Ingeborg Criss, Appellant,v.Louis Caldera, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 24, 1998
01981217 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 24, 1998)

01981217

11-24-1998

Ingeborg Criss, Appellant, v. Louis Caldera, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.


Ingeborg Criss v. Department of the Army

01981217

November 24, 1998

Ingeborg Criss, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01981217

v. ) Agency Nos. 96-05-G0180

) 96-05-G0530

Louis Caldera, ) Hearing Nos. 310-97-5499X

Secretary, ) 310-97-5074X

Department of the Army, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision (FAD)

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination on the bases of reprisal (prior EEO activity)

and age (over 40), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

Appellant alleges she was discriminated against when: (1) she received

a Success Level Three (Satisfactory) performance rating for the period

ending September 30, 1995; (2) she was subjected to threats, screamed at,

ridiculed, belittled, and demeaned in front of customers and co-workers;

(3) she was instructed by her immediate supervisor (S1) and second level

supervisor (S2) to perform a personnel function, and if the function

was wrong, they denied instructing her to do it and blamed her for

the error; (4) she was subjected to a hostile work environment; and

(5) she was subjected to reprisal when S2 initiated an EEO complaint

against appellant's EEO Counselor inquiring into appellant's complaint

of discrimination. The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order

No. 960.001. For the following reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED

as MODIFIED.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, appellant was employed

as a GS-0204-06 Civilian Liaison and Military Personnel Clerk in the

Personnel Division, Darnall Army Community Hospital, Fort Hood, Texas.

Appellant alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of

her age and retaliated against when the above-referenced agency actions

occurred. Appellant further alleged that S1's actions created a hostile

work environment. Believing she was a victim of discrimination, appellant

sought EEO counseling and, subsequently, filed formal complaints on April

24 and November 18, 1996. At the conclusion of the investigations,

appellant received copies of the investigative reports and requested

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a

Recommended Decision (RD) finding no discrimination. The AJ concluded

that with respect to issue (1), appellant established a prima facie

case of discrimination because similarly situated employees not in

her protected classes received better ratings on their performance

evaluations. The AJ then concluded that appellant failed to establish a

prima facie case of discrimination concerning the remaining issues because

she failed to demonstrate either that she was an aggrieved individual,

or that similarly situated employees not in her protected classes were

treated differently under similar circumstances.

The AJ next concluded that S1 and S2 articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for the satisfactory rating provided appellant,

namely, that the performance element entitled adaptability and initiative

warranted a "needs improvement" rating, which was ultimately changed

to a "success" rating, because appellant was resistant to changes being

instituted by S2, and because appellant had demonstrated some difficulty

relating to customers. The AJ found appellant's allegations that S2

stated that civil servants should work no longer than four years was

alone insufficient to evidence age animus respecting her performance

rating by S1. In reaching this conclusion, the AJ found appellant

to be a less than credible witness. Finally, the AJ concluded that

appellant was not harassed, noting that though S1 admitted to yelling

at appellant on two occasions, S1 later apologized for one of those

occasions. Further, there was evidence presented that S1 yelled at

other employees. The agency's FAD adopted the AJ's RD. On appeal,

appellant restates arguments previously made at the hearing and makes

additional arguments in order to demonstrate that appellant was working

in a hostile environment. The agency responds by restating the position

it took in its FAD, and requests that we affirm its FAD.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission first finds that

with respect to the allegations of discrimination in issues (1) through

(3), the AJ's RD summarized the relevant facts and referenced the

appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We note that appellant

failed to present evidence that any of the agency's actions were in

retaliation for appellant's prior EEO activity or were motivated by

discriminatory animus toward appellant's age. We therefore discern

no basis to disturb the AJ's findings of no discrimination which were

based on a detailed assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.

See Gathers v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05890894

(November 9, 1989); Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 499 (6th Cir. 1987);

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985).

Concerning issue (4), we note that the AJ did not employ a harassment

analysis respecting this allegation. We note that the applicable legal

standard is outlined in Wolf v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal

No. 01961559 (July 23, 1998). Applying this standard to the facts in

this case, we conclude that the conduct alleged, either individually or

as a whole, was not sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to constitute a

hostile environment on any of appellant's alleged bases. We find that the

substance of appellant's allegations concern personnel actions, changes

in job responsibilities, changes in workplace policies and procedures,

or occasional callous treatment by S1 toward her. Appellant presents

no evidence that any of the above actions were objectively offensive,

abusive or hostile, and otherwise taken in order to harass her on the

basis of her prior EEO activity or her age. See supra, Wolf.

Concerning issue (5), the AJ concluded that appellant failed to establish

a prima facie case of retaliation because she failed to show that she

was subjected to an adverse employment action. While we agree with

the AJ that appellant failed to demonstrate that she was subjected to

an adverse employment action, we find that such an allegation is more

properly dismissed procedurally, for failure to state a claim. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.107(a); Blinco v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request

No. 05940194 (May 25, 1994) (a complainant lacks standing to file EEO

complaint challenging the actions of a manager filing an EEO complaint,

and thus, complainant fails to state a claim); Calloway v. Department of

the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01943406 (July 18, 1994) (permitting complainant

to file EEO complaint regarding another employee's participation in the

EEO complaint of another co-worker or other agency employee would have

a chilling effect on EEO complaint processing, and further, complainant

fails to state a claim where no harm was suffered by complainant).

Where appellant fails to state a claim, one need not employ a prima

facie analysis to the allegation. Therefore, after a careful review of

the record, including appellant's contentions on appeal, and arguments

and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM as

MODIFIED the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive the decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive the decision. To ensure that your civil action is

considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive the decision or to consult an attorney

concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your

action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court

appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you

to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security.

See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��

791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole

discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not

extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request

and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in

the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Nov 24, 1998

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations