IATSE, Local 720, AFL-CIO, CLC (Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc.)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 30, 2016

363 NLRB No. 148 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

363 NLRB No. 148
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees,
Moving Picture Technicians, Artists and Allied
Crafts of the United States, Its Territories and
Canada, Local 720, AFL–CIO, CLC (Tropicana
Las Vegas, Inc.) and Gary Elias. Case 28–CB–
131044
March 30, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA
AND MCFERRAN
On June 23, 2015, Administrative Law Judge Kenneth
W. Chu issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel and the Charging Party each filed an answering
brief, and the Respondent filed a reply brief to each an-
swering brief. The Charging Party filed cross-exceptions
and a supporting brief, the Respondent filed an answer-
ing brief, and the Charging Party filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions, cross-exceptions, and briefs
and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1
and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified and set forth in full below.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Artists and
Allied Crafts of the United States, Its Territories and
Canada, Local 720, AFL–CIO, CLC, Las Vegas, Neva-
da, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall

1 We agree with the judge that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by failing and refusing to provide the information
requested by the Charging Party. Even applying a more stringent
standard articulated in some cases, we agree with the judge that the
Charging Party has shown a reasonable belief that the Respondent
treated him unfairly. See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 197 (Northeastern
State Boilermaker Employers), 318 NLRB 205, 205 (1995); Operating
Engineers Local 12 (Nevada Contractors Assn.), 344 NLRB 1066,
1066 fn. 1 (2005). In addition, we note that the requested information
is relevant because it would help ascertain the validity of the Charging
Party’s reasonable belief that the Respondent was operating the hiring
hall improperly, including with respect to the general reliability of the
Respondent’s automated dispatch system.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to
the Board’s standard remedial language. We shall also substitute a new
notice that reflects those changes.
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to make available to Gary Elias the hir-
ing hall referral information requested in his letters dated
February 20, 2014, and April 24, 2014.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Furnish Gary Elias with the hiring hall referral in-
formation requested in his letters dated February 20,
2014, and April 24, 2014.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Las Vegas, Nevada office copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix.”3 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 28, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to members are customarily
posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices,
notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by
email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or
other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily
communicates with its members by such means. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 28 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. March 30, 2016
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Member

3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf
with your employer
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to make available to you relevant
requested hiring hall referral information.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above.
WE WILL make available to Gary Elias the hiring hall
referral information requested in his letters dated Febru-
ary 20, 2014, and April 24, 2014.
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL
STAGE EMPLOYEES, MOVING PICTURE
TECHNICIANS, ARTISTS, AND ALLIED CRAFTS OF
THE UNITED STATES, ITS TERRITORIES AND
CANADA, LOCAL 720, AFL–CIO, CLC
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28-CB-131044 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
Larry A. Smith, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Sean D. Graham, Esq. (Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld), for the
Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
KENNETH W. CHU, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Las Vegas, Nevada, on February 24, 2015. The
charge was filed on June 18, 2014,1 and the Regional Director
of Region 28 of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
Board) issued the complaint on August 29 (GC Exh. 1).2
The complaint alleges that the International Alliance of The-
atrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Artists,
and Allied Crafts of the United States, its Territories and Cana-
da, Local 720, AFL–CIO (CLC) (Respondent or IATSE) vio-
lated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act
(Act) when it failed and refused to provide requested infor-
mation to Gary and Tina Elias.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION AND UNION STATUS
Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc. (Tropicana) is a corporation en-
gaged in the hotel and gaming industry in Las Vegas, Nevada.
In 2013 and 2014, Tropicana had gross annual revenues from
sales and services in excess of $500,000 and purchased goods
from states other than the State of Nevada in excess of $50,000
(Tr. 23, 24, GC Exh. 5). As such, I find that Tropicana is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The Respondent has a collective-
bargaining relationship with Tropicana as well as with other
employers. Accordingly, I also find, as the Respondent admits,
that at all times material, the Respondent is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
a. The Respondent’s referral service
The Respondent operates a hiring service that refers skilled
labor to perform stagehand work for signatory employers at

1 All dates are in 2014 unless otherwise indicated.
2 Exhibits for the General Counsel are referenced as “GC Exh.” and
“R. Exh.” for Respondent’s exhibits. Posthearing briefs are referenced
as “GC Br.” for the General Counsel and “R. Br. for the Respondent.
The transcript is abbreviated as “Tr.”
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE, LOCAL 720 (TROPICANA LAS VEGAS, INC.) 3
musicals and other events in the Las Vegas, Nevada area. It is
not disputed that the Respondent has collective-bargaining
agreements with several signatory employers, including Tropi-
cana. On June 1, 2007, the Respondent entered into a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with Hotel Ramada of Nevada d/b/a
Tropicana Resort and Casino and has been recognized as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative by Hotel Ramada
and by its successor, Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc. On January 1,
2014, the Respondent entered into a collective-bargaining
agreement with Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc. through December
31, 2018 (GC Exhs. 6, 7).
Julie Della Penna (Penna) testified that she is the vice-
president for HR at the Tropicana. Penna stated that during all
times relevant to this complaint, Tropicana has a collective-
bargaining agreement with the Respondent (Tr. 25–27). Article
4.03 (a) of the collective-bargaining agreement (GC Exh. 7)
requires
The Employer shall first call the dispatching office of the Un-
ion for such applicants as it may, from time to time need, and
the dispatching office shall refer to the Employer in accord-
ance with the order of preference set forth in Section 4.04 the
requested number of applicants whose registration records in-
dicate they are competent and qualified to perform the work
involved in the classifications to be filled. It shall be the Em-
ployer’s responsibility when requesting applicants to state the
qualifications applicants are expected to possess and the func-
tions they will be expected to perform. The Employer shall
designate the departments in which the employee is expected
to perform his/her duties, but this designation shall not be
construed as prohibiting a change in assignments.
Article 4.03 (e) states, in part
If, within forty-eight (48) hours of the time the Em-
ployer requests applicants to report, the dispatch office has
failed to refer the required number of qualified applicants
requested, the Employer may hire employees from any
other source…
Penna testified to three hiring procedures with the Respond-
ent. Penna described the first hiring procedure as an “open
call,” whereby Tropicana would post vacancies for full-time
positions with the Respondent and applicants would be referred
to the employer by IATSE. Penna testified that Tropicana may
also request applicants on an “on-call” basis to fill a temporary
vacancy and third, an applicant may be requested by name.
Penna said that she has seen similar language in collective-
bargaining agreements between other employers and the Re-
spondent, including the Excalibur Hotel and Casino (Tr. 27–
31).
Penna is not fully familiar with the Respondent’s referral
system, but understood that applicants are referred based on
their position on one of two lists (Tr. 30, 31). Section 4.04 of
the collective-bargaining agreement states, in part
(a) The dispatching office shall refer from among those en-
tered on its job referral lists in the established order of prefer-
ence the required number of applicants who most nearly meet
the qualifications required by the Employer. Subject to the
provisions of Section 4.03, applicants shall be referred in the
order of their dates of registration in the affected classifica-
tions. Referrals of applicants shall be on a non-discriminatory
basis and, in accordance with applicable laws, shall not be
based upon, nor in any way affected by, Union membership,
by-laws rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or any
other aspect or obligation of Union membership, policies or
requirements, nor upon the individual’s race, religion, color,
age, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry, or disa-
bility.
(b) Order of Preference. Registrants on referral List “A” shall
be given preference over registrants on all other lists. Regis-
trants on referral List “B-1” shall be given preference over all
registrants on referral List “B-2”. Within any referral list reg-
istrants shall be referred on a first-registered, first-out basis.
Eligibility for Registration. List A. Applicants who are avail-
able for employment and who are able to demonstrate that in
the three (3) year period immediately preceding their date of
registration they have accumulated at least two thousand
(2,000) hours of experience with an Employer who is signato-
ry to a collective bargaining agreement with the Union in the
classification specified by the requesting Employer.
The three (3) year requirement set forth above will not be in-
terpreted to preclude granting List “A” status to registrants for
other classifications for which they have been previously dis-
patched to the Employers operating in Clark County, Nevada.
List “B’. Referral List “B” shall be divided into two (2) parts:
List “B-1” and List “B-2”.
Applicants shall be eligible for registration on List “B-1” who
are available for employment and who are able to demonstrate
that they meet the requirements of any of the following sub-
paragraphs:
i. Accumulation of at least one thousand (1,000) hours of ex-
perience in the classification specified by the requesting Em-
ployer within the three (3) year period immediately preceding
their date of registration, or
ii. Accumulation of at least one thousand (1,000) hours of
employment experience utilizing the basic skills of the classi-
fication specified by the requesting Employer within the three
(3) year period immediately preceding their date of registra-
tion, or
iii. Successful completion of a basic training program con-
ducted under the auspices of the Nevada Resort Association -
IATSE Local 720 Apprentice and Journeyman Training and
Education Trust.
Dan’L Cook (Cook) testified that he is and has been the un-
ion president for the Respondent for 7 years and is familiar with
the IATSE referral service. Cook said that referents for jobs
are from five crafts consisting of the theatrical stage employees;
audiovisual technicians and projectionists; the film and televi-
sion workers; the industrial trade show workers; and the ward-
robe, hair and makeup employees. Cook said that over 2200
individuals from these crafts applied for employment through
the Respondent’s referral service (Tr. 35, 42, 43). Cook is fa-
miliar with the referral service and stated that there are two lists
for employment (lists A and B), with referents on list A are
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
given priority. Cook said that the order of preference is used
with Tropicana pursuant to their collective-bargaining agree-
ment. Cook confirmed that the Respondent has similar order of
preference language for referring applicants with over 40 em-
ployers. Cook testified that employers with similar order of
preference language as in the Tropicana collective-bargaining
agreement under section 4.04 are required to post vacancies
with the Respondent and such contract language is enforceable
through grievances if an employer fails to follow this referral
process (Tr. 43–46).
b. The February 20 information request
Gary Elias has been a member of IATSE Local 720 for over
20 years.3 During this time, he has been employed by the Re-
spondent and has filed charges and grievances on behalf and
against the Respondent. In particular, Gary Elias testified that
he had previously filed a charge against the Respondent regard-
ing the refusal of the Respondent to provide hiring hall records.
Gary Elias said that the charge was filed over 12 years ago and
resulted in a formal settlement with the Respondent which al-
lowed him to inspect and make copies of the hiring hall referral
records (Tr. 77–79).
Gary Elias is a referent with the Respondent’s hiring service
and is on list A in the order of preference. His list A referent
status is not in dispute (Tr. 49). Gary Elias holds over 23 skill-
set cards and is a list A referent for audio/visual, electrical, and
forklift equipment work (Tr. 77).4
Gary Elias testified to his “reasonable suspicions” of irregu-
larities in the hiring hall service with referrals for jobs for the
Phantom of the Opera musical that was showcased at the Vene-
tian Hotel and Casino. He testified that the LV Theatrical
Group, Inc. staged the musical and had a collective-bargaining
agreement with the Respondent with similar language in the
order of preference of skilled labor on list A and list B (GC
Exh. 11). Gary Elias said that he saw a Facebook page alleged-
ly posted on September 20, 2013, by Glenn Snyder, who was a
head carpenter on the musical production, which seems to indi-
cate that he was responsible for hiring the skilled labor on the
Phantom production (GC Exh. 10). Gary Elias testified that
this would have been in violation of article 5.08 of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement between the Respondent and the LV
Theatrical Group (Tr. 82–89).
Concerned over this hiring irregularity, Gary Elias requested
the following information from the Respondent in a letter dated
February 20 (GC Exh. 9),
In order to determine if I have been discriminated against, I
hereby request inspection of and copies of the hiring hall re-
ferral records as follows:
All referrals to the removal of the show (load out) of LV The-
atrical Group, it’s successors and assigns, (Phantom of the
Opera) on or about September 2, 2012: including but not lim-
ited to the names, addresses, phone numbers, open call or let-

3 Gary Elias testified that he has been a member of Local 720 for
“25 years as of August” (2014) (Tr. 76). It is not clear if he is a mem-
ber at this time.
4 As an example, Gary Elias holds a skill card as a forklift operator
referenced in GC Exh. 8.
ter of request and list status of those referred.
Please schedule a time when I may inspect these records and
receive copies of them within 15 days of the above date of
this letter or provide a reasonable date when I will be able to
do so.
I agree to pay the cost of copying those records up to $5.00.
Should the cost exceed that, please notify me with the ex-
pected cost.
Gary Elias gave the February 20 information request to a re-
ceptionist working at the Respondent’s office. Although Gary
Elias penned in the name of “Melissa” who had allegedly re-
ceived his request for information, the document was actually
given to an unidentified person. Gary Elias asked that his in-
formation request be given to Ron Poveromo5 (Tr. 80–82). It
is not disputed that the Respondent received the February 20
information request.
The Respondent provided five pages of records for the Phan-
tom musical. The Respondent did not provide a list status of
referrals for list A and did not provide any of the phone num-
bers or address information of the referents (R. Exh. 1). Gary
Elias complained that the information was incomplete because
the names did not include the addresses and phone numbers.
He also maintained that the names on the lists were not subdi-
vided into list A, B, B1, and B2. Gary Elias testified that since
he is on list A, the requested information would shed some light
as to whether his name was bypassed for a referent lower on the
order of precedence (Tr. 89–91).
Cook testified that a partial list was provided but the ad-
dresses and phone numbers of the referents on the list were not
included. Cook maintained that phone numbers and address
information have never been provided by the Respondent. He
said that if a member needed an address or number of another
individual, the Respondent would inform that person and leave
it up to him/her to provide the address or phone number to the
inquiring person (Tr. 50–53).
It is not clear when Gary Elias received the partial infor-
mation. Gary Elias testified that he subsequently spoke with
Jeff Foran, the business representative at the time, about the
missing information. On March 3, Gary Elias emailed Foran to
reiterate their conversations that the information request was
for names, addresses, and phone numbers. Foran replied by
email on the following day and informed Gary Elias that he will
“work on this tomorrow” after his union meeting (Tr. 91, 92;
GC Exh. 12). The Respondent never provided the addresses
and phone information of the referents.
c. The April 24 information request
Gary Elias testified he made a second information request on
April 24 because his first request was incomplete (GC Exh. 13).
The April 24 letter also requested information on a nonreferral
regarding Tina Elias.6 The Eliases were concerned over her
nonreferral after her work on the Phantom of the Opera ended
in September 2012 (Tr. 92, 93). Tina Elias testified to receiv-

5 At the time, Poveromo was the secretary-treasurer for Local 720
(Tr. 54).
6 Tina Elias is the spouse of Gary Elias.
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE, LOCAL 720 (TROPICANA LAS VEGAS, INC.) 5
ing only two letters of request but no open calls from the end of
her work on Phantom on September 2, 2012, through April 28
(Tr. 144, 145).7 The April 24 information request stated the
following
Dear Jeff Foran:
You have been repeatedly advised the hiring hall records pro-
vided per my February 20, 2014 request were incomplete. In
the spirit of cooperation I reduced that request to three job
numbers. On March 4, 2014 you said you would have to work
on them the following day.
You have stated that past list status of those referred is diffi-
cult to determine. A referral log similar to the paper referral
log formally used by Local 720 should be in existence par-
ticularly if kept on the automated dispatch system now in use.
It’s noted that Local 720 has not to my knowledge tracked
hours worked but rather tracked individual earnings and di-
vided them by the prevailing rate. Those earnings records
would therefore become necessary should Local 720 fail to
establish past list status in hiring hall records to determine past
order of precedence.
In conversation on or about March 27, 2014, you stated that
certain part time employees had never been signed out there-
fore (sic) they were called for several open positions when
Tina Elias was not. This is mostly irrelevant in the open call
rotation because that part time employment should have been
received from via a Letter of Request from the employer.
That would only affect the open call rotation if the next refer-
ents were working at the exact same time requested via a Let-
ter of Request. Additionally the Local has long held that the
employer not the Local determines the Letter of Request. It’s
also long held even if the referent has full time work or part
time work, the Local can’t discriminate based on Letters of
Request or open calls. The Local MUST dispatch those refer-
ents on Letters of Request and open calls for which they are
available. Only the union is charged with running a non-
discriminatory (sic) hiring hall, not the employer. The Local
has long signed referents out based on only on their availabil-
ity but does not remove them from the open skill card rota-
tion. To do so would discriminate against those which the
employer and not the Local has sole control.
On or about April 10, 2014 you stated that Tina Elias’s phone
number had been changed without her knowledge or request
and that the automated dispatch system had been calling the
wrong number. You further stated that you would be working
over the weekend to resolve these issues. No further infor-
mation has been provided as of the date of this letter despite
several attempts to resolve this matter on our part.
You are reminded of the National Labor Relations Board Or-
der that provides that Local 720 must allow Gary Elias and
Tina Elias to inspect and receive copies of hiring hall records.

7 Tina Elias is also a list A referent, particularly for wardrobe work
(Tr. 50).
The following is a joint request in keeping with that order.
Given our discussion now it’s a matter of not only who actu-
ally took the work but who was called for it. Therefore (sic)
our request is expanded. The Local’s refusal to provide names
addresses and phone numbers list status and a log of those
called is unreasonable given its computer dispatch system.
In order to determine if we have been discriminated against,
we hereby request inspection of and will request copies as
needed of the hiring hall referral records as follows:
All referrals for bid slips for all positions for which Gary Elias
and Tina Elias hold skill cards to Mama Mia at the Tropicana
on or about January 8, 2014. Including but not limited to the
names, addresses, phone numbers, and list status of those re-
ferred. Please note that names, addresses, phone numbers and
list status are absolutely requested.
From the date of our written letter on or about September 3,
2012, a copy of that letter. All CALLS, and referrals for
which we have skill cards. Including but not limited to the
names, addresses, phone numbers, open call or letter of re-
quest and list status of those CALLED. Please note that
names, addresses, phone numbers and list status are absolute-
ly requested. With regard to Gary Elias this would temporary
end with his open call on October 18, 2012 with regard to
open calls but would include those calls for which any bid
slips were given for any referrals for bid slips to employers for
which he has skill cards. Please also provide any calls for his
forklift skill card from the date of my re- certification in De-
cember 2013 and January 2014. With regard to Tina Elias
this would include all open and letter of request calls and bid
slips for any Wardrobe card she has signed in to present, not-
ing that she temporary signed out her Stagecraft cards.
Please schedule a time when we may inspect these records
and receive copies of them as needed within 15 days of the
above date of this letter or provide a reasonable date when we
will be able to do so.
We agree to pay the costs of copying those records as we re-
quire during that inspection. Please notify us of the expected
cost per page.
Sincerely.
Gary S. Elias Tina Elias
Delivered by hand.
Gary Elias gave the request to Poveromo on April 24. Gary
Elias said he was willing to negotiate with Poveromo over the
information being requested. Gary Elias thought that
Poveromo was amendable to his suggestion to negotiate. Gary
Elias also requested information on the Mama Mia musical
located at the Tropicana because his spouse was not referred
despite being on list A. Gary Elias noted that Tina Elias even-
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tually received a bid slip after he intervened on her behalf by
contacting Foran about her not receiving a bid (Tr. 93–97).
Tina Elias testified that she is on list A and has a wardrobe
skill card but was not called for the Mama Mia musical (Tr.
128, 129). Tina Elias also stated she was never informed about
employment for the Jubilee show at the Bally’s Hotel and Casi-
no. Tina Elias testified that she had several Facebook text con-
versations with Karen Bauer (Bauer), a coworker. Tina Elias
asked Bauer whether she received any dispatch calls for job
referrals. Bauer said she received a call for a job on at the Jubi-
lee on March 21. Tina Elias replied to Bauer that she never got
that call. Tina Elias testified that the Respondent would send
out automated calls (sometimes referred as a Blast) to referents
for job openings. Tina Elias never received the automated mes-
sage from the Respondent that work was available at the Jubi-
lee.
Bauer also informed Tina Elias in another Facebook conver-
sation on January 8 that Bauer received a dispatch call for a bid
assignment on the Mama Mia musical. Tina Elias complained
to Bauer that she had not received a referral call from the Re-
spondent since the Phantom musical had closed (in September
2012). Tina Elias testified she was suspicious that the automat-
ed dispatch system was not working correctly because she nev-
er received a bid call for Mama Mia and Jubilee although all
List A referents should have been called for open positions (Tr.
131–136: GC Exhs. 14, 15, 16).
I find that the Eliases have demonstrated a reasonable suspi-
cion that they may have been discriminatory bypassed for the
Phantom of the Opera and the Mama Mia musicals. Tina Elias
testified she never received another referral after the end of the
Phantom show. With regard to the Mama Mia musical, she
testified receiving a phone text from a coworker who was re-
ferred for a wardrobe job even though he did not have a ward-
robe skill card and was informed by another coworker that
dispatch calls were made to others for the Jubilee show but not
to her. Gary Elias testified he wanted information on all dis-
patch calls made for referrals on Mama Mia because Foran had
previously related to him that the Respondent could not reach
Tina Elias because she had allegedly changed her phone num-
ber. Gary Elias also requested information on forklift referrals
because he holds a forklift operator skill card but was never
referred for a trade show that required forklift operators (Tr. 97,
98).
The Eliases met with Cook, Foran, and Poveromo on April
28 to discuss the April 24 information request. Gary Elias ob-
served that Foran had a handwritten list and was allegedly pre-
pared to hand it over to him. Gary Elias requested that Foran
initial the list before handing it over. According to Gary Elias,
Cook “snatched it” as Foran was about to slide the list towards
Gary Elias. Cook said he needed to first review the document.
Cook then stated to the Eliases that he had a problem with giv-
ing out the addresses and phone numbers of the referents on the
list (Tr. 111–114).
Tina Elias recalled that Foran told them at the meeting that
he had the information that was requested. Tina Elias testified
that Cook seemed agitated and grabbed the list away to review
it. Tina Elias remembered Cook saying “I’ll get back later”
about the list (Tr.136, 137).
Cook testified he was aware of the Eliases’ second infor-
mation request. He stated that he met with the Eliases on April
28 and provided a partial response to the request. Cook said
that Gary Elias had reviewed the list, but he did not turn the
document over to the Eliases. Cook said that the phone num-
bers and addresses were not shown to the Eliases (Tr. 54, 55,
64, 65). Cook said that the Respondent never disclose phone
numbers and addresses because of a privacy issue to protect the
referents and union members (Tr. 68, 69). Upon my examina-
tion, Cook admitted that it would be difficult for someone on
the referral list A to determine whether a referent on list B was
called first (without actually having the information to review
the referents on the lists) but surmised that the individual could
look at his/her dispatch information for the answer (Tr. 63, 64).
The Eliases never received the list or any other information on
this request.
Discussion and Analysis
The counsel for the General Counsel alleges that the Re-
spondent operates an exclusive hiring referral service that pro-
vides skilled laborers to perform stagehand work with signatory
employers in the Las Vegas, Nevada area. The counsel for the
General Counsel maintains that the signatory employers are
contractually obligated to utilize the Respondent’s referral ser-
vice to request employees to perform bargaining unit work and
to provide the Respondent with an exclusive opportunity to fill
the requests before the employers could hire from other
sources.
The counsel for the General Counsel argues that the Re-
spondent has a duty of fair representation toward all eligible
users of an exclusive hiring hall, including providing relevant
information requested by a referent. The counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel alleges that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act when it failed and refused to provide
relevant information requested by the Eliases.
It is well established that, as an operator of an exclusive hir-
ing hall, a union owes a duty of fair representation to all appli-
cants using that hall. Radio-Electronics Officers Union, 306
NLRB 43, 44 (1992); Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local
6, 493 U.S. 67 (1989). As part of its duty of fair representation,
a union has an obligation to operate the exclusive hiring hall in
a manner that is not “arbitrary or unfair.” Id. Along with that
duty, a union is also required to provide applicants for em-
ployment with information sufficient so they can intelligently
challenge the hiring hall structure and determine whether
it operates fairly. Therefore, a union violates the Act when it
arbitrarily denies a request for job referral information if the
request is reasonably directed toward ascertaining whether the
user has been treated fairly.
The Respondent presents a myriad of defenses for refusing
and failing to provide the information requested, to wit: (A) No
duty of fair representation in a right-to-work state; (B) The
General Counsel failed to establish jurisdiction over any em-
ployer other than the Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc.; (C) The Re-
spondent does not operate an exclusive hiring hall; (D) The
charging party’s requests are moot because the Board has in-
vestigated the charging party’s allegations that he has been
discriminated against and concluded that there is no evidence of
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE, LOCAL 720 (TROPICANA LAS VEGAS, INC.) 7
discrimination; (E) The complaint is barred by the statute of
limitations contained in Section 10(b) of the Act; (F) Referents
are not entitled to information to determine whether there has
been a violation of the Act; (G) The General Counsel failed to
establish a compelling government interest in the forced disclo-
sure of hiring hall users’ telephone numbers and personal ad-
dresses to a private individual that outweighs the substantial
First Amendment association privacy rights at issue; (H) The
General Counsel failed to establish that the Respondent violat-
ed the duty of fair representation; (I) Disclosure of phone num-
bers, names and addresses interferes with the right to refrain
contained in Section 7 of the Act; (J) The allegations pertaining
to the February 20 request must be dismissed because the Re-
spondent provided the charging party with all requested infor-
mation except telephone numbers and addresses; (K) The alle-
gations in the complaint pertaining to nonparty Tina Elias must
be dimissed in their entirety; (L) The Respondent has no obli-
gation to provide the charging party a copy of correspondence
authored by the charging party in his April 24 request; (M) The
April 24 request is overbroad and unintelligible and was drafted
in an overboard fashion for retaliatory reasons; and (N) The
proviso of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act protects the Respond-
ent’s actions (see, R. Br.).
The Respondent’s defenses are addressed in seriatim
A. No Duty of Fair Representation in a
Right-to-Work State.
The Respondent argues that it has no duty to provide Gary
Elias with referral records because such obligation solely arises
from the duty of fair representation, which cannot apply in a
right-to-work state as to nonmembers who refused to pay for
representation.
I find this argument without merit. The Respondent cites no
Board authority holding that there is no duty of fair representa-
tion of a nonmember in a right-to-work state. In contrast, the
Supreme Court and Board decisions have consistently held that
a union has a duty of fair representation to members and non-
members alike. Breininger; above; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1971); Radio-Electronics Officers Union, above.
In my opinion, the duty of fair representation to a nonmem-
ber is not removed simply because the Respondent is located in
a right-to-work state. In International Association of Machin-
ists Local 697 (H.O. Canfield Rubber Co. of Virginia, Inc.),
223 NLRB 832 (1976), the Board held that a worker in Virgin-
ia, a right-to-work state, was unlawfully informed that IAM
would not pursue his grievance unless he paid a fee toward the
cost of union representation. The employee was not an IAM
member, and the local told him his nonmembership was the
reason for the union’s demand for a fee. The Board held in
Machinists that “a grievance procedure is vital to collective
bargaining and . . . grievance representation is due employees
as a matter of right.” The Board held that “[t]o discriminate
against nonmembers by charging them for what is due them by
right restrains them in the exercise of their statutory rights” the
IAM violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
Equally applicable here, I find that the Respondent has a du-
ty of fair representation because it gains a thing of value by
being allowed the power of exclusive representation over all
employees in the bargaining unit whether the employees agree
or not, and that value is sufficient compensation for whatever
services the Respondent perform for employees. A union has
such comprehensive authority vested in it when it acts as the
exclusive agent of users of a hiring hall and because the users
must place such dependence on the union that there necessarily
arises a fiduciary duty on the part of the union not to conduct
itself in an arbitrary, invidious, or discriminatory manner when
representing those who seek to be referred out for employment
by it.
As such, the duty of fair representation is attached because of
the exclusiveness of the referral service and is not depended
upon the geographic location of the referrals.
B. The General Counsel Failed to Establish Jurisdiction
over any Employer other than the Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc.
The Respondent argues that the Board has no jurisdiction
over employers that were not named in the complaint, but were
involved in the information requested by the Eliases. Essential-
ly, the Respondent maintains that the General Counsel failed to
establish that the Board has jurisdiction over any employer
other than Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc. who uses the referral
system. The Respondent further maintains that even with Trop-
icana Las Vegas, Inc., the General Counsel had failed to shows
that Tropicana was an employer of the bargaining unit employ-
ees because there were several subcontractors that actually
employed and supervised the unit employees.
I find the Respondent’s arguments without merit. With re-
gard to Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc., it is not disputed that the
Board has jurisdiction over this employer. The General Coun-
sel established that there is a collective-bargaining agreement
between the Respondent and Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc. The
collective-bargaining agreement at article 2.02 (GC Exh. 7)
defines Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc. as the employer and the type
of work for which employees are directly employed by the
employer to include
Stage carpentry installation, operations, maintenance and
dismantle
Stage electrical installation, operations, maintenance and dis-
mantle
Stage properties installation, operations, maintenance and
dismantle
Stage sound installation, operations, maintenance and disman-
tle
Stage automation installation, operations, maintenance and
dismantle
Stage special effects installation, operations, maintenance and
dismantle
Wardrobe, Hair and Make-up
Convention/Audio Visual installation, operations, mainte-
nance and dismantle
Lounge installation, operations, maintenance and dismantle
Cook testified that the above are the type of work that the
Respondent would refer employees to Tropicana Las Vegas,
Inc. for employment. Penna testified that Tropicana Las Vegas,
Inc. was the employer and as the employer, it first provides the
vacancies for referrals of craft jobs listed in the collective-
8 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
bargaining agreement to the Respondent and if Tropicana did
not follow the hiring procedure in the agreement, Tropicana
would be subjected to grievances filed by the Respondent.
Cook also testified that Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc. would be
subjected to a grievance for not first posting vacancies with the
Respondent. Consequently, while there may be subcontractors
involved in the operations of maintaining and dismantling the
shows, it is clear that Tropicana Las Vegas. Inc. is the sole
employer and was the successor to a prior labor agreement that
the Respondent had with Hotel Ramada of Nevada d/b/a Tropi-
cana Resort and Casino.
In contrast, the record shows that when Tropicana Las Ve-
gas, Inc. is clearly not the employer of the unit employees and
there is an outside contractor, Tropicana and the Respondent
would reach an understanding under a memorandum of agree-
ment as to the parameters of the subcontractor’s work responsi-
bilities with the unit employees (GC Exh. 7 at 51). As such, I
find that the Board established jurisdiction over Tropicana Las
Vegas, Inc. as the employer on all occasions during the time
frame that the Eliases requested information about referrals and
dispatch records regarding musicals located at the Tropicana
Las Vegas, Inc.
I also find that the Respondent’s defense that the information
requests for referrals and dispatch records pertaining to em-
ployers not named in the complaint should be dismissed as
without merit.8 The Board’s jurisdiction over the Respondent
is not in dispute. Clearly, the only issue is whether the Re-
spondent violated the Act. The Board’s jurisdiction over the
employers not named in the complaint is unnecessary to deter-
mine whether the actions of the Respondent violated the Act.
C. The Respondent Does Not Operate an Exclusive
Hiring Hall.
A threshold issue to address is whether the Respondent even
operates an exclusive hiring hall, for absent of that showing, the
duty of fair representation does not attach. Teamsters Local
460 (Superior Asphalt), 300 NLRB 441 (1990). A union’s duty
of fair representation derives from its status as the exclusive
bargaining representative of employees.9 Teamsters Local 519
(Rust Engineering Co.), 276 NLRB 898, 908 (1985); Denver
Theatrical Stage Employees IASTE Local 7, 339 NLRB 214,
219 (2003).
The Board has reasoned that a union’s monopoly over avail-
able jobs, combined with procedures that favor union members
or irregularities that result in giving great discretion in referrals
to the union agents who run the hall, tends unlawfully to en-
courage employees to be compliant. Teamsters Local 460,
above at 441. Thus, a union owes a duty of fair representation
in the operation of a hiring hall only if it is the employer’s ex-
clusive source of labor. If Local 720 does not operate as an
exclusive hiring hall as alleged, it had no duty to provide the
information requested. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 11 (Los
Angeles NECA), 270 NLRB 424, 426 (1984).

8 As an example, the Respondent argues that the allegation that it
failed to provide information on referrals to the Phantom of the Opera
musical located at the Venetian Hotel and Casino should be dismissed
because the Venetian was not named as an employer in the complaint.
9 The Respondent does not dispute that it is a labor organization.
The Respondent argues that it is not an exclusive hiring hall
because Tropicana may reject referred applicants; it is permit-
ted to issue letters of no rehire to previous employees; may call
specific employees by name for jobs; and may hire employees
directly for bargaining unit positions (R. Br. at 8). I find no
merit to any of the Respondent’s arguments that it is not an
exclusive hiring hall.10
I find that the General Counsel has met his burden in estab-
lishing that the Respondent operates an exclusive hiring hall
because the Respondent is the initial source for applicants for
employment. A union’s hiring hall is exclusive if it is an em-
ployer’s initial or primary source for employees. Stage Em-
ployees IATSE, Local 720 (AVW Audio Visuals, Inc.), 341
NLRB 1267 (2004); Denver Theatrical Stage Employees Union
No. 7, above. Here, Tropicana and other employers must first
utilize the Respondent’s referral service and may seek appli-
cants from other sources only if it cannot fill the vacancies from
the Respondent’s referrals. I again credit the testimony of
Penna when she stated that the collective-bargaining agreement
between Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc. and Local 720 requires the
employer to first contact the Respondent’s dispatch office for
applicants for employment before going to other sources.11
Article 4.03 of collective-bargaining agreement supports
Penna’s testimony and states, “The Employer shall first (em-
phasis added) call the dispatching office of the Union for such
applicants as it may, from time to time need . . . .” Penna testi-
fied to three different hiring procedures, but in all instances, the
job postings and requests for applicants are first passed through
the Respondent’s hiring hall. In Denver Stage Employees
IASTE Local No. 7, above, at 216, 217, the Board affirmed the
judge in finding that the union operated an exclusive referral
service where parties’ contract states that the employer “will
give the Union first opportunity to furnish, and the union agrees
to furnish, applicants for employment with the requisite skills.”
Here, the exclusiveness of the referral service is further bolster
by article 4.03 (e) of the collective-bargaining agreement that
gives the Respondent up to 48 hours to refer applicants to Trop-
icana before the employer may seek other employment sources.
Penna testified she has seen similar language in collective-

10 The Respondent’s insistence that it is not an exclusive hiring hall
borders on being specious. Previously Board decisions have found
IATSE Local 720 operating an exclusive hiring hall. Stage Employees
IATSE, Local 720 (AVW Audio Visuals), above (the Board noted in the
case remanded by the United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth
Circuit that “. . . a heightened duty of fair dealing applies to the union’s
operations of an exclusive hiring hall (citing Jacoby v. NLRB, 233 F.3d
611 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); and Stage Employees IATSE, Local 720 (Pro-
duction Support Services), 352 NLRB 1081 (2008) (the Board adopted
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge finding that IATSE,
Local 720 operated an exclusive hiring hall).
11 The credibility resolutions herein have been derived from a re-
view of the entire testimonial record and exhibits, with due regard for
the logic of probability, the demeanor of the witnesses, and the reason-
able inferences that may be drawn from the record as a whole. Double
D Construction Group, 339 NLRB 303, 305 (2003); Daikichi Sushi,
335 NLRB 622, 623 (2001). Credibility findings need not be all-or-
nothing propositions—indeed, nothing is more common in all kinds of
judicial decisions than to believe some, but not all, of a witness’ testi-
mony. Daikichi Sushi, above.
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE, LOCAL 720 (TROPICANA LAS VEGAS, INC.) 9
bargaining agreements between other employers and the Re-
spondent, including the Excalibur Hotel and Casino. Cook
confirmed that employers other than Tropicana have similar
language in their collective-bargaining agreements with the
Respondent and that such contract language is enforceable
through grievances if an employer fails to follow the referral
process in the agreement.
The mere fact that Tropicana and other employers may reject
a referent for legitimate business reasons does not diminish the
Respondent’s exclusiveness in referring applicants for em-
ployment. In the business world, any employer may reject an
unqualified applicant for employment or not to rehire an em-
ployee found not to have satisfactory performed on the job.
This authority inherent in the responsibilities of being an em-
ployer is not demonstratively indicative that the Respondent is
not an exclusive hiring hall. Indeed, the collective-bargaining
agreement allows for the rejection of referred applicants based
upon the judgment of Tropicana as to the competency and qual-
ifications of the applicants. The agreement also allows Tropi-
cana to call applicants by name, but only through the Respond-
ent’s referral service and only from the A list. Additionally,
Tropicana must wait 48 hours for the Respondent to refer quali-
fied applicants before permitted to look elsewhere for appli-
cants12 (GC Exh. 7). Here, as set forth above, the parties’ writ-
ten agreement and practice clearly indicate that applicants must
go through the Respondent to obtain work with the signatory
companies and they cannot be hired directly by the company
off the street or through a referral from other sources. Alt-
hough an employer may request or reject particular workers on
the Respondent’s referral list, and hire other workers if the
Respondent is unable to fill a numerical request from the list,
the Board has repeatedly held that such provisions or limited
exceptions do not render an otherwise exclusive referral ar-
rangement nonexclusive.
The Respondent cites no Board authority for the proposition
that the exclusiveness of the referral service is rendered nonex-
clusive by the ability of an employer to hire, fire, or seek appli-
cants from outside sources after no qualified applicants are
referred to the employer.13
D. The Charging Party’s Requests are Moot Because the Board
has Investigated the Charging Party’s Allegations That He Has
Been Discriminated Against and Concluded That There is No
Evidence of Discrimination.
The unfair labor practice charge alleges that the Respondent
discriminated against the Eliases by not dispatching them for
arbitrary and discriminatory reasons. That allegation was dis-
missed by the Regional Director (R. Exh. 2). On appeal from

12 It is well settled that a hiring hall is deemed to be exclusive where
the union retains exclusive authority for referrals for some specified
period of time, such as 24 or 48 hours before an employer can hire on
its own. Carpenters Local 608 (Various Employers), 279 NLRB 747,
754 (1986).
13 The Board has held that provisions allowing the employer to re-
quest certain referrals by name or to reject applicants not qualified and
to hire from outside sources do not render the exclusive referral service
nonexclusive. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 727, 358
NLRB No. 86, slip op. at 3–5 (2012) and cases cited therein.
the Region’s dismissal, the Board upheld the Regional Direc-
tor’s dismissal of the charge pertaining to the alleged discrimi-
natory nonreferral of Gary Elias and stated that the investiga-
tion of the charge did not establish
. . . . that any alleged failures in the referral system-including
inaccuracies in the phone number database-were linked to un-
lawful discrimination, but rather to errors and inaccuracies in
the operation of the automated dispatch system, which would
not rise above the level of mere negligence
The complaint alleges that the information requested by the
Eliases was necessary and relevant for them to evaluate wheth-
er they had been fairly treated under the Respondent’s referral
system. The complaint further alleges that the Respondent’s
failure and refusal to provide the information requested is a
violation of section 8(b)(1)(A).
The Respondent argues that the complaint is moot because
the Region had determined there was no evidence that the Re-
spondent had failed to dispatch Gary Elias for arbitrary and
discriminatory reasons (R. Br. at 9, 10). I disagree.
The failure to provide relevant requested information based
upon a reasonable suspicion of a discriminatory referral service
is an independent violation of the Act and is not linked to
whether the allegation of a different violation was established
during the Region’s investigation of the charge. My findings
that the Eliases had a reasonable belief that their referral rights
may have been violated are sufficient to trigger the information
requests. Gary Elias testified without contradiction that he was
never referred for a trade show convention after he was quali-
fied and received his forklift skill card. Tina Elias credibly
testified that she possessed a wardrobe skill card for many
years and was not called but discovered that a coworker with-
out a wardrobe skill card was referred for a job.
As noted above, a union’s duty of fair representation derives
from its status as the exclusive bargaining representative of
employees and a fiduciary duty arises on the part of the union
not to conduct itself in an arbitrary, invidious, or discriminatory
manner when representing those who seek to be referred out for
employment by it. A union violates the Act when it arbitrarily
denies a request for job referral information if the request is
reasonably directed toward ascertaining whether the user has
been treated fairly. Teamsters Local 519 (Rust Engineering
Co.), above. The relief in such a situation, as in the complaint
herein, would require the Respondent to provide the infor-
mation requested by the charging party. In contrast, the relief
where there is a discriminatory referral system would provide
the charging party with referrals that were denied to him due to
the discriminatory hiring hall service.
E. The Complaint is Barred By the Statute of Limitations in
Section 10(b) of the Act.
The Respondent argues that the information requests seek
records pertaining to activity that occurred more than 6 months
before the requests were made, as well as records that were
created more than 6 months prior to the requests. The infor-
mation request of February 24 sought referrals to the Phantom
of the Opera that closed on or about September 24, 2012 (GC
Exh. 9). The Respondent argues that this request seeks docu-
10 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ments “far outside” the statute of limitations period. The Re-
spondent maintains that the charging party waived his right to
vindicate any harm he may have suffered on or about Septem-
ber 2, 2012, when he waited until February 24 to make his in-
formation request. The Respondent states that the allegations
regarding the second request of April 24 should also be similar-
ly dismissed because the April 24 request seeks documents
outside the statute of limitations. The April 24 information
request sought all referral records for the Mama Mia musical on
or about January 8, 2014. The request also sought hiring hall
documents for which the Eliases have skill cards from Septem-
ber 3, 2012, and to include any referrals during the time that
Gary Elias held a forklift skill card from December 2013 to
January 2014. It also sought referral records pertaining to the
time that Tina Elias held a wardrobe skill card (September
2012) to the present (GC Exh. 13).
Section 10(b) of the Act is a statute of limitations and it is an
affirmative defense and, if not timely raised, it is waived. Pub-
lic Service Co., 312 NLRB 459, 461 (1983); DTR Industries,
311 NLRB 833, 833 fn. 1 (1993).
The Respondent’s affirmative defense states that “. . . the
complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, as
set forth in the National Labor Relations Act” (GC Exh. 1(e)).
The General Counsel argues that the Respondent failed to ar-
ticulate or present any evidence at the hearing and failed to
specify which allegations it believes are outside the 10(b) stat-
ute of limitations. The General Counsel also asserts that the
February 20 and April 24 information requests are within 10(b)
limitations from the date the charge was filed on June 18 (GC
Br. at 28, 29).
The Respondent did not specify in its answer the allegations
perceived as untimely and did not litigate the timeliness issue at
trial, but is nevertheless now arguing that the allegations should
be dismissed under Section 10(b) because the activity for the
information requested is beyond the 6 month statute of limita-
tions.
The Respondent’s argument on the issue of timeliness is
misplaced. The violation of the Act as alleged in the complaint
is the failure of the Respondent to provide relevant records
pursuant to two timely requests for information. The complaint
does not allege any violations beyond the 6-month period and
certainly, the complaint does not seek relief for the Eliases
when they were not referred in 2012 and 2013. The Respond-
ent, again, cites no Board authority that would allow for the
dismissal of the complaint in situations where information on
the activity contained in the request was outside the 6-month
period. In Carpenters Local 102 (Millwright Employers Assn.),
317 NLRB 1099 (1995), the union, operating an exclusive hir-
ing hall, denied the charging party’s information request for
approximately 1 year of dispatch records. The Board adopted
the judge’s decision’s that the parties had agreed that the charg-
ing party was only entitled to 6 months of dispatch records but
the judge also noted that there was no precedent limiting the
look back to 6 months and it was unclear whether “it was legal-
ly appropriate to equate an employee’s look back rights with
Section 10(b)’s 6-month rule.” Carpenters Local 102, above,
slip op. at 1105. In adopting the judge’s decision, the Board
held it was unnecessary to address whether the respondent
could have lawfully denied requests for dispatch records dating
back further than 6 months.14
F. Referents Are Not Entitled to Information to Determine
Whether There Has Been a Violation of the Act.
A union’s duty of fair representation includes an obligation
to provide access to job referral lists to allow an individual to
determine whether his referral rights are being protected. Op-
erating Engineers Local 324, 226 NLRB 587 (1976). Thus, a
union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) when it arbitrarily denies a
referent’s request for job referral information. My findings
above clearly establish the Eliases’ reasonable belief that their
referral rights may have been violated to trigger their requests
for information.
The Respondent argues that “the General Counsel failed to
introduce any evidence establishing how, specifically, the tele-
phone numbers and addresses of users of the hiring hall were
necessary and relevant for the charging party to conduct his
investigation.”
The Board affirmed the judge in Bartenders’ finding that the
charging party should have access to the requested information
notwithstanding that the record was “‘naked’ of discrimination
against registrant.” Bartenders’ & Beverage Dispenser’s Un-
ion, Local 165, 261 NLRB 420, 423 (1982). Thus the Bartend-
ers’ holding, supports the charging party’s argument that the
telephone numbers and addresses of users are relevant if it
helps the charging party to determine whether or not discrimi-
nation has occurred.
G. The General Counsel Failed to Establish a Compelling
Government Interest in the Forced Disclosure of Hiring Hall
Users’ Telephone Numbers and Personal Addresses to a Pri-
vate Individual that Outweighs the Substantial First Amend-
ment Association Privacy Rights at Issue.
The Respondent argues that, “the charging party’s requests
directly implicate hiring hall users’ and the union’s and its
members’ associational privacy rights” (R. Br. at 11). To sup-
port its assertion the Respondent cites to NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958). In NAACP, the Supreme Court held that
“there is a vital relationship between freedom to associate and
privacy in one’s associations.” Id. at 462. The Respondent
argues that “the right of associational privacy reasonably ex-
tends to telephone numbers, which are analogous to addresses,
in that a telephone number is a means for achieving contact
with an individual, and which may also be used for purposes of
conducting surveillance and carrying out harassment” (R. Br. at
12).
The Respondent, however, omits from its brief the Court’s
analysis in NAACP, which immediately follows the paragraph,
which it does cite. The Court reasoned that the production
order in that case “entail[ed] the likelihood of substantial re-
straint upon the exercise by petitioner’s members of their right
to freedom of association.” The NAACP had made an “uncon-

14 In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 24
(Mona Electric), 356 NLRB 581 (2011), the Board affirmed the judge’s
finding that the union violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act when it re-
fused to provide 4 years of records from February 2005 to May 2009 in
an information request.
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE, LOCAL 720 (TROPICANA LAS VEGAS, INC.) 11
troverted showing” that on past occasions where the members’
identities were revealed the members were exposed to “eco-
nomic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion,
and other manifestations of public hostility.” The Court went
on to say, “under these circumstances, we think it apparent that
compelled disclosure of petitioner and its members . . . may
induce members to withdraw from the Association and dis-
suade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their
beliefs shown through their associations and of the conse-
quences of this exposure. . . .” NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at
462. Here, the Respondent fails to provide any specific inci-
dents or support for it to reasonably believe that the charging
party would harass other members after he receives the request-
ed information or that a production order in this case would
chill union membership.15
In my opinion, if First Amendment protections were at issue,
the Respondent would have to show that the members on its list
had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the disclo-
sure of their names, addresses, and telephone numbers. The
Respondent would also need to show that disclosure of the
information would expose the referents to harassment by the
Eliases. The Respondent made no such showing at this trial.
The Respondent argues that “the treatment afforded mem-
bership list under the Labor Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act (LMRDA) bolsters the asserted substantial privacy
right in hiring hall users’ telephone numbers and addresses” (R.
Br. at 13). The Respondent cites Section 401 of the LMRDA,
which mandates that a union must provide a means for candi-
dates in union elections to distribute campaign literature to
union members, but states that the candidate’s right to inspec-
tion does not include the right to copy the list. 29 U.S.C.
§452.71(a).
In Carpenters Local 608, the respondent presented the same
argument under the same rule of law. Carpenters Local 608,
279 NLRB 747 (1986). In that case, Judge Fish reasoned and
the Board affirmed that, “the section of the LMRDA cited by
Respondent merely regulates intraunion election campaigns in
connection with disclosure of membership lists to candidates
and, even at that, does not prohibit a union from granting more
extensive disclosure than the statute requires.” Id. Furthermore,
Judge Fish opined, “clearly the intent of the statute is to provide
a minimum amount of disclosure in an election campaign, not
to prevent a union from doing so, or authorizing a union to
decline to do so in appropriate situations.” Id. Thus, the
Board’s affirmation of Judge Fish’s analysis makes the Re-
spondent’s argument inapposite.
Moreover, the Respondent’s assertion that under the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA) telephone numbers and ad-
dresses are regularly treated as private information and thus
protected from disclosure is summarily misplaced. FOIA pro-
vides that any person has a right to obtain access to federal
agency records. See, Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
Sec. 552 (1966). FOIA, like the LMRDA is inapplicable to the

15 Similarly, I find that the two information requests were not de-
signed by the Eliases to harass the Respondent. As noted, the charge
filed by Gary Elias with regard to the refusal of the Respondent to
provide him with referral records has not shown to be without merit.
charging party’s request. “The Board has rejected the argument
that phone numbers and addresses are ‘confidential’ in the con-
text of a request for hiring hall information.” Carpenters Local
608, 279 NLRB 747, 759 (1986); Bartender’s above (the Board
affirmed the administrative law judge’s rejection of the union’s
argument that the hiring hall records were confidential because
the allegedly confidential information was likely available in
the telephone directory).
H. The General Counsel Failed to Establish that the Respond-
ent Violated the Duty of Fair Representation.
Having found and concluded that the Respondent operates an
exclusive hiring hall, the duty of fair representation attaches to
the Respondent. As such, the Respondent must provide its
users with sufficient information, if requested, so they can de-
termine whether they are being treated fairly and the Respond-
ent is “automatically obligated” to provide such relevant infor-
mation in the absence of some good reason for withholding the
information. Radio—Electronics Officers Union, above; Oper-
ating Engineers Local 513 (Various Employers), 308 NLRB
1300, 1302 (1992) (“It is well-settled that a Union which oper-
ates an exclusive hiring hall breaches its duty of fair representa-
tion under the National Labor Relations Act when it arbitrarily
denies requests of its members for job referral information,
where such requests are reasonably directed toward ascertain-
ing whether such members have been properly treated in con-
nection with the operation of the hiring hall. This doctrine does
not require any particular proof of animus against the applicant,
because it rests upon a near absolute view of a union’s obliga-
tion in this area.”).
In finding that the General Counsel met its initial burden of
showing that the Respondent operates an exclusive hiring hall,
a union’s duty of fair representation includes an obligation to
provide access to job referral lists to allow an individual to
determine whether his referral rights are being protected. Oper-
ating Engineers Local 324, above; Boilermakers Local 197,
318 NLRB 205 (1995). Thus, the Respondent violates Section
8(b)(1)(A) when it arbitrarily denies a referent’s request for job
referral information, when that request is reasonably directed
towards ascertaining whether he has been fairly treated with
respect to obtaining job referrals, unless the Respondent can
show the refusal is necessary to vindicate legitimate union in-
terests. Boilermakers Local 197, above. When Gary Elias
sought hiring hall information because he reasonably believes
he has been treated unfairly by the hiring hall, the Respondent
acted arbitrarily by denying the requested information. Car-
penters Local 35 (Construction Employers Assn.), 317 NLRB
18 (1995).
The Respondent argues it has a legitimate substantial interest
in preserving members and hiring hall confidence in the union
by not disclosing confidential information and that the “cases
finding that a union’s interest in confidentiality could not justi-
fy a failure to disclosure hiring hall information have rested
their conclusions on the fact the union did not actually take any
steps to protect the confidentiality of phone numbers and ad-
dresses” (R. Br. at 19). The Respondent misreads the cases its
cites as holding that where the union has created a policy of
confidentiality of phone numbers and addresses the administra-
12 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tive law judge and Board will hold that the phone numbers and
addresses are in fact confidential. Carpenters Local 608, 279
NLRB 747, 759 (1986), clearly states that the union failed to
establish that the policy of confidentiality was disseminated to
employees, any employees sought to have the information kept
confidential, or that the employees had an expectation that this
information would be kept confidential. The party claiming
confidentiality has the burden of proving that such interests are
so significant as to outweigh the union’s need for the infor-
mation.
Here, I find no evidence to show that the Respondent offered
any reasons as to why it had a confidentiality interest. By
merely asserting that something is confidential, without more,
the Respondent has not met its burden. Indeed, Foran’s reply
email to Gary Elias on his February 20 information request
stated that he was willing “. . . to work on it tomorrow” (GC
Exh. 12). In my opinion, this is not indicative that the Re-
spondent had a problem with the confidential nature of the
requested records when Foran was willing to work on providing
the information to the Eliases. Although the Respondent has
asserted the existence of a policy of confidentiality, it has not
produced any evidence of a written policy and has not demon-
strated that employees were aware of a policy of confidentiality
or that the employees have an expectation that this information
would be kept confidential.16
I. Disclosure of Phone Numbers, Names and Addresses Inter-
feres With the Right to Refrain Contained in Section 7
of the Act.
The Respondent argues that persons on the referral lists may
or may not wish to be contacted by Gary Elias to engage or not
to engage in concerted activity. The Respondent states that
until the General Counsel identifies the employees in the in-
formation sought by the Eliases wish to engage in concerted
activity, these employees have a right to refrain from being
contacted by the charging party.
The Board has held that certain types of information can be
disclosed by the exclusive union hall pursuant to the duty of
fair representation to verify the accuracy of hall data and ensure
that the hall’s hiring operations are not conducted in a discrimi-
natory manner. In that regard, the names, addresses, and tele-
phone numbers of list registrants, dispatch records, and dates of
referral are producible and a union’s refusal to supply members
of this type of information may pose a violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A). Iron Workers Local 27 (Morrison-Knudson), 313

16 In Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314–315 (1979),
cited by the Respondent, the employer was not obligated to disclose
requested test scores of employees given the sensitive nature of the
testing information and that the employer has a substantial interest in
preserving the testing information. The Respondent finds support in
Detroit Edison, arguing that the union also has a substantial interest in
keeping confidential the phone numbers and addresses. However, in
applying the balancing test articulated in Detroit Edison Co., the Re-
spondent has not met its burden of proving that such interests are so
significant as to outweigh the union’s need to keep the information
confidential, as well as not meeting its burden to seek an accommoda-
tion with the Eliases in fashioning an alternative method in disclosing
the requested information. GTE California, Inc., 324 NLRB 424, 427
(1997).
NLRB 215 (1993). The Board does not impose on the General
Counsel the perquisite of identifying referents interested in
engaging in concerted activity with the charging party before
the disclosure of their addresses and phone numbers. In addi-
tion, members and nonmembers of Local 720 are free to ignore
and refrain from engaging in concerted activity if contacted by
the charging party. Again, I find that the Respondent asserts a
nonmeritorious argument and relies on no Board precedent for
its position.
J. The Allegations Pertaining to the February 20 Request Must
Be Dismissed Because the Respondent Provided the Charging
Party with all Requested Information Except Telephone Num-
bers and Addresses.
I find this argument without merit. The Respondent cannot
seriously contend that it met its obligation to provide infor-
mation by merely giving the names of referents to Gary Elias.
In Carpenters Local 102, above, the Board held that the record-
ing of names and phone numbers was appropriate, but not so-
cial security number. In Electrical Workers (Mona Electric),
above, the Board held that permitting the charging party to
review the names, addresses, and phone numbers of out-of-state
referents was appropriate; also, Carpenters Local 35 (Construc-
tion Employers Assn.), 317 NLRB 18 (1995) (the Board affirm-
ing judge’s finding of a violation for union’s refusal to provide
requested addresses and phone information).
Gary Elias’ February 20 information request was for all re-
ferrals to the removal of the show (load out) of LV Theatrical
Group and was to include “names, addresses, phone numbers,
open call or letter of request and list status of those referred.”
Gary Elias testified that he received a copy of the referral lists
(R. Exh. 1). However, the referral lists did not include the tele-
phone numbers and addresses. The Respondent argues that if
Gary Elias was dissatisfied with the Respondent’s responses to
his request, he was obligated to inform the union, but he failed
to do so.
For the Respondent to argue that it was not on notice that its
responses were inadequate is contrary to the record. As a con-
sequence of not receiving all the relevant information, Gary
Elias credibly testified that he made a second request on April
24. His April 24 information request specifically stated that his
February 20 request was incomplete and his April 24 request
detailed the conversations he had with Foran in trying to obtain
that information. Gary Elias’ conversations with Foran demon-
stratively show that the Respondent’s response to the February
20 request was inadequate.17
Moreover, Gary Elias credibly testified that on April 28
when he met with Cook and Foran, he was able to glimpse a
copy of the referral list, but when it was about to be passed to
him, it was Cook who snatched the document away and stated
to Gary Elias that he was not entitled to the information. Gary
Elias never received the document on that date and to have the
Respondent now argue that he should have followed up and
inform the Respondent of its inadequate response would be

17 The Respondent did not seriously rebut the veracity of Gary Eli-
as’ testimony regarding the substance of his conversations with Foran
over the information requested. As such, the testimony of Gary Elias
has not been discredited by the Respondent.
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE, LOCAL 720 (TROPICANA LAS VEGAS, INC.) 13
futile since the Respondent had continuously denied the Eliases
the phone numbers and addresses. The Respondent was firm
and would not waiver in its position even if the Eliases had
made a third request.
K. The Allegations in the Complaint Pertaining to Nonparty
Tina Elias Must be Dismissed in Their Entirety.
I reject the Respondent’s argument that the allegations in the
complaint pertaining to Tina Elias must be dismissed because
she is not specifically named therein. In International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, Local 24 (Mona Electric), above,
an referent to the union’s hiring hall, Willard Richardson, was
permitted to review the hiring hall records, but not to photocop-
ied information regarding out-of-state work list, including
names, addresses, and telephone numbers. Richardson did not
file a charge and was not named as a charging party in the
complaint. The Board held that the exception taken on this
point was without merit. The Board stated that the General
Counsel had alleged in the complaint that the union unlawfully
prohibited hiring hall applicants from recording the telephone
numbers from the referral records. The Board further stated
that Richardson was a witness at the hearing in support of the
allegation and found that the complaint allegation encompassed
Richardson.
In similar fashion herein, complaint paragraph 5 (e) alleges
that the Eliases by letter dated April 24 requested information
from the Respondent for all referrals for bid slips for all posi-
tion for which Gary Elias and Tina Elias hold skill cards to
Mama Mia . . . and the refusal to provide the information re-
quested by the Eliases is an alleged violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act (GC Exh. 1(a)). Consequently, I find that
the complaint sufficiently encompassed Tina Elias.
I also find, as the Board noted in International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, Local 24, that even if the complaint did
not include Tina Elias’ name, the allegation is closely connect-
ed to the subject matter of the complaint and was fully and
fairly litigated by the parties.18 In this regard, Tina Elias testi-
fied as a witness, the Respondent cross-examined her at the trial
and the union’s president testified to his knowledge regarding
Tina Elias’ situation.
L. The Respondent Has No Obligation to Provide the Charging
Party a copy of Correspondence Authored by the Charging
Party in His April 24 Request.
The Eliases’ April 24 information request sought a copy of
their letter to the Respondent dated on or about September 3,
2012. Specifically, the April 24 information request stated, in
part, “From the date our written letter on or about September 2,
2012, a copy of that letter” (GC Exh. 13(b)). The Respondent
argues that it was not obligated to provide a document that was
authored by the charging party.
The April 24 information request was for the referral and
dispatch records based upon the Eliases’ reasonable suspicions
of a discriminatory hiring system. The request for the hiring
hall records was relevant to ascertain the validity of those sus-
picions.
In my opinion, assuming the Respondent was not required to

18 Pergament United Sales, 296 NLRB 333, 334 (1989).
provide a document already in the possession of the Eliases, I
find it inconsequential that the request sought a copy of a Sep-
tember 2 document inasmuch as it did not impact or distract
from the primary purpose of the April 24 information request,
which was to obtain the referral and dispatch records. Here, the
Respondent totally ignored the April 24 request and never pro-
vided a response in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
M. The April 24 Request is Overbroad and Unintelligible and
Was Drafted in An Overboard Fashion For
Retaliatory Reasons.
The April 24 request is neither overbroad or unintelligible.
Under well-established Board law, the burden to show relevan-
cy for an information request is not exceptionally heavy, “re-
quiring only that a showing be made of a probability that the
desired information is relevant, and that it would be of use to
the union in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibili-
ties.” NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967).
The standard for relevancy to apply is a liberal discovery-type
standard requiring only that the information be directly related
to the union’s function as a bargaining representative.” Acme
Industrial Co., supra.
I find that the April 24 request was not unintelligible. Clear-
ly, while some of the sentences were jumbled and disconnected,
it unmistakenly requested the following (1) all referrals for bid
slips for all positions for the Eliases holding skill cards to Ma-
ma Mia on or about January 8, 2014 (including names, address-
es, phone numbers and list status of those referred); (2) From
the date on or about September 3, 2012, all calls and referrals
for which the Eliases have skill cards to include open call or
letter of request and list status of those called with names,
phone numbers, addresses; (3) With regard to Gary Elias, the
date in time would temporarily end with his open call received
on October 18, 2012, but would include bid slips for any refer-
ral; (4) with regard to Tina Elias, to include open and letter of
request calls and bid slips for any wardrobe skill card jobs; (5)
Any calls pertaining to jobs relating to Gary Elias’ forklift skill
card from December 2013 to January 2014 (with names, ad-
dresses, and phone numbers).
I also find that the April 24 request was relevant and meets
the liberal style discovery standard. The Respondent argues
that the charging party’s request is overbroad. I disagreed. The
Board has never definitely established a time frame as to the
period of time that an information request would be considered
overbroad. In Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 24
(Mona Electric), above, the Board affirmed the judge’s deci-
sion finding a violation of 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act when the union
refused an information request for the charging party to review
the union’s referral books from February 1, 2005, to May 10,
2009. In Carpenters Local 102 (Millwright), above, the Board
declined to find that a registered user of a hiring hall is limited
to only 6 months of dispatch records.19

19 It would also be difficult for the Respondent to argue that it was
unduly burdensome to produce the dispatch records because it was not
in dispute that the records were readily obtainable after the Respondent
instituted an automatic dispatch system. In Local No. 324, Operating
Engineers, the Board rejected the respondent’s claim that “preparation
of a list of out-of-work employees would be unduly burdensome”
14 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Respondent also has the responsibility to inform the
Eliases that the information request is burdensome, to seek a
clarification or a mutual accommodation. Here, the infor-
mation requests are similar to a collective-bargaining situation,
and as stated in National Steel Corp., 335 NLRB 747, 748
(2001).
With respect the confidentiality claim, it is well established
than an employer may not avoid its obligation to provide a
union with requested information that is relevant to bargaining
simply by asserting a confidential interest in the information.
Rather, the employer has the burden to seek an accommodation
that will meet the needs of both parties.
Based on the above case precedent, it is not unduly burden-
some for the Respondent to provide the charging party with the
hiring hall list and dispatch records where the list is readily
available and easily produced.
N. The Proviso of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act protects the
Respondent’s Actions.
The Respondent asserts that Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
states that it is an unfair labor practice for a union to restrain or
coerce employees in [the] exercise of their rights under Section
7 provided that this section does not impair the right of unions
to establish and enforce rules of membership and to control
their internal affairs. The Respondent argues that assuming that
the charging party’s right to examine the hiring hall records
was affected by the Respondent’s conduct, no job right of the
charging party was affected and the Respondent had a legiti-
mate interest in protecting the privacy of referents’ information
pursuant to an established union policy.
I find there is no merit to this defense. As noted above, es-
tablished Board precedents clearly provide that names, phone
numbers, and addresses of referents in an information request
to a union that operates an exclusive hiring service are properly
disclosable in a request for such information. The Board has
rejected the argument that phone numbers and addresses are
‘confidential’ in the context of a request for hiring hall records
unless the union has a legitimate interest in preserving the con-
fidential information. Carpenters Local 608, above at 759.
Carpenters Local 608 clearly states that a union fails to estab-
lish that a policy of confidentiality where it fails to establish
that the policy was disseminated to employees, any employees
sought to have the information kept confidential, or that the
employees had an expectation that this information would be
kept confidential. Id.
As noted above, Cook testified to the confidentiality policy,
but the Respondent has not produced any evidence of a written
policy and has not demonstrated employees were aware of the
policy of confidentiality or that the employees have an expecta-
tion that this information would be kept confidential. The Re-
spondent failed to proffer any evidence that referents on the
eligible list have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
the disclosure of their addresses and phone numbers. Moreo-
ver, while the complaint does not allege that any job right of the
Eliases had been affected, the Respondent’s failure and refusal

where the respondent admitted that “out-of-work indices containing
names, phone numbers, and layoff dates are in existence and are in the
possession of its business agents.” 226 NLRB 587, 587 (1976).
to provide the information request is an independent violation
of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act (see H, above).20
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Employer is an employer engaged in commerce with-
in the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent IATSE Local 720 is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
when it breached its duty of fair representation to Gary Elias
related to the operation of its exclusive hiring hall by failing
and refusing to provide Eliases with requested relevant infor-
mation.
4. By engaging in the conduct described above, Respond-
ent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
in violation of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease
and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended21
ORDER
The Respondent, IATSE Local 720 of Las Vegas, Nevada,
its officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Arbitrarily denying access to referral/dispatch records or
other job referral information from employees who are regis-
tered for referral from its exclusive hiring hall and who reasona-
bly believe they have been improperly denied referrals.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Allow Gary and Tina Elias to look at, take notes on,
and/or photocopy (at their expense), all job referral/dispatch
records in Respondent’s possession, of all referents and all
jobs, to all signatory employers to a collective-bargaining
agreement with Respondent for the period from September
2012 to January 2014, to help the Eliases determine their rela-
tive referral position or ascertain whether they are being or

20 Lastly, the Respondent raises several affirmative equity defenses
in its answer including, estoppels, unclean hands, waiver, and laches. I
find none to applicable in this situation. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
271 NLRB 343 (1984) (the Board’s proceedings do not constitute
“courts of equity” and unclean hands, laches and estoppel are not rec-
ognized in Board proceedings); also, International Woodworkers
(Kimtruss Corp.), 304 NLRB 1 (1991) (the Board would not recognize
the unclean hand defense that the union may have acted improperly).
21 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE, LOCAL 720 (TROPICANA LAS VEGAS, INC.) 15
have been treated fairly regarding job referrals by Respond-
ent.22
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board
or its agents for examination and copying, all records match-
ing the foregoing descriptions in paragraph (a).
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post
at its offices or hiring halls, wherever they may be main-
tained copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix .”23
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 28, after being signed by the Respondent’s au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent im-
mediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees and members are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall
be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an
intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the
Respondent customarily communicates with its employees and
members by such means.
(d) Within 21 days after service of this Order by the Region,
to file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a
responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting
to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 23, 2015
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

22 As I had rejected the Respondent’s argument that the allegations
in the complaint pertaining to Tina Elias should be dismissed because
she was not named in the complaint, I now find that Tina Elias is enti-
tled to the remedy noted above. International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers, above at 3.
23 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted By Order of The
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of The United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
The National Labor Relations Board.”
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with
your employer
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT arbitrarily refuse to respond to or arbitrarily
deny your request for access to referral/dispatch records or
other job referral information to help you ascertain whether you
are being or have been treated fairly regarding job referrals.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain,
or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL maintain our duty of fair representation as guar-
anteed you by the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL PROVIDE the referral records requested by letters
dated February 24, 2014, and April 24, 2014, to permit Gary
and Tina Elias to look at, take notes about, and/or photocopy
(at their expense), all job referral/dispatch records in our pos-
session, of all referents and all jobs, to all signatory employers
to our collective-bargaining agreement for the period from
September 2, 2012, to April 24, 2014, to help Gary and Tina
Elias determine whether they are begin or have been treated
fairly regarding job referrals.
WE WILL preserve, and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all records
matching the foregoing descriptions.
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE
EMPLOYEES, MOVING PICTURE TECHNICIANS, ARTISTS,
AND ALLIED CRAFTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS
TERRITORIES AND CANADA, LOCAL 720, AFL–CIO,
CLC