HARMAN INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES, INCDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 26, 20212020001254 (P.T.A.B. May. 26, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/634,687 02/27/2015 James M. KIRSCH HRMN/0120US (P140320US) 1599 98031 7590 05/26/2021 Artegis Law Group, LLP - Harman 7710 Cherry Park Drive Suite T #104 Houston, TX 77095 EXAMINER FALEY, KATHERINE A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2652 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/26/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): bkistler@artegislaw.com jmatthews@artegislaw.com sjohnson@artegislaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JAMES M. KIRSCH, AJAY IYER, and BRANDEN SHEFFIELD Appeal 2020-001254 Application 14/634,687 Technology Center 2600 Before DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, JESSICA C. KAISER, and KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judges. SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 5–14, 16–22, constituting all claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Harman International Industries, Incorporated. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-001254 Application 14/634,687 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s invention generally relates to sharing common audio between two users’ headphones while allowing those users to communicate with one another via respective microphones. Spec. ¶¶ 4, 9, 22. Claims 1 and 10, reproduced below, are illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A computer-implemented method for generating an audio signal, the method comprising: receiving a first signal from a first audio source, wherein the first signal corresponds to a first frequency range; transmitting the first signal to an output element associated with a first user for output; receiving a second signal from an input element associated with a second user, wherein the second signal corresponds to a second frequency range that is narrower than the first frequency range, and the second signal has different amplitudes at different frequencies within the second frequency range; selectively ducking, in the first signal, the different frequencies within the second frequency range by different amounts and in proportion to the different amplitudes of the different frequencies in the second signal to generate a ducked first signal, wherein less than all of the first frequency range is ducked in the ducked first signal; combining the ducked first signal with the second signal to produce a combined signal; and transmitting the combined signal to the output element associated with the first user for output. 10. A system for generating an audio signal, comprising: a first output element associated with a first user and configured to produce audio signals; Appeal 2020-001254 Application 14/634,687 3 a first input element associated with the first user and configured to receive audio signals; a first audio source configured to generate audio signals; a first circuit element coupled to the first output element, the first input element, and the first audio source, the first circuit element including a first adaptive echo cancellation unit configured to be coupled to a second adaptive echo cancellation unit within an audio device associated with a second user, wherein an output associated with the first adaptive echo cancellation unit controls an input associated with the second adaptive echo cancellation unit, the first circuit element configured to: receive a first signal from the first audio source; transmit the first signal to the first output element for output; receive a second signal from a second input element that is coupled to an output of the second adaptive echo cancellation unit associated with the second user; combine the first signal with the second signal to produce a combined signal; and transmit the combined signal to the first output element for output. REJECTIONS Claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 21, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the combination of Briggs et al. (US 2015/0063601 A1, published Mar. 5, 2015) (“Briggs”) and Rand (US 2016/0036962 A1, published Feb. 4, 2016) (“Rand”). Appeal 2020-001254 Application 14/634,687 4 Claims 7 and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the combination of Briggs, Rand, and Goldberg et al. (US 2005/0160270 A1, published July 21, 2005) (“Goldberg”). Claims 10–13, 16, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the combination of Briggs and Dyba et al. (US 2003/0235294 A1, published Dec. 25, 2003) (“Dyba”). Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the combination of Briggs, Dyba, and Kane et al. (US 5,982,901, issued Nov. 9, 1999) (“Kane”). Claims 18 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the combination of Briggs, Dyba, and Goldberg. Claim 19 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the combination of Briggs, Dyba, Goldberg, and Shin et al. (US 8,295,500 B2, issued Oct. 23, 2012) (“Shin”). ANALYSIS Independent claims 1 and 21 Appellant contends the references do not teach or suggest “selectively ducking, in the first signal, the different frequencies within the second frequency range by different amounts and in proportion to the different amplitudes of the different frequencies in the second signal to generate a ducked first signal,” as recited in claim 1 and commensurately recited in independent claim 21. Appeal Br. 11; Reply Br. 3. The Examiner finds Rand teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Final Act. 3–4 (citing Rand ¶¶ 136, 191); Ans. 12–13. The Examiner relies on Rand’s “auto duck feature,” which “recognize[s] when somebody is Appeal 2020-001254 Application 14/634,687 5 speaking and automatically duck[s] the background audio (music or otherwise).” Rand ¶ 191. Rand describes that its auto duck feature reduces background audio, i.e., a “first signal,” when voice, i.e., a “second signal,” is detected; that ducking is based on a ratio of voice volume to background volume. Id. Rand further describes that, in an “embodiment of the auto ducker, selective ducking would be used. Selective ducking would generally determine a voice frequency range to be ducked, based on the frequency range of incoming voice signals.” Id. Appellant argues the claims require that “different frequencies in one audio signal are ducked by different amounts based on the amplitudes of those frequencies that are present in a different audio signal” (Appeal Br. 12), but “Rand does not contain any teachings that the amplitudes at different frequencies in a second signal affect the proportion at which each of the different frequencies is ducked in a first signal” (Reply Br. 4). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the Examiner’s findings and conclusions. See Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 12–13. As the Examiner points out, “the claims do not explicitly say that the first signal is ducked based on the amplitudes in the second signal,” as Appellant asserts. Ans. 12. Rather, as the Examiner explains, the claims recite “that the first signal is ducked in proportion to the second signal” but the claims do not limit “what that proportion is or how it is defined” or require “that a higher or lower amplitude of the second signal will affect how the first signal is ducked.” Id. The Examiner explains that “[d]ucking all voice frequencies by the constant ratio of Rand will ensure that the first signal,” i.e., background audio, “is ducked in proportion to the second signal,” i.e., voice signals, as Appeal 2020-001254 Application 14/634,687 6 required by the claim. Id.; see id. at 13. The Examiner states that it is “just the nature of voice” to “have different amplitudes at different frequencies”; that is, a voice signal spans different frequencies with different amplitudes. Id. at 12. Both Rand and the Specification support the Examiner’s findings. See Rand ¶ 191 (disclosing that a “frequency range could be specific to the sending party’s voice, or it could be a range that covers most human speech”); Spec. ¶ 32 (“[A] low frequency range signal may include frequencies below 400Hz, a mid range signal may include frequencies between 400Hz and 4kHz, and a high range signal may include frequencies above 4kHz.”). Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s findings. As such, because the ducked voice frequency range spans different frequencies and different amplitudes, we agree with the Examiner that Rand’s background audio signal is ducked “by different amounts” according to “different amplitudes of the different frequencies” of its voice signal. Ans. 13. Moreover, because Rand ducks based on a ratio of background audio to voice level, we also agree with the Examiner that Rand’s ducking is “in proportion” to the different frequencies and amplitudes of the voice signal. Id. Moreover, even assuming claims did require the features Appellant asserts, Rand includes an embodiment in which background audio is ducked “based on” or “affected” by voice signals. As the Examiner points out (Final Act. 4), Rand teaches “selective ducking” (Rand ¶ 191). Rand discloses that “[s]elective ducking would generally determine a voice frequency range to be ducked, based on the frequency range of incoming voice signals. This frequency range could be specific to the sending party’s voice . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, only certain voice frequencies Appeal 2020-001254 Application 14/634,687 7 in background audio would be ducked, based on a specific person’s voice frequencies. As such, Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive because Appellant’s arguments are not commensurate with the scope of the claims. Further, Appellant has not persuasively addressed the Examiner’s explanation that voice “naturally” has different frequencies and different amplitudes, and, so, ducking voice signals in background audio selectively ducks in the manner required by the claims. Even further, Appellant has not addressed the Examiner’s reliance on Rand’s selective ducking, which ducks background audio based on a specific user’s voice frequency range. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims 1 and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103, and, therefore, sustain the rejection. Independent Claim 10 Appellant contends the references do not teach or suggest “receiv[ing] a second signal from a second input element that is coupled to an output of the second adaptive echo cancellation unit associated with the second user” and “combin[ing] a first signal with the second signal to produce a combined signal,” as recited in claim 10. Appeal Br. 13; Reply Br. 4. The Examiner finds the disputed limitations would have been obvious over the combination of Briggs and Dyba. Final Act. 7–8 (citing Dyba Fig. 1; Briggs ¶ 42, Figs. 1, 3); Ans. 13–14. In particular, the Examiner relies on the configuration of Dyba’s echo cancellers to teach “receiv[ing] a second signal from a second input element that is coupled to an output of the second adaptive echo cancellation unit associated with the second user.” Final Act. Appeal 2020-001254 Application 14/634,687 8 8 (citing Dyba ¶ 42, Fig. 1). Figure 1 of Dyba, reproduced below, shows a communication system with echo cancellers. Dyba ¶¶ 5, 42. As shown in Figure 1, transmitter 12 (which receives voice for transmission) provides signal Sin 37 to echo canceller 20; echo canceller 20 subsequently sends echo cancelled send signal Sout 42 to receiver 14, through echo canceller 22. See Dyba ¶ 42; see also id. ¶ 36. That is, the output of echo canceller 20 (which receives a voice signal from transmitter 12) is coupled to the input of echo canceller 22 (and vice-versa). The Examiner further relies on Briggs to teach “combin[ing] the first signal with the second signal to produce a combined signal.” Final Act. 7–8 (citing Briggs Fig. 3). In particular, the Examiner relies on Briggs’ summing node 14 which combines voice input, e.g., V1 or V2, with a common audio signal C, for output to a headset. Briggs ¶¶ 15, 18; see id. at Fig. 3. The Examiner combines Briggs and Dyba such that Dyba’s “echo cancellers would be respectively coupled to the output voice signal from each user system, so that the system of Briggs can receive a second signal from a second input element that is coupled to an output of the second adaptive echo cancellation unit.” Final Act. 8 (emphasis omitted). The Examiner explains the combination would “eliminate [audio] echoes completely or to Appeal 2020-001254 Application 14/634,687 9 reduce them to an acceptable level” so that “users [may] have a better listening experience.” Final Act. 8; Ans. 14. As such, the Examiner determines the disputed limitations would have been obvious over the combination of Briggs and Dyba. Final Act. 8; Ans. 14. Appellant argues that “neither Briggs, nor Dyba, nor their combination teaches a circuit element that receives a signal from an input element that is coupled to an output of an adaptive echo cancellation unit and then combines that signal with another signal” and similarly argues that “nothing in Briggs and Dyba teaches or suggests the particular configuration of input elements and echo cancellation units that is expressly recited in claim 10.” Appeal Br. 14. Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive because those arguments do not address the Examiner’s combination and inappropriately attack the references individually. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). As discussed above, the Examiner combines Briggs’ teachings and Dyba’s teachings such that Dyba’s “echo cancellers would be respectively coupled to the output voice signal from each user system, so that the system of Briggs can receive a second signal from a second input element that is coupled to an output of the second adaptive echo cancellation unit.” Final Act. 8 (emphasis omitted); Ans. 13. These arguments that the references do not teach the entirety of the disputed limitation do not persuasively address that combination. Further, Appellant argues “neither Briggs, nor Dyba, nor the combination of these references teaches every possible configuration of audio ducking units and echo cancellation units.” Appeal Br. 14. Appeal 2020-001254 Application 14/634,687 10 This argument is unpersuasive because we are unaware of any requirement that “every possible configuration” of a combination must be taught by the references. Further, the Examiner’s proffered combination addresses the claimed configuration, not “every possible configuration.” See Final Act. 8; Ans. 13–14. Furthermore, claim 10 does not recite audio ducking units, and so, the combination need not teach audio ducking units. Still further, Appellant argues that “the Examiner provides no support” for the Examiner’s proffered combination of Briggs and Dyba. Appeal Br. 14–15; Reply Br. 6. Relatedly, Appellant argues “the Examiner has failed to explain how inserting the echo cancellers of Dyba at the outputs of the voice output gain stage 210 would affect the voice output filter of the voice output gain stage 210”; “how such echo-cancelled output signals would be affected when combined with the filtered side-tone gain stage output 208 at the summing node 214”; and “whether the acoustic systems of Briggs would still work if the echo cancellers of Dyba were inserted at the outputs of the output gain stages 210.” Reply Br. 6. These arguments are also unpersuasive because the Examiner has provided adequate rationale and explanation for the proffered combination of Briggs and Dyba, reasonably supporting the Examiner’s determination that the disputed limitations would have been obvious. The Examiner points out that “the setups of Briggs and Dyba are similar[],” e.g., “[b]oth systems have two communication end points, each with [voice] input and output” and the systems similarly couple inputs and outputs over a communication network. Ans. 13–14. Because of those similarities, the Examiner explains that “one of ordinary skill in the art would know how to place the echo cancelers of Dyba so that they would be inserted at the outputs and inputs of Appeal 2020-001254 Application 14/634,687 11 each of [element] 210” in order to provide echo cancellation. Id. at 14; see Briggs Fig. 3. In fact, Dyba describes that its “echo canceller 20 may also function to reduce some aspects of acoustic echo” that is caused by “the received signal, after being output via the speaker,” that “may be redirected back into the microphone of transmitter/receiver 12 and also be reflected back to transmitter/receiver 14,” i.e., the type of voice echo that would be present in Brigg’s system. Dyba ¶ 38. Because the Examiner has adequately explained, and the references support, that Briggs and Dyba are systems with similar features, Appellant’s arguments fail to persuade us that a person of ordinary skill would not have been able to fit the teachings of Briggs and Dyba “together like pieces of a puzzle,” rendering the claimed limitations obvious. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), and, therefore, sustain the rejection. Remaining Dependent Claims 5–9, 12–14, 16–20, and 22 Appellant does not argue separate patentability for dependent claims 5–9, 12–14, 16–20, and 22, which depend directly or indirectly from claims 1, 10, and 21. See Appeal Br. 13, 15. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Examiner’s rejections of dependent claims 5– 9, 12–14, 16–20, and 22. Appeal 2020-001254 Application 14/634,687 12 CONCLUSION In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 5, 6, 9, 21, 22 103 Briggs, Rand 1, 5, 6, 9, 21, 22 7, 8 103 Briggs, Rand, Goldberg 7, 8 10–13, 16, 17 103 Briggs, Dyba 10–13, 16, 17 14 103 Briggs, Dyba, Kane 14 18, 20 103 Briggs, Dyba, Goldberg 18, 20 19 103 Briggs, Dyba, Goldberg, Shin 19 Overall Outcome 1, 5–14, 16– 22 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). 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