HARMAN INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 1, 2022

2021002101 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 1, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 16/240,495 01/04/2019 Riley WINTON HRMN0289US1 5624 98031 7590 04/01/2022 Artegis Law Group, LLP - Harman 7710 Cherry Park Drive Suite T #104 Houston, TX 77095 EXAMINER WU, ZHEN Y ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2685 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/01/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): algdocketing@artegislaw.com jmatthews@artegislaw.com sjohnson@artegislaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte RILEY WINTON, GORM JORGENSEN, CHRISTOPHER LUDWIG, and CHRISTOPHER TRESTAIN Appeal 2021-002101 Application 16/240,495 Technology Center 2600 Before MINN CHUNG, ADAM J. PYONIN, and NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1-7 and 21-33. See Final Act. 2-12. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 1 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed September 28, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”) and Reply Brief filed February 3, 2021 (“Reply Br.”); and the Examiner’s Final Office Action mailed May 1, 2020 (“Final Act.”) and Answer mailed December 11, 2020 (“Ans.”). We also refer the Specification filed January 4, 2019 (“Spec.”). Rather than repeat the Examiner’s findings and Appellant’s contentions in their entirety, we refer to these documents. 2 “Appellant” herein refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2020). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Harman International Industries, Incorporated. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2021-002101 Application 16/240,495 2 We REVERSE. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The subject matter of the present application pertains to “a moodroof for an augmented media experience in a vehicle cabin.” Spec. ¶ 2. Claims 1, 21, and 28 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below with the disputed limitations emphasized, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A computer-implemented method for presenting media content within a vehicle cabin, comprising: determining an initial state associated with the vehicle cabin based on sensor data from at least one sensor; selecting media content based on the initial state and a goal state associated with the vehicle cabin; and causing visual content associated with the media content to be displayed on at least one display surface positioned on a ceiling of the vehicle cabin. Appeal Br. 13 (Claims App.). REJECTIONS The Examiner relies on the following references: Name3 Reference Date Gassman US 2019/0092170 A1 Mar. 28, 2019 Hopkins US 2019/0132395 A1 May 2, 2019 Claims 1-5, 7, 21-25, 27-31, and 33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Gassman. Final Act. 4-9. 3 All citations herein to the prior art are by reference to the first named inventor only. Appeal 2021-002101 Application 16/240,495 3 Claims 6, 26, and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Gassman and Hopkins. Final Act. 10-11. ISSUE4 The issue presented by Appellant’s contentions is whether the Examiner erred in finding that Gassman discloses selecting media content based on the initial state and a goal state associated with the vehicle cabin; and causing visual content associated with the media content to be displayed on at least one display surface positioned on a ceiling of the vehicle cabin, as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in independent claims 21 and 28. ANALYSIS In rejecting the pending claims, the Examiner finds that Gassman discloses all limitations of independent claims 1, 21, and 28. Final Act. 4-8. In particular, the Examiner relies on Gassman’s disclosure of blocking light entering a vehicle by changing the transmissivity of a display (e.g., an LCD display) installed on the sunroof or the glass portion of the vehicle’s roof. Id. at 4-6 (citing Gassman Abstract, Figs. 1-18, ¶¶ 62, 65, 69). According to the Examiner, Gassman discloses “determining an initial state associated with the vehicle cabin based on sensor data from at least one sensor” and “selecting media content based on the initial state and a goal state associated with the vehicle cabin,” as recited in claim 1, because Gassman describes 4 Appellant’s arguments raise additional issues. Because the identified issue is dispositive of the appeal, we do not reach the additional issues. Appeal 2021-002101 Application 16/240,495 4 [t]he vehicle continuously changes the tint setting of the display from an initial tint state to a goal tint state based on sunlight reaching into the cabin. It is inherent that the vehicle must have a sensor to detect the amount of sunlight to cause the tint setting to change from an initial tint percentage to a final tint percentage. Id. at 4-5 (emphases added) (citing Gassman ¶¶ 62, 65). The Examiner further finds that Gassman discloses “causing visual content associated with the media content to be displayed on at least one display surface positioned on a ceiling of the vehicle cabin,” as recited in clam 1, because in Gassman “[t]he vehicle causes the deployable display to display various information or to simulate environment or to tint the lighting going into the vehicle cabin after deployment.” Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added) (citing Gassman Figs. 1-18, ¶ 69). Appellant argues that “while Gassman discloses displaying entertainment or information on the deployable display, Gassman does not disclose selecting the entertainment or information to be displayed based on an initial/starting state and a goal/ending state.” Appeal Br. 11 (emphases added). The Examiner makes no contrary finding. In other words, unlike Gassman’s changing tinting level, which the Examiner finds is inherently based on sensor data, the Examiner makes no finding that Gassman’s selection of entertainment or information content (e.g., movies, games, or video conferencing) for display is “based on the initial state . . . associated with the vehicle cabin,” which, in turn, is “determin[ed] based on sensor data from at least one sensor,” as recited in claim 1. See Final Act. 4-6; Ans. 3- 5. We agree with Appellant that there is no disclosure in Gassman that the selection of entertainment or information content for display is based on sensor data from a sensor. See Gassman ¶¶ 52, 69. Appeal 2021-002101 Application 16/240,495 5 That leaves, then, Gassman’s changing tinting level as the only feature the Examiner relies on as disclosing the disputed limitations, based on the Examiner’s finding of Gassman’s inherent disclosure of changing or selecting tinting level based on a sensor. See Final Act. 4-6 (citing Gassman ¶¶ 62, 69). Appellant argues that Gassman’s selecting tinting level does not disclose the disputed limitations because “selecting an amount of light blockage is different from selecting media content” and applying electrical current to a display to block light entering the vehicle is not “causing visual content associated with the media content to be displayed on at least one display surface,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 10 (citing Gassman ¶¶ 52, 62, 69). In response, the Examiner states that “changing the tint percentage of a display . . . is considered as a form of a visual content that is associated with the media content.” Ans. 5 (emphasis added). Although the Examiner appears to identify Gassman’s “tint percentage” or tinting level as the recited “visual content,” the Examiner does not identify the “media content” associated with the tinting level. The Examiner also states that “media content is broader than just entertainment or information content” and that “[t]int, hue, color and shade are also considered as parts that defines a media content.” Ans. 3-4 (citing Gassman ¶¶ 62, 65, 69). To the extent the Examiner finds Gassman’s “tint” fall within the meaning of the term “media content,” we disagree with the Examiner. Among other reasons, the Examiner does not address the claim language and the Specification in the Examiner’s interpretation of “media content.” See In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. Appeal 2021-002101 Application 16/240,495 6 2010) (A broadest reasonable interpretation must reasonably reflect the plain language of the claim, the specification, and teachings in the underlying patent.). Beginning with the claim language, the phrase “visual content associated with the media content” indicates or suggests that the “media content” is the source of the “visual content.” This reasonable interpretation is consistent with the Specification. Appellant’s Specification describes “an image (e.g., an image of a clear night sky, a star-filled night sky, or an aurora),” “an image of a forest, an undersea environment with animated sea creatures, or a stream,” and “an image of a sunny clear sky” as examples of a “media content” or “visual media content.” Spec. ¶¶ 63, 64. Thus, the Specification describes an “image” media, e.g., a photograph or video, as the source of visual content, such as a clear night sky, a star-filled night sky, an aurora, a forest, an undersea environment with animated sea creatures, a stream, or a sunny clear sky. Id. The Specification further describes “causing visual content associated with the media content to be displayed on at least one display surface” as “transmit[ting] the . . . visual media content . . . to the moodroof displays” and “output[ting] the visual media content to the moodroof displays.” Id. ¶¶ 38, 63. Gassman describes applying or outputting electrical current to a display to change or select the transmissivity of a display, i.e., the tinting level, and adjust the amount of light blocked from entering the vehicle (between “0% to 100% light block”). Gassman ¶¶ 52, 65, 69. The Examiner does not identify, nor do we discern, any disclosure in Gassman of any tint “media” that is the source of the tinting level between 0% and 100% Appeal 2021-002101 Application 16/240,495 7 of light blockage (the claimed “visual content” identified by the Examiner) “cause[d] . . . to be displayed on at least one display surface,” as recited in claim 1. The only source that can possibly be considered to “cause” the tinting level to be “displayed” on a display surface in Gassman is electrical current applied to the display. Id. ¶ 52. In view of the claim language and the disclosures in the Specification discussed above, we determine that Gassman’s “tint” falls outside the meaning of “media content” recited in the claim under the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term and that Gassman’s applying or outputting electrical current to a display to select the tinting level of the display does not teach “selecting media content” and “causing visual content associated with the media content to be displayed on at least one display surface,” as recited in claim 1. Suitco, 603 F.3d at 1260 (A broadest reasonable interpretation must reasonably reflect the plain language of the claim, the specification, and teachings in the underlying patent.); In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted) (“The correct inquiry in giving a claim term its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification is . . . an interpretation that corresponds with what and how the inventor describes [the] invention in the specification, i.e., an interpretation that is ‘consistent with the specification.’”); In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“While the Board must give the terms their broadest reasonable construction, the construction cannot be divorced from the specification and the record evidence.”). Accordingly, we determine the Examiner errs, as the findings in the Examiner’s rejections are not sufficient to show Gassman discloses all of the Appeal 2021-002101 Application 16/240,495 8 limitations of claims 1, 21, and 28. We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1, 21, and 28, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Gassman, together with the rejection of claims 2-5, 7, 22-25, 27, 29-31, and 33, which depend from claims 1, 21, or 28. Furthermore, we do not sustain the rejection of dependent claims 6, 26, and 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of Gassman and Hopkins because the Examiner’s application of Hopkins does not cure the deficiency in the rejection of the base claims addressed above. CONCLUSION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-7 and 21-33 is reversed. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-5, 7, 21- 25, 27-31, 33 102 Gassman 1-5, 7, 21- 25, 27-31, 33 6, 26, 32 103 Gassman, Hopkins 6, 26, 32 Overall Outcome 1-7, 21-33 REVERSED