Georges-Henri Moll

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 23, 2020

13025820 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/025,820 02/11/2011 Georges-Henri Moll RSW920100152US1 3497
11445 7590 03/23/2020
IBM Corporation - Endicott Drafting Center
1701 North Street
Building 256-3
Endicott, NY 13760
EXAMINER
MEINECKE DIAZ, SUSANNA M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/23/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
edciplaw@us.ibm.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte GEORGES-HENRI MOLL
____________

Appeal 2018-007001
Application 13/025,820
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, and
TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1, 2, and 4. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,”
filed Mar. 19, 2018) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed June 27, 2018), and
the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Apr. 27, 2018), and Final Office
Action (“Final Act.,” mailed Oct. 17, 2017). Appellant identifies
International Business Machines Corporation as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED INVENTION
Claims 1 and 4 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A method of producing a product with improved
efficiency due to improved machine logic based forecasting, the
method comprising:
[(a)] invoking a machine logic based forecasting module
in a production planning tool executing in memory of a computer
upon demand data to compute data corresponding to a
forecasting model;
[(b)] executing in the memory of the computer, a
coupling manager that responds to an implementation of a
stochastic linear programming (LP) relaxation module by
providing the forecasting model computed by the forecasting
module as input to the stochastic LP relaxation module instead
of a classic LP relaxation module;
[(c)] retrieving, by the coupling manager a stochastic
vector for the product from the computed forecasting model, the
stochastic vector expressing a vector of expected values of
demand for the product;
[(d)] linearizing, by the coupling manager the stochastic
vector describing a linear model for demand of the product; and,
[(e)] providing by the coupling manager the linearized
stochastic vector to a stochastic LP relaxation module of a
planning module of the production planning tool as deterministic
production decisions under resource constraints that maximize
an expected value of a gain.
REJECTIONS2
Claims 1, 2, and 4 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to
comply with the written description requirement.

2 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claims 1, 2, and 4 under 35
U.S.C. § 112(b). Ans. 10.
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Claims 1, 2, and 4 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.
ANALYSIS
Written Description
In rejecting claims 1, 2, and 4 under § 112(a), the Examiner found that
the Specification fails to provide adequate written description support for the
phrase “producing a product,” as recited in the preamble of independent
claim 1, and similarly recited in the preamble independent claim 4. Final
Act. 11. In particular, the Examiner determined that “[t]he original
disclosure does not make any mention of actually producing a product,
thereby rendering this limitation new matter.” Id.
A Specification must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in
the art that, as of the filing date, Appellant was in possession of the claimed
invention in order to comply with the written description requirement.
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding, Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2000). Here, the Specification describes that the claimed invention relates to
“coupling forecasting and planning in a production planning tool.” See e.g.,
Spec. ¶¶ 1, 6, 11–15. Appellant’s invention seeks to “address deficiencies .
. . [with known methods and systems for] production planning” for a
product. Id. ¶ 6 (“[T]he method also includes retrieving a stochastic vector
from the computed forecasting model for a product, the stochastic vector
expressing vector of expected values of demand for the product”) (emphasis
added). In our view, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand with
reasonably clarity that the Appellant, at the time of filing, was in possession
of the claimed invention — namely, a forecasting and production planning
tool for a product that was intended to be used to help produce the product
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more efficiently, such as with improved forecasting regarding demand for
the product.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1 and 4, and dependent claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Appellant argues claims 1, 2, and 4 as a group. Appeal Br. 9–22. We
select independent claim 1 as representative. Claims 2 and 4 stand or fall
with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217.
The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not
directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry
ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements
of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’”
to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo,
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566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original).
In rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner
determined that the claims are directed to “a mathematical algorithm that is
used in a forecasting and planning environment,” i.e., a mathematical
concept, which the Examiner determined is an abstract idea. Final Act. 7.
The Examiner further determined that claims 1 and 2 additionally recite “a
machine logic based forecasting module in a production planning tool, a
memory, a computer, various modules, and a coupling manager” and that
claim 4 additionally recites “a computer with at least one processor and
memory, a production planning tool, program code, a coupling manager,
various modules, and machine logic.” However, the Examiner concluded
that these additional elements that are not sufficient to amount to
significantly more than the judicial exception. Id. at 7– 8.
In so doing, the Examiner notified Appellant of the reasons for the
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in a sufficiently articulate and informative
manner as to meet the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132, thereby
establishing a prima facie case of patent ineligibility. See In re Jung, 637
F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the USPTO carries its
procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection
satisfies the notice requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132 by notifying the
applicant of the reasons for the rejection, “together with such information
and references as may be useful in judging the propriety of continuing []
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prosecution”). Appellant’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. See,
e.g., Appeal Br. 19.
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published
revised guidance on January 7, 2019, for use by USPTO personnel in
evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED
PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 57
(Jan. 7, 2019) (the “Revised Guidance”). That guidance revised the
USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of the
Mayo/Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that
[are] considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not
“directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a
practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. The Revised Guidance, by
its terms, applies to all applications, and to all patents resulting from
applications, filed before, on, or after January 7, 2019. Id.
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong
One)
The first step in the Mayo/Alice framework, as mentioned above, is to
determine whether the claims at issue are “directed to” a patent-ineligible
concept, e.g., an abstract idea. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. This first step,
as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is a two-prong test;
in Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial
exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas:
(1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human
activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or
legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 54; see also id. at 52 (identifying the three groupings). If so,
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we next consider whether the claim includes additional elements, beyond the
judicial exception, that “integrate the [judicial] exception into a practical
application,” i.e., that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a
manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that
the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception (“Step 2A, Prong Two”). Id. at 54–55. Only if the claim
(1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into
a practical application do we conclude that the claim is “directed to” the
judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. Id.
The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry
applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification,
based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject
matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d
1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a
specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself
qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the Specification (including
the claim language) that the claims focus on an abstract idea, and not on any
improvement to technology and/or a technical field.
Appellant’s Specification is titled “COUPLING DEMAND
FORECASTING AND PRODUCTION PLANNING WITH CHOLESKY
DECOMPOSITION AND JACOBIAN LINEARIZATION,” and describes
that the invention “relates to production planning pattern management and[,]
more particularly[,] to coupling demand forecasting and production planning
in a production planning tool.” Spec. ¶ 1; see also id. ¶ 14. Prior art
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production planning included a stochastic, forecast module 110 and a
deterministic, planning module 120. See id. ¶ 3, Fig. 1. As shown in
Figure 1 of Appellant’s Specification, planning module 120 comprised an
LP relaxation module 125 and a heuristic module 130. See id. ¶ 3.
Forecasting module 110 coupled with the planning tool’s LP relaxation
module 125, resulting in an early separation of the stochastic side and
deterministic side at a stochastic frontier, which negatively impacts
forecasted demand. See id. ¶¶ 4–5, Fig. 1.
Appellant’s production planning module addresses the problem of
early separation of the stochastic side and the deterministic side, by adding
stochastic LP pre-processing module 225 to the planning module, and
coupling output from the stochastic, forecast module to the input of the
stochastic LP pre-processing module 225 (instead of to the input of the
deterministic LP module). See id. ¶¶ 5, 15, Fig. 2. In this way, as shown in
Figure 2 of the Specification, Appellant’s invention pushes back the
stochastic frontier 275 and improves the forecasted demand of the product.
See id.; see also id. ¶ 6. An issue with Appellant’s modification to product
planning “is how to fit the output of forecasting module 210 into the input of
the stochastic LP pre-processing module 225.” Id. ¶15; see also id. ¶ 25
(“[m]atching the forecasting output and stochastic LP [pre-processing] input
is a[n] important consideration”).
Consistent with this disclosure, claim 1 recites a method of producing
a product with improved efficiency by performing the following
steps: “invoking a . . . forecasting module in a production planning tool . . .
upon demand data to compute data corresponding to a forecasting model”
(limitation (a)); “executing . . . a coupling manager that responds to an
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implementation of a stochastic linear programming (LP) relaxation module
by providing the forecasting model computed by the forecasting module as
input to the stochastic LP relaxation module instead of a classic LP
relaxation module” (limitation (b)); “retrieving, by the coupling manager a
stochastic vector for the product from the computed forecasting model, the
stochastic vector expressing a vector of expected values of demand for the
product” (limitation (c)); “linearizing, by the coupling manager the
stochastic vector describing a linear model for demand of the product”
(limitation (d)); and “providing by the coupling manager the linearized
stochastic vector to a stochastic LP relaxation module of a planning module
of the production planning tool as deterministic production decisions under
resource constraints that maximize an expected value of a gain”
(limitation (e)). These limitations, thus, recite a method in a production
planning tool for providing the output of an executed forecasting model (the
output being a stochastic vector expressing a vector of expected values of
demand for a product) as input to a stochastic LP relaxation module of a
planning module after linearizing the stochastic vector. When given its
broadest reasonable interpretation, claim 1 recites a method for coupling a
demand forecasting model and a stochastic LP relaxation module in a
production planning tool using mathematical relationships and/or
mathematical calculations. Put simply, claim 1 recites a mathematical
concept and, therefore, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
The Federal Circuit has held similar concepts to be abstract. For
example, the Federal Circuit has held that claims directed to a “process of
organizing information through mathematical correlations” are directed to an
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abstract idea. Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc.,
758 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic,
LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that claims to “a series
of mathematical calculations based on selected information” are directed to
an abstract idea). The court also has held that abstract ideas include the
concepts of collecting data, analyzing the data, and reporting the results of
the collection and analysis, including when limited to particular content.
See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d
1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (identifying the abstract idea of collecting,
displaying, and manipulating data); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (characterizing collecting information,
analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by
mathematical algorithms, and presenting the results of collecting and
analyzing information, without more, as matters within the realm of abstract
ideas).
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (Revised Guidance, Step 2A,
Prong Two)
Having concluded that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea (Step 2A, Prong One), we next consider whether the claim
recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (Step 2A, Prong Two). See Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
Beyond the abstract idea, claim 1 additionally recites that the
forecasting module is “machine logic based”, and that the production
planning tool and the coupling manager execute in a “memory” of a
“computer.” However, Appellant’s Specification describes these elements at
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a high degree of generality, i.e., as generic computer components. See, e.g.,
Spec. ¶¶ 47 (“[a]ny combination of one or more computer readable mediums
may be utilized”), 49 (“[c]omputer program code for carrying out operations
for aspects of the present invention may be written in any combination of
one or more programming languages”), 51 (“computer program instructions
may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special
purpose computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus”); see
also id. ¶¶ 46, 48, 50, 52. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no
doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise
ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
Appellant seemingly concedes that claim 1 pertains to “coupling
demand forecasting production planning in a production planning tool.”
Appeal Br. 13. However, Appellant argues that the steps of claim 1
“describe a particular solution to a program[,] or a particular way to achieve
a desired outcome . . ., as opposed to merely claiming the idea of a solution
or outcome[,] and the collection and manipulation of information. Id. at 14.
Yet, a specific abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See, e.g., Mayo, 566
U.S. at 88–89 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (holding a
narrow mathematical formula unpatentable)); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“A narrow claim
directed to an abstract idea, however, is not necessarily patent-eligible.”);
BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“[A] claim is not patent eligible merely because it applies an abstract idea in
a narrow way.”)
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Appellant asserts that claim 1 is directed to an improvement to
computer-related technology and is, thus, directed to patent-eligible subject
matter, pursuant to the holding in Enfish. Appeal Br. 15. Yet, Appellant
does not direct us to what is alleged to be the improvement to computer-
related technology. Nor does Appellant otherwise adequately explain how
the court’s ruling in Enfish impacts the patent-eligibility of the present
claims. Unlike the claims at issue in Enfish, claim 1 appears to focus on an
improvement to a process for forecasting using improved models (i.e.,
mathematical relationships). Put simply, Appellant’s claim 1 focuses on an
improvement to the abstract idea itself, rather than any improvement to
computer functionality.
We also are not persuaded of Examiner error by Appellant’s argument
regarding preemption. See Appeal Br. 20–21. Although the Supreme Court
has described “the concern that drives [the exclusion of abstract ideas from
patent-eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption,” Alice Corp., 573 U.S.
at 216, characterizing preemption as a driving concern for patent eligibility
is not the same as characterizing preemption as the sole test for patent
eligibility. “The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of
preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or
this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the
§ 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216). “[P]reemption
may signal patent ineligible subject matter, [but] the absence of complete
preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id.
We do not find anything of record that attributes an improvement in
technology and/or a technical field to the claimed invention, or that
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otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the abstract idea
into a “practical application,” as that phrase is used in the Revised
Guidance.3 For example, Appellant’s Specification does not indicate that
claim 1 reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an
improvement to other technology or technical field; implements the abstract
idea with a particular machine; or reduces a transformation or reduction of a
particular article to a different state or thing.
We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 recites a
mathematical concept, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the additional elements
recited in the claim do no more than use a computer as a tool to perform the
abstract idea. Therefore, the additional elements do not integrate the abstract
idea into a practical application. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner
that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (Revised Guidance, Step 2B)
Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that
claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the
Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, whether
claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements that
provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether the additional elements
amount to “significantly more” than the judicial exception itself. Revised

3 The Revised Guidance references MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e) in
describing the considerations that are indicative that an additional element or
combination of elements integrates the judicial exception, e.g., the abstract
idea, into a practical application. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. If
the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, as
determined under one or more of these MPEP sections, the claim is not
“directed to” the judicial exception.
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Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Here, we look at whether claim 1 adds any
additional element or combination of elements that are not “well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an
inventive concept may be present.” Id.
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred at the second step of the
Mayo/Alice framework, because the Examiner “only refers” to components
such as a machine logic based forecasting module, a memory, and a
computer, and does not refer to “the full compliment (sic) of limitations
present in claim 1.” Appeal Br. 17 (quoting limitations (a)–(e) of claim 1).
Yet, at step two we analyze whether any element or combination of elements
other than the abstract idea provides an inventive concept. See BSG Tech
LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been
clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to
which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the
invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”) (internal
citation omitted).
As described above, the only claim elements beyond the abstract idea
here are that the forecasting module is “machine logic based”, and that the
production planning tool and the coupling manager execute in a “memory”
of a “computer,” i.e., generic computer components used to perform generic
computer functions) — a determination amply supported by, and fully
consistent with the Specification. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 46–52.4 Appellant

4 The Office’s April 19, 2018 Memorandum to the Examining Corps from
Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, Robert W. Bahr,
entitled, Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter
Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP,
Inc.), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
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cannot reasonably contend, nor does Appellant, that there is a genuine issue
of material fact regarding whether the operation of these components is well-
understood, routine, or conventional, where, as here, there is nothing in the
Specification to indicate that the operations recited in claim 1 require any
specialized hardware or inventive computer components or that the claimed
invention is implemented using other than a generic computer component to
perform generic computer functions, e.g., receiving, storing, and processing
information. Indeed, the Federal Circuit, in accordance with Alice, has
“repeatedly recognized the absence of a genuine dispute as to eligibility”
where claims have been defended as involving an inventive concept based
“merely on the idea of using existing computers or the Internet to carry out
conventional processes, with no alteration of computer functionality.”
Berkheimer, 890 F.3d at 1373 (Moore, J., concurring) (internal citations
omitted); see also BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1291 (“BSG Tech does not argue
that other, non-abstract features of the claimed inventions, alone or in
combination, are not well-understood, routine and conventional database
structures and activities. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
determining that the asserted claims lack an inventive concept.”).
We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and claims 2 and 4, which fall
with claim 1.

memo-berkheimer-20180419.PDF, expressly directs that an examiner may
support the position that an additional element (or combination of elements)
is well-understood, routine or conventional with “[a] citation to an express
statement in the specification . . . that demonstrates the well-understood,
routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s)” (id. at 3).
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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4 101 Eligibility 1, 2, 4
1, 2, 4 112(a) Written Description 1, 2, 4
Overall Outcome 1, 2, 4
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED