Huttig Sash and Door Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 31, 1965

154 N.L.R.B. 811 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

HUTTIG SASH AND DOOR COMPANY, INCORPORATED 811
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
As recommended by a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board,
we are posting this notice to inform our employees of the rights guaranteed them in
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their union activities
in a manner constituting interference , restraint , or coercion in violation of
,Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT violate any of the rights which you have under the National
Labor Relations Act to join a union of your own choice or not to engage in
any union activities.
All our employees are free to become or remain members of District Lodge 71,
International Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO, or any other union , and they are
also free to refrain from joining any union.
T. J. FLEMING,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 1200
Rialto Building , 906 Grand Avenue, Kansas City, Missouri , Telephone No. Baltimore
1-7000, Extension 2733.
Huttig Sash and Door Company, Incorporated and Carpenters
District Council of St. Louis and Vicinity . Case No. 14-CA-
3564. August 31, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On June 14, 1965, Trial Examiner George A. Downing issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that the
Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices
and recommended that the complaint be dismissed with respect to
such allegations. Thereafter, the Respondent and Charging Party
filed exceptions to the Decision, and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
bers Brown and Zagoria].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
154 NLRB No. 67.
812 DECISIONS Or NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as
its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
orders that the Respondent, Huttig Sash and Door Company,
Incorporated, St. Louis, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Rec-
ommended Order as so modified:
1. Amend paragraph 1(b) of the Recommended Order to read as
follows :
"(b) Instituting changes in wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment of its said employees during the effective term
of any collective-bargaining agreement covering said employees with-
out first consulting with and bargaining with the Union concerning
such changes and reaching agreement on any modification of the terms
of the contract."
2. Amend paragraph 2 (b) of the Recommended Order to read :
"(b) Restore to the 11 employees the premium wage rates which
Respondent eliminated on November 30, 1964, and snake said em-
ployees whole for any losses they may have suffered as a result of
such reduction, and include thereon interest at the rate of 6 percent
per annum, as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB
716."
3. Add the following as paragraph 2 (c) to the Recommended
Order and reletter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly :
"Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its
agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social
security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Recommended Order."
Amend paragraph 2 of the Appendix to read as follows:'
WE WILL NOT institute changes in wages, hours, or other terms
and conditions of employment of our employees during the
effective term of any collective-bargaining agreement covering
said employees without first consulting with and bargaining with
the Union concerning such changes and reaching agreement one
any modification of the terms of the contract.
' The address and telephone number for Region 14, appearing at the bottom of the
Appendix attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision, is amended to read: 1040 Boatmen's
Bank Building, 314 North Broadway , St. Louis, Missouri, Telephone No. 622-4156.
HUTTIG SASH AND DOOR COMPANY, INCORPORATED 813
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, was heard in St. Louis, Missouri, on April 19 and 20, 1965, pursuant to
due notice. The complaint, which issued on March 25, 1965, on a charge dated
January 27, alleged that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed
by Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union on
and after November 30, 1964. Respondent answered denying the refusal to bargain.
The General Counsel's motion to correct the transcript, filed on May 10, is hereby
granted in the absence of objections.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS
Respondent, a Delaware corporation, has its principal place of business in the
city of St. Louis, Missouri, and a manufacturing plant in St. Louis County where it
is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of doors, windows, and other
millwork. It sells and ships annually to extrastate points products valued in excess of
$50,000, and is therefore engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Charging Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
,of the Act.
I II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction and issues
Respondent and Union are parties to a multiple-employer contract dated January 1,
1963, whose term will expire on December 31, 1966. The complaint charges
Respondent with a refusal to bargain on November 30, 1964, in the following respects:
(a) Refusing to negotiate with the Union concerning, and unilaterally reducing, the
wages of 11 employees; (b) unilaterally modifying the terms of the contract without
complying with the terms of Section 8(d) of the Act; and (c) bargaining individually
with the 11 employees involved concerning the reduction in their wage rates.
Admitting the reductions, Respondent denied (by its answer) that they were made
unilaterally. It contended that it notified the Union of the proposed changes and
that it met and bargained wih the Union concerning them but that the parties were
unable to agree. Respondent also relied upon the grievance procedure in the con-
tract, which was admittedly not invoked or followed by the Union. By briefs
Respondent made the further contention that the parties bargained to impasse in a
single meeting on November 24, leaving Respondent free to put the proposed changes
into effect "without recourse."
The only factual issue is whether the Union's representative, Ollie W. Langhorst,
acquiesced in Respondent's proposed action in a single meeting on November 24,
and whether he acquired in the proposed individual bargaining with the employees,
with the caveat that he would process any resulting grievances.
B. The contract provisions
Article 3 of the contract set up some six work classifications, "A" through "F,"
with full lob descriptions for each.' It also established the minimum hourly wage
rates for each, effective as of January 1, 1963, and provided for increases of 10
cents an hour in each (except for immaterial variations in classification "A") on
January 1, 1964, and again on January 1, 1965. Corresponding increases were
provided for employees in each classification who were being paid in excess of the
minimum rates, For classification "C," for example (within which fell 10 of the
11 employees involved herein), the provision read as follows:
All employees in Classification "C" who are receiving wages in excess of those
minimum rates specified above as of January 1, 1963, January 1, 1964, or
January 1, 1965 shall receive an hourly increase of ten (.10¢) cents per hour.
i The job descriptions reflected some overlapping In content . For example , certain
operations to be performed by glaziers were set out in both classifications "A" and "B,"
and by machine hands and certain types of machine operators under classifications "A,"
"B," and "C."
814 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Article 24 provided that the contract should not be subject to change or modifica-
tion during its term for any cause of reason whatsoever, subject only to provisions
which tracked the language of Section 8(d) of the Act.
Article 2 contained a management rights clause which reserved to the employer,.
inter alia, the right to transfer employees, but which also provided that none of the
powers reserved to the employer by said clause should "be inconsistent with the
terms of [the] contract." Article 21, captioned "Transfer," provided that in event
the employer transfers an employee to a higher or lower classification than the one
presently occupied, the employee should receive his former rate for not more than
30 days.
The contract also contained a grievance clause which provided that if differences
should arise as to the interpretation of the agreement, "or should any other dispute
whatsoever arise between the parties hereto," an earnest effort should be made to,
settle such differences by following a three-step grievance procedure, with arbitration
thereafter as the terminal stage.
C. The wage reduction
The basic facts herein are simple and mainly undisputed. Respondent had in
its employ some 11 employees who were being paid at rates in excess of the minimum
rates (conveniently referred to herin as premium rates) for their classification, most
of whom had received such rates for many years. On November 19 Respondent
notified the Union that on November 30 it would "adjust" the rates of the 11
employees "to conform to their current job classification," which in 10 cases was
listed as "C" and in one case as "B." The new rate specified for each employee was
the minimum fixed in the contract for his classification.
The notice made no reference either to a reclassification or to a transfer, and no,
actual transfer or reclassification was made either on November 19, November 30,
or later. Also, contrary to express provisions of the contract identical with Section
8(d), Respondent failed to notify either the Federal or the State Mediation Services
of the existence of a dispute and failed to continue in full force and effect for 60,
days, all terms and conditions of the existing contract. Indeed, all that Respondent
did before making the reductions on November 30 was to discuss the impending
reduction with the Union's representative on November 25, without reaching agree-
ment, and to notify the individual employees on November 30 of the reduction and
to ask if each would accept the cut.
The reasons assigned by Respondent both to the 11 employees and earlier to
Ollie W. Langhorst, business representative of the Council, was that because of the
competitive situation in its market it was necessary to economize. To Langhorst,
Respondent also added that the employees involved were no longer able to produce as
they had in the past (the factor which had originally accounted for most of them
receiving the premium rates as merit increases). Answering Langhorst's objection
that the contract provisions covered the payment of rates above the minimum,
Respondent relied first on the management rights clause, and when Langhorst argued
that Respondent's action would be "inconsistent with the terms of [the] contract,"
within the language of that clause, Respondent contended that in any case the transfer-
clause would cover the reduction.
The foregoing summary contains the evidence which is material to the General
Counsel's theory of the case save for the testimony of Plant Manager Ferd W. Wunder-
that the decision to make the reductions, a matter which was "out of [his] realm,"
was made by Respondent's top management (President Robert F. Eson and Vice
President William E. Waller), that he was directed to carry it out, and that the extent
of his authority was to put the wage cuts into effect.
Respondent relies chiefly on the testimony of Plant Manager Wunder and
Plant Superintendent Marion LaHue that although Langhorst did not agree that
the reduction could be made, he did agree that they could proceed with their
announced plan to call the men in individually and (in LaRue's words) to try to,
"sell" the reduction to the men, and that he cautioned them they should be pre-
pared to face a grievance Langhorst denied that anything was said on either side
about a grievance and testified that at the end of the conference when Wunder
and LaRue told him that despite his objections, the reduction would go into
effect on November 30 and that they would inform the employees individually
what they were going to do, he replied, "Well, if you are going to do it there.
is nothing I can do about it. Go ahead and do it."
HUTTIG SASH AND DOOR COMPANY, INCORPORATED 815
Resolving the foregoing conflicts , I credit part of each of the foregoing
versions . Since Wunder testified that Langhorst was very persistent in opposing
the reduction , I credit, as more consistent with the probabilities inherent in the
situation , Langhorst `s testimony that his "consent " was limited to Respondent's
announced action of notifying the employees individually , that he did not suggest
(as LaHue testified but as Wunder did not) that Respondent try to "sell" the
reduction to the men, and that his consent to the interviews was given explicitly
because of Respondent 's statement that it intended to act anyway.2 By the same
token, I consider it extremely improbable, under the circumstances, that Lang-
horst would make no reference to the likelihood that a grievance might arise,
and I credit the testimony of Wunder and LaHue that he did so.
The evidence is undisputed , however, that no grievance was presented or filed,
that the grievance clause was not invoked , and that none of the prescribed steps
was taken. Though some of the employees assumed that a "grievance" was being
processed , their testimony as a whole showed that they were referring to informal
discussions with the shop steward and to preliminary investigations by the Union's
attorney which led in turn to the filing of the charge and later to the Board's
own investigation.
D. Concluding findings
Under the General Counsel 's theory, this case can be decided on the barest
of essentials ; i.e., it involves simply a contract modification made unilaterally in
midterm over the objection of the Union . Without more, a statutory refusal
to bargain is established, of course , absent assertion and proof of a valid defense.
Though Respondent gave the Union advance notice of its action and consulted
with it in a 2i-hour conference , those brief negotiations plainly did not qualify
as good-faith bargaining , for Respondent 's top management had already decided
that the reductions were to be made and the extent of the authority of its rep-
resentatives at the conference was to put that decision into effect.
By the same token the individual meetings with the employees did not con-
stitute bargaining as such, for again they were simply informed of the proposed
action 3 and Respondent's representatives were still without authority to bargain
for, or to agree to, anything different Indeed, Langhorst himself understood, as
his testimony explicitly showed, that Respondent proposed simply to inform the
employees of the cut in their wages.
Furthermore, Respondent was barred by Section 8(d) as well as by explicit
contract provisions from taking unilateral action to modify the contract except
after following a prescribed procedure which Respondent admittedly did not
follow. Thus, Respondent did not, as obligated, give 60 days' notice prior to
the time it proposed to make the modification, it did not notify the mediation
services as provided ; and it did not continue all terms and conditions of the
contract in full force and effect as required.
Assertion of an impasse (even a bona fide one) cannot avoid those obligations,
which arise normally because impasse has either occurred or is anticipated.
But aside from that , no bona fide impasse was shown to result from the single
conference with the Union, for Respondent was already committed by top man.
agement decision to put the reduction into effect and its representatives in the
conference were authorized only to carry out that decision. Thus, the notice to
and consultation with the Union were empty and meaningless formalities, with
the Union's objections being foredoomed to futility. There was plainly no such
"notice and consultation" or "prior discussion" as would lay a valid basis for
lawful unilateral action after rejection of the proposal by the Union. See
N.L.R.B. v. Benne Katz, etc., d/b/a Williamsburg Steel Products Co, 369 U.S.
735, 747.
2 Indeed , Langhorst ' s testimony received corroboration from Willis Arnold, one of the
employees involved, who testified that Wunder informed him during his individual in-
terview that Langhorst had stated that although he did not agree with what the Com-
panv was doing, lie was unable to stop the Company from doing it
3 Though asked whether they would accept the cut, the employees felt that they had
little or no choice or option-a correct appraisal since management's decision was
predetermined.
816 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Respondent contends, how-
-ever, that its action in fact involved a reclassification of the employees to a
different and proper classification. Its theory is that the employees had "somehow
slipped out of their proper classification and were being returned." That con-
tention is contrary to the great bulk of the evidence submitted on both sides.
It is contrary to the testimony of the 11 employees that their jobs remain unchanged
before and after November 30. It is contrary to Respondent's notice to the Union
of November 19, which listed as the "current classification" of each employee the
same as that in which he remained after the reduction on November 30. It is
contrary to Wunder's repeated admissions that there was no material change in
the jobs of the 11 men at the time and that the classifications were not changed,
but that the rates were "adjusted" to the contract rate covering the classification
,of the work they were doing. It was also contrary to LaHue's testimony which
reflected his assumption that rate alone (not the job description) determined clas-
sification, that the contract so provided, and that there was in fact no other way
for determining classification. Indeed LaHue's confusion was further demonstrated
by his admission that once an employee got a premium rate, he (LaHue) would
not know in what classification the employee fell.
To overcome the foregoing mass of evidence, Respondent cites a few minor
and inconsequential items such as the following:
Jacob Folk, formerly a leadman in classification "C," was being paid a lead-
man's differential of 15 cents plus a premium rate of 6 cents an hour. He was
demoted from leadman on October 1, 1964, but continued to receive his full rate
of $2.76 until November 30. Folk was informed on November 30 that he would
have to take a cut because he was no longer a leadman, but he was actually cut
to the mininmum of $2 55 for classification "C," losing not only his leadman's
differential but the extra 6 cents premium rate as well.
Arthur A. Gravatt was informed that some of the special work he had been
,doing was being cut out and that he was being transferred into another department
and would have his wages cut down to the others in classification "C" (which
was his classification at the time). Gravatt testified that the actual change in his
duties had occurred around October 1, but that nothing was said to him about the
wane cut until November 30.
Elmer Martin was the employee whose classification was "B" both before and
-after November 30. Though LaHue testified that some change was made in
Martin's duties in August and September, he admitted that the work which Martin
did both before and after the change fell in classification "B."
The foregoing examples constitute no real exceptions, for in each case the
employee continued to do work within the same job description and work clas-
sification Thus, there was no "reclassification" (as Wunder agreed), and there
was no "transfer" to a higher or lower classification different to the one the
-employee was occupying. All that occurred was compatible with the finding
required by the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the jobs of the affected
=employees were not changed as to their contract classifications or materially in
content, and that nothing was done but to reduce their wage scales to the
minimum rates stipulated in the contract by eliminating the premium rates.
Respondent's attempts to invoke a question of contract interpretation must fall
in view of the plain and unambiguous provisions of the contract While estab-
lishing minimum rates for each work classification, the contract also plainly
recognized the existence of premium rates and insured their continuance by
preserving the differentials through periodic increases identical to those in the
minimum rates. Respondent was thus no more entitled to reduce the premium
rates unilaterally than it was entitled to reduce the minimum rates; and plainly
such a reduction of the latter would involve not an arbitrable matter, but an
unfair labor practice, whether viewed generally as a refusal to bargain or as
,one established by failure to comply with Section 8(d).
The transfer clause was also obviously inapplicable for it specifically applied
to transfers to a higher or lower job classification, not to one from one to one
department to another, and not to different work within the same classification.
Indeed, the speciousness of Respondent's contract interpretation claims was
wholly exposed by LaHue's baseless claims that rate alone (not job content)
HUTTIG SASH AND DOOR COMPANY, INCORPORATED 817
was determinative of classification . Such an obvious misconception (whether genu-
ine or otherwise) plainly laid no foundation for forcing the Union to arbitration
under the contract . But even assuming some reasonable basis for Respondent's
interpretation claims, "The Board is not disabled from resolving an unfair labor
practice issue simply because as an incident thereto it may be necessary to construe
a contract to determine whether the right to take unilateral action has been
contractually reserved to management." Smith Cabinet Manufacturing Company,
Inc., 147 NLRB 1506. Also in C & C Plywood Corporation, 148 NLRB 414, the
Board, commenting that it "is not unfamiliar with the problems of contract
construction ," rejected an argument that because determination of the validity
of the employer 's defense involved construction of the collective -bargaining con-
tract, the complaint alleging an 8(a)(5) violation should be dismissed.
In sum , rejecting Respondent 's defenses , I conclude and find that Respondent
refused to bargain with the Union on November 30, 1964, and since by (1)
unilaterally reducing the hourly rates of the 11 employees named in the complaint,
and (2) unilaterally modifying the terms of the contract without complying with
the provisions of Section 8(d) of the Act. By such conduct Respondent engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
I do not find, however, that Respondent engaged in individual bargaining with
the employees on November 30 for, as found above, those conferences amounted
in reality to no more than notification to the employees of a predetermined course
of action to which Respondent was committed.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices I
shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain
affirmative action of the type which is conventionally ordered in such cases as
provided in the Recommended Order below, which I find to be necessary to
remedy and to remove the effects of the unfair practices and to effectuate, the
policies of the Act.
My recommendation that Respondent restore to the 11 employees the premium
wage rates which Respondent eliminated on November 30, 1964, does not require
restoration to Jacob Folk of the leadman differential of 15 cents an hour.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact , and upon the entire record
in the case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. All Respondent's productions and maintenance employees including working
foremen, but excluding office employees, clerical employees , and supervisors as
defitied in Section 2(11) of the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes
of .collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
2. Atall times on and after January 1, 1963, the Union has been and now is
the exclusive representative for the purpose of collective bargaining of the
employees in the above unit as provided in Section 9(a) of the Act.
3. By refusing to bargain with the Union as above found on November 30,
1964, and thereafter, the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed
by Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning
of Section'2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record,
and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
I hereby recommend that the Respondent, Huttig Sash and Door Company,
Incorporated, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1.. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representa-
tive of its employees in the appropriate, unit found herein.
206-446-66-vol. 154-53
818 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Instituting changes in the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment of its said employees without first consulting with and bargaining
with the Union concerning such changes.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Bargain with the Union, upon request, as the exclusive representative of its
employees in the appropriate unit found herein with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment.
(b) Restore to the 11 employees the premium wage rates which Respondent
eliminated on November 30, 1964, and make said employees whole for any
losses they may have suffered as a result of such reduction.
(c) Post in its plant in St. Louis County, Missouri, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 14, shall, after being signed by Respondent's representative, be posted
by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date
of the receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.5
'In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order".
In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read' "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days
from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National
Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Carpenters District Coun-
cil of St. Louis and Vicinity as the exclusive representative of our employees
in the appropriate unit noted below with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT institute changes in wages, hours, or other terms and con-
ditions of employment of our employees in said appropriate unit without
first consulting with and bargaining with the Union concerning such changes.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act.
WE WILL restore to the 11 employees the premium wage rates which we
eliminated on November 30, 1964, and will make them whole for any loss
which they may have suffered as a result of such discrimination.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with above-named Union as the exclusive
representative of our employees in the appropriate unit noted below with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
The appropriate unit is:
All our production and maintenance employees, including working
foremen, but excluding office employees, clerical employees, and super-
visors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act.
TENNESSEE PACKERS, INC. FROSTY MORN DIVISION 819
All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming
or remaining , members of the above named or any other labor organization.
HUTTIO SASH AND DOOR COMPANY , INCORPORATED,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office,
4459 Federal Building, 1520 Market Street, St. Louis, Missouri , Telephone No.
Main 2-4142.
Tennessee Packers, Inc. Frosty Morn Division and Amalgamated
Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-
CIO, Local No. 405 . Case No. 26-CA-2053. August 31, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On June 10, 1965, Trial Examiner Stanley N. Ohlbaum issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to
the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
bers Brown and Jenkins].
The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the
exceptions, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as
1 We affirm the Trial Examiner 's refusal to permit the Respondent to relitigate in this
complaint proceeding its objections previously considered by the Board in the representa-
tion proceeding , Case No. 26-RC-2030. On July 6, 1965, the Respondent filed a motion
to reconsider the Board ' s Supplemental Decision and Certification of Representative
issued on December 11, 1964, in Case No. 26-RC-2030. This motion was denied on
August 5, 1965. The Respondent 's exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision rely
upon the same arguments advanced in the recent motion to reconsider and are clearly
without merit.
154 NLRB No. 73.