (Global
Experience Specialists) and Steven Lucas and
Jamy Richardson. Cases 28–CB–107693 and 28–
CB–113281
February 28, 2020
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN RING AND MEMBERS KAPLAN
AND EMANUEL
On May 7, 2014, Administrative Law Judge Lisa D.
Thompson issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel and Charging Party Steven Lucas filed answer-
ing briefs.1 The General Counsel also filed limited ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, the Respondent filed an
answering brief, and the General Counsel filed a reply
brief. Charging Party Lucas filed limited exceptions and
the Respondent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions,
cross-exceptions, and briefs and has decided to affirm the
judge’s rulings,2 findings,3 and conclusions only to the
extent consistent with this Decision and Order.4

1 While styled as an “Opposition” brief, Charging Party Lucas’s
brief responds to the Respondent’s exceptions and supporting brief and
is therefore more accurately described as an answering brief.
2 The Respondent has excepted to the Regional Director and Asso-
ciate Chief Administrative Law Judge’s denial of its motion for a con-
tinuance and the judge’s imposition of sanctions for its failure to com-
ply with the General Counsel’s subpoenas. We have carefully exam-
ined the record and find that the Regional Director and judge did not
abuse their discretion in denying the Respondent’s motion for a contin-
uance. See Abramson Chrysler-Plymouth, 225 NLRB 923, 923 fn. 1
(1976), enfd. mem. 559 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, we
find that the judge did not abuse her discretion in imposing sanctions.
See McAllister Towing & Transportation Co., 341 NLRB 394, 396–397
(2004), enfd. 156 Fed. Appx. 386 (2d Cir. 2005).
3 We agree with the judge that the Respondent operated an exclu-
sive hiring hall and that it violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by failing
and refusing to provide the dispatch information requested by Charging
Party Steven Lucas. Even applying the more stringent “reasonable
belief” standard, cited by the Respondent, that has been articulated in
some cases, we agree with the judge that the Charging Party has shown
a reasonable belief that the Respondent treated him unfairly. See, e.g.,
Stage Employees IATSE, Local 720 (Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc.), 363
NLRB No. 148, slip op. at 1 fn. 1 (2016), enfd. mem. 718 Fed. Appx.
512 (9th Cir. 2017); Operating Engineers Local 12 (Nevada Contrac-
tors Assn.), 344 NLRB 1066, 1066 fn. 1 (2005). We would be willing
to revisit the “reasonable belief” standard in an appropriate future case.
The primary issue before us is whether the Respondent
unlawfully applied its disciplinary rules against Charging
Party Jamy Richardson. We agree with the judge, as
further explained below, that the Respondent violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by suspending
Richardson from its referral service and preventing him
from returning to work until–pursuant to the disciplinary
rules–he paid all fines that had been levied against him.
I.
The Respondent operates an exclusive hiring hall in
the Las Vegas area that provides employers with skilled
laborers to perform stagehand work at conventions and
trade shows. The Respondent maintains a written disci-
plinary procedure that groups offenses into three catego-
ries–major, moderate, and minor–and sets out specific
fines for the number of offenses committed within a 24-
month period. For moderate offenses, for instance, the
policy provides that an individual will be fined $1000 for
the first offense in a 24-month period, $2000 for the sec-
ond, and $5000 for the third. The rule also states that
failure to pay the assessed fine within a stated time peri-
od will result in automatic suspension from the Respond-
ent’s referral service.
Jamy Richardson had been a registered user of the Re-
spondent’s service for 10 years. In late 2012, Richardson
was involved in a verbal confrontation at the Respond-
ent’s office with a coworker, during which Richardson
threatened physical harm. The Respondent, acting pur-
suant to its disciplinary policy, imposed a $1000 fine on
Richardson; Richardson successfully appealed the fine
and suspension but was warned that if he was involved in
a similar infraction during the next 24-month period, he
would be suspended from the referral service and fined
$2000.
Around March 28, 2013, Richardson physically as-
saulted a coworker outside of the Respondent’s office.
The Respondent notified Richardson that he was being
fined $2000 for his conduct and that he would be sus-
pended until he paid the fine; Richardson appealed the
fine and suspension. In denying Richardson’s appeal, the
Respondent informed him that the fine had increased to

In addition, we find merit in the exceptions of the General Counsel
and the Respondent and find that the judge erred by concluding that the
Respondent violated Sec. 8(b)(2) by failing to provide the information,
as this was not alleged.
Finally, we leave to compliance questions involving the scope of the
information to which Lucas is entitled, including the issue of which
employers have an exclusive referral relationship with the Respondent.
4 We have amended the judge’s conclusions of law and remedy and
modified the judge’s recommended Order consistent with our findings
and legal conclusions herein and the Board’s standard remedial lan-
guage. We shall substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as
modified.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
$4000. Richardson did not pay the fine and was sus-
pended from the referral list effective June 25, 2013. He
then filed the unfair labor practice charge in this case.
In late November 2013, Richardson met with the Re-
spondent’s President Dan’l Cook and asked whether he
could be permitted to return to work while having in-
stallments of the $4000 fine deducted from his paycheck.
Cook declined the request, but also suggested that he
might consider permitting Richardson to pay off the fine
in installments. Richardson thus remained suspended.
Following the issuance of a complaint in this case,
Cook called Richardson into his office and told him that
he would rescind the $4000 fine and return Richardson to
work if he agreed to withdraw the charge against the Re-
spondent. Richardson agreed verbally, and, in January
2014, the Respondent began referring him out for work.
However, because Richardson believed that the Re-
spondent was continuing to harass him, he did not in fact
withdraw the charge. At the hearing, the Respondent
asserted–for the first time–that it never intended to col-
lect the $4000 fine from Richardson and that it merely
wanted him to “chill out” from his threatening behavior.
The General Counsel alleged that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) by failing and refusing
to refer Richardson for employment pursuant to the refer-
ral system. The judge found that “both the Respondent’s
rule and how it was applied to Richardson” violated the
Act. The judge specifically found that the Respondent’s
application of the rule was arbitrary, based on the Re-
spondent’s offer to rescind the fine if Richardson with-
drew the charge and on the Respondent’s assertion that it
never intended to enforce the fine.
II.
When a union operates an exclusive hiring hall, it
owes a duty of fair representation to all applicants using
the hall, whether members or nonmembers. See Brein-
inger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 6, 493 U.S. 67
(1989). As part of this duty, the union must operate its
exclusive hiring hall “in a fair and impartial manner.
This code of acceptable conduct necessarily extends to
the institution of any referral rules which . . . cannot be
discriminatory or arbitrary.” Boilermakers Local 374
(Combustion Engineering), 284 NLRB 1382, 1383
(1987), enfd. 852 F.2d 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
In Operating Engineers Local 18 (Ohio Contractors
Assn.), 204 NLRB 681, 681 (1973), enf. denied on other
grounds 555 F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 1977), the Board ex-
plained that, in the hiring hall context, when a union in-
terferes with a referent’s employment status for reasons
other than the failure to pay dues, initiation fees, or other
fees uniformly required, a rebuttable presumption arises
that the interference is intended to encourage union
membership in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A).5
A union may rebut the presumption by establishing
that referrals are made pursuant to a valid union-security
provision, or that its conduct did not violate its duty of
fair representation and was necessary for the effective
performance of its representational function. Teamsters
Local 519 (Rust Engineering), 276 NLRB 898, 908
(1985), enfd. mem. 843 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir. 1988); Boil-
ermakers Local 433 (Riley Stoker Corp.), 266 NLRB
596, 599 (1983).
III.
Here, because the Respondent’s application of the dis-
ciplinary rules affected Richardson’s employment status,
we find that the General Counsel has established a rebut-
table presumption that the rule would “encourage union
membership” within the meaning of Operating Engi-
neers Local 18 (Ohio Contractors Assn.), above, and
thus was unlawful. Accordingly, we must next evaluate
whether the Respondent has rebutted this presumption.
More specifically, as explained above, the question is
whether the Respondent has shown that its conduct did
not violate its duty of fair representation and was neces-
sary for the effective performance of its representational
function. For the reasons explained below, we find that
the Respondent has not made this showing.
Significantly, the Respondent–in assessing fines
against Richardson–did not conform to its own written
rules and procedures. See Laborers Local 135 (Bechtel
Corp.), 271 NLRB 777, 780 (1984) (“A departure from
established exclusive hiring hall procedures that results
in a denial of employment to any applicant inherently
encourages union membership and therefore violates
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) . . . .”), enfd. mem. 782 F.2d
1030 (3d Cir. 1986); Operating Engineers Local 406
(Ford Construction), 262 NLRB 50, 51 (1982), enfd. 701
F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1983). Instead, the Respondent: (1)
without explanation, increased Richardson’s fine from
$2000 to $4000–an amount that appears nowhere in the
Respondent’s written procedure; (2) offered to rescind

5 As the Board explained in Operating Engineers:
When a union prevents an employee from being hired or causes an
employee’s discharge, it has demonstrated its influence over the em-
ployee and its power to affect his livelihood in so dramatic a way that
we will infer—or, if you please, adopt a presumption that—the effect
of its action is to encourage union membership on the part of all em-
ployees who have perceived that exercise of power. But the inference
may be overcome, or the presumption rebutted, not only when the in-
terference with employment was pursuant to a valid union-security
clause, but also in instances where the facts show that the union action
was necessary to the effective performance of its function of repre-
senting its constituency.
204 NLRB at 681.
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE (GLOBAL EXPERIENCE SPECIALISTS) 3
the fine in exchange for Richardson’s withdrawal of
Board charges; and (3) asserted post hoc that it never
even intended to enforce the fine at all. These actions
were patently arbitrary and thus were inconsistent with
its duty of fair representation.6 Accordingly, we adopt
the judge’s conclusion that, in suspending Richardson,
the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A).7
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Substitute the following as Conclusion of Law 2.
“2. Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
when it breached its duty of fair representation owed to
Charging Party Steven Lucas by failing/refusing Lucas’s
June 2013 request for access to job referral records.”
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and de-
sist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. We shall order the
Respondent to make Jamy Richardson whole for any loss
of earnings and other benefits resulting from his unlawful
suspension from the Respondent’s referral service during
the period from June 25, 2013, to January 2, 2014.
Backpay shall be computed in accordance with F. W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest at
the rate prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky
River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010). In accord-
ance with our decision in King Soopers, Inc., 364 NLRB
No. 93 (2016), enfd. in pertinent part 859 F.3d 23 (D.C.
Cir. 2017), we shall also order the Respondent to com-
pensate Richardson for his search-for-work and interim
employment expenses regardless of whether those ex-
penses exceed interim earnings. Search-for-work and
interim employment expenses shall be calculated sepa-
rately from taxable net backpay, with interest at the rate
prescribed in New Horizons, above, compounded daily as
prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, above.
Additionally, we shall order the Respondent to com-
pensate Jamy Richardson for the adverse tax conse-
quences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay award,
and file with the Regional Director for Region 28, within
21 days of the date the amount of backpay is fixed, either

6 Accordingly, we need not determine whether the Respondent’s ac-
tions were necessary to its effective performance of its representative
function. Cf. IATSE Local 838 (Freeman Decorating), 364 NLRB No.
81, slip op. at 3 (2016).
7 We therefore find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s apparent
alternative finding that the Respondent’s policy was unlawful on its
face. See Electrical Workers IBEW Local 6 (San Francisco Electrical
Contractors), 318 NLRB 109, 109–110 (1995), enfd. 139 F.3d 906 (9th
Cir. 1998). Such an additional finding would not materially affect the
remedy.
by agreement or Board order, a report allocating the
backpay awards to the appropriate calendar year(s). Ad-
voServ of New Jersey, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 143 (2016).
The Respondent shall also be required to expunge from
its files any and all references to the unlawful suspen-
sion, and to notify Jamy Richardson in writing, within 3
days thereafter, that this has been done and that the sus-
pension will not be used against him in any way.
Further, having found that the Respondent violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act by arbitrarily
and discriminatorily applying a hiring hall rule providing
for the suspension of hiring hall users from referral pend-
ing the payment of assessed fines, we shall order it to
rescind the relevant disciplinary rules.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Artists and
Allied Crafts of the United States, Its Territories and
Canada, Local 720, Las Vegas, Nevada, its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Arbitrarily refusing to make available to Steven
Lucas the relevant hiring hall referral information that he
requested.
(b) Suspending employees from its exclusive hiring
hall referral list for arbitrary or discriminatory reasons.
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Furnish Steven Lucas with the relevant hiring hall
referral information that he requested.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, restore
Jamy Richardson to the exclusive hiring hall referral list
in the rightful order of priority.
(c) Make Jamy Richardson whole for any loss of earn-
ings and other benefits suffered as a result of his unlaw-
ful suspension from the referral list, in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of the judge’s decision as
amended in this decision.
(d) Compensate Jamy Richardson for the adverse tax
consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay
award.
(e) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, re-
move from its files any reference to the unlawful suspen-
sion from the exclusive hiring hall referral list of Jamy
Richardson, and within three days thereafter notify him
in writing that this has been done and that his removal
from the list will not be used against him in any way.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
(f) Rescind the disciplinary work rules at issue in this
case.
(g) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all hiring-hall referral
records and all other records, including an electronic
copy of such records if stored in electronic form, neces-
sary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(h) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Las Vegas, Nevada facility copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix”8 in both English and Spanish.
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 28, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to employees and members are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, post-
ing on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other elec-
tronic means, if the Respondent customarily communi-
cates with its members by such means. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notic-
es are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other mate-
rial.
(i) Within 14 days after service by the Region, deliver
to the Regional Director for Region 28 signed copies of
the notice in sufficient number for posting by the Em-
ployer at its Las Vegas, Nevada facility, if it wishes, in
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted.
(j) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 28 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. February 28, 2020
______________________________________
John F. Ring, Chairman
______________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan, Member

8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
________________________________________
William J. Emanuel Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT arbitrarily refuse to make available rele-
vant hiring hall information that you request.
WE WILL NOT suspend you from our exclusive hiring
hall referral list for arbitrary or discriminatory reasons.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above.
WE WILL furnish Steven Lucas with the relevant hiring
hall referral information that he requested.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, restore Jamy Richardson to the exclusive hiring
hall referral list in the rightful order of priority.
WE WILL make Jamy Richardson whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of his
unlawful suspension from the referral list, less any net
interim earnings, plus interest, and WE WILL also make
him whole for reasonable search-for-work and interim
employment expenses, plus interest.
WE WILL compensate Jamy Richardson for the adverse
tax consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum back-
pay award.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful suspension from the exclusive hiring hall referral list
of Jamy Richardson, and WE WILL, within three days
thereafter, notify him in writing that this has been done
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE (GLOBAL EXPERIENCE SPECIALISTS) 5
and that his removal from the list will not be used against
him in any way.
WE WILL rescind the disciplinary work rules at issue in
this case.
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL
STAGE EMPLOYEES, MOVING PICTURE
TECHNICIANS, ARTISTS AND ALLIED CRAFTS OF
THE UNITED STATES, ITS TERRITORIES AND
CANADA, LOCAL 720 (GLOBAL EXPERIENCE
SPECIALISTS)
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28-CB-107693 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Andrew S. Gollin, Esq., for the General Counsel.
William A. Sokol and Kristina L. Hillman, Esqs. (Weinberg,
Roger & Rosenfeld), for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LISA D. THOMPSON, Administrative Law Judge. This con-
solidated case was tried in Las Vegas, Nevada, on January 21
and 22, 2014. Steven Lucas (the “Charging Party” or “Lucas”)
filed a charge against Respondent, the International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Art-
ists, and Allied Crafts of the United States, et al. (the “Re-
spondent” or “IATSE”) on June 21, 2013. The Regional Direc-
tor for Region 28 of the National Labor Relations Board (the
“NLRB” or the “Board”) issued the complaint and notice of
hearing on August 30, 2013 (Case 28–CB–107693).
Jamy Richardson (the “Charging Party” or “Richardson”) al-
so filed a charge and an amended charge against Respondent
(Case 28–CB–113281) on September 13, 2013, and November
26, 2013, respectively. On November 27, 2013, the Regional
Director issued the complaint on Richardson’s charge, consoli-
dated both Lucas’ and Richardson’s cases, and issued a notice
of hearing. The consolidated complaint was amended on De-
cember 5, 2013, and again on January 21, 2014, the day of the
hearing.1
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
“NLRA” or the “Act”) when it refused to allow Lucas to review
hiring hall/dispatch records to determine if the hall was being
operated in a discriminatory manner. The complaint also alleg-
es that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) of the
Act when it refused to refer Richardson for employment until
he paid fines levied against him by Respondent. Respondent
filed its answer, denying all facts and allegations, including
inter alia all jurisdictional allegations, the Board’s jurisdiction,
its status as a labor organization, the names and job titles of its
officers and agents, and that it served as an exclusive hiring hall
and referral source for employees who perform stagehand work
in Las Vegas. Respondent also set forth its affirmative defenses
to the complaint.
MOTION TO STRIKE
Before delving into the merits of this case, I must rule on an
outstanding motion raised by counsel for the General Counsel
(CGC) during the hearing. Prior to the hearing, on December
24, 2013, I granted in part and denied in part Respondent’s
Petition to Revoke.2 In so doing, I ordered Respondent to pro-
duce 18 categories of documents at the hearing which were
responsive to the General Counsel’s subpoena duces tecum B-
713350.3 Those documents included, but were not limited to:
information concerning the names and job titles of Respond-
ent’s officers and agents, documents relating to any contracts or
agreements between Respondent and Encore Productions, Inc.
(“Encore”),4 documents related to the collective-bargaining
agreement, including the employees’ terms and conditions of
employment with Encore and whether and to what extent Re-
spondent was the exclusive source of employee referrals for
Encore, written materials, correspondence, and/or documents
concerning the employee referral system, as well as its rules
and regulations therein.
At the hearing, Respondent again objected to the production
of the subpoenaed documents for the reasons previously denied
in its Petition to Revoke. I again overruled Respondent’s objec-
tion on those grounds. However, Respondent further objected
to the production of the subpoenaed documents essentially,
from what I gathered, in protest to Region 28’s and the San

1 GC Exh. 2. Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows:
“Tr.” for transcript; “GC Exh.” for General Counsel’s exhibit; “GC
Br.” for the General Counsel’s brief; “R. Exh.” for Respondent’s exhib-
it; and “R. Br.” for Respondent’s brief.
2 GC Exh. 3a.
3 GC Exhs. 2, 3c.
4 The General Counsel’s subpoena duces tecum B-713350 originally
listed Encore Productions, Inc. as the signatory employer in this case.
However, Respondent denied all allegations regarding Encore, includ-
ing that Encore is an employer within the meaning of the Act and that
Encore served as one of the signatory employers for whom IATSE
Local 720 referred employees. More importantly, Respondent refused
to produce any of the subpoenaed documents concerning its relation-
ship with Encore. In light of this, I granted the CGC’s motion to amend
the consolidated complaint to change the employer from Encore Pro-
ductions, Inc. to Global Experience Specialists. See Sec. 102.17 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
Francisco Division of Judges’ denial of Respondent’s request
for continuance and its order requiring Mr. Sokol (versus co-
counsel Kristina Hillman) to appear at the hearing.5
Respondent also failed to produce subpoenaed witnesses
John Hanson, Jeff Foran, and Daniel Cook for the General
Counsel’s case on grounds that the witness subpoenas were not
properly served on the above-named individuals.6 Neverthe-
less, Respondent, through counsel, advised it did not intend to
comply with either subpoena absent a court order. The CGC
objected to Respondent’s failure to produce the subpoenaed
documents and the failure to make the subpoenaed witnesses
available for trial. I held these issues in abeyance pending the
completion of the General Counsel’s case-in-chief.
At the conclusion of the General Counsel’s case, the CGC
decided against enforcement of the subpoenas and rested his
case. At that point, Respondent sought to introduce various
documents, marked Union Exhibits 1–10, during its case-in-
chief. However, those documents were responsive to the Gen-
eral Counsel’s subpoena duces tecum B-713350 which were
not produced to the CGC during his case-in-chief. Additionally,
Respondent called John Hanson as a witness but failed to pro-
duce him for the CGC’s case.
As such, the CGC objected and moved to strike the admis-
sion of all of Respondent’s exhibits as well as the testimony of
John Hanson due to Respondent’s deliberate refusal to comply
with the General Counsel’s subpoenas and my Order granting
in part and denying in part Respondent’s Petition to Revoke. I
reserved ruling on the CGC’s motion, pending receipt of the
parties’ post-hearing briefs.
Section 102.113(c) of the Rules and Regulations of the
Board provide that “subpoenas shall be served upon the recipi-
ent either personally, by registered or certified mail, by tele-
graph, or by leaving a copy . . . at the principal office or place
of business of the person required to be served.” See also Off-
shore Mariners United, 338 NLRB 745 (2002). Subpoenas
served by regular United States Mail also constitute effective
service. Section 102.113(d) of the Board’s Rules, see also Best
Western City View Motor Inn, 327 NLRB 468, 468-469 (1999).
More importantly, a party need not serve the subpoena on the
person specifically authorized to accept service in order to
prove effective service. Control Services, 303 NLRB 481, 483
fn. 13 (1991), enfd. mem. 961 F.2d 1568 (3d Cir. 1992) (leav-
ing a copy of the subpoena with the receptionist at the respond-
ent’s principal place of business was effective service on the
respondent’s officer under Section 102.113(c), even if respond-
ent had not authorized the receptionist to accept service).
Once service is effectuated, a party has an “obligation to
begin a good faith effort” to gather and produce the responsive
documents. A party who ignores a subpoena pending a ruling
on a petition to revoke does so at his/her own peril. McAllister
Towing & Transportation Co., 341 NLRB 394, 396-397
(2004), enfd. 156 Fed. Appx. 386 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding
judge’s imposition of evidentiary sanctions against respondent
for failing to substantially comply with the subpoenas upon
issuance of the judge’s order partially denying its petition to

5 Tr. 6–11, 35-37.
6 GC Exhs. 4-6; see also Tr. 44–55.
revoke on the first day of hearing) (emphasis added). Similarly,
the judge can impose sanctions where a party fails and/or refus-
es to timely or properly comply with a subpoena. See McAllis-
ter Towing, supra.
In determining whether sanctions are appropriate, the judge
must consider the following factors: (1) the initial scope and
specificity of the subpoena(s) directions; 2) the volume of the
records addressed, and those produced; (3) the nature of the
call, or request for production, and the nature and type of prior
responses; (4) other factors of record indicative of the oppo-
nent’s actual intended compliance with subpoena direction,
including whether there has been voluntary prehearing and
hearing response, or response to a subsequent ruling on dispute
thereon; (5) the status of the record showing a claim made of
prior conduct of a reasonable and diligent search; (6) the nature
of the explanations offered for any late production; (7) the point
in the hearing at which the records were produced; and (8) any
other factors reasonably tending to establish that there was
good faith in adherence to the Board’s subpoena process. See
People’s Transportation Service, 276 NLRB 169, 225 (1985).
After considering all of the evidence, including the parties’
arguments in their post-hearing briefs, I find that sanctions are
appropriate against Respondent for refusing to comply with the
General Counsel’s subpoena duces tecum B-713350, my Order
regarding its Petition to Revoke, and for refusing to produce
witness John Hanson (and other witnesses) during the CGC’s
case-in-chief. Respondent’s arguments for its noncompliance
are meritless.
First, I find that the subpoenas in question were properly
served on Respondent pursuant to the Board’s Rules.7 Second,
the record clearly reveals that the General Counsel’s subpoenas
were clear and unambiguous regarding the documents request-
ed and the witnesses to be produced. While Respondent argued
that production of the subpoenaed documents were overbroad
and unduly burdensome, I previously overruled that argument
and, except for three categories of documents, ordered produc-
tion of the documents at the hearing. Rather, Respondent,
through counsel, willfully refused to produce any of the sub-
poenaed documents despite my ruling and failed to make any of
the subpoenaed witnesses available for the CGC’s case.
I further find that Respondent, by virtue of its Exhibits 1-10,
actually located documents responsive to the subpoena but
simply refused to produce them to the CGC. Moreover, Re-
spondent was fully aware that the CGC properly subpoenaed
witness John Hanson (among others) to testify during the
CGC’s case-in-chief, but only made Hanson available for its
case-in-chief. Lastly, but for Respondent’s Exhibits 1-10, none
of the documents subpoenaed were produced at the hearing,
and I find Respondent’s rationale for its conduct; i.e., that it
sought a continuance of the hearing so that the attorney origi-
nally assigned to the case could try the case, unpersuasive, at
best, and more likely, obstructionist and a wanton disregard of
the orders and authority of the Board. Accordingly, the CGC’s
motion to strike is GRANTED.
Because I find that Respondent deliberately refused to com-
ply with the General Counsel’s subpoenas and my prior Order,

7 GC Exhs. 4-6.
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE (GLOBAL EXPERIENCE SPECIALISTS) 7
I will:
(1) Strike from admission into the record and give no weight
to Respondent’s Exhibits 1–10 proffered during the hearing, see
Equipment Trucking Co., 336 NLRB 277, 277 fn. 1 (2001).
(2) Strike from admission into the record and give no weight
to the testimony of John Hanson who testified on behalf of
Respondent, Id.
(3) Permit the CGC to use secondary evidence to prove any
element of his case-in-chief.
Therefore, based upon the record primarily made by the
CGC, including my observations of the demeanor of CGC’s
witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the CGC and
Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Global Experience Specialist (GES) is an Arizona corpora-
tion, with an office and place of business in Las Vegas, Neva-
da.8 GES is an event company engaged in the business of as-
sembly at trade shows and conventions in Las Vegas and across
the United States.9 During a 12-month period ending in De-
cember 2013, GES derived gross revenue in excess of $100
million.10 At its Las Vegas location, in 2013, GES purchased
and received goods and services valued in excess of $1,000,000
from points outside the State of Nevada.11 Accordingly, at all
times material, I find that GES is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Although Respondent denied that it is or functions as a un-
ion, I find that, at all times material, Respondent was a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Similarly, despite that Respondent refused to identify the names
and job titles of its officers, I find the following individuals
held the positions set forth opposite their names and have been
agents of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of
the Act:
Dan’l Cook (Cook) President
Ron Poveromo Secretary Treasurer
John Hanson Business Representative12

8 Tr. 61-62.
9 Id.
10 Tr. 63-64.
11 Tr. 67-68.
12 GC Exhs. 7, 10-12. Jeff Forman (Forman) replaced John Hanson
as Respondent’s business representative in January 2014. Respondent
objected to the admission of GC Exhs. 11 and 12 on the grounds that
the website, www.iatselocal720.com, could not be properly authenti-
cated as the official website of IATSE Local 720. However, I overrule
Respondent’s objection, on the ground that, since Respondent deliber-
ately refused to produce subpoenaed documents to determine its status,
I will allow the CGC to admit GC Exhs. 11 and 12 as secondary evi-
dence to prove that IATSE Local 720 is, in fact, a labor organization.
Alternatively, I take judicial notice that www.iatselocal720.com is a
public website containing the information documented in GC Exhs. 11
and 12.
III. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Respondent’s Hiring Hall
Respondent operates an exclusive referral service that pro-
vides signatory employers with skilled labor to perform stage-
hand work at conventions and trade shows in the Las Vegas
area. Respondent has collective-bargaining agreements
(“CBA”) with several signatory employers, including GES,
wherein employers are contractually obligated to utilize Re-
spondent as its exclusive source of employee referrals before
the employer can hire employees from another source.13 These
CBAs also govern the terms and conditions of employment for
employees referred out for stagehand work. Respondent has
also been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative for
employees working for GES and other employers within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.14
While the specifics of each employer’s referral procedures
with Respondent differs slightly, generally speaking, Respond-
ent’s referral process begins when the signatory employer, like
GES, initiates a call request to Respondent to request employee
referrals.15 For each project, the employer will complete and
submit a requisition sheet, specifying the location, date, and
times of the project, as well as the number of positions that
need to be filled.16 The employer may request employees by
name for certain positions or have an open call, where Re-
spondent (versus the employer) determines the best qualified
employees for the particular project.17 Employers also may
request that Respondent refrain from referring certain member
users to their jobsites.18
Once Respondent receives a referral request, it must ensure
that it expeditiously refers qualified employees to fulfill the
employer’s call request. Prior to 2012, much of the referrals
were handled by telephone calls between the employee users
and Respondent’s dispatchers. For example, prior to 2012,
when an employee user was referred work, the employee called
the dispatcher directly to accept or decline work. Also, em-
ployee users and the employer often telephoned one another
directly regarding the specifics of a project, including arrival
locations and time changes.
However, in 2012, Respondent implemented a new comput-
erized dispatch system. Namely, after receiving call requests
from employers, like GES, Respondent’s dispatchers would
input the request into an automated or computerized system.19
Thereafter, the automated system contacts the individual em-
ployee to determine if they are available for the project.20 Em-
ployee users of the new system were required to register to
utilize the automated system and were given codes and pass-
words that identified them and allowed them to access and

13 GES is a party to a collective-bargaining agreement requiring that
Respondent be the exclusive source for its employment referrals. See
GC Exh. 7
14 Tr. 78–79.
15 Tr. 80–81.
16 GC Exh. 8.
17 Tr. 81–83; 88–90, 108; see also GC Exhs. 7–9.
18 Tr. 109.
19 Tr. 173–175.
20 GC Exhs. 14–15.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
respond to the automated dispatch system. Also, instead of
telephoning the employee user directly, under the new system,
the employer spoke directly with Respondent’s dispatchers to
convey any changes to the project, the dispatchers input the
changes into the automated system, and the automated system
would contact the employee user. The effect of the new system
essentially eliminated much of the direct telephone contact
between the employee users, Respondent’s dispatchers and the
signatory employer.
B. The Lucas Allegations
1. Facts
Charging Party Lucas is a registered user of Respondent’s re-
ferral service. He has used Respondent’s service for over 30
years. Over the years, Lucas has filed multiple unfair labor
practice (ULP) charges against Respondent challenging almost
every aspect of how Respondent operates its referral service.21
The litigation has spanned over several years and resulted in
substantial acrimony and mistrust between Respondent and
Lucas. This mistrust is important to note, because it forms the
backdrop for Respondent’s defense to Lucas’ complaint. Nev-
ertheless, the acrimony between Lucas and counsel for Re-
spondent was palpable at the hearing.22
In any event, turning to the facts of this case, in early spring
of 2013, Lucas began having concerns over several dispatch
errors that he believed cost him work. Specifically, on Febru-
ary 26, 2013, Lucas was referred for work as a tape operator at
Caesars Palace (the “Tape operator job”). Toward the end of his
shift, Lucas was asked by Caesars to return the next day, Feb-
ruary 27, to continue the job. Lucas agreed to the call back, but
he was already scheduled to be sent on a head audio job (the
“A1 job”) at Caesars on February 27.23
Sometime during the evening of February 26, Lucas called
Respondent’s dispatcher, Jennifer Schaffer (“Schaffer”) about
the schedule change. However, instead of informing Schaffer
that he was being recalled for the tape operator job on February
27, Lucas simply told Schaffer to cancel the A1 referral.24 For
his part, Lucas admitted that he did not explain to Schaffer why
he canceled the A1 job but indicated that, according to Re-
spondent’s work rules, he was not required to do so. While
Lucas is technically correct that Respondent’s work rules pro-
vide that, when a registered user is called for a job, the user is

21 See Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (AVW Audio Visual), 332
NLRB 1 (2000), revd. by Lucas v. NLRB, 333 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2003);
see also Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (AVW Audio Visuals, Inc.),
341 NLRB 1267 (2004); and Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (AVW
Audio Visuals, Inc.), 352 NLRB 29 (2008) (parties litigated over ap-
propriate remedy); and Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (Production
Support Services), 352 NLRB 1081 (2008).
22 Lucas’ responses during cross-examination were oftentimes vague
and unresponsive. Lucas initially leaned back in his chair with a stiff-
ened countenance and body stance, but in answering Respondent coun-
sel’s questions, would lean forward and cut off counsel to make his
point before counsel completed his question. However, Respondent’s
counsel’s tone in questioning Lucas was intended to provoke him to
anger.
23 Tr. 212–213.
24 Tr. 213–214.
only required to accept or decline availability, I find Lucas’
reliance on this technicality disingenuous, because nothing in
Respondent’s work rules prohibited him from disclosing or
explaining his unavailability either. Rather, I find, as set forth
below, that Lucas was intentionally evasive with his availability
and that evasiveness contributed to the confusion as to his
availability the next day.
Despite informing Schaffer that he was unavailable for work
on February 27, Respondent’s automated system continued to
call Lucas with referrals. Lucas again called Schaffer to com-
plain about the repeated automated calls and told her to sign
him out from receiving referrals for 24 to 48 hours.25
Still later that same evening, Carmen Gomez (“Gomez”), a
Caesars Palace labor coordinator, called Respondent and told
Schaffer to have Lucas report to Caesars at 8 a.m. versus 7 a.m.
on February 27.26 Gomez was referring to the Tape operator
job which Lucas was recalled. However, since Schaffer was
unaware that Lucas had been recalled for the tape operator job,
she mistakenly thought that Gomez was calling about the A1
job which Lucas declined. As such, Schaffer told Gomez that
Lucas was unavailable for work on February 27, and Gomez
found another employee to perform the work. When Lucas
arrived on February 27 to continue the Tape operator job, he
was told he was no longer needed.27 Lucas was also concerned
about similar dispatching errors that occurred on February 28
and March 10, 2013.28
As a result of these incidents, on March 11, 2013, Lucas
emailed Respondent’s Business Representative, Hanson, Treas-
urer Poveromo, and President Cook concerning the botched
dispatches.29 Lucas demanded $1500 for his lost wages result-
ing from the botched referrals and threatened to file a lawsuit in
Clark County, Nevada’s small claims court if he and Respond-
ent could not resolve the matter. Cook did not take kindly to the
litigation threat but agreed to look into the matter.30
At the hearing, Lucas explained his concerns about the
botched dispatches, but he was vague and evasive in his an-
swers on cross-examination concerning why he failed to dis-
close his unavailability to Schaffer. While Lucas testified that
he refused to disclose to Respondent his unavailability for re-
ferrals because he thought he would be accused of violating
Respondent’s work rules against job jumping,31 there was no
evidence presented that Lucas had ever been accused of job
jumping. Rather, I credit the portion of Lucas’ testimony on
cross-examination where he acknowledged that part of the con-
fusion with his dispatches, and particularly, the Caesars’ refer-
ral, stemmed from his unfamiliarity with Respondent’s new
automated system, but more so, his unwillingness to disclose
information to Respondent regarding his availability.

25 Tr. 229.
26 Tr. 216–217.
27 GC Exh. 16, see also Tr. 218–222. While Business Representative
Hanson testified regarding Respondent’s version of the Caesars Palace
mix-up, his testimony will not be considered based upon my previously
imposed sanction against Respondent.
28 GC Exh. 16.
29 Id.
30 GC Exh. 17.
31 Tr. 223.
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE (GLOBAL EXPERIENCE SPECIALISTS) 9
In any event, on or around March 22, 2013, Lucas arrived at
Respondent’s offices to pick up his paycheck. He spoke with
Hanson and Cook about the botched dispatches and gave fur-
ther details about the Caesars Palace mix-up.32 According to
Lucas, Hanson acknowledged that the dispatchers did not know
the difference between an A1 and Tape operator job, something
Lucas believed the dispatchers should have been able to differ-
entiate.33 In any case, Hanson told Lucas that Lucas could file
a claim with Respondent for the botched referrals, and if Re-
spondent found merit to the claim, it would pay him $100 for
any losses resulting from the botched dispatch.34 Lucas’ ac-
count of the conversation stands uncontroverted.35
Later that same day, Lucas emailed Hanson and Cook, stat-
ing that he considered $100 insufficient to reimburse him for
his lost wages. However, in order to get to the bottom of the
botched dispatches, Lucas requested access to Respondent’s
dispatch records so he could clarify how the dispatching refer-
rals were handled. Lucas told Hanson and Cook that he would
pursue a ULP charge with the Board if he did not receive the
requested information.36
In response to Lucas’ email, on March 27, 2013, Hanson
emailed Lucas and attached Lucas’ “current years dispatch
record,” which included his referrals for a 3-month period from
January through March 2013.37 Lucas testified that he believed
the information provided was unresponsive to his request be-
cause it only contained information on his referrals; and as
such, he was unable to determine how the mix-up in the dis-
patches occurred. Because of this, Lucas grew suspicious that
Respondent was not only withholding information but was
unfairly referring him out for work.38 Thereafter, Lucas filed a
lawsuit in small claims court and, on April 29, 2013, filed a
ULP charge against Respondent (Case 28-CB-103922).39 On
May 21, 2013, Lucas withdrew the ULP charge.40
Despite withdrawing the ULP charge, Lucas remained suspi-
cious that Respondent was “hiding something” from him con-
cerning the botched dispatches. Specifically, Lucas testified:
JUDGE THOMPSON: Did you have reason to believe—and
I think this is what Mr. Gollin just asked—that there were
other anomalies in your dispatching?
THE WITNESS: Yes, they weren’t giving me any infor-
mation. So I had reason to believe, in the past, dispatch had
been operated—they fired a dispatcher for the hiring hall be-
ing operated in an unfair and discriminatory manner. And
they would not respond to me with the information I wanted.
So I was suspicious that there’s thing[s] that were being kept
from members or non-members or registrants. So that’s what

32 Tr. 185–186.
33 Id.
34 Tr. 184–186.
35 I will not consider Hanson’s testimony regarding this discussion
due to the previously imposed sanction against Respondent. See supra
at 4-5.
36 GC Exh. 18.
37 GC Exh. 19.
38 Tr. 188-192.
39 GC Exh. 20.
40 GC Exh. 21.
led me to request information so I could determine if the hir-
ing hall was being operated in a fair and nondiscriminatory
manner.41
Therefore, on June 4, 2013, Lucas emailed a second, more spe-
cific information request to Cook, Hanson, and Poveromo. This
request stated:

Dear John Hanson, Business Representative IATSE Local
720 Stagehands, Danl’ Cook, President IATSE Local 720
Stagehands, Ronald Poveromo, Secretary Treasurer IATSE
Local 720 Stagehands,
I wish to review all dispatch records to insure the IATSE 720
Stagehands hiring hall is operated in a non discriminatory
fashion. I am also requesting the current rules and procedures
to be eligible for dispatch through IATSE Local 720 Stage-
hands hiring hall.
To emphasize, I respectfully request to review all dispatch
records, for all jobs Local 720 stagehands has dispatched any
referent, to any employer signatory to a contract with 720
Stagehands.
Myself and other referents are seeking the IATSE Local 720
Stagehands dispatch records of all referents, and all jobs, to all
employers signatory to a collective bargaining agreement with
Local 720 Stagehands from May 2012 to April 30, 2013.
Additionally, Steven Lucas and other referents are requesting
dispatch records of all referents, and all jobs, to all employers
signatory to a collective bargaining agreement with Local 720
Stagehands from December 4, 2012 to June 4, 2013.
Provide the requested dispatch information within 14 days of
this writing otherwise I have no alternative than to file an Un-
fair Labor Practice with the National Labor Relations Board.
Very truly yours,
Steven Lucas
Referent #10163242
It is undisputed that Respondent received Lucas’ June 4 let-
ter but did not respond to it.43 It is also undisputed that Re-
spondent never contacted Lucas regarding the request, never
told him that it had concerns about responding to the request,
and never provided him with any of the requested information.
2. Analysis
Counsel for the General Counsel alleges that Respondent vi-
olated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) of the Act when it refused
to give Lucas access to over 1 year’s worth of Respondent’s job
referral records showing the names of all member user’s that
were referred jobs and the names of the employers to whom

41 Tr. 195-196.
42 GC Exh. 22.
43 Tr. 402–405.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
they were referred between May 2012 and June 2013.
Under Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, a union, acting as an
exclusive hiring hall, owes its member users a duty of fair rep-
resentation by operating that hall in a fair and nondiscriminato-
ry manner. Radio Electronics Officers Union, 306 NLRB 43 fn.
2 (1992). Concomitant with that duty, the union is also required
to provide users with information sufficient so they can intelli-
gently challenge the hiring hall structure and determine whether
it operates fairly. Id. Therefore, the union violates the Act
when it arbitrarily denies a request for job referral information
if the request is reasonably directed toward ascertaining wheth-
er the user has been treated fairly. However, the union can
avoid liability if it can show that its refusal to provide the re-
quested information is necessary to vindicate legitimate union
interests.44
In this case, Respondent advances several arguments in
denying liability. First, Respondent avers that it is not a hiring
hall. This argument is completely without merit.
In Carpenters Local 102 (Millwright Employees Assn.), 317
NLRB 1099 (1995), the Board adopted specific elements to
establish whether a labor organization is an exclusive hiring
hall. First, Respondent must be a “labor organization,” and,
second, its actions must have affected “employees.” Regarding
the first element, despite Respondent’s denials, I have already
determined that Respondent is and has always been a “labor
organization” within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
My conclusion is based upon record evidence; and specifically,
that under Section 2(5): (a) Respondent is an organization in
which employees participate; (b) it exists inter alia for the pur-
pose of dealing with grievances, labor disputes, rates of pay,
and/or other terms and conditions of work of persons perform-
ing stagehand work within the Las Vegas area and the sur-
rounding counties; and (c) it admits that it is the “sole and ex-
clusive collective bargaining representative of all employees in
the bargaining unit,” under Article 3 of Respondent’s CBA
with GES.45 In addition, prior Board decisions have concluded
that Respondent is a labor organization.
For the second element, Respondent’s actions have “affected
employees” as Lucas fell into the general class of jobseekers
using Respondent’s hiring hall, so he was an “employee” for
purposes of Section 8(b)(1)(A).46
Now, when a union is alleged to have violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) by failing to fulfill its duty of fair representation in
connection with operating a hiring hall, a third element must be
established. That is, the union’s hiring hall is an ‘exclusive’
one; “for absent that showing, the duty of fair representation

44 Carpenters Local 608 (Various Employers), 279 NLRB 747
(1986), enfd. 811 F2d 149 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied 484 U.S. 817
(1987); Carpenters Local 35 (Construction Employees Assn.), 317
NLRB 18 (1995) (Board found respondent union violated Act by refus-
ing to disclose and make copies of requested hiring hall records show-
ing job referrals for all users during 6-month period); see also Boiler-
makers Local 197 (Northeastern State Boilermaker Employers), 318
NLRB 205 (1995), citing Carpenters Local 35, supra; and NLRB v.
Operating Engineers Local 139, 796 F.2d 985, 992–994 (7th Cir.
1986).
45 GC Exh. 7.
46 See Houston Chapter, AGC, 143 NLRB 409, 412 (1963).
does not attach.”47 A union’s hiring hall is “exclusive” if it is an
employer’s initial or primary source for employees.48
In this case, this element is also met as Respondent’s agree-
ment with GES specifically provides that Respondent serves as
GES’ sole and exclusive source of referrals of employees for
GES’ stagehand work.49 Moreover, I credit Noel Cummins’,
GES’ rigging department’s senior operations manager, uncon-
troverted testimony that Respondent and GES have, in practice,
an exclusive referral arrangement.50 Finally, and most im-
portantly, the Board has repeatedly found Respondent to be an
exclusive hiring hall so it is unclear to me why Respondent
chose to argue this point in the first place.51 Nevertheless, I find
that Respondent is clearly a union that acts and continues to act
as an exclusive hiring hall for its users looking for stagehand
work in the Las Vegas metropolitan area.
Because I have concluded that Respondent is a union that
acted as an exclusive hiring hall, the duty of fair representation
attaches to Respondent regarding the operation of its hiring
hall. As such, Respondent must provide its users with sufficient
information, if requested, so they can determine whether they
are being treated fairly. On this point, Respondent argues that it
was justified in denying Lucas’ information request because he
“is not a member of” the union. Yet, Respondent cites absolute-
ly no authority for this proposition. In fact, it cannot rely on
Board precedent because the Board has held that a union that
acts as a hiring hall owes a duty of fair representation to all
users of the hall regardless of union membership.52 What’s
more, Respondent, by virtue of being the opposing party in
multiple charges filed by Lucas, was and remains fully aware
that Lucas has challenged being denied access to job referral
information when he was not a member of Local 720.53
Equally unavailing is Respondent’s argument that it was jus-
tified in denying Lucas’ information request because the re-
quest “was not directed toward ascertaining whether or not he
had been treated fairly.”54 Respondent’s argument, made for
the first time during the hearing and in its post-hearing brief, is
premised on the fact that Lucas’ request for approximately one
years’ worth of dispatch records was overbroad and unreasona-

47 Carpenters Local 102, supra at 1102, citing Teamsters Local 460
(Superior Asphalt), 300 NLRB 441 (1990).
48 See Stage Employees IASTE Local 7, 339 NLRB 214, 216-217
(2003) (exclusive referral service exists where parties’ contract states
that employer “will give the Union first opportunity to furnish, and the
Union agrees to furnish, applicants for employment with the requisite
skills”).
49 GC Exh. 7.
50 Tr. 90–92.
51 See Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (AVW Audio Visual), 332
NLRB 1 fn. 5 (2000), revd. on other grounds by Lucas v. NLRB, 333
F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Stage Employees IATSE Local 720
(AVW Audio Visuals, Inc.), 341 NLRB 1267 (2004); and Stage Em-
ployees IATSE Local 720 (AVW Audio Visuals, Inc.), 352 NLRB 29
(2008); and Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (Production Support
Services), 352 NLRB 1081(2008).
52 See Carpenters Local 608, supra; see also Breininger v. Sheet
Metal Workers Local 6, 493 U.S. 67, 89 (1989).
53 See, e.g., Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (Production Support
Services), 352 NLRB 1081 (2008).
54 R. Br. at 15.
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE (GLOBAL EXPERIENCE SPECIALISTS) 11
ble given the “one” botched referral in February 2013 that cost
him the Caesars Palace call back. Respondent relies on the
Board’s decision in Millwrights to limit a request for dispatch
records to 6 months. However, the Board never set such a de-
finitive limit.55 In Millwrights, the charging party filed a charge
against respondent union, an exclusive hiring hall, for denying
his request for approximately one year’s worth of dispatch rec-
ords. The charging party requested these records because he
believed the union breached a prior settlement agreement be-
tween he and respondent that was signed approximately a year
prior to the records request. Yet the Board, in adopting the
judge’s decision, found that the parties previously agreed be-
tween themselves that the charging party was entitled to 6-
months worth of dispatch records and noted no precedent limit-
ing the look back period to six months. In fact, it was unclear
whether “it was legally appropriate to equate an employee’s
look back rights with Section 10(b)’s 6-month rule.”56
However, even assuming that Lucas is limited to requesting
6-months worth of dispatch records, Respondent failed to pro-
vide even those records. In fact, it never responded in any way
to Lucas’ request and offered no explanation or justification to
Lucas for its refusal to comply with his request. As the judge
held in Millwrights, I find that Respondent violated Section
8(b)(2) and (1)(A) by refusing to provide any of the requested
records.
Finally, Respondent avers that its decision to deny Lucas’
records request was not arbitrary because it had a duty to pro-
tect the privacy and safety of its members and Lucas had no
compelling reason for requesting the records. However, this
defense is also unpersuasive for several reasons. First, Re-
spondent has not shown that the dispatch records contained
such “confidential” information for which it had to protect. In
fact, Lucas was only requesting referant’s dispatches, i.e., what
jobs registered users were referred, when and by whom. Even if
Lucas would have been privy to confidential information such
as a referant’s name, address, or social security number, Re-
spondent could have (and should have) redacted that infor-
mation from the records. Instead, it simply refused to turn over
the requested documents.
Second, although Respondent raises a myriad of First
Amendment defenses, these constitutional protections do not
attach to the release of dispatch records (versus the release of a
union’s membership list) which the Board clearly determined
do not infringe upon one’s First Amendment rights.57 Third,
even if First Amendment protections were at issue here, not
only has Respondent failed to show that the referants on its list
had any reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the disclo-
sure of their names, addresses, telephone, or social security
numbers (assuming that this information was contained on
Respondent’s dispatch records), Respondent never raised any
of these concerns with Lucas at the time of his request (or at
any time prior to submitting its post-hearing brief); for if Re-

55 Millwrights, supra at 1099 fn. 2. The Board passed on the question
of whether a registered user of a hiring hall is limited to requesting only
6 months of dispatching records.
56 Id.
57 See, e.g., Millwright, supra, Carpenters Local 608, supra.
spondent had, Lucas and Respondent could have dealt with
those concerns accordingly. Again, Respondent ignored Lucas’
June 2013 information request.
I also find Lucas had a compelling reason (assuming he
needed one) for requesting Respondent’s dispatch records.
Contrary to Respondent’s assertion that Lucas’ “one botched”
referral did not warrant his request for over a year’s worth of
dispatch records, the record reveals that Lucas became con-
cerned about Respondent’s operation back in 2012. Lucas chal-
lenged Respondent’s denial of his information requests in sepa-
rate litigation. Then, in 2013, Lucas experienced three
“botched” referrals that occurred between February and March
2013. Once this occurred, Lucas requested job referral infor-
mation from Respondent but Respondent’s disclosures were not
responsive to his request. Thus, it was the series of events over
a span of two years that raised Lucas’ concern about Respond-
ent’s operation. That fact alone, I conclude, was sufficient for
Lucas’ June 2013 request for records from Respondent.58
Respondent further argues that Lucas’ June 2013 request was
made in bad faith. Here, Respondent points to Lucas’ persistent
evasiveness with Respondent about his availability which con-
tributed to the confusion with the Caesars Palace call back.
However, Lucas’ behavior did not make his June 2013 request
any less compelling.59 Rather, I must consider Lucas’ reason
for requesting the dispatch records to determine if the request
was “reasonably directed toward determining whether [Lucas]
was treated fairly.”60 Respondent, relying on the litigiousness
and animosity between it and Lucas, infers that Lucas’ reasons
for his June 2013 request was made to further harass Respond-
ent. However, I could posit that that same animosity is what
motivated Respondent to ignore Lucas’ request. Be that as it
may, while it is clear from the record that there is no love lost
between Lucas and Respondent, I find no evidence that Lucas’
request for Respondent’s dispatch records was made in bad
faith. Rather, I credit Lucas’ testimony that he grew suspicious
overall of Respondent’s operation when he kept experiencing
“botched” referrals, requested referral information from Re-
spondent (March 2013) to get to the bottom of it but was only
provided with his referrals. Lucas grew even more concerned
that Respondent was withholding information and requested
more specific information on all user’s job referrals (June
2013), but after doing so, received no response from Respond-
ent. Although I cannot award Lucas backpay since I find that
his evasiveness regarding his availability contributed to the
February 2013 “botched” referral and I have no evidence in the
record as to his lost wages for any of the other “botched” refer-

58 GC Exh. 22.
59 At the hearing, Respondent also attempted to show that Lucas’ in-
formation request was made in bad faith by painting Lucas as a para-
noid, violent, racist, and sexist individual who takes no responsibility
for his own actions. These allegations are more thoroughly delineated
in the CGC’s brief. However, all of these assertions are irrelevant in
determining whether Respondent violated the Act by failing/refusing to
provide Lucas with the information he requested. Moreover, to the
extent Respondent proffered documents or testimony to support its
theory, they are striken and given no weight due to the previously im-
posed sanction against it.
60 See fn. 44, supra.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
rals, Lucas’ reasons behind his March and June 2013 infor-
mation requests were nevertheless made in good faith. Simply
put, Respondent’s arguments fail to protect it from liability.
Accordingly, I find Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) and
(1)(A) of the Act when it breached its duty of fair representa-
tion owed to Lucas by arbitrarily refusing to comply with his
June 2013 information request.
C. The Richardson Allegations
1. Facts
Charging Party Richardson is a registered user of Respond-
ent’s referral service. He has used the service for 10 years.61 In
late 2012, at Respondent’s offices, Richardson was involved in
a verbal confrontation with coworker, Antoine (Jersey)
Gilliam.62 During the confrontation, Richardson threatened
Gilliam with physical harm. After the altercation, Richardson
met with Business Representative Hanson for assistance in
dealing with Gilliam. However, Richardson felt that Hanson
failed to act on his concerns, and he became frustrated, loud,
and verbally abusive with Hanson.
On December 27, 2012, Hanson sent Richardson a letter ad-
vising that:
In accordance with Article VIII of Work Rules and Proce-
dures for Referents, which we have included for your refer-
ence, you are in violation of Article VIII, Section 1B(iv):
Verbal assault against or threatening harm to any referent,
Union employee, Job Steward, Union official or Employer
representative while at work, or in connection with work. This
includes threatening or abusive language to the employees at
the Union office.63
The letter added that Richardson was being fined $1000 for his
conduct toward Gilliam and Hanson. Additionally, Richardson
would be suspended from the referral service if he failed to pay
the fine. Richardson was advised that the fine and suspension
would be held in abeyance if he appealed the fine. 64
Under Respondent’s work rules, disciplinary infractions are
divided into three categories: major, moderate, and minor of-
fenses. Major offenses include but are not limited to: convic-
tion of felony related to work, physical assaults, or theft at
work. Moderate offenses include but are not limited to: har-
assment, verbal assault, conduct or behavior damaging to un-
ion’s contractual relations, or consumption of alcohol or con-
trolled substances at work. Minor offenses include but are not
limited to: failure to appear before the rules committee, chronic
tardiness (defined as three (3) times in twelve (12) consecutive
months), job jumping, failure to notify the Union before per-
forming nonunion work that falls within the traditional scope of
the Union’s jurisdiction, or failure to maintain current valid
address with Local 720.65
Each category of offenses results in a fine but the amount of

61 Tr. 273.
62 Tr. 406–407.
63 GC Exh. 23
64 Id.
65 GC Exh. 13
the fine depends on the type and number of offenses. Specially,
article VIII, section 2 provides:
Major Offenses:
i) First offense in a twenty-four (24) month period
$2,000 fine
ii) Second offense in a twenty-four (24) month period
$5,000 fine
iii)Third offense in a twenty-four (24) month period
$10,000 fine
Moderate Offenses:
i) First offense in a twenty-four (24) month period
$1,000 fine
ii) Second offense in a twenty-four (24) month period
$2,000 fine
iii)Third offense in a twenty-four (24) month period
$5,000 fine
Minor Offenses:
i) First offense in a twelve month period
$100 fine
ii) Second offense in a twelve month period
$200 fine
iii) Third offense in a twelve month period
$300 fine
iv) Four minor offenses within a twelve-month period equal a
moderate offense66
Section 3 of article VIII provides:
. . . . Failure to pay a minor offense fine within fourteen (14)
days from the time the fine is imposed shall result in removal
from the Local 720 referral system until such fine is paid.
Failure to pay a moderate or major fine with in thirty five (35)
days, from the time the fine is imposed shall result in removal
from the Local 720 referral system until such fine is paid.67
Additionally, article VII, section 2 provides:
. . . . Failure to pay the fine in the allowed period of time as
per Article VIII, Section 3, will result in automatic suspension
from the Local 720 referral system until such fine is paid. In
case of appeal, no penalty shall be imposed until the appeal
procedure has been completed.68
It is undisputed that Richardson successfully appealed his fi-
ne and suspension. However, he was warned that if he was
involved in a similar infraction within a 24-month period, he
would be suspended from the referral service and fined
$2000.69 Unfortunately, Richardson did not heed the warning.
In or around March 28, 2013, Richardson was involved in
another confrontation with Gilliam. This time, however, the

66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id., see also GC Exh. 13.
69 GC Exh. 24.
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE (GLOBAL EXPERIENCE SPECIALISTS) 13
altercation led to Richardson physically assaulting Gilliam
outside of Respondent’s offices. On April 3, 2013, Hanson sent
Richardson a letter advising him that he had again violated
Respondent’s work rules, was being fined $2000 for his con-
duct and that he would be suspended until he paid the fine.70
Richardson again appealed the fine and suspension.71
On July 11, 2013, Respondent denied the appeal, fined Rich-
ardson $4000 and informed him that if he failed to pay the fine,
he would be suspended from the referral list.72 It is undisputed
that Richardson did not pay the fine, and he was suspended
from the referral list effective June 25, 2013.73 Thereafter, he
filed the instant unfair labor practice charge.
At the hearing, Richardson testified that, in late November
2013, he called President Cook to discuss his fine and suspen-
sion.74 According to Richardson, he asked Cook if Cook would
allow him return to work and work off the $4000 fine by de-
ducting set amounts from his paycheck. Cook declined this
suggestion and told Richardson he needed to pay the fine in full
before he could return to the referral list. Yet, seemingly in the
next breath, Cook also mentioned that he might consider allow-
ing Richardson to pay off the fine in installments but it is un-
disputed that Richardson did not work off the fine.75 In any
event, Richardson remained off work following this conversa-
tion. Because Respondent declined to cross-examine or recall
Richardson, Richardson’s testimony stands uncontroverted.76
Richardson testified that, after Region 28 issued its Consoli-
dated and Amended Consolidated Complaint in late November
2013, Cook called him into Respondent’s offices. According to
Richardson, Cook told him that he would rescind the $4000
fine and return him to work if he agreed to withdraw his ULP
charge against Respondent. Richardson verbally agreed, and in
or around January 2, 2014, Respondent began referring Rich-
ardson out for work. However, Richardson felt that Respondent
continued to harass him and only allowed him to return to work
because he agreed to withdraw his ULP charge. Richardson did
not withdraw his ULP charge.
It is undisputed that Richardson was suspended from Re-
spondent’s referral service from June 25, 2013, to January 2,
2014. Respondent again declined to cross-examine or recall
Richardson, so his testimony stands uncontroverted.
2. Analysis
The CGC alleges that Respondent violated the Act when it
suspended Richardson from its referral list and prevented him
from working until he paid a $4000 fine for violating Respond-
ent’s work rules. Respondent counters, arguing that it was justi-
fied in suspending Richardson from its referral service in order

70 GC Exh. 25.
71 Tr. 276–278.
72 Tr. 278–279, see also GC Exh. 27.
73 Tr. 279–280.
74 Tr. 280–281.
75 Tr. 281.
76 Respondent offered Hanson’s testimony concerning Richardson’s
threats and the actions taken against Richardson in response to him
violating Respondent’s work rules. Respondent also offered various
documents to support Hanson’s testimony. However, I struck Hanson’s
testimony and will give no weight to any of Respondent’s documented
evidence due to the previously imposed sanction.
to protect the safety of its employees and staff from Richard-
son’s threatening and violent behavior.
In his brief, the CGC argues that, based upon Board prece-
dent, I should determine that any union hiring hall rule that
suspends users from its referral service to enforce a fine is pa-
tently unlawful.77 I decline to so find. Rather, the Board has
consistently held that a union rule suspending a user from its
referral service for failing to pay a fine/assessment is presump-
tively unlawful unless the union can show that the rule was
necessary to the effective performance of its representative
functions.78 Although the Board has found that a union cannot
necessarily tie an employment-related sanction (i.e., not refer-
ring an employee) to the collection of a fine,79 the Board never-
theless evaluates the reasons behind the union imposing the
fine.80
In this case, I find that both Respondent’s rule and how it
was applied to Richardson, violates the Act. Initially, Respond-
ent argues, for the first time at hearing, that it never intended to
collect the $4000 fine from Richardson. Rather, Respondent
avers that it only imposed the fine so Richardson would “chill
out” from his threatening behavior. However, the plain reading
of Respondent’s disciplinary letter clearly indicates that it in-
tended to suspend Richardson from its referral service until he
paid the $4000 fine. In fact, I credit Richardson’s unrebutted
testimony that, when he tried to make arrangements with Re-
spondent to pay the fine in installments and return to work,
Cook declined to return him to work until the fine was paid in
full. To that end, I find this case identical to the Board’s deci-
sion in Fisher Theatre, where the Board adopted the judge’s
finding that Respondent violated the Act when it unlawfully
suspended two employees from its referral services who violat-
ed union work rules and refused to return them to work until
their fines were paid in full.81
Respondent next argues that it rebutted the presumption that
its actions regarding Richardson were unlawful because Rich-
ardson’s suspension was necessary to protect the safety of its
staff and others from his continuing threatening behavior.82
However, the Board has previously found this very argument

77 GC Br. at 36–40.
78 Fisher Theatre, 240 NLRB 678, 691 (1979) (a union rule that pro-
hibits referrals for nonpayment of fine is ordinarily unlawful regardless
of why the fine was imposed) (emphasis added).
79 See, e.g., Longshoremen ILWU Local 13 (Pacific Maritime Assn),
228 NLRB 1383, 1385 (1977).
80 See Employees IATSE Local 720 (Production Support Services),
352 NRLB 1081, 1086 (2008) (the ALJ determined that “. . . nonpay-
ment of a fine, per se, has nothing to do with the union’s representative
function. It is the reason for imposing the fine that must be scrutinized.
As the cases above have demonstrated, there may be legitimate and
lawful reasons for imposing fines that result in removal from a referral
system. These cases must be scrutinized on a case-by-case basis.”)
(emphasis added).
81 Fisher Theatre, supra at fn. 77.
82 Respondent again introduced testimonial and documentary evi-
dence through John Hanson concerning how Richardson’s outbursts
and continued threatening behavior was so pervasive it caused employ-
ers to issue “no hire” letters for Richardson. However, as previously
stated, I give this testimonial and documentary evidence no weight due
to the sanction against Respondent.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
unpersuasive in rebutting that presumption.83 Thus, while Re-
spondent is certainly free to impose fines/assessments when
users violate its internal work rules, it simply cannot enforce
the fine by excluding users from its service.
Respondent also claims its actions in fining/suspending
Richardson were not unfair, arbitrary or unlawfully motivated.
However, the fact that Respondent initially asserted that it nev-
er intended to enforce the fine against Richardson reinforces the
fact that its actions were arbitrary. Moreover, I find the evi-
dence supports that Respondent had an unlawful motive as I
credit Richardson’s unrebutted testimony that Respondent only
tolled the fine and returned Richardson to work when he ver-
bally agreed to withdraw the instant charge.
Lastly, Respondent raised several affirmative defenses in its
answer (i.e., the complaint was untimely, unconstitutional,
inequitable, and a waste of Board resources) but failed to elabo-
rate or present any evidence to support these defenses. Thus,
Respondent’s defenses are hereby waived. Furthermore, to the
extent Respondent argues the equitable defenses of estoppels,
unclean hands, laches and waiver, the Board has declined to
recognize these defenses in its proceedings.84 Accordingly, all
of Respondent’s arguments and defenses fail to rebut the pre-
sumption that its rule and how it was applied to Richardson
were unlawful.
Therefore, I find Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) and
(1)(A) of the Act when it breached its duty of fair representa-
tion owed to Richardson by suspending him from its referral
service and preventing him from returning to work until he paid
all fines levied against him.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent IATSE Local 720 is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act.
2. Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act
when it breached its duty of fair representation it owed Charg-
ing Party Steven Lucas by failing/refusing Lucas’ June 2013
request for access to job referral records.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act
when it breached its duty of fair representation it owed to
Charging Party Jamy Richardson by suspending him from Re-
spondent’s referral service and preventing Richardson from
returning to work until he paid all fines levied against him.
4. By engaging in the conduct described above, Respondent
has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the

83 Longshoremen ILWU Local 13 (Pacific Maritime Assn), 228
NLRB at 1385, enfd. 581 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440
U.S. 935 (1979).
84 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 271 NRLB 343, 346 (1984);
Woodworkers (Kimtruss Corp.), 304 NLRB 1 (1991); NLRB v. J.H.
RutterRex Mfg Co., 396 U.S. 258 (1969); Gulf States Mfg, Inc., 598
F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1979).
entire record, I issue the following recommended85
ORDER
The Respondent, IATSE Local 720 of Las Vegas, Nevada,
its officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Arbitrarily refusing to allow Steven Lucas access to re-
ferral/dispatch records or other job referral information that
would assist Lucas to determine his relative referral position or
ascertain whether he is being or has been treated fairly regard-
ing job referrals.
(b) Enforcing a fine levied against Jamy Richardson for vio-
lating Respondent’s Work Rules by suspending him from Re-
spondent’s referral service.
(c) Maintaining a rule, policy and/or practice of enforcing a
fine levied against a member user/referant for violating Re-
spondent’s work rules by excluding a member-user/referant
from its referral service until full payment of the fine is re-
ceived.
(d) Threatening, encouraging, coercing or offering a “quid
pro quo” to any member-user/referrant to withdraw or not to
pursue a charge or complaint against Respondent with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board in exchange for nonpayment of a
fine levied against them.
(e) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Allow Lucas to look at, take notes on, and/or photocopy
(at his expense), all job referral/dispatch records in Respond-
ent’s possession, of all referants and all jobs, to all signatory
employers to a collective-bargaining agreement with Respond-
ent for the period from May 2012 to June 4, 2013, to help Lu-
cas determine his relative referral position or ascertain whether
he is being or has been treated fairly regarding job referrals by
Respondent.
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board
or its agents for examination and copying, all records matching
the foregoing descriptions in paragraph (a).
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its of-
fices or hiring halls, wherever they may be maintained copies
of the attached notice marked “Appendix 1”86 in both English
and Spanish. Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 28, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places

85 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
86 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE (GLOBAL EXPERIENCE SPECIALISTS) 15
where notices to employees and members are customarily post-
ed. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on
an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if
Respondent customarily communicates with its members and
employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced or
covered by any other material.
(d) Rescind or revise Respondent’s work rules to make clear
to employees, members and/or referants that Respondent will
no longer enforce a fine levied against a referant/registered user
for violating Respondent’s work rules by suspending or other-
wise causing a referant to be excluded from its referral service
until full payment of the fine has been received.
(e) Notify all employees, member users and/or referants of
the rescinded or revised rule to include providing them a copy
of the revised policy/rule or specific notification that the poli-
cy/rule/practice has been rescinded.
(f) Calculate and reimburse Jamy Richardson for all wages
lost resulting from his suspension from Respondent’s referral
service during the period from June 25, 2013, to January 2,
2014.
(g) Calculate and make Richardson whole for any loss of
any other monetary benefits, retirement contributions and/or
any other benefits suffered as a result of the unlawful suspen-
sion.
(h) Remove or expunge from its files and records all refer-
ences to Richardson’s suspension from Respondent’s referral
service for failing to pay fines levied against him, and within 3
days thereafter, notify Richardson in writing that Respondent
has done so and that it will not use the unlawful suspension
against Richardson in any way.
(i) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its of-
fices or hiring halls, wherever they may be maintained copies
of the attached notice marked “Appendix 2”87 in both English
and Spanish. Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 28, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees and members are customarily post-
ed. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on
an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if
Respondent customarily communicates with its members and
employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced or
covered by any other material.
(j) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification by a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
Respondent has taken to comply with this Order.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 7, 2014

87 Id.
APPENDIX 1
NOTICE TO MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT arbitrarily refuse to respond to or arbitrarily
deny your request for access to referral/dispatch records or
other job referral information to help you ascertain whether you
are being or have been treated fairly regarding job referrals.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
WE WILL maintain our duty of fair representation as guaran-
teed you by the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL allow Charging Party Steven Lucas to look at, take
notes about, and/or photocopy (at his expense), all job refer-
ral/dispatch records in our possession, of all referants and all
jobs, to all signatory employers to our collective bargaining
agreement for the period from May 2012 to June 4, 2013, to
help Lucas determine whether he is being or has been treated
fairly regarding job referrals.
WE WILL preserve, and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all records
matching the foregoing descriptions.
IATSE LOCAL 720
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28-CB-107693 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD16
APPENDIX 2
NOTICE TO MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT maintain a policy, rule or practice of enforcing
a fine levied against you for violating our internal Work Rules
by suspending or otherwise excluding you from our referral
service.
WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, encourage or offer you a
“quid pro quo” where we state, offer, refer or in any way sug-
gest that you not pursue or file or that you withdraw a charge(s)
or complaint(s) against us with the National Labor Relations
Board in exchange for rescinding a fine levied against you.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
WE WILL maintain our duty of fair representation as guaran-
teed you by the National Labor Relations Board
WE WILL rescind or revise our internal Work Rules to make
clear to you that we will no longer enforce a fine levied against
you for violating our internal work rules by suspending or oth-
erwise excluding you from our referral service until full pay-
ment of the fine is received.
WE WILL notify all employees, member-users and/or refer-
rants of the rescinded or revised rule, policy and/or practice to
include providing you with a copy of the revised policy/rule or
specific notification that the policy/rule/practice has been re-
scinded
WE WILL reimburse Charging Party Jamy Richardson for
wages lost resulting from his suspension from our referral
service during the period from June 25, 2013, to January 2,
2014.
WE WILL remove or expunge all records of and references
to Charging Party Richardson’s suspension from our referral
service for failing to pay fines levied against him.
IATSE LOCAL 720
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28-CB-107693 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.