GHASSEMI, Ali

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 30, 2019

14030344 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/030,344 09/18/2013 Ali GHASSEMI K8001244US 9239
34236 7590 08/30/2019
Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP
50 QUEEN STREET NORTH, STE. 1020
P.O. BOX 2248
KITCHENER, ONTARIO N2H6M2
CANADA
EXAMINER
NGO, CHUONG D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2182
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/30/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
JEFF.WONG@GOWLINGWLG.COM
VAL.COTTRILL@GOWLINGWLG.COM
Waterloo.IP@gowlingwlg.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte ALI GHASSEMI
____________________

Appeal 2019-000377
Application 14/030,3441
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before ERIC S. FRAHM, KRISTEN L. DROESCH, and
MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1–24. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–24 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, without
significantly more (see Final Act. 2–3; Ans. 3–4).

1 As noted by Appellant in the Appeal Brief (App. Br. 3), the real party in
interest is D2L Corporation.
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Disclosed Invention and Illustrative Claim
Appellant’s disclosed invention relates to a method and system for a
Hijri calendar (Title; Spec. ¶¶ 1–5; Abstract), and more generally “to
converting between or among calendars” (Spec. ¶ 1). The main point of
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention is to provide a program to allow
a user to convert a date from a predetermined calendar into a date
corresponding to the Hijri calendar (Abstract; claims 1, 11, 20; Spec. ¶¶ 7,
17).
Independent claim 1, and claim 9 depending from claim 1, recite
methods for managing a Hijri calendar, including using a processor to
convert a date from a predetermined calendar into a date corresponding to
the Hijri calendar employing various data and a Hijri conversion algorithm.
Dependent claim 9 additionally recites obtaining more accurate conversion
information for the requested date to be converted by “querying at least one
third party system or database.” Remaining independent claims 11 and 20
recite a system for managing a Hijri calendar (claim 11) and a non-transitory
computer readable medium to perform the method of claim 1 (claim 20), and
are commensurate in scope with claim 1. Independent claim 1 and
dependent claim 9, reproduced below with emphases and bracketed lettering
added, are illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for managing a Hijri calendar comprising:
[A] receiving, from one or more of a user or an
application, a request for a date conversion, the request
including a date input from a first predetermined calendar;
[B] determining, by one or more processors, the first
predetermined calendar and a conversion type associated with
the requested date conversion based at least in part on the date
input;
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[C] in response to receiving the request for the date
conversion, obtaining, by one or more processors a
predetermined Hijri calendar;
[D] determining, by one or more processors, whether a
date associated with the date input falls within a predetermined
Hijri calendar date range based at least in part on the date
input and the predetermined Hijri calendar;
[E] in the event the date input falls within the date range,
using, by one or more processors, the predetermined Hijri
calendar to convert the date input including looking up a Hijri
date that matches the date associated with the date input,
wherein the Hijri date that matches the date associated with the
date input corresponds to a converted date to be output;
[F] in the event that the date does not fall within the date
range, computing, by one or more processors, the converted
date based at least in part on a predetermined Hijri conversion
algorithm, wherein the Hijri conversion algorithm is based at
least in part on one or more astronomical characteristics; and
[G] returning, by one or more processors, the converted
date to the one or more of the user or the application, wherein in
the event that the converted date was computed based at least in
part on the Hijri conversion algorithm, [H] an indication that
the converted date is potentially inaccurate is provided to the
user.

Br. 15 (Claims Appendix).
9. The method of claim 1, wherein if the date input falls
outside of the predetermined Hijri calendar, querying at least one
third party system or database to retrieve a more
accurate converted date for the date input.

Br. 16 (Claims Appendix).

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REJECTION
The Examiner made the following rejection:
Claims 1–24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
non-statutory subject matter (Final Act. 2–3; Ans. 3–4).

ISSUE
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (Br. 10–13), the
disputed issue on appeal is whether or not the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being (i) directed to a judicial
exception, i.e., an abstract idea, without significantly more, and thus (ii)
patent-ineligible under § 101.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
We first note “[w]hether a [patent] claim is drawn to patent-eligible
subject matter is an issue of law that [is] review[ed] de novo.” SiRF Tech.,
Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.2
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,

2 This threshold analysis of whether a claim is directed to one of the four
statutory categories of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, is referred to as “Step 1” in the patent-eligibility
inquiry under § 101.
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70 (2012) (brackets in original) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185
(1981)).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014)
(citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that framework, we
first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory
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does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 192 (“We view
respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance in the Federal Register
concerning the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (January 7, 2019) (hereinafter,
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“Revised Guidance”) (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-
07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf).
Under the Revised Guidance, after determining that a claim falls
within one of the statutory categories under §101 (hereinafter, “Step 1”), we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes);3 and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).4
See Revised Guidance, 51–52, 54–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.5
See Revised Guidance, 56.

3 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 1” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter, “Step 2A(i)”).
4 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 2” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter, “Step 2A(ii)”).
5 Items (3) and (4) continue to be collectively referred to as “Step 2B” of the
Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
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Step 2A(i) – Abstract Idea
Informed by our judicial precedent, the recent Revised Guidance
extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts as abstract
ideas to explain that the abstract idea exception includes the following
groupings of subject matter, when recited as such in a claim limitation:
(a) Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations;
(b) Certain methods of organizing human activity —
fundamental economic principles or practices (including
hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts;
legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people (including social
activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions); and
(c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the human mind
(including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).
Under the Revised Guidance, if the claim does not recite a judicial
exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the
enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above), then the claim is patent-
eligible at Step 2A(i). This determination concludes the eligibility analysis,
except in situations identified in the Revised Guidance.6
However, if the claim recites a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea
enumerated above, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon), the claim

6 In the rare circumstance in which an Examiner believes a claim limitation
that does not fall within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should
nonetheless be treated as reciting an abstract idea, the procedure described in
the Revised Guidance for analyzing the claim should be followed. See
Revised Guidance, Section III.C.
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requires further analysis for a practical application of the judicial exception
in Step 2A(ii).
Step 2A(ii) – Practical Application
If a claim recites a judicial exception in Step 2A(i), we determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception in Step 2A(ii) by: (a) identifying whether there
are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial
exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and
in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a
practical application.
The seven identified “practical application” sections of the MPEP,7
cited in the Revised Guidance under Step 2A(ii), are:
(1) MPEP § 2106.05(a) Improvements to the Functioning of a
Computer or To Any Other Technology or Technical Field
(2) MPEP § 2106.05(b) Particular Machine
(3) MPEP § 2106.05(c) Particular Transformation
(4) MPEP § 2106.05(e) Other Meaningful Limitations
(5) MPEP § 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An
Exception
(6) MPEP § 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity
(7) MPEP § 2106.05(h) Field of Use and Technological
Environment

7 See MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Citations to the MPEP herein refer to
revision [R-08.2017].
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If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application as determined under one or more of the MPEP sections cited
above, then the claim is not directed to the judicial exception, and the patent-
eligibility inquiry ends. If not, then analysis proceeds to Step 2B.
Step 2B – “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
Under our precedent, it is possible that a claim that does not
“integrate” a recited judicial exception under Step 2A(ii) is nonetheless
patent eligible. For example, the claim may recite additional elements that
render the claim patent eligible even though a judicial exception is recited in
a separate claim element.8 The Federal Circuit has held claims eligible at
the second step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2B) because the
additional elements recited in the claims provided “significantly more” than
the recited judicial exception (e.g., because the additional elements were
unconventional in combination).9 Therefore, if a claim has been determined
to be directed to a judicial exception under Revised Step 2A, we must
evaluate the additional elements individually and in combination under Step
2B to determine whether they provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the
additional elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself).10

8 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
9 See, e.g., Amdocs (Israel), Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288,
1300, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2016); BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349–52 (Fed. Cir. 2016); DDR
Holdings v. Hotels.com, 773 F.3d 1245, 1257–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
10 We note the patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of
fact. Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314,
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In particular, “[t]he question of whether a claim
element or combination of elements is well-understood, routine and
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Under the Revised Guidance, we must consider in Step 2B whether an
additional element or combination of elements: (1) “Adds a specific
limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an
inventive concept may be present;” or (2) “simply appends well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative
that an inventive concept may not be present.” See Revised Guidance,
III.B.11
In the Step 2B analysis, an additional element (or combination of
elements) is not well-understood, routine, or conventional unless the
examiner finds an evidentiary basis, and expressly supports a rejection in
writing with, one or more of the following:
1. A citation to an express statement in the specification or to
a statement made by an applicant during prosecution that
demonstrates the well-understood, routine, conventional nature
of the additional element(s).

conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact.”
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
11 In accordance with existing Step 2B guidance, an Examiner’s conclusion
that an additional element (or combination of elements) is well understood,
routine, conventional activity must be supported with a factual
determination. For more information concerning evaluation of well-
understood, routine, conventional activity, see MPEP § 2106.05(d), as
modified by the USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum (USPTO Commissioner
for Patents Memorandum dated Apr. 9, 2018, “Changes in Examination
Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter
Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)” (hereinafter “Berkheimer
Memo”).
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2. A citation to one or more of the court decisions discussed
in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-understood, routine,
conventional nature of the additional element(s).
3. A citation to a publication that demonstrates the well-
understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s).
4. A statement that the examiner is taking official notice of
the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the
additional element(s).
See Berkheimer Memo.
The analysis in Step 2B further determines whether an additional
element or combination of elements:
(a) Adds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that
are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field, which is indicative that an inventive concept may be
present; or
(b) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative
that an inventive concept may not be present.
Revised Guidance, and see Berkheimer Memo.
If the Examiner or the Board determines under Step 2B that the
element (or combination of elements) amounts to significantly more than the
exception itself, the claim is eligible, thereby concluding the eligibility
analysis.
However, if a determination is made that the element and combination
of elements does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself,
the claim is ineligible under Step 2B, and the claim should be rejected for
lack of subject matter eligibility.

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ANALYSIS
Step 1
Under Step 1 in the patent-eligibility inquiry under § 101, in
accordance with the Revised Guidance, we determine whether a claim is
directed to one of the four statutory categories of invention, i.e., a process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
Independent claim 1 and claims 2–10 and 21–24 depending therefrom
each recite “[a] method for managing a Hijri calendar comprising” a series
of steps or acts performed “by one or more processors” (claim 1).
Therefore, claims 1–10 and 21–24, as method claims, recite at least one of
the enumerated categories (e.g., a process) of eligible subject matter in 35
U.S.C. § 101.
Independent claim 11 recites “[a] system for a Hijri calendar
comprising: at least one processor” and “a memory coupled to the at least
one processor” (claim 11). Therefore, claims 11–19, as system claims, recite
at least one of the enumerated categories (e.g., machine and/or manufacture)
of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Independent claim 20 recites “[a] non-transitory computer readable
medium.” Therefore, claim 20, as an apparatus claim, recites at least one of
the enumerated categories (e.g., a manufacture).
Therefore, as to claims 1–24, we continue our analysis under Step
2A(i) of the Revised Guidance to determine whether the claims (1) recite a
judicial exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter
within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above); or (2) the claims
are patent-eligible.
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Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (see Br. 10–
14),12 (i) we select claim 1 as representative of the group of claims
consisting of claims 1–24, pursuant to our authority under
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv); and (ii) the issue before us is whether claim 1 is
“directed to”13 a judicial exception (Steps 2A(i) and 2A(ii)) without
significantly more (Step 2B), and is therefore patent-ineligible.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that claim 1 and claims 2–24
grouped therewith are directed to a judicial exception (a law of nature,
natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the enumerated groupings of
abstract ideas above), because the recited claim limitations (i) fall within the
enumerated groupings of abstract ideas (e.g., mathematical concepts,
methods of organizing human activity, and mental processes—concepts

12 Appellant primarily argues claim 1, and relies on the arguments presented
for claim 1 for the patent eligibility of claims 2–24 (see Br. 10–14).
Appellant presents separate arguments as to claim 9 (only as to Step 2B), and
only nominal and/or conclusory arguments as to claims 22–24 (see Br. 13).
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv) (“A statement which merely points out what a
claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of
the claim.”); see also In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require
more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the
claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were
not found in the prior art.”); cf. In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388,
391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court to examine the
claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for [patentable]
distinctions over the prior art.”).
13 The issue of whether claims 1–24 are directed to a judicial exception turns
on whether representative claim 1 (i) recites a judicial exception (Step
2A(i)); and (ii) does not contain additional limitations that integrate the
exception into a practical application (Step 2A(ii)).
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performed in the human mind), and (ii) do not contain additional elements
that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
Step 2A(i): Does Representative Claim 1 Recite a Judicial Exception?
We have reviewed the Examiner’s subject matter eligibility rejection
of claims 1–24 (Final Act. 2–3) in light of Appellant’s contentions that the
Examiner has erred (Br. 10–14), as well as the Examiner’s response to
Appellant’s arguments (Ans. 3–4). We disagree with Appellant’s
contentions that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1 and 9 under 35
U.S.C. § 101. Most specifically, we disagree with Appellant’s contentions
that claim 1 does not recite an abstract idea or combination of abstract ideas.
The Examiner determines:
The invention of claims 1-24 is to perform date conversion
to Hijri calendar from another calendar. The claimed invention
clearly includes calculations and/or manipulations of
numerical values for converting a set of data/values to another
set of data/values according to mathematical relationships or
formulas, and thus are directed a judicial exception (i.e., a law of
nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) as it is similar
to Gottschalk v. Benson that merely performs calculations and/or
manipulations numerical data values according to
mathematical relationships or formulas for converting binary
coded decimal to pure binary, and that the courts have identified
as an abstract idea. The steps of receiving a request and date
input, determining whether a date associated with the date input
falls within a predetermined Hijri calendar date range, and
performing the conversion accordingly by either looking up a
precomputed a Hijri date that matches the date associated with
the date input, or computing the Hijri date according to
conversion algorithm, and returning the Hijri date are clearly
abstract idea because they are merely calculation and/or
manipulation of numerical values. Further, the user’s location as
recited in the claims is merely a variable of mathematical
relationships or formulas. The claims do not include additional
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elements that provide meaningful limitation(s) to transform the
abstract idea into a patent eligible application of the abstract idea,
and that that amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea
itself.

Final Act. 2–3 (emphasis added); see also Ans. 3–4. We agree with the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions.
As we explained supra, the Supreme Court has held that concepts
determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Thus, the
very last clause of claim 1 on appeal, reciting providing “an indication that
the converted date is potentially inaccurate is provided to the user,” is post-
solution activity, such as a warning when a warning limit has been reached)
as found in Parker v. Flook. We also agree with the Examiner (see Final
Act. 2–3; Ans. 4) that the user’s location (recited in claims 6, 10, 16, 19, and
22–24) is just a variable using in the mathematical conversion, and we find
these claim recitations broad enough to cover both global positioning system
(GPS) and manual input of the user’s location.14

14 Appellant’s Specification describes determining the user’s location in
three ways: (1) “the connection module 110 may include a location
component (not shown), for example, a Global Positioning System, which is
configured to determine the location of the user of the network enabled
device;” (2) “the user’s location may be predetermined, for example, entered
by the user, and stored in the memory module 140;” or (3) “the user may
select which location or which fixed Hijri calendar to use and the user’s
selection may be stored in the memory module 140 and retrieved by the
conversion module 130” (Spec. ¶ 66).
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In response to Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief, the
Examiner determines:
. . . the claimed invention is clearly similar to Gottschalk v.
Benson because they are both directed to converting an abstract
data to another abstract data according to mathematical
relationships or formulas implemented by generic computer
structure, which the courts have identified as an abstract idea.
Further, the claimed invention is merely to convert date from a
predetermine calendar to Hijri calendar, and provide an alert of a
potential inaccuracy in the conversion. The claim solution is
clearly rooted in the calendar conversion itself. It is not
necessarily rooted in computer technology or an internet-centric
problem in order to overcome a problem specifically arising the
realm of computer software applications and the internet.
Therefore, the examiner respectfully submits that the claimed
invention is directed to a judicial exception of an abstract
idea, and because the claims fail to recite additional elements
that, both individually and in combination, provide meaningful
limitations to transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible
application of the abstract idea, such that the claims as a whole
amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself, claims
1-24 are not directed eligible subject matter.

Ans. 3–4. Again, we agree with the Examiner’s findings and ultimate
conclusion of patent ineligibility.
The focus of Appellant’s disclosed invention is a “method and system
for a Hijri calendar” (Spec. ¶ 1; Abstract; see also Title), and more generally
“to converting between or among calendars” (Spec. ¶ 1). The focus of
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention is to provide a program to allow
a user to convert a date from a predetermined calendar into a date
corresponding to the Hijri calendar (Abstract; claims 1, 11, 20; Spec. ¶¶ 7,
17). Independent claim 1, and claim 9 dependent from claim 1, recite
methods for managing a Hijri calendar, including using a processor to
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convert a date from a predetermined calendar into a date corresponding to
the Hijri calendar employing various data and a Hijri conversion algorithm.
Claim 1 (see supra) recites a method for managing a Hijri calendar by
(i) “receiving . . . a request for a date conversion, the request including a date
input from a first predetermined calendar” (limitation [A]); (ii) “determining
. . . the first predetermined calendar and a conversion type” using the date
input (limitation [B]); and (iii) “obtaining . . . a predetermined Hijri
calendar” (limitation [C]), which are all data collection and/or data gathering
steps. Claim 1 (see supra) also recites (iv) “determining . . . whether a date
associated with the date input falls within a predetermined Hijri calendar
date range” (limitation [D]), which constitutes making a mathematical data
comparison. Claim 1 (see supra) also recites (v) computing converted dates
in one of two different manners depending on whether “the date input falls
within the date range” determined in the data comparison step of limitation
[D] (limitations [E] and [F]), which constitute mathematical calculations and
mental processes. Finally, claim 1 (see supra) recites “returning . . . the
converted date” and “an indication that the converted date is potentially
inaccurate” to the user (limitation [G]), which constitute post-solution
activity, like issuing a warning in Parker v. Flook. Essentially, claim 1
recites a method of converting a date of a calendar, which involves
mathematical calculations and mental processes.
We note independent claim 1 performs the function of managing a
Hijri calendar by receiving and obtaining data, and comparing data to
determine optimum results (accuracy of the converted date) based on an
algorithm (including at least the Hijri conversion algorithm).
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Our determination that claim 1 recites steps for converting dates
between calendars (a first predetermined calendar and a Hijri calendar) as
being abstract ideas, such as mathematical calculations and mental
processes, is supported by case law. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
594–95 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972); Digitech
Image Technologies, LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (employing “mathematical algorithms to manipulate
existing information to generate additional information” found abstract);
Accenture Global Services, GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d
1336, 1344–46 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (generating tasks based on rules in response
to events found abstract).
Our reviewing court has concluded that abstract ideas include the
concepts of collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected data
set, and storing the data in memory. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding that the acts of parsing, comparing,
storing, and editing data are abstract ideas; Content Extraction &
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (abstract ideas include the concepts of collecting data,
recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and storing the data in
memory); see also Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth., 873
F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding “claims directed to the
collection, storage, and recognition of data are directed to an abstract idea”).
Therefore, claim 1, which recites collecting and recognizing certain data
(limitations [A]–[C]), sets forth concepts recognized by our reviewing court
to be judicially excepted abstract ideas that are patent ineligible.
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Moreover, the further-recited acts of (i) comparing data, such as the
date comparison recited in limitation [D]; and (ii) returning the converted
date to the user recited in limitation [G], are acts that are abstract ideas.
With regard to the date range determination/comparison recited in limitation
[D], collection of information and analysis of information (e.g., recognizing
certain data within the dataset) are abstract ideas. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). And, with regard to both
limitations [D] and [G], our conclusion that these acts are part of an abstract
mental process is further supported by case law. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding that acts of parsing,
comparing, storing, and editing data are abstract ideas); SAP Am., Inc. v.
Investpic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018)) (“merely presenting
the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information . . .
is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis.”); Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (“collecting, displaying, and manipulating data” is an abstract idea);
Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that a process that starts with data, applies an
algorithm, and ends with a new form of data is directed to an abstract
idea).
Further, merely combining several abstract ideas (such as a
mathematical concept and a mental process) does not render the combination
any less abstract. RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1327 (“Adding one abstract
idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-
abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089,
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1094 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining the pending claims were directed to a
combination of abstract ideas).
In this light, the method for managing a Hijri calendar, including
computing converted calendar dates (see limitations [E] and [F] recited in
claim 1 on appeal), is a (1) mathematical concept involving mathematical
relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, or mathematical
calculations; combined with (2) a mental process involving concepts
performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion). Thus, we conclude claim 1 recites (i) a method of
managing a Hijri calendar, through performance of observations and
judgments capable of being performed in the human mind, which is a mental
process; and (ii) computing converted calendar dates, which is a
mathematical concept, i.e., claim 1 recites a combination of abstract ideas.
Claims 2–24 grouped with claim 1 contain similar subject matter, and
similarly recite combinations of abstract ideas. Because we conclude
independent claim 1 and claims 2–24 grouped therewith recite a
combination of abstract ideas, we proceed to Step 2A(ii) to determine
whether the judicial exception of claims 1–24 is integrated into a practical
application.
Step 2A(ii) – Practical Application
If a claim recites a judicial exception, in Step 2A(ii) we determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.
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If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, the
claim is not directed to the judicial exception.
Appellant’s claimed method for managing a Hijri calendar (claim 1)
recites the collection and comparison of data and the use of mathematical
algorithms to determine optimal results (i.e., an accurate conversion of the
input date into a Hijri calendar date), a combination of abstract ideas. See
claims 1, 11, 20. Claim 1 merely recites the additional elements of a “one or
more processors.” Considering claim 1 as a whole, this additional element
fails to apply or use the abstract idea in a meaningful way such that the claim
as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception.
Moreover, but for the recitation of a generic processor (see claim 1,
“one or more processors”) and a database or third party computer (see claim
9, “at least one third party system or database”), we find the recited steps or
acts, could be performed as mental steps, or with the aid of pen and paper.
See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (“While the Supreme Court has altered the § 101 analysis since
CyberSource in cases like Mayo and Alice, we continue to ‘treat[] analyzing
information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical
algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the
abstract-idea category.’”) (quoting Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354); see also
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when
performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in
Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
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“[M]erely selecting information, by content or source, for collection
[and] analysis . . . does nothing significant to differentiate a process from
ordinary mental processes.” Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355. Receiving and
analyzing (or identifying data), by itself, does not transform an otherwise-
abstract process or system of information collection and analysis. See id.
Like the claims at issue in Electric Power, we find Appellant’s claim 1 does
not invoke “any assertedly inventive programming” or an “arguably
inventive set of components or methods.” Id. Therefore, in this light, even
if the collection and comparison of data and the use of mathematical
algorithms to determine optimal results (i.e., an accurate conversion of the
input date into a Hijri calendar date) recited in claim 1 were not abstract
ideas, they are alternatively not additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception that integrate the exception into a practical
application.
The nature of claim 1 as a whole is not to define a specific
technological improvement, which may constitute integrating the claim into
a practical application. Instead, claim 1 merely recites the steps necessary to
perform the abstract idea itself. Our reviewing court has “made clear that
mere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not
constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.” Credit
Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Like the claims in Credit Acceptance, the focus of claim 1 is on the mental
process of performing the claimed calculations, “and the recited generic
computer elements ‘are invoked merely as a tool.’” Id. (citing Enfish, 822
F.3d 1327); see also Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d
1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (collecting cases).
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Specifically, the claimed “one or more processors” used to achieve the
claimed results are not focused on “a specific means or method that
improves the relevant technology.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appellant’s Specification
confirms the generic, conventional nature of the claimed processing device.
See Spec. ¶¶ 36, 37, 73, 74; Fig. 1. In particular, the Specification discloses
the claimed method may be executed “on a network enabled device (not
shown), for example, a personal computer, a tablet computer, a smartphone,
a notebook computer, or the like” (Spec. ¶ 37).
Appellant’s contention (Br. 10–11) “that performing of a date
conversion to Hijri calendar from another calendar is different from merely
converting binary coded decimal to pure binary” because “date conversion
to Hijri calendar from another calendar inherently requires more than
converting binary coded decimal to pure binary, such as an interface via
which a request for a dat[e] conversion is received, a database storing a
plurality of calendars and conversion types for reference” is unpersuasive for
at least three reasons. First, as discussed above, the operations of the
method for managing a Hijri calendar are capable of being performed by
conventional processors and computing device. Second, Appellant’s claim 1
does not recite an interface, database for storage of data, or output device
such as a display (see claim 1). Third, even if claim 1 could be construed to
include an interface such as a network or the Internet (see e.g., Fig. 1,
network 10), and a database (see e.g., Fig. 1, database 20), such elements are
nothing more than generic computing system components that operate in
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conventional ways (see Spec. ¶ 37) (describing network 10 and databases
20).15
Thus, Appellant (Br. 10–11) has not persuaded us of Examiner error
with respect to either Step 2A(i) or Step 2A(ii) of the Revised Guidance. We,
therefore, conclude the judicial exception is not integrated into a practical
application under the Revised Guidance. Because representative claim 1
recites a judicial exception (i.e., the abstract ideas of a mental process and
mathematical concept) that is not integrated into a practical application, in
accordance with the Revised Guidance, we conclude claim 1 and claims 2–
24 grouped therewith are directed to a combination of abstract ideas under
Step 2A(i), and the eligibility analysis with regard to claims 1–24 proceeds to
Step 2B.
Step 2B – Inventive Concept
Having determined claims 1–24 are directed to abstract ideas that are
not integrated into a practical application, we now evaluate whether the
additional elements add a specific limitation that is not well-understood,
routine, or conventional activity in the field, or simply append well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract ideas. See
Revised Guidance. Thus, we determine whether representative claim 1, and
claim 9 separately argued (see Br. 12), “focus on a specific means or method
that improves the relevant technology” or are “directed to a result or effect

15 Paragraph 37 of the Specification states that “network 10 may be, for
example, the Internet, a local area network, a virtual network, a wide area
network, a wireless network or the like, or a combination of networks,” and
data may be queried “from, for example, external databases 20, third party
devices 30, and the like.”
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that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299,
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Claim 1 recites “one or more processors” which is shown as part of a
system (100) for a Hijri calendar (see Fig. 1, processor 150; Spec. ¶ 36).
The system 100, including processor 150, “is intended to reside on a
network enabled device (not shown), for example, a personal computer, a
tablet computer, a smartphone, a notebook computer, or the like” (Spec.
¶ 37). Appellant’s Specification describes the system 100 and processor 150
as being composed of “well-known structures” such that “specific details are
not provided as to whether the embodiments described herein are
implemented as a software routine, hardware circuit, firmware, or a
combination thereof” (Spec. ¶ 73). And, when Appellant’s disclosed
invention is embodied in “[a] non-transitory computer readable medium
containing instructions, that when executed, perform the method of claim 1”
(see claim 20), Appellant’s Specification discloses those instructions “can be
executed by a processor or other suitable processing device” (Spec. ¶ 74)
(emphasis added). Thus, Appellant does not describe any specific
technological improvement of a processor or computing device for
managing a Hijri calendar.
Claim 9 recites the additional element of “at least one third party
system or database.” Appellant’s Figure 1 shows a database 20 and at least
one third party device 30, which are described in paragraph 37 of the
Specification as being connected to the system 100 through network 10.
Again, the database 20 and/or third party device 30, like the processor 150
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discussed above with respect to claim 1, are not described as having a
technological improvement, but are simply used in a conventional manner.
In view of the foregoing, the written description thus describes these
components (processor 150, database 20, and/or third party system 30) in a
manner that indicates the components and the functions they perform were
well known in the art. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.,
802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that “a patent need not
teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art”); see
also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in
implementation details that it amounts to merely a generic component
(software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the performance of the
abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-specific resources.”).
The Examiner determines, and we agree, that:
Processors, interface and a non-transitory computer readable
medium containing instructions as recited in the claims are mere
generic structures of computer. The features of querying
databases, or tables for precomputed data and related
information and providing an indication the converted
date potentially inaccurate that is merely displaying a warning
related to a processed data, are well-understood, routine,
conventional activity previously known to the industry. These
elements amount to no more than (i) mere instructions to
implement the abstract idea on a computer, and (ii) recitation of
generic computer structure that serves to perform generic
computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities previously known to the
pertinent industry. Therefore these additional claim element(s)
do not provide meaningful limitation(s) to transform the abstract
idea into a patent eligible application of the abstract idea such
that the claim(s) as a whole amounts to significantly more than
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the abstract idea itself. Therefore, claims 1-24 are not directed
to patent eligible subject matter.

Ans. 3.
As a result, we are not persuaded that the operations recited in claims
1 and 9 are anything beyond generic computer functions as opposed to an
improvement to a mathematical concept and/or mental process. Considering
the elements of claims 1 and 9 individually and as an ordered combination,
claims 1 and 9 do no more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement
the abstract ideas on a generic computer/processer or database. Dealertrack,
Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Simply adding a
‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without
more, is insufficient to render [a] claim patent eligible.”).
Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. As explained
above, Appellant’s claims focus on managing a Hijri calendar by converting
a date input for one calendar into a Hijri calendar date—an improvement to
the abstract idea itself, not an improvement to a technological process.
In DDR Holdings, the Federal Circuit found that claims drawn to
“generating a composite web page that combines certain visual elements of a
‘host’ website with content of a third-party merchant” provided a solution
“necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem
specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1248, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The
claims addressed a problem in a manner that was “not merely the routine or
conventional use of the Internet.” Id. at 1259. In particular, rather than the
expected behavior of simply sending the website visitor to a third-party
website, the claimed invention behaved in a manner different than expected
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by sending a website visitor to a hybrid web page presenting information
from a third-party with the look and feel of the host website. Id. at 1258‒59.
In contrast, Appellant’s invention solves a problem of managing a
Hijri calendar by converting a date input for one calendar into a Hijri
calendar date. This is not a problem particular to the Internet or any other
technology, and Appellant’s solution does not override the routine or
conventional use of the Internet, processors, or any other technology.
Rather, Appellant’s claims use conventional computer components to
perform conventional computer functions to perform a mathematical
calculation. Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments based on DDR Holdings,
that the claims are “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer software
applications and the Internet” (see Br. 11), are unpersuasive.
Therefore, based on the record before us, we are not persuaded of
error in the Examiner’s determination that the appealed claims are directed
to patent ineligible subject matter, without significantly more. Accordingly,
we affirm the Examiner’s rejection claims 1–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
Summary
Therefore, under the USPTO’s Revised Patent Eligibility Guidance,
informed by our governing case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, the
Examiner did not err in concluding claim 1 (and claims 2–8 and 10–24
grouped therewith) and claim 9 (separately argued) are directed to a judicial
exception, i.e., an abstract idea or combination of abstract ideas, without
significantly more, and thus is patent-ineligible under § 101. In view of the
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foregoing, we sustain the Examiner's § 101 rejection of claims 1–24 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–24 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, without
significantly more.

DECISION
For the above reasons, the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–24
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED