01A34526_r
02-06-2004
Gwendolyn M. Williams, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Gwendolyn M. Williams v. United States Postal Service
01A34526
February 6, 2004
.
Gwendolyn M. Williams,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A34526
Agency No. 1-H-331-0060-02
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from an agency
final decision dated June 27, 2003, finding that it complied with an
August 20, 2002 settlement agreement. The Commission accepts the appeal.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. �
1614.405.
The August 20, 2002 settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part,
that:
(1) [Complainant] will obtain a revised schedule after submitting medical
documentation of [complainant's] required therapy sessions and a CA-17
form to [named supervisor] (herein referred to as NS);
(2) The revised schedule will be renewed each month until it is no
longer needed;
(3) Documentation will also reference [complainant's] need to go home
directly following her therapy session; and
(4) [NS] will be responsible for approving the revised schedule.
Complainant claims that she submitted medical documentation in October
2002, which indicated that she was being treated with certain medications,
which in turn caused her to develop a sleep disorder (insomnia),
and that a work schedule of 7:00am to 3:00pm for 90 days would be
beneficial. Complainant avers that she was given a Tour 2 schedule based
on this medical documentation, but that when she submitted essentially
the same statement in April 2003, her request to continue working a Tour
2 schedule was disapproved by NS, and she was reassigned to Tour 3.
In its final decision, the agency noted that it obtained information
from NS and another manager (AM) in order to address complainant's
breach claim. The agency noted that NS stated that under the terms of
the settlement agreement, complainant was obligated to provide him with
monthly medical statements, and that based thereon, her revised schedule
would then be approved. Additionally, the agency noted that NS stated
that the medical documentation provided by complainant failed to comport
with the terms of the settlement agreement. Specifically, the agency
indicated that NS stated that the settlement addressed complainant's
3:00pm physical therapy appointments, as well as complainant's inability
to return to work afterwards because of pain. NS further stated that
medical documentation submitted by complainant in August 2002 and April
2003, which advocates a change of tour assignment due to insomnia,
falls outside the scope of the settlement agreement. The agency then
indicated that AM contended that she had no significant role in this
matter. Accordingly, based on this information, the agency determined
that the settlement agreement had not been breached.
On appeal, in pertinent part, complainant argues that NS has no legitimate
reason to explain why he accepted her medical documentation in October
2002, as sufficient to justify a change in her schedule to Tour 2,
and yet refused to accept nearly identical documentation in April 2003,
and disapproved her request to remain in Tour 2. Complainant also
claims that NS and AM have engaged in conduct, and undertaken various
actions against her, all for the purpose of harassing her, and that
she has filed EEO complaints, appeals to the Department of Labor, and
union grievances, to address these matters.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a
contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules
of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further
held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,
not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states
that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
In the instant case, based on its plain meaning, we concur with the
agency that the terms of the settlement agreement contemplate a change
in complainant's schedule, to be approved monthly, to facilitate her
required physical therapy, and her need to go directly home afterwards.
The Commission recognizes that the agency may have approved a change in
her schedule based on the October 2002 medical documentation concerning
her insomnia; however, the Commission further determines that the October
2002 medical documentation was unrelated to required physical therapy
sessions and/or the need to return home thereafter. Therefore, we find
that the initial approval for a Tour 2 schedule based on the October 2002
medical documentation is outside of the scope of the settlement agreement.
Consequently, we also find that NS's disapproval of complainant's
request to remain in a Tour 2 schedule, based on the nearly identical
April 2003 medical documentation cannot be viewed as a breach of the
settlement agreement. In fact, it does not appear that complainant
ever submitted the required medical documentation needed to implement
the terms of the settlement agreement, i.e., monthly medical statements
describing her need for physical therapy, the schedule of these sessions,
and the continued need to return home after each session.
Although we note that complainant avers that her need for a tour schedule
change because of her insomnia is related to the schedule change
described in the settlement agreement, because they both concern the
same injury, we are not convinced that this is sufficient to bring her
request to remain in Tour 2 within the scope of the settlement agreement.
Instead, we find that this claim is best viewed as a separate complaint
concerning the agency's alleged failure to provide complainant with a
reasonable accommodation. Therefore, if she has not already done so,
we advise complainant to contact an EEO Counselor if she wishes to pursue
further this matter
Furthermore, although from her statements it appears that complainant
may have already filed a separate EEO complaint (and union grievances)
regarding her claims of retaliatory harassment by NS and AM, in the
event that she did not actually follow through on her stated intentions,
we advise complainant to contact an EEO Counselor regarding this matter
as well, which also must be treated as a separate complaint. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.504(c).
In conclusion, for the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the agency's
final decision finding no breach of the settlement agreement.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
February 6, 2004
__________________
Date