Great Dane Trailers, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 16, 1964

150 N.L.R.B. 438 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

438 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Great Dane Trailers, Inc. and International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers , Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths , Forgers and
Helpers Local No. 26, AFL-CIO. Case No. 10-CA-5518. De-
cember 16, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 15, 1964,'Trial Examiner Joseph I. Nachman issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that
the Respondent had not engaged in other unfair labor practices
alleged in the complaint. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions
to the Decision and a brief in support thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members
Leedom and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.1
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the entire
record in this case, including the Trial Examiner's Decision and ex-
ceptions and brief, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings,
conclusions, and recommendations with the following additional
comments :
We agree with the Trial Examiner that the denial of vacation pay
to strikers who had not abandoned the strike by July 1, 1963, unlaw-
fully discriminated against them because of their adherence to the
Union's strike. Whether vacation pay was granted to those employees
who were actually working on July 1, pursuant to the provisions of
the expired contract, or was granted, as the Employer contends, as a
unilaterally adopted policy formulated after the expiration of the
contract, is immaterial. Any striker who had not yet been perma-
nently replaced was entitled, as an employee under Section 2(3) of
the Act, to be treated in the same fashion as other employees. And
even those strikers who had been permanently replaced before the date
of payment of vacation benefits were entitled to a pro rata share,
either under article VIII (e) of the expired contract, or under the uni-
lateral policy of the Employer which admittedly adopted substan-
tially the same provisions on eligibility.
1 Respondent took exception to certain rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hear-
ing with respect to testimony relating to the independent violations of Section 8(a) (1)
alleged in the complaint. In view of the Trial Examiner 's dismissal of these allegations,
to which the General Counsel has not excepted, it is apparent that no prejudice to the
Respondent has resulted from such rulings.
150 NLRB No. 55.
GREAT DANE TRAILERS, INC. 439
We are not hereby interpreting the contract for the parties, as the
Employer contends, but are only holding that strikers must be treated
uniformly with nonstrikers with respect to whatever benefits accrue
to the latter from the existence of the employment relationship.'
Whatever problems may arise as to specific amounts due, or as to
status, may be resolved at the compliance stage of the proceeding.
As for the Employer's contention that an action for the payment of
vacation benefits may only be brought under Section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act, our previous discussion and the Trial
Examiner's Decision indicate that the Board's power to order reim-
bursement of vacation benefits to the strikers is based on the need to
remedy the unfair labor practice committed, and not on their contrac-
tual rights, whatever they may be. The Board's jurisdiction to remedy
unfair labor practices is not preempted by the possible existence of a
contractual obligation arising from the same circumstances -3
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order the Order recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner, and orders that Great Dane Trailers,
Inc., Savannah, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order.
2 Cf. General Electric Company, 80 NLRB 510, where the accrual of future vacation
benefits, based on the performance of services or its equivalent , was allowed to nonstrikers,
but disallowed for strikers . Here, on the other hand , we are not awarding vacation pay
to the strikers based on any period in which they were on strike , but are rather adopting
the same eligibility requirements , such as total hours worked in the preceding year, as
the Employer imposed on the nonstrikers.
3 See Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 , footnote 9.
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This complaint l under Section -10 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, herein called the Act, heard before Trial Examiner Joseph I. Nachman at
Savannah , Georgia, on May 19, 1964, involves allegations that Great Dane Trailer,
Inc., herein called Respondent of Company , violated Section 8 (a) (3) and ( 1) of the
Act by discriminatorily refusing to pay certain employees vacation pay allegedly
because they engaged in a strike and other concerted activities on behalf of Interna-
tional Brotherhood of. Boilermakers , Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths , Forgers and
Helpers Local No. 26 ,, AFL-CIO , herein called the Union or Local 26, and other-
wise threatened , coerced , and restrained its employees in violation' of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. The General Counsel and Respondent participated-fully in the hearing,
and were afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence, to examine and cross -examine
witnesses , and to argue orally on the record . Oral argument was waived . Briefs on
behalf of the General Counsel and Respondent , respectively , have been received and
duly considered.
1 Issued April 10, 1964, on a charge filed October 25, 1963.
440 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the entire record in the case, including my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT 2
1. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE INVOLVED
A. Background
For some years the Union has been the collective-bargaining representative of the
employees at Respondent's Savannah, Georgia, plant. The last contract was effective
by its terms, from April 1, 1960, through March 31, 1963, and thereafter from year
to year, absent notice, but terminable under certain circumstances upon 15 days'
notice. Article VIII of this contract is entitled "Vacations," and contains the fol-
lowing provisions:
(a) Each qualified employee covered by this agreement shall be entitled after
one (1) year of continuous employment, at a time agreeable to the Company,
to a vacation of seven (7) consecutive days with pay for forty (40) hours at the
rate of pay existing for such employee at the time of the beginning of his vaca-
tion. Each employee after five (5) years continuous service, shall be entitled
to a vacation of fourteen (14) consecutive days, with pay for eighty (80) hours.
Any employee entitled to a vacation with pay may waive the right, if his services
are needed by the employer, to such vacation during the period of this agreement,
and in such cases shall be entitled to receive in lieu thereof, at the time he
becomes entitled to the vacation, the amount of vacation pay such employee
would otherwise have received for work performed during the vacation period.
(b) To qualify for said vacation, it is necessary that an employee shall have
worked a total of fifteen hundred twenty-five (1525) hours in the said year; any
time lost, however, because of an industrial accident while employed by this
Company to count as part of the qualifying time.
(d) Employees who have served less than sixty (60) days on the next July 1
after date of employment will receive no vacation pay on that date but on the
following July 1 will receive the vacation due in accordance with the above
qualifying requirements, plus extra amount due in accordance with hours
worked. '
(e) In case of lay-off, termination or quitting, employee who has served
more than sixty (60) days shall receive pro rata share of vacation.
(f) All vacation pay shall be paid on Friday nearest July 1st, except as out-
lined in paragraph (d).
B. Current facts
1. The vacation pay
On April 30,3 in accordance with its provisions, the Union gave Respondent notice
terminating the then current contract, and on or about May 16, approximately 348
employees out of a total work force of about 400, went on strike and began picketing
Respondent's plant. All parties concede that the strike was entirely economic in
nature.4 By letters dated July 12, a great number of the striking employees made
demand on the Company for payment of the vacation pay allegedly due them under
article VIII of the aforementioned contract. Respondent admits the receipt of these
letters. Except in the instances hereafter noted, which were apparently few in num-
ber, none of the striking employees received vacation pay in 1963, although it is
2 No issue of commerce or labor organization is present . The complaint alleges and the
answer admits the necessary factual averments In this regard. I find the facts as pleaded.
8 This, and all dates hereafter mentioned are 1963, unless otherwise indicated.
* The strike and picketing continued until December 26, at which time it was abandoned
unconditionally , and the strikers made application to return to work. In the meantime
the Company had replaced a number of the strikers. By July 1, about 259 had been
replaced ; by August 1, a total of about 325; by September 1, a total of about 339; by'
October 1, a total of about 442 ; and all strikers had been replaced by October S. These
so-called "replacements ," however , included some strikers who abandoned the strike and
returned to work. The number of these does not clearly appear . As a striker was replaced
by a new employee , he was notified by the Company of, his replacement by a permanent
employee . Some of the strikers were rehired by the Company , apparently as new em-
ployees, after their replacement . The exact number of these does not appear.
GREAT DANE TRAILERS, INC. 441
admitted that such employees satisfied the conditions therefor, as set forth in the
contract. Also under date of July 8, counsel for the Union wrote Respondent's plant
manager asking when and where the men could secure the vacation pay allegedly due
them under the contract. On July 12, Respondent's counsel replied to that letter
taking the position, in substance, that because the Union had canceled the contract,
there was no contract in effect providing for the payment of vacation- pay.5
Stephen Docie, a witness called by Respondent, who was at the time of these events
its personnel director, admitted that vacation benefits were paid to all employees who
did not strike on May 16 and who met the contract qualifications therefor, and were
also paid to those who struck but abandoned the strike and returned to the job before
they had been replaced. The reason assigned by Docie for this was that in the case
of the nonstrikers it was company policy to pay vacation benefits to all qualifying
employees who were on the job on July 1; and in the case of returning strikers who
had not yet been replaced, there was no break in service. Plant Manager Granger
testified, however, that the aforesaid payments to nonstrikers and to returning strikers
were not made pursuant to the contract because that had been canceled, but that sub-
sequent to the cancellation it was necessary to have some rules concerning vacation
pay, and that Respondent adopted rules which were substantially the same as those
in the canceled contract.
2. The alleged independent 8(a) (1) statements
The essential testimony relating to this aspect of the case, offered by both the
parties, will be set forth with respect to all of the incidents relied upon by the General
Counsel. Credibility issues will be resolved in the concluding findings.
a. The Vernon Barber incident
Vernon Barber, a striker since May,16, who had been replaced in June, and who
engaged in picketing Respondent, testified that: In mid-November he and W. E.
Pierce, also a striker and picket, left the picket line to get lunch at' a drive-in about
a mile from the plant; at the table they were joined by Arthur Davis, a foreman, and
admitted supervisor in Respondent's sheet metal department; he (Barber) asked Davis
how production was going at the plant; and Davis replied it was "pretty bad" and
offered Barber and Pierce a better job and more money than they were making when
they went out on strike if they would return to work at the plant. Barber further
testified that: Neither he nor Pierce had worked under Davis' supervision; he did not
think Davis was hard of hearing; and he did not ask Davis the nature of the job
offered by the latter, or what the rate of pay would be. Pierce did not testify, nor
is there any explanation for the failure to call him. -
Davis, who is 70 years of age and obviously has a substantial hearing impediment,
testified that: In obedience to instructions given him by management, he refrained
from asking any employee to return to work, or making any promises in that con-
nection; he frequently had lunch at the drive-in, and on occasions saw many of the
strikers there, to all of whom he spoke by a simple hello; this may have included
Barber, but he had no specific recollection of seeing him; and he denied offering
Barber or Pierce a job or promising them more money.
b. The Edward Criswell incident
Edward Criswell, an employee who joined the strike at its inception, testified that:
About a week after the strike began on May 16, and about a month prior to receiving
notice of his replacement by the Company, he and fellow striker Pierce were picket-
ing a temporary employment office which Respondent had established in downtown
Savannah, and observed Personnel Manager Docie in the doorway to this employ-
ment office; they approached Docie and he (Criswell) asked Docie for his vacation
pay; Docie replied, in substance, that if Criswell would return to work he would
"give me my vacation pay and more money"; and he told Docie he would not cross
the picket line to return to work. - As heretofore pointed out, Pierce did not testify,
and the record contains no explanation for the failure to call him.6
5 The General Counsel also adduced some testimony concerning oral demands by some
employees for the vacation pay allegedly due them. As this evidence is, for the most part,
controverted, it will be dealt with in a subsequent portion of this Decision.
6 Elzie West, a witness for the General Counsel, whose testimony will hereafter be more
fully detailed, testified that he overheard the conversation between Criswell and Docie
on this occasion , and that Criswell was alone.
442 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
c. The Elzie West incident ,
Elzie West, also a striker, at first testified that about a week after the strike began
and while picketing the temporary employment office on Congress Street, he over-
heard Criswell ask Docie about the vacation pay and that Docie replied, "If you will
come back you will get your vacation pay." Later in his testimony, West'added that
Docie also offered "a better job, a supervision job." West also testified that in the
conversation between Criswell and Docie, which he (West) had overheard, Docie
told Criswell "the same thing that he told me." 7
d. The Inman Hagan incident
Inman Hagan, also a replaced striker, testified that he went to Respondent's per-
sonnel office about the first week in August to check on his tools left in the plant
when he went on strike; that he asked the receptionist about this and was told to come
back after lunch. As he was leaving the personnel office Docie came out of his pri-
vate office and he (Hagan ) asked Docie about the vacation pay, and Docie replied,
"It was tied up in a labor dispute but if I would come back to work I would get it." 8
e. The Robert Hathaway incident
Robert Hathaway, an employee who went on strike on May 16, testified that on
Saturday afternoon of the July 28 weekend, he met Docie at a liquor store on the
outskirts of town, and after some preliminary conversation asked the latter if "we
were ever going to get our vacation pay or was we ever going back to work," and that
Docie replied, "If you come back to work all matters will be settled, financial and
otherwise."
Docie testified that when the strike began, he was instructed by Company Counsel
not to solicit any employee to return to work, or to make any promises regarding
"fringe benefits or any favoritism"; that he followed these instructions "implicitly."
He denied that he had any conversation with Criswell, West, Hagan, or Hathaway
regarding vacation pay, as they had testified. Particularly in the case of Hagan and
Hathaway, Docie testified that the conversation with them, at the time and place they
indicated, was impossible because he was on Santa Belle Island, off the coast of Fort
Myers, Florida, spending his vacation, from July 28 to August 10.
f. The Julian Grimes incident
Julian Grimes, a striking employee, who had worked as a utility man on the
assembly line, testified that about September 20 he met James Griner, manager of
Respondent's service department, on the street in downtown Savannah, and asked
Griner if he had any idea when the men would receive their vacation pay, and that
Griner stated, in substance, that those men returning to work had received their vaca-
tion pay, and if he (Grimes) would come back to work he would get his vacation
pay and "a better paid job." Grimes replied that he would not come back until the
picketing had ceased.
Griner denied that any such conversation occurred, saying that Grimes did not
work in his department, and he had not talked with him for some 3 or 4 years.
C. Analysis and concluding findings
1. The alleged 8(a) (3) violation _St
Respondent contends that this aspect of the case presents nothing more than an
effort on the part of the employees to collect money allegedly due them under the
terms of a collective-bargaining agreement. It argues that the employees should be
left to their rights under Section 301 of the Act, which rights, as the Supreme Court
has held,9 may be enforced in either the State or Federal courts. Were this the
theory of the General Counsel's case, I would agree with Respondent. "The Board
7 West does not attribute to Docie, as did Criswell , the statement that a return to
the job would also mean "more money."
8 Hagan admitted that while he had gone to the plant for the purpose of seeing about
his tools, he did not return after lunch as he had been told by the receptionist, and has
not yet gotten his tools . He also stated that on this occasion Docie did not offer him a
better paying job if he returned to work.
6 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln-Mills, 353 U.S. 448; Association of Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse , etc., 348 U.S. 437 ; Smith v. Evening News Assoc ., 371 U .S. 195.
GREAT DANE TRAILERS, INC. 443
is not the proper forum for parties seeking to remedy an alleged breach of contract
or to obtain specific enforcement of its terms" ( United Telephone Company of the
West; et al., 112 NLRB 779, 782). To the same effect see Association of Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse, etc., supra, footnote 2. The General Counsel 's case,
however, is premised on a broader base. His theory is that Respondent withheld
vacation pay due employees under the contract , because of their membership in and
activities on behalf of the Union , and because they engaged in concerted activities
for the purposes of collective bargaining and other material aid and protection. If
such was Respondent 's purpose , the withholding of the vacation pay was plainly dis-
criminatory , and a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and ( 1) because its natural and
foreseeable effect was to discourage membership in the Union , cf. Krambo Food
Stores, Incorporated, 106 NLRB 870, 877, and was simply punishment for engaging
in a strike against Respondent, a right protected by Section 7 of the Act. N.L.R.B. v.
Washington Aluminum Company , Inc., 370 U.S. 9. The issue , therefore , is factual,
namely, whether Respondent withheld the vacation pay for the reason assigned by
the General Counsel , or for some other reason or reasons unconnected with union
membership or the concerted activities of the employees.
Respondent admits that all employees qualifying for vacation pay under the terms
of the contract , and who did not go on strike , received their vacation pay about July 1,
when it became payable under the terms of the contract ; but no striker received such
payment even though he had fulfilled every contractual condition precedent. Its
stated reason for pursuing this course was that the contract had expired and hence
imposed no obligation upon it to pay vacation benefits to anyone, and that the pay-
ment to the nonstrikers was not pursuant to the contract , but pursuant to its unilat-
erally promulgated rules to pay such benefits to all employees at work on July 1,
which unilateral , rules happened to coincide with the provisions of the expired con-
tract. Respondent also admits that it paid vacation pay to each qualifying striker
who abandoned the strike and returned to work prior to being permanently replaced,
urging that permanently replaced strikers lost their status as "employees ," and hence
were entitled to no benefits . But these explanations do not withstand scrutiny.
Stripped to its essentials , Respondent was in effect saying to all its employees refrain
from joining the strike, or having joined it, abandon the strike and return to work,
and you will receive the vacation benefits due , but join or continue adherence to the
strike, you will not receive the vacation benefits to which you would otherwise be
entitled. Not only was the natural and foreseeable consequence of Respondent's
conduct to discourage membership in the Union, but, upon the entire record, I find
and conclude that Respondent 's intent and purpose was to retaliate against the strikers
for having engaged in this concerted activity.
2. The alleged independent 8 (a) (1) violations ' '
I find the testimony offered by the General Counsel insufficient to establish the
incidents above discussed. In short, I credit the testimony of Davis, Docie, and
Griner, and discredit that of Barber, Criswell, West, Hagan , Hathaway and Grimes.
I am persuaded to this conclusion because of the several inconsistencies in the testi-
mony of the General Counsel' s witnesses.
Vernon Barber "did not think" Foreman Davis was hard of hearing. That Davis
is hard of hearing was perfectly. evident to me, and if Barber in fact talked with
Davis, it must have-been perfectly evident to Barber. Also, I am at a loss to under-
stand why Pierce, who allegedly was with Barber on the occasion in question, was
not called as a witness , or why his failure to testify was not explained.
Criswell testified that Docie's promise was to give him (Criswell) his "vacation
pay and more money." Not only was Pierce, who allegedly was with Criswell, not
called, but General Counsel's witness West, who allegedly overheard the conversa-
tion, testified that Docie told Criswell "the same thing he told me." West at first
testified that Docie's statement was simply a promise to give the vacation pay, but
later stated that Docie also offered "a better job, a supervision job." Significantly,
West did not support Criswell's statement that Docie offered Criswell "more money."
Having credited Docie with respect to the Criswell and West incidents, I also credit
him with respect to the Hagan and Hathaway incidents.
With respect to Grimes' incident, it seems most unusual that Griner , a foreman in
Respondent's service department, would discuss with an employee whom he knew
only slightly, and who did not work in his department, a matter solely within the
jurisdiction of the personnel department, particularly at a time when virtually all of
the- strikers had been replaced. Accordingly, I credit Griner.
-444 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
For the reasons stated, I find and conclude that the alleged independent Section
8(a)(1) violations have not been established, and will recommend that the allega-
tions of the complaint in that regard be dismissed.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent discriminatorily withheld from certain of its employ-
ees vacation pay for which they had qualified under the terms of the contract between
Respondent and the Union, it will be required to pay to each such employee the vaca-
tion pay so withheld. The amount due to each such employee shall bear interest at
the rate of 6 percent per annum from June 28, 1963, the date such vacation pay was
payable under provisions of the applicable contract until paid.
It will also be recommended that Respondent shall, upon request, make available
to the Board or its agents, for inspection and reproduction, all books and records
necessary or helpful in determining the identity of the employees to'whom vacation
pay is due as herein provided, and in computing the amount thereof.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, and
is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. By withholding vacation pay from its employees as set forth in section B, 1,
above, Respondent engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices proscribed
by Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. It has not been established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent
solicited employees to abandon their strike and return to work, and promised them
benefits if they would do so, and that allegation of the complaint should be dismissed.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire
record in this case , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, I recommend that Respondent, Great Dane Trailers, Inc., its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Withholding vacation pay from, or in any other manner discriminating against,
its employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of
employment, to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it has been found is necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Forthwith pay to each employee on its payroll on May 15, 1963, who qualified
for vacation pay under the terms of article VIII of the agreement between Great
Dane Trailers, Inc., and International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Build-
ers, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, Local No. 26, AFL-CIO, effective April 1,
1960, the vacation pay due on June 28, 1963, as provided in the aforesaid article
VIII; provided, however, that nothing herein shall be construed as requiring the pay-
ment of such vacation pay to any employee who has heretofore received such vaca-
tion pay for the contract year ending June 30, 1963.
(b) Post at its plant in Savannah, Georgia, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." 10 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 10, shall,'after being duly signed by its representative, be posted immediately
10 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and
Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner"
in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals,
Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order".
ALPINE COAL COMPANY 445
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. A copy of the aforesaid Appendix shall
also be mailed by Respondent to each employee on its payroll on May 15, 1963, and
who is not presently employed by it, at his or her last known address, and to the
aforesaid Local No. 26.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board and its agents, for in-
spection and reproduction, all books and records necessary or helpful in determining
the identity of the employees to whom vacation pay is due as provided herein, and in
computing the amount thereof.
(d) Notify the aforesaid Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the
receipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith 11
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that paragraphs 13 and 14 of the complaint herein, as
amended at the hearing, be, and the same are, dismissed.
n In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, you are hereby notified that:
WE WILL NOT withhold vacation pay from, or in any other manner discrimi-
nate against, our employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any
term or condition of employment, to encourage or discourage membership in
any union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist unions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all
such activities.
WE WILL pay to each employee on our payroll on May 15, 1963, who quali-
fied for vacation pay under the terms of article VIII of our contract with Local
26, which became effective April 1, 1960, and who has not heretofore received
the same, the vacation pay due June 28, 1963, under the terms of the aforesaid
contract.
GREAT DANE TRAILERS, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 528 Peach-
tree-Seventh Building, 50 Seventh Street NE., Atlanta, Georgia, Telephone
No. 876-3311, Extension 5357, if they have any question concerning this notice or
compliance with its provisions.
Alpine Coal Company and Clyde Scott and Howard Scott and
Warren Scott. Cases Nos. 5-CA-2708-1, 5-CA-2708-2, and
5-CA-2708-3. December 16, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On September 22, 1964, Trial Examiner George L. Powell issued
his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Re-
150 NLRB No. 52.