Harry A. Derderian, Appellant,v.Joseph D. Duffey, Director, United States Information Agency, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 30, 1998
01974567 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 30, 1998)

01974567

10-30-1998

Harry A. Derderian, Appellant, v. Joseph D. Duffey, Director, United States Information Agency, Agency.


Harry A. Derderian v. United States Information Agency

01974567

October 30, 1998

Harry A. Derderian, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01974567

) Agency No. OCR-96-17

Joseph D. Duffey, )

Director, )

United States Information Agency, )

Agency. )

______________________________________)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) from the final agency decision concerning his equal

employment opportunity (EEO) complaint, which alleged discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �621 et seq. The appeal is

accepted by the Commission in accordance with the provisions of EEOC

Order No. 960.001.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether the agency properly dismissed as untimely

certain allegations of appellant's complaint.

BACKGROUND

Appellant, a Project Manager, GM-14, first contacted an EEO Counselor

on November 1, 1995. The sole issue raised by appellant at that time

pertained to a performance appraisal received in mid-October 1995. On May

2, 1996, appellant filed a formal EEO complaint which raised several

issues in addition to the performance appraisal: several non-selections

which occurred in 1991-1993; the denial of career-enhancing opportunities

in 1991-1992; and comments made by a supervisor in 1993 (appellant states

on appeal that this allegation was since withdrawn). The agency referred

appellant back to the EEO Counselor to discuss the additional matters.

The record reflects that when the EEO Counselor queried appellant with

regard to the amount of time which had elapsed since the additional

incidents had occurred, appellant indicated merely that he "wanted to

show a pattern." By final agency decision (FAD) dated April 18, 1997, the

agency accepted for investigation the allegation regarding the performance

appraisal, but rejected the remaining allegations as untimely. The agency

noted that the remaining allegations were separate and distinct acts from

the performance appraisal, and therefore did not constitute a continuing

violation. It is from this decision that appellant now appeals.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission's regulations require that complaints of discrimination

be brought to the attention of an EEO counselor within 45 days of the

date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a

personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action.

29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(1). The Commission has adopted a "reasonable

suspicion" standard, as opposed to a "supportive facts" standard,

to determine when the 45-day limitation period is triggered. See Ball

v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05880247 (July 6, 1988). Thus,

the limitations period is not triggered until a complainant reasonably

suspects discrimination, but before all of the facts that support a

charge of discrimination have become apparent.

One circumstance under which the time limitation may be waived is if the

otherwise untimely allegation is part of a "continuing violation," i.e.,

a related series of discriminatory acts, at least one of which occurred

during the 45 days prior to the initial counselor contact. In order

to present a continuing violation, appellant must show "a series of

related acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations period."

United Airlines, Inc., v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977); Valentino

v. United States Postal Service, 674 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Appellant

must also establish that the various acts complained of are sufficiently

interrelated by a common nexus so as to constitute a continuing violation.

See Milton v. Weinberger, 645 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

A determination of whether a series of discrete acts constitutes

a continuing violation depends on the interrelatedness of the past

and present acts. Berry v. Board of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971, 981

(5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 868 (1986). It is necessary to

determine whether the acts are interrelated by a common nexus or theme.

See Vissing v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, EEOC Request No. 05890308

(June 13, 1989); Verkennes v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request

No. 05900700 (September 21, 1990); Maldonado v. Department of the

Interior, EEOC Request No. 05900937 (October 31, 1990). Should such

a nexus exist, appellant will have established a continuing violation

and the agency would be obligated to "overlook the untimeliness of the

complaint with respect to some of the acts" challenged by appellant.

Scott v. Claytor, 469 F. Supp. 22, 26 (D. D.C. 1978).

In determining whether a continuing violation exists, the Commission

has relied on the decision in Berry, wherein the court set forth

three relevant factors: whether the alleged acts involve the same

type of discrimination; whether the alleged acts are recurring (e.g.,

a biweekly paycheck) or more in the nature of an isolated work assignment

or employment decision; and whether the act has the degree of permanence

which should trigger an employee's awareness of and duty to assert

his or her rights, in other words, whether the act should indicate to

the employee that the continued existence of the adverse consequences

of the act is to be expected without being dependent on a continuing

intent to discriminate. Berry, 715 F.2d at 981. Incidents that are

sufficiently distinct to trigger the running of the limitations period do

not constitute continuing violations. See, e.g., Miller v. Shawmut Bank,

726 F. Supp. 337, 341 (D. Mass. 1989); Cogen v. Milton Bradley Co./Hasbro

Inc., 449 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) �38,894 (D. Mass. 1989). In Cogen, the

court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to apply the continuing violation

theory to, among other allegations, an assignment issue. The court stated

that "discrete acts of discrimination taking place at identifiable points

in time" are not continuing violations for the purpose of extending the

limitations period. Id. at 58,757; see also Edinboro v. Department

of Health and Human Services, 704 F, Supp. 364, 367 (S.D. N.Y. 1988)

(demotion not a continuing violation).

In this case, the Commission finds that the non-selections and denial of

career-enhancing opportunities, which occurred in the period 1991-1993,

were separate and distinct events from the performance appraisal received

in 1995, and had the degree of permanence which should have triggered

appellant's awareness to assert his rights. The events therefore do

not constitute a continuing violation. Further, although solicited to

do so, appellant provided no information upon which a waiver of the time

limitation might otherwise be granted. Accordingly, dismissal of these

allegations as untimely was proper.

CONCLUSION

Based upon a thorough review of the record, and for the foregoing reasons,

it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to

AFFIRM the final agency decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �l6l4.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from

the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil

action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY

(30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or

to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil

action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON

WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT

PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may

result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department"

means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or

department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the

administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Oct. 30, 1998

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations