General Electric Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 16, 1964

150 N.L.R.B. 192 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
gramer, there are other nonsupervisory office employees who are not
considered as included in the Petitioner's unit, such as the assistant
purchasing agent and the estimators and planners who are assigned
to the scheduling department.
The differences between the systems analyst and programer on
the one hand and the unit employees on the other, with respect to
working conditions, remuneration, responsibilities, and use of initia-
tive and judgment, are in our opinion sufficiently substantial so that
the former cannot be regarded as an accretion to the existing office
clerical unit.' We shall therefore deny the Petitioner's motion to
amend the certification and shall dismiss the instant proceeding. In
view of our dismissal for the above reasons, we find it unnecessary
to decide whether the systems analyst supervises the programer or
whether either is a technical employee.
[The Board denied the motion to clarify certification.]
1 Aluminum Company of America, 146 NLRB 929.
General Electric Company and International Union of Electri-
cal, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. ?-CA-
7581-1, 3-CA-7581-92, 2-CA-7581-4, and 2-CA-7864 (post 10-CA-
4682). December 16, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On April 1, 1963, Trial Examiner Arthur Leff issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Intermediate
Report. Thereafter, the Respondent, the General Counsel, and the
Charging Union filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and
supporting briefs.' On May 7, 1964, the Board heard oral argument
at Washington, D.C. All parties were represented by counsel and
participated in the argument.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Intermediate Report and the entire record in the case, including the
oral argument, the exceptions, and briefs, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
1 The General Counsel and Charging Union were granted permission to file and did file
briefs in reply to the Respondent 's exceptions and brief.
150 NLRB No. 36.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 193
The Trial Examiner found that Respondent had not bargained in
good faith with the Union, thereby violating Section 8(a) (5)2 and
(1) of the Act, as evidenced by :
(a) Its failure timely to furnish certain information requested by
the Union during contract negotiations.
(b) Its attempts, while engaged in national negotiations with the
Union, to deal separately with locals on matters which were properly
the subject of national negotiations, and its solicitations of locals
separately to abandon or refrain from supporting the strike.
(c) Its presentation of its personal accident insurance proposal to
the Union on a take-it-or-leave-it basis .3
(d) Its overall approach to and conduct of bargaining.
We agree with these findings of the Trial Examiner. Because
Respondent's defense of its bargaining conduct raises a fundamental
question as to the requirements of the statutory bargaining obliga-
tion, we have stated for more particular emphasis the reasons why
we agree with the Trial Examiner that Respondent did not bargain
in good faith with the Union.
In challenging the Trial Examiner's finding that it violated Sec-
tion 8(a) (5), Respondent argues that an employer cannot be found
guilty of having violated its statutory bargaining duty where it is
desirous of entering into a collective-bargaining agreement, where it
has met and conferred with the bargaining representative on all
required subjects of bargaining as prescribed by statute and has not
taken unlawful unilateral action, and where it has not demanded
the inclusion in the collective-bargaining contract of any illegal
clauses or insisted to an impasse upon any nonmandatory bargaining
provisions. Given compliance with the above, Respondent further
argues that an employer's technique of bargaining is not subject to
approval or disapproval by the Board.
Respondent reads the statutory requirements for bargaining col-
lectively too narrowly. It is true that an employer does violate
Section 8(a) (5) where it enters into bargaining negotiations with a
desire not to reach an agreement with the union,4 or has taken uni-
Section 8(a) (5) of the Act provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, sub-
ject to the provisions of section 8(a)."
Section 8(d) defines the duty to bargain collectively as "the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours , and other terms and
conditions of employment , or the negotiation of an agreement , or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract .. . .
a For the reasons set forth in his dissent In Equitable Life Insurance Company, 133
NLRB 1675 , 1677, Member Fanning would not find that Respondent 's refusal to bargain
In regard to the insurance plan was unlawful . However, he believes that Respondent's
take-it-or-leave-it position on June 13 can be properly considered in ganging its overall
good faith In negotiations.
• N.L.R.B . v. Reed t Prince Manufacturing Co., 205 F. 2d 131 , 134 (C.A. 1).
194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
lateral action with respect to a term or condition of employment,
or has adamantly demanded the inclusion of illegal E or nonmanda-
tory 7 clauses in the collective-bargaining contract. But, having
refrained from any of the foregoing conduct, an employer may still
have failed to discharge its statutory obligation to bargain in good
faith. As the Supreme Court has said : 8
... the Board is authorized to order the cessation of behavior
which is in effect a refusal to negotiate, or which directly
obstructs or inhibits the actual process of discussion, or which
reflects a cast of mind against reaching agreement. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Thus, a party who enters into bargaining negotiations with a "take-
it-or-leave-it" attitude violates its duty to bargain although it goes
through the forms of bargaining, does not insist on any illegal or
nonmandatory bargaining proposals, and wants to sign an agree-
ment.' For good-faith bargaining means more than "going through
the motions of negotiating." 10 ". . . the essential thing is rather
the serious intent to adjust differences and to reach an acceptable
common ground ...." 11
Good-faith bargaining thus involves both a procedure for meeting
and negotiating, which may be called the externals of collective bar-
gaining, and a bona fide intention, the presence or absence of which
must be discerned from the record.12 It requires recognition by both
parties, not merely formal but real, that "collective bargaining" is a
shared process in which each party, labor union and employer, has
the right to play an active role.18 On the part of the employer, it
requires at a minimum recognition that the statutory representative
is the one with whom it must deal in conducting bargaining negotia-
tions, and that it can no longer bargain directly or indirectly with
the employees.14 It is inconsistent with this obligation for an
N.L.R.B. v. Benne Katz, etc., d/b/aWilliamsburg Steel Products Co., 369 U . S. 736.
° National Maritime Union, etc ., 78 NLRB 971 , 980, enfd . 175 F . 2d 686 ( C.A. 2), cert.
denied 338 U.S. 954.
7N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corporation , 356 U . S. 342, 349.
8 N.L.R.B. v. Benne Katz, etc., d /b/a Williamsburg Steel Products Co., supra, at 747.
9 N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO ( Prudential Ins. Co.),
361 U.S. 477, 487.
N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 , 155 (Frankfurter, J.).
11 First Annual Report of The National Labor Relations Board, p. 85, quoted with
approval by the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. Y. Insurance Agents' International Union,
AFL-CIO ( Prudential Ins. Co.), supra, at 485.
12 Ibid.; N.L .R.B. v. Herman Sausage Co ., Inc., 275 F. 2d 229, 231 (C.A. 5).
18 "The basic concepts underlying the Labor Management Relations Act call for utiliza-
tion of joint efforts at the bargaining table as a substitute for labor strife." East Bay
Union of Machinists Local 1304 , United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, et al. (Fibre-
board Paper Products Corp. ) v. N.L.R.B., 322 F. 2d 411 , 415 (C.A.D.C.).
1' ".. . the duty of management to bargain in good faith is essentially a corollary of
its duty to recognize the union ." N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union,
AFL-CIO (Prudential Ins. Co.), supra, at 484-485.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 195
employer to mount a campaign, as Respondent did, both before and
during negotiations, for the purpose of disparaging and discrediting
the statutory representative in the eyes of its employee constituents,
to seek to persuade the employees to exert pressure on the repre-
sentative to submit to the will of the employer, and to create the
impression that the employer rather than the union is the true pro-
tector of the employees' interests.15 As the Trial' Examiner phrased
it, "the employer's statutory obligation is to deal with the employees
through the union, and not with the union through the employees."'
We do not rely solely on Respondent's campaign among its employ-
ees for our finding that it did not deal in good faith with the Union.
Respondent's policy of disparaging the Union by means of the com-
munications campaign as fully detailed in the Trial Examiner's
Intermediate Report, was implemented and furthered by its conduct
at the bargaining table. Thus, the negotiations themselves, although
maintaining the form of "collective bargaining," fell short, in a real-
istic sense, of the concept of meaningful and fruitful "negotiation"
envisaged by the Act. As the record in the case reflects, Respond-
ent regards itself as a sort of achninistrative body which has the
unilateral responsibility for determining wages and working condi-
tions for employees, and it regards the union's role as merely that
of a kind of adviser for an interested group-the employees. Thus,
according to its professed philosophy of "bargaining," Respondent,
on the basis of its own research and evaluation of union demands,
determines what is "right" for its employees, and then makes a "fair
and firm offer" to the unions without holding anything back for
later trading or compromising. It professes a willingness to make
prompt adjustments in- its offer, but only if new information or a
change in facts indicates that its initial offer is no longer "'right."
It believes that if its'research has been done properly there will be
no need to change its offer unless something entirely unforeseen has
developed in the meantime. Simultaneously, Respondent empha-
sizes , especially to employees, that as a matter of policy it will not
be induced by a strike or a threat of a strike to make any change
in its proposals which it believes to be "wrong." This "bargaining"
approach undoubtedly eliminates the "ask-and-bid" or "auction"
form of bargaining, but in the process devitalizes negotiations and
collective bargaining and robs them of their commonly accepted
meaning.16 "Collective bargaining" as thus practiced is tantamount
'a N.L .R.B. v. Herman Sausage Co ., Inc., supra, at 233; N.L R .B. v. Fitzgerald Mills
Corporation, 313 F. 2d 260 , 268 (C A. 2).
16 The term "bargain collectively" as used in the Act "has been considered to absorb
and give statutory approval to the philosophy of bargaining as worked out in the labor
movement in the united States." Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S.
342, 346 , quoted with approval in N.L .R.B. v. American National Insurance Qq., 343 U S.
386, 408.
196 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to mere formality and serves to transform the role of the statutory
representative from a joint participant in the bargaining process to
that of an adviser. In practical effect, Respondent's "bargaining"
position is akin to that of a party who enters into negotiations "with
a predetermined resolve not to budge from an initial position," an
attitude inconsistent with good-faith bargaining.'7 In fact Respond-
ent here went even further. It consciously placed itself in a posi-
tion where it could not give unfettered consideration to the merits
of any proposals the Union might offer. Thus, Respondent pointed
out to the Union, after Respondent's communications to the employ-
ees and its "fair and firm offer" to the Union, that "everything we
think we should do is in the proposal and we told our employees
that, and we would look ridiculous if we changed now."
In short, both major facets of Respondent's 1960 "bargaining"
technique, its campaign among the employees and its conduct at the
bargaining table, complementing each other, were calculated to dis-
parage the Union and to impose without substantial alteration
Respondent's "fair and firm" proposal, rather than to satisfy the
true standards of good-faith collective bargaining required.by the
statute. A course of conduct whose major purpose is so directed
scarcely evinces a sincere desire to resolve differences and reach a
common ground. For the above reasons, as well as those elabo-
rated at greater length by the Trial Examiner in his Intermediate
Report, we adopt his conclusion that Respondent did not bargain
in good faith with the Union, thereby violating Section 8 (a) (5) and
(1) of the Act.
Our concurring colleague, Member Jenkins, who joins us in find-
ing certain conduct of the Respondent inconsistent with its bargain-
ing obligation under the statute, misreads the majority opinion and
the Trial Examiner's Intermediate Report, which we affirm, in assert-
ing that our decision is not based on an assessment of Respondent's
conduct, but only on its approach to or techniques in bargaining.
On the contrary our determination is based upon our review of
the Respondent's entire course of conduct, its failure to furnish rele-
vant information, its attempts to deal separately with locals and to
bypass the national bargaining representative, the manner of its
presentation of the accident insurance proposal, the disparagement
of the Union as bargaining representative- by the communication
program, its conduct of the negotiations themselves, and its attitude
or approach as revealed by all these factors.
Nothing in our decision bans fact gathering or any specific meth-
ods of formulating proposals. We prescribe no timetable for nego-
17 N.L.R .B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 154 (Frankfurter, J.).
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 197
tiators. We lay down no rules as to any required substance or
content of agreements. Our decision rests rather upon a considera-
tion of the totality of Respondent's conduct.
In one central point of our colleague's comment, with all respect
we believe he is in error. His strictures in relation to our interpre-
tation of the law's restraints on "take-it-or-leave-it" bargaining were
decisively answered by the Supreme Court in its review of the
18nature of the bargaining obligation in Insurance Agents :
. . . the legislative history [of Taft-Hartley] makes it plain
that Congress was wary of the position of some unions, and
wanted to ensure that they would approach the bargaining
table with the same attitude of willingness to reach an agree-
ment as had been enjoined on management earlier. It intended
to prevent employee representatives from putting forth the
same "take it or leave it" attitude that had been condemned in
management.
And in Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Truitt 19 upon which our
colleague relies, the Justice also wrote :
. . . it [good faith] is inconsistent with a predetermined
resolve not to budge from an initial position.
While we share his objective and that of our dissenting colleague
of, encouraging a maximum, of freedom and experimentation in col-
lective bargaining, when questions are raised under the law as con-
strued by the courts and the Board concerning the conformity of a
specific respondent's course of conduct with the requirements of the
law,, the Board must apply the law to the totality of that conduct
in the- interest of preserving and fostering collective bargaining
itself. That is what we have sought to do here.
THE REMEDY
We have carefully, considered the various exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Recommended Order which were filed by each of the
parties. As we think his Recommended Order is appropriately
tailored to- the violations found and will effectuate the purposes of
the Act, we overrule all these exceptions.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended , the Board hereby adopts, as its Order, the Order rec-
I8N.L.R .B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union , AFL-CIO (Prudential Ina. Co.),
supra, at 487.
19 N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., supra, at 154.
198 ' DECISIONS OF. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ommended by the Trial Examiner and orders that Respondent, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order 20.
MEMBER , JENKINS, concurring :
.The fundamental issues in this case have been obscured by slogans
and shibboleths which have understandably led; my colleagues into
deciding ' issues which in my judgment, are not presented - for deci-
sion. Moreover, the Board has undertaken to describe the statutory
obligation to bargain in good faith by 'utilizing coiiclusio'nary com-
ments which may be justified by' the facts in'this case but which
have' such far-reaching 'impl'ications as to warrant ' the expression of
my individual views designed to limit the reach of this decision.
Stripped of verbiage this case presents'the fundamental issue of
whether the course of conduct engaged in'by the Employer during
the 1960 contract ' negotiations, which led to an' unsuccessful' 3-week
strike, fell below the standard of good-faith bargaining required by
Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. Certain specific, conduct was, alleged as
the basis for finding that the Respondent's 'conduct violated 8( a)(5)
and (1) of, the Act. This Board,has repeatedly held that conduct
designed to undermine the union, or to demonstrate to employees
the futility of engaging in collective bargaining through a union,
fails to meet the ' standard of 'good-faith bargaining. If my 'col-
leagues had been content'to thus grouihd'theii finding in the instant
case, I would have rio reason to disagree.' 'The record clearly sup-
ports their findings with respect to (a) the failure' of Respondent
to furnish certain' information requested by the Union during 'eon-
tract negotiations,' (•b) the attempts to deal separately with locals
on matters which were properly tlie'subject of national negotiations,
and (c) the Respo'ndent's importuning of locals to abandon or
refrain from supporting the strike authorized by the collective-
bargaining representative. .I share Member Fanning's view that
Respondent's presentation of its personal" accident insurance, pro-
posal to the Union on a take-it-or-leave-!it basis was not violative of
Section 8(a) (5). Within the context of the facts of this case; were
the Board'to conclude that the foregoing derelictions justify a broad
remedial order, I would be able to join and find no fault with the
disposition of the case. However,, in view of the fact that the
majority has gone beyond conduct and indeed concedes that it is not
basing its finding of overall bad faith on conduct but rather is bas-
ing that finding on an assessment 'of the Respondent's approach to
its duty to bargain in good, faith, I am constrained to disavow their
comments concerning the employer's bargaining technique. •
20 The Board includes as part of its Order the "Armed Forces" provision now appear-
ing in the notice marked "Appendix B" to the Trial Examiner 's Intermediate Report.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 199
In' effect I read the majority opinion to hold that the Act so regu2
lates a party's choice of techniques in collective bargaining as to
make unlawful an advance decision, and a frank communication of
that decision, concerning the position from which a party is unwill-
ing to retreat. The majority would apparently find that it is unlaw-
ful for a union to present a contract proposal on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis since I assume the majority would not apply different stand-
ards to unions than to employers. The bargaining. technique often
employed by unions in-support of "area standards" contracts is not
significantly different from the technique described as the "firm, fair
offer" by an employer. I would* not find a lack of good-faith bar-
gaining where either the employer or the union entered the negotia-
tions with a fixed position from which it proposed not to retreat,
engaged in hard bargaining to maintain or protect such position, and
made no concessions from that position as a result of bargaining. As
one member of the Supreme Court, has pointed out, good faith is
not necessarily incompatible with stubbornness or even with what to
an outsider may seem unreasonableness.21
The majority states frankly that the holding of a predetermined
resolve not to budge from an initial position' is incompatible with
good-faith bargaining. That statement seems to ignore the language
in Section 8(d) of the Act which makes it clear in unequivocal,words
that "such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a pro-
posal or require the making of a concession." The opinion of my col-
leagues fails to distinguish between two important concepts; viz, the
formulation of a settlement position and the techniques employed in
reaching a settlement. The Act does not dictate the methods which a
party may choose to utilize in formulating its bargaining position.
Indeed, many unions and employers use surveys of one sort or another
as a fact-gathering device in advance of bargaining. Moreover, 'both
employers and unions are free from statutory regulation under this
Act in formulating the kind of proposal or counterproposal which each
will communicate to the other. I know of no decision of this Board
which has sought to interpret the statute as requiring either unions or
employers to follow a prescribed timetable in communicating the vari-
ous shifts in position which seem desirable as a matter of self-interest.
Thus, if either an employer or a union for reasons dictated'by'self-
interest chooses to include in a proposal trading items which it is will-
ing later to withdraw or conversely chooses to limit its proposal to
items which it will never withdraw voluntarily, the choice is its and not
the Board's.
To describe the foregoing in shorthand by evocative terms provides
little guidance for either unions or employers. To condemn bargain-
^
21 N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg ^Co., 351 U S 149, 154-1155 (Frankfurter, J
200 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL' LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ing techniques as unlawful because of the utilization of, what the
majority describes as "take it or leave it" is to obfuscate the issue.
Basically'it is our purpose to examine industrial relations against the
realities that exist. It is not our function to require the adoption of a
particular technique or to condemn the use of a given technique as
such. Under circumstances where the overall conduct is designed to
destroy the bargaining relationship or to undermine the status of 'a
bargaining representative, it is clear that good-faith bargaining has
not occurred. This, however,, does not flow from the adoption of a
technique or from an effort to gain the supposed advantage of winning
acceptance of one's own proposal. There is adequate evidence in this
record to support a finding that the Respondent by its course of conduct
sought to bypass the Union and deal directly with the employees, to
discredit the collective-bargaining representative with which it was
obligated to deal and carry on negotiations with others.
Some portions of my colleagues' opinion may be read as holding
that the Act was violated because Respondent chose to decide in
advance on the proposal which it was willing to make and from which
it was unwilling to retreat unless forced to do so by economic pressure
which it apparently regarded as a calculated risk. If such an inference
be drawn I disavow it. If free collective bargaining is to survive, both
employers and unions must remain free of governmental interference
with their right to formulate independently the economic positions
which each desires to take and to decide without governmental compul-
sion whether that position shall be conveyed to the other party at the
outset, at some midpoint, or at the conclusion of negotiations. To do
otherwise maximizes governmental construction of the bargaining and
minimizes the free flow of independent economic judgment essential
to a strong, independent trade union movement and a strong, inde-
pendent entrepreneurial system, both of which are vital to the kind of
economy envisaged by the Act which we administer.
MEMBER LEEDOM , dissenting in part :
My colleagues have found that the Respondent failed to bargain in
good faith with the Union in the 1960 negotiations, both in certain
specific respects and generally. Although I agree with the specific
violations found, I cannot justify the bad-faith finding with respect
to the Respondent's overall bargaining conduct. ,
On the issue as to Respondent's overall good or bad faith it should
be conceded that there are various approaches to, and tactics in, nego-
tiations that are wholly consistent with the bargaining obligation
imposed by the Act; and it seems to me that both management and
labor should not be discouraged from seeking new techniques in deal-
ing with the constantly evolving problems with which they are faced
across the bargaining table. Consequently we should take care not to
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 201
create the impression that we view with suspicion novel approaches to,
and techniques of, collective bargaining. This is not an area of sharp
disagreement at this Board. Rather it is a question of emphasis :
Should the parties be given a wide latitude in devising their bargain-
ing methods, or should there be careful intervention by a regulator?
At this time when not only the industrial community, but some labor
spokesmen as well are urging less Government intervention in indus-
trial relations, it seems to me the emphasis should be on freedom of
action in the bargaining process. Very respectable authority seems to
agree : "The law of collective bargaining will have little value to the
community if the process of logical deduction from prior decisions
results in wide divergence between the administrative and judicial
rules and the needs of both management and labor." 22
Notwithstanding the foregoing, I cannot fully accept Respondent's
view of the breadth of the bargaining obligation imposed by the Act,
nor the limitation it believes the law places on those matters which can
properly be considered where good- or bad-faith bargaining is in issue.
In both regards its construction seems too rigid. I nevertheless believe
that both the law and good policy require that this Board not be
hypercritical of what goes on at the bargaining table or in a develop-
ing situation. , In order for collective bargaining to be free and to
succeed, the parties themselves must with a minimum of exceptions
have the right to resort to such tactics, and to take such positions, as
they believe necessary or desirable in dealing with the matters before
them. If at each step they must consider the effect of their specific
words, actions, and proposals upon some distant tribunal unacquainted
with the particular problems in dispute, and with that more subtle
distinction, the personalities of the negotiators themselves, they surely
lose the flexibility and spontaneity necessary for free, effective bargain-
ing. Thus they are deprived, of their right -to determine, free of
governmental intervention, the substantive terms of their agreement,
should one be reached.
No matter how much we may disclaim any intent to compel bargain-
ing to proceed in some set form, the fact that we closely scrutinize what
goes on at the bargaining table' will necessarily have the effect of
directing bargaining-into channels which we have in the past approved,
for in such channels will lie security in 'bargaining, if not success 23
2a Cox and Dunlop , Regulation of Collective Bargaining, 63 Harvard Law Review,
389, at 405.
23 The majority cites the Supreme Court to the effect that to bargain collectively as
used in the Act "has been considered to absorb and give statutory approval to the phi-
losophy of bargaining as worked out in the labor movement in the United States " See
footnote 16, supra. With this statement I certainly agree and, in fact, am arguing here
that this process of working out be permitted to continue with a flexibility capable of
meeting new problems as they arise But if only standards of conduct approved in the
past are to have Board approval now and in the future , as seems to be the majority's
position , then change will be difficult if not impossible , and industry and labor will be
saddled with archaic rules and procedures for their conduct in negotiations.
202 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Whether the substitution of our judgment as to the proper forms and
content of bargaining be made directly or indirectly is a difference of
no consequence insofar as it interferes with free bargaining and tends
to discourage innovation both in tactics and proposals which, as I
believe, could be of benefit not only to the parties but to the public
as well 24 Consequently, good policy suggests that we leave the parties
to their own-devices at the bargaining table unless some compelling
facts force us into the area of bargaining. As the Supreme Court
stated in Oliver, "The purposes of the Act [Wagner and Taft-Hartley
Act] are served by bringing the parties together and establishing
conditions under which they are to work out their agreement
themselves." 25
The principal facts are not disputed. Concededly the Respondent
did not intend to rid itself of the Union during the 1960 negotiations.
Rather it approached the bargaining table fully intending to reach an
agreement with the Union and to this end engaged in many bargaining
sessions running from mid-summer to the late fall of 1960. And the
end'result was in fact a comprehensive agreement. To be sure, the
Respondent in presenting its offer on August 31 took a firm position
but that does not in itself demonstrate bad faith.26 In , fact, the
Respondent's initial attitude with respect to its offer does not appear
to have been appreciably, if any, more intransigent than that of union
presenting its proposed changes. However, I find it hard to measure
degrees of intransigence and have considerable doubts that balancing
it out is of,real significance; for whatever may have been the situation
at early stages of negotiations, it is clear that as negotiations proceeded
the Union backed down considerably and the Company acquiesed in a
number of changes from its original proposals. Even though the
Respondent's changes may not have been all that the Trial Examiner
and majority may have wished, I fail to see how their alleged "incon-
sequential" nature is some evidence of bad faith when Respondent
was not obligated to propose or agree to any change at all in its initial
offer.
The majority and the Trial Examiner advert to statements by the
Respondent and its representatives both at the bargaining table and
in employee communications which were highly critical of the Union
and its president and some also suggesting an approach to bargaining
not wholly in keeping with its statutory responsibilities. But against
24 See N.L R.B. v. Insurance Agents'. International Association , AFL-CIO ( Prudential
Ins Co ), 361 U.S. 477, 495, where the Court in considering the issue of good faith stated
that it "failed to see the relevance whether the practice in question was time honored
or whether -its exercise is generally supported by public opinion " Further , as the Court
points out in its decision at p. 490, Board regulation of tactics in support of negotiations
necessarily implies some control over the substantive terms of agreement.
25 Local 2 4 of I.B. of T.C.W. & H. v. Oliver, 358 U S. 283, 295 ( 1959).
2e N L.R.B. v. American National Insurance Co, 343 U.S. 395 , 404 (1952 ). N.L.R.B.
v. Fitzgerald Mills Corporation , 313 F. 2d 260 ( C.A. 2, 1963).
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 203
the background of continuing negotiations and the Union's equally
inflammatory publications and comments, and its statements of "must"
demands, the Respondent's role in this battle of words seems to me to
lose some of its evidentiary significance. Consequently, I question
whether the cause of collective bargaining is aided by the Board's
taking particular comments and evaluating them in a dispassionate
context so extremely different from that of which they were tti part.
It is too easy through such an approach to find unlawful that which
is perhaps at worst only undesirable.
I do not mean to suggest that the issue of good or bad faith has any
clear-cut answer here. My position is not dictated so much by strong
conviction as by uncertainty. I am not persuaded by the reasons that
the majority state for their finding of bad-faith bargaining; and the
finding itself and the supporting rationale leave me in the dark as to
their practical efficacy. But I am particularly disturbed by the treat-
ment accorded Respondent's communications. Surely the Respondent
can lawfully communicate with its employees. Yet here, although the
communications are held to be some evidence of bad faith, the majority
neither in its decision nor in adopting the Trial Examiner's Recom-
mended Order provides the Respondent with any guides by which it
can with reasonable certainty determine what it can lawfully say to
its employees. In areas such as this bordering on Section 8 (c) of the
Act and free speech, I believe that the Respondent is entitled to some-
thing more by way of clarification than the vague proscription implied
in the general bargaining order. But I doubt if the facts and findings
indicate what specific limitations can properly be laid down. In any
event, the situation with respect to the bad-faith finding is at best
ambiguous, and I would, therefore, find that the General Counsel has
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent
did not bargain in good faith during the 1960 negotiations with the
Union.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charges were filed on September 21 and October 4 and 14, 1960, and March 16,
1961 , by International Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO,
herein called IUE or the Union , against General Electrical Company, herein variously
called GE, the Company , or the Respondent . Based on such charges , the General
Counsel , on April 12, 1961 , issued an amended consolidated complaint (thereafter
further amended ) alleging that the Respondent in respects more fully to be set out
below had engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(1), (3 ), and (5 ) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , 61 Stat. 136 , herein called the Act. The Respondent filed
an answer in which it denied generally the commission of the alleged unfair labor
practices , and also pleaded a number of affirmative defenses , some of which were
later stricken at the hearing on motion of the General Counsel and the Union. A
pretrial conference was conducted on May 31, 1961 , and thereafter a hearing was
held before Trial Examiner Arthur Leff at New York City on some 79 separate
hearing dates beginning July 24, 1961 . The record was closed for the taking- of
evidence on February 15, 1962, but the hearing was continued sine die for oral
204 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
argument. Briefs were filed by all parties on July 26, 1962, and reply' briefs on
November 1, 1962. Oral argument was held on January 28 and 29, 1963. The
hearing was closed on January 29, 1963.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
General Electric Company, a New York corporation with its principal office at
New York City, is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of electrical
motors, appliances, and equipment, as well as numerous other products. The Com-
pany has plants in 29 States and, in addition, some 400 service installations or other
places of business located in all 50 States. The Respondent is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, and its
constituent locals referred to in the complaint are labor organizations within the
meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The issues presented by the pleadings
This case arises out of the 1960 national contract negotiations between the IUE
and GE. The negotiations led to an unsuccessful 3-week strike, alleged in the com-
plaint to have been an unfair labor practice strike, before the IUE finally capitulated
to GE's prestrike contract terms. The complaint basically alleges that the Respondent
during the course of the negotiations failed and refused to bargain in good faith with
the Union and engaged in related conduct in derogation of the Union's status as
bargaining agent , all in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. As a sub-
ordinate issue, the complaint also alleges a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
based upon an alleged threat to discharge striking employees at the Respondent's
Augusta, Georgia, plant and upon the Respondent's failure and refusal to reinstate
20 named employees at that plant who had been replaced during the course of the
strike. As to the 8(a)(3) issue, however, all parties are agreed that a finding of
unlawful discrimination must stand or fall on the disposition to be made of the
complaint's allegation that the strike was caused or prolonged by the Respondent's
refusal to bargain.
With respect to the key 8(a)(5) and (1) issue, the complaint as last amended
prior to the hearing includes the broad allegation that at all times since June 13,
1960, the date the Union first submitted its contract proposals, Respondent negotiated
with the Union in bad faith. As the General Counsel made clear at the prehearing
conference, and as his voluminous bill of particulars several times supplemented
reflects, the intent of the pleading is to place in issue the Respondent's overall course
of conduct, both at and away from the bargaining table, insofar as it bears on the
Respondent's bargaining frame of mind during the entire period of the negotiations.
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing broad allegation, the complaint also
contains a number of more specific allegations. Thus, it alleges in substance that on
or about August 30, 1960, the Respondent adopted and thereafter maintained what
was in effect a "take-it-or-leave-it" position with respect to a counteroffer the Respond-
ent had submitted that day. The complaint also alleges that "in order to undermine
the Union" and "in derogation of the status of the Union as bargaining agent," the
Respondent by means of communications and other appeals directed to employees
in the bargaining units (a) engaged in a campaign throughout the period of negotia-
tions to discredit and impugn the motives and abilities of the Union's leadership;
(b) attempted through direct contact with employees to induce employee acceptance
of the Respondent's August 30 counteroffer; and (c) attempted during the latter part
of September to induce employees to depart from the Union-prescribed method for
conducting a scheduled vote on the Respondent's counteroffer. The complaint further
alleges that during October 1960, while national negotiations with the Union were
being conducted, the Respondent attempted-further in derogation of the Union's
status as national bargaining agent-to bargain directly with employees and/or their
local representatives at certain of its plants, and offered at some of them terms and
conditions of employment more favorable than those it had theretofore offered the
Union in national negotiations. Finally, the complaint alleges that the Respondent
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 205
failed and refused timely to furnish the Union with certain relevant data the Union
had requested in connection with the bargaining. The alleged attempts to bargain
directly with employees and the alleged refusal to supply requested information are
relied upon by the General Counsel both as providing additional evidence of bad-faith
bargaining and as constituting independent violations of Section 8(a) (5) and (1).
B. As to I UE's status as bargaining representative
GE employs approximately 250,000 employees, of whom about 120,000 are in
organized bargaining units. The IUE is by far the largest union in terms of em-
ployees represented. It represents some 70,000 employees under Board certifications
issued to it and to its constituent locals. The United Electrical Workers Union
(UE)-from which the IUE stemmed as a result of schismatic action following the
ouster of the UE from the CIO for alleged Communist domination in about 1950-
is the union next in size. The UE represents either directly or through constituent
locals some 10,000 GE employees. The balance of the represented employees are
divided among some 100-odd other unions with which GE is under contract.'
,As a result of separate certifications issued in Board representation proceedings
from time to time since 1950, the IUE-represented employees are formally grouped
in more than 105 appropriate bargaining units, almost all of which are immediately
involved in this proceeding. Appendix A of the complaint as amended at the hearing
(General Counsel's Exhibit No. 5), which is incorporated herein by reference, con-
tains a general description of each such unit, the name of the certified union (IUE or
one of its locals), the date of certification, and the case number of the Board's repre-
sentation proceeding in which the certification was issued. As appears from the
appendix, the IUE itself is certified as the representative in 43 of the units and various
constituent IUE locals in the others. The record reflects that even in those instances
where the IUE itself is certified, the IUE has a local union which represents the
employees on a local level and which, vis-a-vis GE as well as its parent International,
functions in substantially the same manner as do the locals directly certified.
Notwithstanding the separate unit certifications, the IUE and GE, by mutual ac-
quiescence, have historically engaged in bargaining on a national or multiunit basis,
at least with respect to the negotiation of their basic agreements. This pattern of
bargaining, which had theretofore prevailed in the relationship between the UE and
GE, and which is still conformed to in GE's dealings with the remnants of UE, was
adopted in 1950 when the IUE first appeared on the GE scene, and has consistently
been followed since. The first national or multiunit collective-bargaining agreement
was entered into between the IUE and GE in September 1950, and was followed by
renewal agreements in 1951, 1952, 1954, and 1955. The agreements recited in their
preamble that they were:
. entered into ... by and between [GE] and [IUE], acting for itself and in
behalf of each of the below-listed IUE (CIO) Locals currently certified as col-
lective bargaining representatives of Company employees and such other IUE
(CIO) Locals as may hereafter be certified as collective bargaining representa-
tives of Company employees.
The agreements also contained the following union-recognition clause:
The Company agrees to recognize the Union on behalf of and in conjunction
with its Locals for those bargaining units of Company employees for which the
Union or any of its locals, through [NLRB] certifications, is designated, as the
exclusive collective bargaining representative within such units....
The 1960 agreement, entered into following the strike, was similarly executed by
the IUE on behalf of itself and listed locals (along with such additional locals as
might thereafter be certified). It contained a recognition recital identical to the
one in the earlier agreements.
Every agreement between the IUE and GE has, with a few insignificant exceptions,
covered every GE bargaining unit for which the IUE or an affiliate had been certified
by the Board. The only exceptions have been a few small units for which the TUE
had obtained representation rights at a time when the particular plants involved were
not integrated in the GE corporate structure, but subsequently became part thereof,
i Where a certified bargaining agent does not participate in national bargaining with
GE-as only the IUE, the IIE, and the Pattern Makers do-it is counted here as a sepa-
rate union for each unit it represents. This is so even though the same union or another
local affiliated with the same International may be the certified representative of GE
employees at another location or in a separate bargaining unit at the same location.
206 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and where special situations existed which necessitated special treatment. The total
number of such excluded units in 1960 was 8 and the total number of employees in
those'units was 118.
In actual practice, the negotiation of the national agreements between the IUE and
GE has been conducted on behalf of the IUE and the certified locals by the IUE's
General Electric Conference Board, acting as their duly designated bargaining agent.
The IUE-GE Conference Board is a constitutional body of the Union. It is com-
posed of elected delegates from all IUE local unions representing GE employees.2
The Conference Board designates from among its delegates the negotiating committee
that directly participates in the contract negotiations. Under the Union's constitution,
the Conference Board is authorized to determine contract proposals, to call strikes,
and to approve and conclude agreements, and any such action voted by it is made
binding upon all locals, regardless of their individual consent.
The Respondent in its dealings with the IUE since 1950 has recognized and ac-
quiesced in the Conference Board's status in national bargaining as the authorized
bargaining agent of all locals represented on that body and has expressly acknowledged
the Conference Board's constitutional authority to undertake effective action binding
on all such locals with respect to matters committed to national contract negotiations.
As to such matters, GE for all practical purpdses has dealt with the IUE through
its GE Conference Board as a de facto accredited bargaining representative of
all IUE represented employees in a single overall bargaining unit.
The national agreements made between the IUE and GE since 1950 have in-
cluded comprehensive provisions applicable on a chainwide basis relating to reg-
ulation of wage rates, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. Thus,
for example, such subjects as overall wage increases, automatic in-grade wage
progression, cost-of-living adjustments, vacations, holidays, overtime' provisions,
insurance and pension benefits,3 termination pay on plant closings, and dues
checkoff arrangements have been covered by such agreements. The agreements
have not been all embracing, however, and have reserved certain subjects for
negotiation on a local level. Since 1950, the only contract negotiations the Com-
pany has conducted with any IUE locals covered by the national agreements have
been for supplements to the national agreements covering matters such as local
seniority, layoffs and recalls, and inequity wage -adjustments The IUE also re-
tains an important representative status in the administration of- the national
agreements. Under the grievance and arbitration procedure set out in the national
agreements, the locals handle their grievances through the first two steps of the
three-step grievance procedure, but at the third (headquarters) step, the grievance
is "referred to the National Officers of the Union for submission to' an Executive
Officer of the Company or his designated representative." The IUE alone has
the authority and iesponsibility to administer the arbitration procedure.
When, as will be seen, the Company went into the 1960 negotiations, it gave
no indication of any desire to depart from the national method of bargaining as
historically developed with the' acquiescence of all concerned. For the purpose
of determining the Respondent's bargaining obligations in this case, it is unneces-
sary to disturb the Board's appropriate unit findings as heretofore made. As was
stated in Radio Corporation of America, 135 NLRB 980, "the Board is not such
a prisoner of a narrow interpretation of its own findings concerning appropriate-
ness of a separate bargaining unit that it cannot recognize a workable pattern of
bargaining developed by the parties which ... seeks to accommodate the interests
of local and national bargaining." Here the parties have developed such a pattern
which in the particular circumstances of this case I find to be entirely consistent
with the spirit of the Act. As to matters historically delegated to national nego-
tiations, the Respondent has recognized the IUE, through its Conference Board,
as the actual bargaining agent for all employees in the aggregate of units repre-
sented by delegates to the Conference Board. Having accorded such recognition
to the IUE and having entered into the 1960 national negotiations on that basis,
the Respondent is in no position in this proceeding to question the representative
status of the IUE, and, within the area of such negotiations, must be held to the
2 Each local Is entitled to 1 delegate for each 1,000 members or part thereof, and
1 additional delegate for each additional 1,000, but not more than 4' in all. The presi-
dent of the IUE is an ew o co member of the board and all its committees.
B Insurance and pensions are covered by separate national agreements simultaneously
executed.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 207
same standards of good -faith bargaining as would have prevailed had a finding
been made in this case that the collective units comprised a single appropriate
bargaining unit with the IUE, as its exclusive representative .4
C., Background of 1960 negotiations
1. GE's general approach to collective bargaining
As will . later more fully appear , many of the specific events relating to the
1960 negotiations can be seen in true focus only if considered against the back-
drop of GE's underlying policies relating to collective ' bargaining . It is therefore
appropriate to examine such policies before undertaking a review of GE's specific
conduct which is here under attack.
GE's present approach to employee and union relations was first conceived in
1947 and developed largely under the guidance of Lemuel R. Boulware , then and
for many years later GE's vice president relations service.5 The approach has
often been referred to as "Boulwareism ," although GE itself abjures use of that
term , claiming it has been misconstrued by outsiders to reflect a concept not actu-
ally GE's. . It came into being as an aftermath of a lengthy companywide strike
which the UE had conducted against GE in 1946. That strike was settled only
after GE,raised its wage offer from a prestrike 10 cents an hour to a poststrike
-181/z cents an hour. As appears from one company report, GE's management
regarded UE's "highly successful strike" as "little short of a debacle ." Manage-
ment had theretofore had a "feeling " of "security in the knowledge that the
Company had been a good employer [which] had treated employees fairly,' and
had pioneered in the voluntary installation of many employee benefit programs."
Nevertheless , the strike had been "broadly supported " by employees . The realiza-
tion that its earlier feeling of security had been a false one was a "somber event"
for GE management.
The jolt of the. 1946 strike led GE management to take a new look. GE
.sought to determine why it had failed (as it saw it ) to achieve the same high
degree of success and effectiveness in its employee relations as it had in other
areas of its operations , such as, for example, in product development and market-
ing. Management concluded , inter alia , that to gain employee job satisfaction,
loyalty, and support, it was not enough that '• the Company be a good employer.
It was equally if not more important that the Company be known to its employees
as a good employer . With regard to employee pay, benefits , and other terms and
conditions of employment , as well as other elements entering into employee job
satisfaction , the employees .must be made to understand that it was the Company's
aim "to do right voluntarily" and to allow its employees all that was fairly war-
ranted , bearing in mind the "balanced best interests " of employees and all others
having a stake in the Company 's enterprise . Moreover , the employees must also
be made to understand that , just as there was no need to drag reluctantly from
the Company all that was fairly coming to them, so, too, there could be no•profit
in a show of force by a labor organization designed to extract more for the
employees than the facts-as management evaluated them-justly warranted. This
involved essentially a selling problem, or , as the Company termed it, one of
"job marketing ." If the Company was to achieve ultimately the same success in
job marketing that it had accomplished in its highly successful product marketing,
it must assimilate to the latter what it had learned in the former about sound
product planning and research , market development , and merchandising.
Application of this program necessitated a revision of the Company 's approach
to collective bargaining . The Company had theretofore engaged in the tradi-
tional type of bargaining , under which a union initially asks more than it expects
4In order to find that a unit is a unit appropriate for the purpose of'collective bargain-
ing, it is unnecessary to decide that it is the only appropriate unit. Morand Brothers
Beverage Co., et al, 91 NLRB 409, 428 ; A. S. Beck Shoe Corporation, 92 NLRB 1457,
1458-1459 , Safeway Stores, Inc., 110 NLRB 1718, 1731-1732. . There is Board
authority for finding that a grouping comparable to that represented by the IUE In the
instant case constitutes a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.
General Motors Corporation, 120 NLRB 1215. 11
6During the 1960 negotiation`s Boulware no longer ., occupied that position , having been
succeeded by Jack S. - Parker, but still participated ' in a consultant capacity in some of
management 's deliberations relating to such negotiations.
775-692=65=vol.' 150-15
208 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to get and an employer offers less than it expects to give, and, through the process
of compromise and give-and-take, both sides, if bargaining. is successful, eventually
arrive at a mutually acceptable middle ground. But that type of bargaining had
- to go if the Company was to establish its credibility with employees that it was
putting into effect voluntarily and without need of outside pressures all that was
warranted in the way of wage and benefit improvements.,
Under GE's present approach to bargaining,' as GE states it, the Company itself
seeks through extensive year-round -research into all pertinent facts -to determine
what is "right" for employees.. Its research includes not only -a study 'of business
conditions, competitive factors, economic trends, and the like, but the gathering
of its own information as to employee -needs and desires through independent
employee attitude surveys, comments made by employees at informative meetings,
direct discussions by supervisors with employees,- and statements in union publica-
tions. When bargaining begins, the Company, as part of its overall research, listens
to the presentations made by all the unions with which it deals, and evaluates the
unions' demands with the help of all the facts it has on hand, including those
supplied by the unions.
On the basis of its study so made, GE makes its -own determination of what is
"right." GE then makes an offer which-as it declares to the unions and to its
employees-includes everything it has found to be warranted,. without anything
held back for later trading or compromising. GE makes precisely the same basic
offer to substantially all unions with which it is engaged in negotiations. Con-
trary to the assertion of the General Counsel; GE does not initially present its
offer on an avowed "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. It professes a willingness to make
prompt adjustments in its, offer whenever (but only when) new information from
any source or a significant change in facts indicates that its initial offer fell short
of being right.6 But GE believes-or at least so declares-that if it has. done its
preliminary research into the facts accurately, no substantial reason for changing
its offer should ever exist, save in the event of some. new unforeseen development
having an impact on the economy as a whole. And GE repeatedly emphasizes,
especially to employees, that as a matter of policy it will-not make any change
it believes to be incorrect because of a strike or threat of strike and that it will
"take" a strike of any duration to resist doing what it considers to be "wrong."
The Respondent extols its "fair and firm offer" approach as a straightforward
one that removes doubt from employees' minds, as to precisely where it stands.
It disparagingly refers to the "ask-and-bid" or "auction" form of bargaining as a
"flea bitten eastern type of cunning and dishonest but pomtless haggling." Such
bargaining, according to the Respondent's articulation, allows a union to appear
to get more than an employer is willing to give, though that is often not; the
case,,and this only serves, it says, to mislead employees into believing that union
officials are useful in ways-they are not, thus falsely enhancing-the union's prestige
while diminishing that of the employer and encouraging employee support of
union shows of strength. The Respondent's approach on the other hand, it says,
makes it obvious to employees that the Company "is not being forced to be
fair by the belligerent action of a labor union."
All that has been said above is tied to what clearly appears to be the keystone
of Respondent's bargaining philosophy-the marketing of management positions
directly to,employees so that the employees in turn may influence union accept-
ance. It is a stated policy of the Company to achieve maximum involvement and
participation of employees in decisions, affecting its business, including specifically
though not limited to decisions relating to collective bargaining; to minimize op-
-position to steps, management takes; and to build , active employee support for
management's goals and objectives. Toward that.end GE has fashioned an elab-
orate employee communications system, making use of plant newspapers, daily
news digests, employee bulletins, letters to employees' homes, television and radio
broadcasts, and other media of mass communication, as. well as personal contacts.
Supervisors are • instructed' as to GE's views on controversial. subjects and, are ex-
pected to speak out to employees on such subjects and seek to gain employee con-
fidence in the correctness of company decisions. , The direct, employee communica-
s GE contends that practically every offer it has made in the past 10 years has been
,altered in one way or another.after discussions with the unions, involved. But,this is
disputed by the General Counsel who asserts that once GE hasiformally presented its offer
it will only consider insubstantial, changes save in extraordinary situations such as the
one referred to in footnote 8, below. The nature of the changes made prior to 1960 was
not fully explored at the hearing and cannot be here evaluated. The 1960 changes will
be considered in a later section of this report.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 209
tions-if 1960 may be -considered as representative-are utilized on a most ex-
tensive scale both before and during negotiations to influence employee attitudes
to a favorable reception of the Company's views and rejection of the Union's con-
flicting positions. After the Company's offer is presented to the unions, the flow
of communications, directed toward that end, reaches flood proportions. At that
-time, the Company also discusses the terms of its offer at plant meetings; invites
employees to take up individually with their supervisors or managerial officials any
questions they may have about the offer; and seeks through direct contact of its
supervisors with employees to sound out for its own guidance employee reactions
to its- offer. The avowed purpose of the communications program is to equip
employees to render their own independent judgment -on matters commonly affect-
ing their own interests and those of the Company. But, as related to bargaining
issues, the record in this case, as will be seen, leaves no doubt that GE's more
basic purpose is to compete with the bargaining representative for the allegiance
and support of employees.
Another consideration which shapes the- Respondent's approach to bargaining
is its uniformity policy. -
As noted above, GE deals with some 100-odd unions. With regard to wage
and benefit improvements, it is GE's policy to see to it that no union gets more
favored treatment than any other. GE justifies that policy on the basis of fair
play, business realism, and as necessary to avoid whipsawing. In line with that
policy, GE prepares and presents to substantially all unions with which it deals
the same basic offer with regard to wage adjustments and benefit programs.
Moreover, as further noted above, about half of GE's employees are unrepre-
sented. Representation elections frequently are held among different groups of
such employees, and sometimes decertification elections among groups of. em-
ployees previously represented. Where such elections are held, GE engages in
preelection campaigning in which it makes no secret of its opposition to union
organization. In urging its employees to vote against union representation, GE
emphasizes, inter alia, that a union can obtain for them no benefits they would
not otherwise receive. It points up the Company's policy to "do right volun-
tarily" and to put into effect for nonrepresented employees the same pay and
benefit program it makes available to represented employees.? In keeping with
such assurances, GE applies in the case of its unrepresented employees the same
principle of uniformity that it applies to represented groups. The terms of the
basic offer made to unions are also put into effect for nonrepresented employees.
Prior to 1960, GE invariably withheld such action until either the IUE contract
had been settled or the anniversary date of the prior IUE contract had expired.
Theoretically, it is possible for company negotiators, engaged in negotiations
with a given union to improve as to that union the, basic offer made by GE to
unions generally, even though the offer has already been put into effect for other
bargaining units or for unrepresented employees. • But the company witness testify-
ing on that point-Virgil B. Day, now vice president relations service-could recall
only one instance where-that was ever done: And that, as appears from his testi-
mony, involved -a situation squarely falling within the stated exception to GE's
"fair and firm offer" approach, namely, that GE will change its offer where a new
significant development has occurred to make that change "right." 8 In one impor-
tant area, however, the Company's negotiators have no flexibility whatever. As
appears from Day's testimony, the Company insists for practical reasons on a
single uniform pension plan covering all GE employees, and once an offer has
been put in effect for other bargaining units or for nonrepresented employees, the
What is said here is not meant to suggest that GE's participation in such election
campaigns is illegal. No GE election has ever been set aside because of improper pre-
election conduct by the Company '
8 That change occurred in 1953. As appears from Day's testimony, GE had settled
that year with other unions and had also put the benefits of its basic offer in effect
for nonrepresented employees, but the IUE had held out for more past the anniversary
date of its contract without, however, striking. A "break-through" had then occurred in
the national wage pattern as a result of a settlement in another major industry It
was one which the Company felt would soon be reflected broadly throughout the economy
Moreover, the Company at that time was faced with a tight manpower situation and was
fearful of being placed at a competitive disadvantage in the labor market. Accordingly,
it recognized the "break-through" as a significant "new fact," changed its offer to the
IUE accordingly, and in line with its policy to "do right voluntarily" provided a similar
adjustment to the unions with which it had already settled, as well as for its unrepre-
sented employees.
210 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
freedom of negotiators to effect changes is foreclosed. The significance of what
has been said will become more clear when the course of the 1960 negotiations
is reported.
2. Preparations for 1960 negotiations
The prior collective-bargaining agreement between GE and IUE, negotiated in
1955, was for a 5-year term ending October 1, 1960. The agreement when made
was considered by the IUE a highly satisfactory one. Among other economic
improvements of substantial benefit to employees, the package provided for an
immediate 3-percent general wage increase; for additional annual increases amount-
ing to 3 percent each in 1956 and 1957, and 31/2 percent each in 1958 and 1959;
and for a cost-of-living escalator clause, which resulted over the 5-year term in
"adders" totaling some 10 percent. The 1955 contract also contained a reopener
provision allowing the IUE to reopen the contract in 1958 for the negotiation
of employment security items only.9
In 1958, the TUE reopened the 1955 contract for the negotiation of employment
security items. GE rejected all the Union's demands The Company proposed
instead a so-called savings and security plan which provided for employee invest-
ment in company stocks and bonds. The same savings and security plan was
simultaneously offered to other unions and was later also made available to un-
represented employees. The IUE rejected the plan proposed by the Company as
unrelated to the problem of employment security, but the Company stood firm. The
result was a stalemate. The Union failed to muster sufficient support for a strike
vote. In the wake of the 1958 negotiations, the IUE changed its, constitutional
provisions so as to provide for a majority instead of as theretofore a two-thirds
vote of the GE Conference Board to call a national strike.
As the end of the 1955 contract neared, both sides began to prepare for the
oncoming 1960 national negotiations.
In late 1959, the IUE and four other member unions of the AFL-CIO Indus-
trial Union Department representing bargaining units in the GE chain formed a
loose coalition for the purpose of exchanging information and coordinating certain
other activities related to the 1960 negotiations. The IUD group distributed to
their represented employees in the GE and Westinghouse chains a ballot listing
some 19 demands-substantially all of which later appeared in the IUE contract
proposal. Employees were asked to indicate on the ballot the order of priority
in which they desired such demands pressed. Later, after the IUE bargaining
demands were formulated and publicly announced, the IUE put on the road a
so-called IUE caravan which visited various GE locations for the purpose of
dramatizing to the employees and the communities the nature, need, and reason-
ableness of the IUE bargaining objectives. The IUE bargaining objectives were
also publicized in publications of the IUE and its locals, and, it is reasonable to
infer, though there is no specific evidence on this point, at local meetings as well.
Even before the IUE bargaining demands were formulated, however, GE was
able to anticipate the maior bargaining issues with which it would be faced in
the 1960 negotiations. Thus, GE quite reasonably expected the IUE to renew
0 It Is GE's practice to give the IUE (and also the UE) an informal oral outline of the
contents of its basic offer about a day before formal presentation of the offer is made
to the IUE and other unions with which GE is engaged in negotiations. That was done
in 1955 at a dinner meeting attended by Vice President Boulware and (then) Union
Relations Manager Virgil Day for the Company, and by President James B Carey and
Conference Board Chairman John H Callahan for the Union When the informal outline
was given, Carey declared his agreement in principle with the economic package, but
expressed the view that some other features, particularly in the employment security area,
were needed to make the offer acceptable At his request, the GE representatives agreed
to withhold for several days the formal presentation and public announcement of its offer
to allow the IUE a preliminary opportunity to negotiate further on matters in difference
before GE froze its offer. In the intervening period, Carey met with Boulware informally
and discussed the Union's strong objections to a 5-year contract without employment
security provisions At a regular negotiating meeting the next day-this was still before
formal presentation or public announcement of the offer was made-GE agreed to include
in its offer the 1958 reopener, and the union negotiators agreed on that basis to recom-
mend acceptance of the Company's offer when formally presented Thus, in 1955, sub-
stantial agreement was worked out between the GE and IUE before GE presented its
formal offer to the IUE and other unions and announced it publicly. When the GE offer
was formally presented to all unions a day or so later, it incorporated the 1958 reopener
provision.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 211
its 1958 employment security demands-such as for supplementary unemployment
benefits, the right of employees to follow jobs to other plants, restrictions on the
subcontracting out of work during layoffs, neutralization of the effects of automa-
tion, etc. From its own employee attitude surveys and other research, GE had
satisfied itself that employment security was a matter of deep concern to em-
ployees. Moreover, GE anticipated that it would be confronted with a serious
wage issue in the 1960 negotiations. It had come to regret its 1955 wage settle-
ment, particularly the cost-of-living escalator feature thereof which had proved
far more costly than it had foreseen and to the continuance of which it was now
opposed in principle as having an inflationary tendency. It was also of the view
that the annual wage improvement factors provided for in the 1955 contract were
no longer appropriate in the light of the current economic climate and wage ad-
justment patterns. At the same time, GE was aware, as its communications reflect,
that the Union would make much of GE's substantial profits and productivity
rate as justification for continued wage increments along the lines of the 1955
contract.
GE early realized that it would be confronted with greater problems than usual
in the 1960 negotiations. It knew well ahead of the start of negotiations that its
1960 offer would be far less attractive to the Union in terms of economic content
than, say, its 1955 proposal. It knew, too, that it was faced with a special problem
in the area of employment security, particularly since the Union's failure to get
anywhere in 1958 with its employment security demands had left a sour taste.
Moreover, taking into account the reactivated IUD coalition and other considera-
tions, such as the IUE constitutional change relating to strike votes, GE was
persuaded that the IUE leadership was 'determined to press hard in the 1960
negotiations for its major contract demands. On the basis of its total appraisal
of the situation, GE feared that the perennial risk of a strike was potentially
greater in 1960 than in prior years. Long before the 1960 negotiations began,
GE concluded that the solution to its anticipated problems lay largely in a care-
fully prepared and particularly intensified communications program designed to
build employee support for its positions, as opposed to the Union's, on the bar-
gaining issues that were likely to arise.
As early as November 1959, GE headquarters drew up a list of topics with
brief digests of supporting arguments, on which communications to employees
would be appropriate. Then, during a 2-day meeting of plant employment rela-
tions managers (ERM's), held at New York in December 1959, these topics and
a program for preparation of materials were outlined fully. The topics and
supporting digests, under the heading "Communication Topics (Prior to Nego-
tiations)" were later incorporated in a monograph released in March 1960 to
plant communication personnel, entitled "Building Employee Understanding."
Among the 28 topics included were the following (citing here only the topic
headings): "How automation makes more and better jobs"; "How subcontracting
helps to keep us competitive, helps make jobs secure, helps other businesses, etc.";
"Role of profits in providing jobs"; "Why employee `expectations' should be real-
istically modest in 1960"; "The Why and How of curbing inflationary settlements";
"'Escalation' vs. Inflation"; "Why S.U.B. is not the answer to employment secu-
rity"; "The problem of guaranteeing transfers to employees during plant moves";
"The fallacy of using `ability to pay' as a guide to wage and benefit levels-a
tie-in with the profit story"; "Why employees could not gain and certainly would
lose by striking";' "Why the Company has no choice but to `take' a strike rather
than be forced beyond what is right"; and "Why employees can expect their
union officials to `demand' a strike from them"; and "Show how employees not
represented by unions get their wage and benefit improvements without the pos-
sible delay of waiting for union acceptance."
Following the preparation of the list of topics, the Company issued as to some
of the topics detailed communication guides for the suggested use by ERM's at
plant locations, containing basic messages, news stories, editorials, questions and
answers, photo features, letters to employees, and other material, which, with
appropriate revision 'to meet local conditions, might be used to develop the com-
munication topics. These guides set forth in detail the Company's arguments on
automation, the necessity for profits, opposition to supplementary unemployment
benefits, the need for subcontracting, and on other matters on which bargaining
issues were anticipated. The record shows that the communication program out-
lined above was thereafter widely applied in plant newspapers and other employee
communications issued before as well as after the commencement of negotiations.
The monograph, "Building Employee Understanding in 1960," embodies the
blueprint of the Company's communication program, at least in its earlier stages.
212 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The document asserts it to be the employer's responsibility to provide "full and
accurate information on [negotiation] issues," 10 so that employees, rather than
rely upon what they are told by their union officials, may make their own per-
sonal assessments, see to it that their union officials act as their servants rather
than their masters, and direct their union officials to pursue a course' that the
employees decide for themselves is in their own and their employer's common
best interests. In making that assessment-the monograph adds-the employees
should be asked to consider whether they have any personally valid reason for
striking; whether union officials when demanding a strike are not "politically
motivated by reasons of their own"; whether a strike is likely to bring about any
improvements; and "whether the certainty of heavy pay losses in a long strike
may be worth suffering when balanced against the uncertainty of any real gain."
(As to the last, the monograph comments, "His [the employee's] information
needs on the-subject of strike losses inside and outside the Company are thus
evident.") The document also emphasizes the need for employees to under-
stand the careful research undertaken by the Company to develop a proposal that
"best suits the needs of employees and the Company in which they make their
living," as well as the Company's policy when making a proposal to hold nothing
back for horsetrading. The manner in which GE in its subsequent direct com-'
munication to employees implemented the foregoing program, planned long in
advance of negotiations, will be shown more fully infra.
Further in preparation for the 1960 negotiations, Vice President Parker' and
Union Relations Manager Moore, along with several consultants, made a swing
around the GE chain in early 1960 to discuss with plant managers and others" the
particular business needs, local issues, and employee attitudes and desires that
might have to be evaluated in shaping up the Company's 1960 contract proposals.
In the course of their trip, Parker and Moore stopped at some 16 area' locations
where they spoke at general meetings to some 13,000 supervisors and some 700
to 800 section and department heads of all components of the Company. Moore
in his prepared address to supervisory employees stressed,' inter alia, that the
solution to the 1960 negotiation problems would be:
along the lines of the communication that you are doing-both written
and oral-and the man-to-man communications and relationship that you
have built up, because really what you're doing is establishing your credi-
bility as against the time when you'll need it, and one of the times that you
are going to have to draw on it is this fall when the votes are cast whether
the folks believe you or believe the opposition. [Emphasis supplied.]
In his discussion of the role of the supervisor in securing employee acceptance
of the Company's position, Moore said:
Now, whether we have a strike next fall depends not alone,' however, on
whether employees believe they have an appropriate offer from General
Electric Company and have received satisfactory day-to-day treatment from
their bosses. It also depends on whether employees believe they can gain
anything further by a strike. And, lastly, it also depends on whether em=
ployees understand that they will be asked to strike in any case to support
the political ambitions of some union officials. [Emphasis supplied.]
He further told the supervisors that "you owe it to [employees] to let them know
every chance you get certain hard facts." For one thing, employees' must be
made to understand that it is "better for all concerned, including employees, for
the Company to take a long strike now than to yield to demands that would
threaten sales and jobs in the future " For another, the employees should be
made "to understand the motivation of union officials who foment trouble for
trouble's sake" and "simply to further their own selfish ambitions."
Parker in his comments likewise emphasized that the' Company's success in
presenting its proposals would depend largely on its supervisors' effectiveness in
gaining employee acceptance through "personal individual man-to-man commu-
nication." Parker rejected as untrue the belief of some that but for the Union's
negotiating stand the benefits GE made available to its employees would not be
forthcoming. He emphasized that the Company framed its offer on the basis
70 Actually, however, as the Respondent eventually conceded at the hearing, GE does
not attempt to provide "full" Information but gives its own one-sided presentation, on the
theory that the Union can, should, and does take care of its side of the argument.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 213,
of its own careful research , voluntarily' putting into its offer all it considered
appropriate in light of the best interests of all associated - with its business. He
stressed that the Company , once having decided on what was appropriate, would
not as a matter of policy yield further concessions by reason of a threat of force,
for to do so, . he said , would only open the door to future union shows of strength
and demands for more. The Company had long since resolved , said Parker, that
"if you are going to take a strike you might just as well take it now [and] we
are completely relaxed on this front ." . Parker identified the Company 's bargain-
ing approach as that of Boulware, which he described as follows:
The Boulware approach to this has been that we would go forward and
do the things we felt appropriate . We would then offer these to the Union
and if they saw fit to accept them , why God bless them , but if they didn't
well they could do something else.
3. Prenegotiation meetings
The 1955 National Agreement provided for notice of modification or termina-
tion not more than 60 days and -not less than 30 days prior to October 1, 1960.
Negotiations were to begin within 15 days after such notice.
On December 22, 1959, IUE President James B. Carey wrote GE Board Chair-
man Ralph J. Cordiner requesting an "informal and unpublicized discussion on
matters of mutual concern ." Cordiner referred Carey to Moore, stating that GE
had delegated to Moore full responsibility for dealing with the WE. On Janu-
ary 26 ,- 1960 , representatives of the IUE and of GE met at an informal meeting
arranged between Carey and Moore. Carey asked GE to join with the Union in
putting together a common body of information for the 1960 negotiations .. Moore
agreed to do so to the extent it was appropriate and possible . He asked Carey
to submit in writing the Union 's specific requests for information. - -
On March 7 , 1960, the IUE submitted to GE a written request for information
relating to employment and layoff statistics , hours worked , average earnings, and
the operations of the Company 's pension and insurance plans."
Between March 7 and May 5, 1960, IUE and GE representatives held several
additional meetings relating to the subject of information.
During that period, as contrasted to a later period after negotiations began,
GE displayed a clear spirit of cooperation in furnishing the Union the informa-
tion it desired . There were a number of instances where GE thought it was not
feasible or too costly to supply the information precisely in the form requested.
In those instances GE suggested and the Union consented to a different basis of
submission that would substantially meet the Union's needs . In the end the
Union expressed satisfaction over the manner in which GE had within reason
complied with its prenegotiation requests for information,
At the preliminary meetings , Carey at various times urged early negotiations,
starting well ahead of the time stipulated in the contract . More specifically, he
suggested May 24 , 1960, which was the scheduled date of the Conference Board
meeting at which the IUE planned to have its 1960 bargaining demands formu-
lated . Moore thought it too soon to decide , but agreed to take the - Union's re-
quest for early negotiations under advisement.
In late May, GE agreed to meet with the IUE on June 13, 1960, but solely
for the purpose of hearing the IUE 's presentation and explanation of its 1960
contract demands. GE made it clear that its agreement to meet was subject to
the express reservation that the meeting would not be construed as the opening
of negotiations.
D. GE's refusal to bargain on June 13, 1960, with respect to its
personal accident insurance proposal
The parties met, as arranged , on June 13, 1960. At the very outset of the
meeting, the Union, before presenting its 1960 contract demands, brought up for
discussion a recent proposal made by GE relating to the coverage of IUE=
represented employees under a group personal accident insurance policy. The
proposal had first been submitted to the Union after arrangements had been com-
pleted for the June 13 meeting.
"The information requested as to the pension and insurance plans or most of it, was
information GE was required to furnish under its then existing agreements with IUE
214 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On June 1, 1960, GE advised the IUE by letter that it had arranged with an
insurance company for an accidental death or dismemberment group insurance
policy under which all GE employees desiring to do so might participate, the full
cost of the insurance to be borne by the participating employees. The letter
stated that the decision to make the insurance' available had "resulted from in-
tensified employee interest in additional coverage of this type." The insurance
was to be made available as of July 1, 1960. If the IUE had no objection to
making the proposed insurance available to employees in IUE-represented units,
GE would proceed to have this done by the date mentioned, in advance of the
employees' vacation periods. However, if the Union desired to defer action, the
insurance would still be available for IUE-represented employees at any later
time the Union desired. GE closed its letter with the assertion that it did not
regard the new insurance as related to the forthcoming negotiations, but simply
as an opportunity for personally interested employees to secure additional insur-
ance at a lower cost than would normally be available to them as individuals.
The plan for the new accident insurance had been publicized to all GE em-
ployees prior to the June 13 meeting, along with an announcement that enroll-
ment would take place during the week of June 20 to 24, 1960.
The existing insurance plan incorporated, in the IUE-GE '1955-60 agreement
already provided for accidental death and dismemberment insurance coverage in
a limited amount under a contributory arrangement, with the Company and cov-
ered employees sharing the cost. The new proposed insurance, which was of a
similar nature, was to be in addition to that provided for in the contract, but its
full cost was to be' borne by employees electing to participate in the group policy
Under the 1955-60 IUE-GE pension and insurance agreement, each of the
parties had waived the right to require the other party to bargain as to pensions
or insurance matters during the term of the agreement, except during the stated
renegotiation period.
At the June 13 meeting, the Union objected to the Company. instituting the
new insurance without first bargaining about it. Carey contended that the Com-
pany's proposed plan was connected to the basic insurance plan covered by the
contract and was a bargainable matter. He declared that the- Union did not
desire to defer the matter until the start of formal negotiations, but was prepared
to negotiate on the Company's insurance plan that day and to reach agreement
thereon. At various times during the ensuing discussion, Carey stated that (a)
the Union was opposed to its members paying the cost of the insurance; (b) the
cost as reported by the Company was in any event too high and could be sub-
stantially lowered by a blanket policy covering all employees; (c) if the proposed
insurance were to be put into effect as proposed, it would prejudice the Union's
ability and opportunity later to negotiate on its program for improvements in
the insurance schedule and for an increase in the amount of the Company's con-
tributions to the cost of insurance; and (d) the Company in offering the insurance
at that time on a take-it-or-leave-it basis was attempting to discredit the Union
and "undermine" collective bargaining by making it appear that the Union, if it
deferred action, was depriving employees of a benefit they could have had during
their vacations. Subsequently, the Union advised the Company in substance that
it would interpose no objection to the Company putting the new insurance into
effect at the time proposed, provided GE paid the full cost of the insurance pending
bargaining on the subject. But such bargaining it stated, should be conducted with-
out delay.
The GE representatives took the flat position that the proposed new insurance
was not a bargainable subject at that time under the terms of the existing agree-
ment. It might perhaps become so, they stated, after the beginning of formal
negotiations later on. In the meantime, the Union could either accept the insur-
ance as offered or reject it. If the Union declined to accept the proposal as
made, the Company would respect its wishes, and would not put it in effect for
the IUE-represented employees. It would, however, go ahead with its plan to
make the new insurance available for all other employees before vacation time.
At the same time, however, Moore unsuccessfully sought to convince Carey
that GE had no ulterior motive in making the added insurance available at that
particular time. He assured Carey that the Company would not attempt to
embarrass the Union by making capital of the Union's refusal to allow its mem-
bers to participate in the new insurance plan on the basis prepared.
There was no further change in the positions of the parties. The Company
went ahead with its new insurance plan as to other employees without offering
participating rights to IUE-represented employees. GE kept faith with its promise
not to make capital of the Union's rejection. In a teletype to ERM's at plant
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 215
locations sent out on -June 14, 1960, Moore urged them to "take pains to not
publicize that 1UE objections prevented us" from offering the insurance to IUE-
represented employees. So far as appears, the ERM's generally complied.12
The General Counsel and the Union assert that in the subsequent formal con-
tract negotiations, GE again refused to bargain on the subject of the personal
accident insurance., A fair reading of the record does not support that assertion,
however. So far as appears, the Union never made the added accident insurance
a matter of formal demand during the negotiations. The negotiating minutes in
evidence do show that casual reference was made to the subject on several occa-
sions. But on each occasion it came up simply in the nature of a complaint by
the,. union negotiators concerning GE's past conduct. During the negotiations,
GE told the Union on several occasions that the added personal accident insur-
ance was still available for IUE-represented employees on the original terms if
the IUE wished it. The IUE did not wish it on that basis, but never during the
formal negotiations suggested any specific alternative arrangement.
E. Presentation of IUE's contract proposals to GE on June 13, 1960, and GE's
communications to employees with reference thereto in advance - of
bargaining
At the June 13 meeting, the Union presented its contract proposals. The pro-
posals had theretofore-on May 24-been formulated at a Conference Board meet-
ing and had been widely circulated internally to the Union's membership, along with
supporting arguments.
The Union's 1960 contract proposals included demands for (1) a 31/2-percent
annual wage increase; (2) continuance of cost-of-living escalation; (3) improve-
ments in holidays and vacations; (4) establishment of a joint labor-management
committee to recommend adjustments for sharing the benefits of automation;
(5) equal pay for equal work; (6) supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB);
(7) separation pay; (8) a union shop; (9) unemployment-security provisions, spe-
cifically, the right of employees to follow their jobs transferred to other plants
and restrictions on the subcontracting of work normally done at a plant and on
overtime work while plant employees are on layoff; (10) limited paid sick leave;
(11) various improvements in the existing pension and insurance plans; and (12)
numerous revisions in the national agreement as to noneconomic matters.
There was no discussion of the Union's proposals at the time, except for clarification
of some of the items in response to questions from the company side of the table. At
the end of the Union's presentation, Moore simply declared that the Union's proposals
were "ridiculous," "astronomical" in terms of cost, and not designed for an early settle-
ment . At the end of the meeting, Carey again requested early negotiations. Moore
said he would take the request under advisement.
The Company did not wait for negotiations to begin before proceeding to present its
case directly to its employees, as, indeed, on some bargaining issues it had already long
been doing in anticipation of union demands. The Company obtained reprint rights to
certain newspaper articles which were critical of the Union's demands and sent them
to plant ERM's for suggested publication in employee communication media. One of
the newspaper articles reprinted in employee news media inaccurately estimated the
cost of the Union's demands for recognized employees alone at a half billion dollars.
On July 1, the Company issued a four-page relations newsletter, entitled "Another
Round of Astronomical Union Demands versus 1960 Problems." 13 In a subsequent
teletype, it advised the.ERM's that "Supervisors should be able to discuss this subject
with employees on the basis of the July 1 Relations Newsletter and the interest
generated [by] the news stories."
. The July 1 newsletter discussed the IUE demands largely in terms of their asserted
adverse impact on employee job security and resultant injury to GE plant communi-
ties. The letter stressed that the IUE demands, if met, would add more than
$500,000,000 to GE's total employment costs in the next 2 years. The added cost
burden, it said, "could destroy thousands upon thousands of jobs." The problems of
1960, the letter went on, were different from those in earlier years. GE was now
faced with menacing , competition from Japan and Europe as well as from domestic
sources. Moreover, new communities were taking away business from older com-
13 In thereafter announcing the enrollment dates for such insurance , however , some of
the plant 'publications noted that "Employees in bargaining units are eligible provided
there is no objection to this Insurance on the part of the unions "
13 The relations newsletter does not go directly to employees but is designed for distribu-
tion to managerial and supervisory personnel and to community thought leaders.
216 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
munities . To meet these problems,' it was imperative to maintain prices at levels that
would attract customers and sales in increasing volume; only by doing so could
employment be maintained at present levels. Additional employment costs would
inevitably lead to loss of jobs by subtracting from GE's ability to compete. The letter
also set out at length the Company's arguments in answer to the principal justifications
for increased wages and employee benefits given by the Union during the presentation
of its demands but not answered by the Company at the time.14 The letter also
reiterated that it was GE's intent, when the time came, to make a fair and " firm",offer
that would include "everything" shown by its total research to be in the common best
interests of employees, shareowners,, and others concerned with the success of, its
business . Moreover, the Company by its offer would try to do everything it could to
make sure that employees had no valid reason from their standpoint to strike,or to
permit themselves to have a strike imposed on them from above. In conclusion, the
letter cautioned against acceptance of the sincerity of Carey's recent statements
that he neither expected or wanted' a strike, suggesting that in truth Carey was "deter-
mined" for reasons of his own to strike GE in 1960, regardless of the fairness of GE's
offer.15 - ,
The July 1 newsletter set out the basic lines of GE's employee communications pro-
gram during the period beginning in early July (before the start of negotiations) and
continuing through the end of August when the Company's offer was presented. The
themes expressed in the newsletter were widely broadcast to employees in plant com-
munication media, through news stories, articles, editorials, and other means: The
theme stressed above all was that the Union's "astronomical" demands, even if granted
only in substantial part, were bound to result in the destruction of numerous employee
jobs. The communications constantly reiterated that GE was now engaged in' the
greatest competitive struggle in its history; that maintenance of current levels of
employment depended on GE's ability to compete successfully for customers and sales
while at the same time maintaining profits sufficiently high to' attract investment capi-
tal; that the Union's proposed remedial program for meeting the problems of job
security would only have an opposite effect by adding to GE's production costs at a
time when it was vital to the best interests of all concerned with-GE's success to
keep such costs at a minimum ; and that any substantial rise in employment costs would
force GE out ofmarkets and employees out of jobs.
At the same time-particularly at the larger plants, although even there the nature,
scope, and content of the communications varied from plant to plant-GE plant
publications continued to carry with steadily increasing frequency, and volume- articles,
news reports, editorials, displays, and cartoons indoctrinating employees with its
views on certain specific bargaining issues and other topics outlined in "Communica'-
tion Topics (Prior to Negotiations)," referred to above, and bearing also on'related
subjects, such as how good GE jobs were, the features of GE benefit plans, how profits
create jobs, the danger of a strike being imposed on employees by the Union's leader-
ship, how strikes cause loss of orders and jobs, etc. The communications also sought
,to build up an image of the Company as the protector of employee interests, 'pointing
14 The Union had justified its economic demands largely, on the, basis of productivity
considerations, pointing particularly to GE's constantly increasing sales and evergrow-
ing profits as contrasted to a declining employee complement. The Company's answering
argument as given in its letter was substantially this: To maintain employment at present
levels in the current competitive climate, it was essential to increase both the output per
job and the volume of sales each year, to do so required a constantly increasing invest-
ment per job in the form of'improved equipment and facilities ; and to attract investment
capital it was necessary to have steadily rising profits.
15 Reference was made, inter alia, to a statement, "I owe GE a strike" attributed to
Carey in an article relating Whim that had appeared in the July 1959 issue of "Steel,"
a trade magazine with a limited circulation in the metalworking industry. Though this
is disputed, I accept the testimony of the reporter who interviewed Carey that the at-
tributed statement was actually made. The quotation was picked up by-GE long before
the start of the 1960 negotiations and was constantly reiterated by it in its employee
communications as evidence of Carey's asserted determination to strike GE in 1960 for
purely personal reasons. Carey in his personal contacts wtih GE officials had-theretofore
protested GE's use of the quotation, had claimed that it was inaccurate, and had sought
to assure GE of his genuine desire to come to a peaceful agreement. This, however, did
-not deter GE from continuing its constant references to' that 'statement in•'its employee
communications 1 ' ' 7
ni a•, .
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 217
up how the Company voluntarily sought to do what was ",right" by engaging in careful
research to determine employees ' real needs and to fashion a fair and firm offer that
would give employees "everything" that was appropriately coming to them.
F. The 1960 negotiations as a whole
1. Arrangements for negotiations
At the June 13 *meeting , the Company had stated that it would take the Union's
request for early negotiations under advisement . Having received no response, Carey
wrote Moore on June 29 renewing the Union 's request . Moore replied by letter on
July 8. He stated that the mid-August opening date contemplated by the contract
should provide ample time to examine the Union 's "familiar demands" in the pay and
benefit areas . As for the Union 's union-shop and SUB demands , he added , the Com-
pany's "convictions ," already well known to the Union from prior negotiations, had
been reconfirmed by the Company 's "continuous research ." However, recognizing
the employees' concern over job security , Moore thought "it would not be amiss to
meet early if the additional time is spent in a mutual exploration of any grass roots
opportunities that may exist for improving employment continuity ." ' On that , basis,
said Moore , the Company was ready to go "forward with the Union 's proposal for early
negotiations , starting July 19, with the first 6 days spent hearing from local IUE
officials from each location where "you feel a problem is of sufficient importance to
warrant this study," after which it might be desirable to call in ERM 's from various
plants to "give the national negotiators the benefit of their knowledge of the local
situations ." In a later communication to the Union , Moore made clear that what he
had in mind was to devote the early sessions exclusively "to discussions of the causes
of such , unemployment as appears at the plant level and the solutions that may be seen
by those closest to the problem."
Carey quickly agreed to the suggested early opening date but objected to Moore's
proposed limitations on the scope and purpose of the early meetings . He declared
that the Union wanted full negotiations , although it was prepared to begin with the
subject of employment security. '
After a further exchange of communications, and a preliminary procedural 'meeting
held between GE and IUE representatives , the parties finally agreed that the early
meetings should be negotiating and not simply review sessions . More specifically the
parties agreed as follows: The early negotiations would start the following day,
July 19, with employment security as the first subject on the agenda. If agreement
was reached on employment security prior to August 16, the parties would proceed
to other subjects at once If no agreement on employment security was reached by
August 15, the parties would then go on to other matters , but employment security
would remain a subject for negotiations.is
At the July 18 meeting , the parties also agreed on a schedule of meeting dates for
the negotiations as a whole, extending through September . It was also agreed, inter
alia, that there would be no 'meetings between September 8 and 20 because • of the IUE
convention that was scheduled for the week of September 12.
2. Chronology of more significant dates and events
Formal negotiations opened on July 19 , 1960, and continued at some 45 meetings
over a period of approximately 3 months, ending on October 22, 1960 , during the last
3 weeks of which the Union was on strike . The course of the negotiations , along with
related events which occurred away from the bargaining table, will be reviewed at
length. below. It may be helpful , 'however, in order that ready reference may be
available at one place for clearer focus , to set forth at the outset a table listing the
more important dates which mark phases or turning points in the history `of negotia-
tions to be recounted below. The table follows:
July 19 to August 11, 1960: Early negotiations limited to the subject of employ-
ment security.
August 1 , 1960: Union serves notice of termination of the 1955-60 agreement on
its October 1, 1960 , expiration date.
In a teletype to ERM's sent out that day , GE took full credit for the start of early
negotiations . The teletype stated , "The Company proposal to begin negotiations a full
month ahead of schedule for the purpose of concentrating on the subject of employment
security was accepted by union officials " [ Emphasis supplied 1 The Substance of the
teletype was thereafter published in plant communication media.
218 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
August 16, 1960: Negotiations on the Union's general demands begin.
August 29 and 30, 1960: The Company, informally on August 29 and formally
on August 30, presents its offer to the Union.
September 8, 1960: Negotiations are suspended until September 20 because of the
IUE convention.
September 13, 1960: Resolution adopted at the IUE convention calling for a vote
by IUE locals in the GE chain on Sunday, September 25, on the recommendation of
IUE negotiating committee to reject the Company's offer in its then present form.
, September 16, 1960: The Company launches a campaign to induce local officials
and unit employees to change the time, place, and conditions of voting and to influence
employees to vote against striking, stressing, inter alia, the finality of its offer and its
fixed policy not to make concessions to avoid a strike or threat of strike.
September 20, 1960: Negotiations resume. GE declares that its full offer is on the
table and that there is nothing more to come.17 On the same day, GE authorizes its
local general managers to put into effect for nonrepresented employees wages and
benefits contained in its basic offer to IUE and other unions.
September 21, 1960: The Federal Conciliation and Mediation Service enters the
negotiations at the request of the Union.
September 22, 1960: The Union presents a written request for information relevant
to bargaining issues, embodying in part the content of prior requests not granted.
The request is not complied with except in part and then only after the end of the
strike.
September 29, 1960: GE rejects mediators' proposal for a truce on the basis of an
extension of 1955-60 agreement beyond its October 1, 1960, expiration date and
states the conditions under which it plans to continue operations after the contract
expiration date.
September 30 to October 4, 1960: GE offers IUE's Schenectady and Pittsfield locals
strike truce terms on conditions more favorable than it had theretofore offered the
IUE national negotiations.
October 2, 1960: The Union strikes. Negotiating meetings continue.
October 10 to 20, 1960: GE engages in additional conduct alleged by the General
Counsel to constitute direct local bargaining in derogation of the 1UE's status' as the
national representative.
October 19, 1960: The Company declares that negotiations have reached an
impasse.
October 19 to 22, 1960: The Union capitulates. Negotiations are conducted for
a strike settlement.
October 22, 1960: The strike ends.
October 27 to November 23, 1960: Meetings are held for the purpose of drafting
definitive contract language and to settle certain items theretofore left open.
November 10, 1960: New 3-year agreement is concluded and signed.
3. Employee communication during the period of negotiations-in general
As earlier noted, GE declares it to be its policy to keep employees informed of the
progress of negotiations so that they may form their own independent judgments on
the issues involved and guide their bargaining agent accordingly. While formal nego-
tiations were in progress in 1960, GE headquarters sent to its plant locations, in most
cases by teletype, daily reports on the negotiations. The reports were prepared by
communication specialists employed in a company service component under the juris-
diction of Moore. They were utilized at the plant levels for purposes of employee
communication. At some plants the teletyped accounts were published substantially
in full in daily negotiation bulletins or other media of employee communication; at
others only the highlights were given either daily or at broader intervals. At least at
some plants the reports purported to-provide the employees with a full account of what
occurred in the conference room. But a comparison of the reports with the negotiat-
ing minutes shows that not to be true. The accounts given were slanted in the Com-
pany's favor, sometimes presented the Company's arguments to the employees more.
fully than the Company did at the bargaining table, frequently failed to present the
Union's position at all, and, when stating the Union's contentions, often did so in a
manner so abbreviated or editorialized as to give an inaccurate or unfavorable impres-
sion of the Union's position on the issues. The reports seized almost every occasion
17 The extent to which modifications were thereafter made in GE's offer and the charac-
ter of such modifications will be considered infra.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 219
that presented itself to disparage, belittle, or ridicule the Union's principal negotiator
by pointing up behavior at the bargaining table as well as positions taken by him in
such a manner as to cast him in an unfavorable light.18
The communications to employees, however, were not limited to reports on the
progress of negotiations. Throughout the period of negotiations, the employees were
subjected to other communications relating to the negotiations in the form of plant
newspapers,, employee bulletins, leaflets, letters to employees' homes, newspaper
advertisements, press releases, and radio and telephone messages.19 GE also com-
municated with employees at plant meetings and through supervisors' man-to-man
contacts with employees. The communications grew in number during September
and October. During that 2-month period a typical employee at some of the larger
plants was exposed to well over 100 separate communications in one form or another
concerning matters related to the negotiations, and on many days he was subjected to
at least 2 and sometimes to as many as 3 or 4. The last does not take into account
oral communications by supervisors, as to the precise volume of which there is no
specific evidence in the record.
The communications were geared to the developing stages of the negotiations. This
aspect of the case will be more particularly considered below as the course of negotia-
tions and related events is reviewed. Broadly speaking, however, the communications
prior to August 30-the date GE presented its offer-were primarily directed at con-
ditioning employee attitudes and opinions in the manner and along the lines earlier
referred to. Following announcement of GE's offer, the employees were flooded
with communications aimed at persuading them that the Company's package offer had
been designed after careful research to meet their needs and that its acceptance was in
their best interests. After passage of the IUE convention resolution calling for a
vote by locals on GE's offer, the same program continued, but the communications
now stressed that the Company had gone as far as it could without jeopardizing the
future of its business and the security of employees' jobs; that its final offer was now on
the table with no more to come; and that it was its policy not to yield concessions
because of a strike or threat of strike, regardless of the strike's duration. The General
is This is not to suggest that the Company's criticism of Carey's behavior was alto-
gether without foundation. Carey by some of his behavior at the bargaining table exposed
himself to and invited much of it The negotiating minutes reveal Carey as an aggressive,
highly articulate, and voluble negotiator with a bent for tough talk and invective. He
obviously felt frustrated by his failure to get anywhere in the negotiations and showed it.
He engaged on occasions in time-consuming harangues and not infrequently in side
excursions into perhaps interesting but wholly irrelevant subjects. On a number of
occasions , he displayed an explosive temper (several times to the point of threatening
physical violence) and was frequently uninhibited and a few times wholly unrestrained in
expressing his opinion (low) of some of the Company's negotiators He was at times also
highly critical - of GE top management. The Respondent in its brief makes much of
Carey's behavior at the bargaining table, devoting some 42 pages to excerpts from its
negotiating minutes bearing on that subject. The Respondent makes no claim, however,
that Carey's conduct influenced the actual course of bargaining in any substantial way.
I am satisfied that it did not. It is quite clear from the record as a whole that the Com-
pany planned from the beginning to downgrade Carey in its employee communications
program relating to the negotiation. (See, e.g., "Communication Topics (Prior to Negotia-
tion ).") Carey's conduct adverted to above provided the Company, I believe, with not
unwelcome ammunition with which to do so.
- ie Not all the written publications are in evidence. The General Counsel and the Re-
spondent, pursuant to a stipulation to limit proof, each selected the publications of three
of the larger and five of the smaller IDE-represented GE plants as a sampling to show
the range and character of the Company's communications to its employees and the gen-
eral public between June 13, 1960, and October 24, 1960. These exhibits -alone- occupy
a full drawer of a standard sized filing cabinet. The communications at the various
plants, although in major respects similar in theme, are by no means identical, and also
vary greatly as to their volume In the case of some multidepartment plants, not all
communications went to all employees The General Counsel selected the following larger
plants (with the number of separate communications for each plant shown in parenthesis) :
Schenectady, New York (246) , Pittsfield, Massachusetts (277) ; and Bridgeport, Con-
necticut (152). He selected the following smaller plants: Rome, Georgia (115) ; Burling-
ton, Vermont (143) ; Tyler, Texas (65) ; Memphis, Tennessee (43) ; and Waterford, New
York (60). 'The Respondent selected from larger plants* Fort Wayne, Indiana (142) ;
Louisville, Kentucky (243) ; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (118). It selected the fol-
lowing smaller plants: Jonesboro, Arkansas (21) ; Newark, New Jersey (44) ; Linton,
Indiana (29) ; Fitchburg, Massachusetts (40) ; and New Kensington, Pennsylvania (17).
220 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Counsel and the Union claim that at some plants the Company's communications went
further and made statements and declarations of a coercive character to induce
employee withdrawal of their support of union positions. But of all this, more later.
The communications, particularly after the negotiations recessed for the IUE con-
vention, also unmistakably disclosed an effort on the Company's part to undermine
employee faith and confidence in positions espoused by the Union, by disparaging and
attacking the motives of the IUE top leadership, especially those of Carey. That
tactic, as has been seen, was suggested as far back as November 1959 when "Com-
munication Topics (Prior to Negotiations)" was drawn up. The Company's effort to
discredit Carey actually began in muted tones even before the start of negotiations,
and continued throughout its course, gradually mounting in intensity, reaching a high
point, thereafter maintained, when the negotiations recessed for the IUE convention.
Through constant suggestions and adverse references, the communication sought to
portray Carey as an irresponsible, self-seeking leader primarily concerned, not with
the best interests of the employees, but with the furtherance of his own personal and
political ambitions, and therefore determined to lead the employees down the.path of
a job-destroying strike.
The Union also communicated with employees during the negotiation-.period, but,
perhaps because it lacks GE's resources, not nearly on the scale the Company did, at
least as far as written communications are concerned.20 In some instances the
Union's written communications dealt with bargaining issues, expressing sharp criti-
cism of the Company's offer and of the Company itself and advancing arguments in
support of the Union's demands. In the main, however, the communications, particu-
larly those released on a local level, confined themselves to exhorting employees to
maintain their union solidarity and not be taken in, intimidated, or deceived by what
they characterized as the Company's massive propaganda campaign directed at alien-
ating employee support of the Union. So far as appears, the Union made no attempt,
at least in written communications, to report to employees the daily course of negotia-
tions, as did the Company. To what extent this may have been done through personal
contacts of local officials with union members or at local union meetings, the record
does not show. -
G.- The early meetings on the subject of employment security-
July 19 to August 11 -
On July 19, 1960, the GE and IUE negotiating committees, led,by Moore and
Carey, respectively, met as scheduled to conduct early negotiations on the subject of
employment security. Twelve meetings limited to that subject were held between
July 19 and August 11, 1960. These meetings were later to be characterized in a GE
publication as "listening sessions."
The first six meetings were devoted to the presentation and discussion of the Union's
employment-security proposals calling for (1) establishment of a joint committee on
automation; (2) limitations on overtime work while other employees were on layoff
or working a short week; (3) limitations on subcontracting under similar circum-
stances; (4) the right of employees to move with their jobs transferred to other plants;
(5) supplementary employment benefits (SUB); (6) separation pay-at.the rate of
1 week's pay for each year of service in excess of 2-for all employees laid off for
more than 12 months.21
The Company criticized the Union's proposals as a whole, asserting they were
directed primarily to the effects rather than the solution of the problem of employ-
ment instability. The Company took the position, frequently reiterated, that the
negotiators should approach the subject at hand, not through consideration of specific
proposals, but by seeking to identify through persons having direct knowledge of the
facts the "causes and sources" of employment instability at plant levels.i Neverthe-
• 2" The IUE has a biweekly newspaper, the, IUE. News, which goes -to all its members,
not just to those in the GE chain. The regular issues of the IUE News published, dur-
ing the early period of negotiations dealt, only in small part with the GE negotiations.
Stories relating to the GE negotiations -were, however, featured during the months of
September and October. In addition, a special Issue of the IUE News, released shortly
after the IUE convention, dealt entirely with the GE situation Constituent IUE locals
In the GE chain also from time to time published material relating to the negotiations,
mostly in the form of mimeographed leaflets Their number, however, was but a small
fraction of the tremendous volume of literature GE put out at the same plants.
a The existing contract already made provision for termination pay In the event of plant
closings.
r o .. 1. ,
•'ti. i - , GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 221
less, during the course of the Union's presentation, the Company, in some instances
only after considerable prodding by union negotiators, 'did discuss with the Union in
specific terms the latter's demands, and declared its positions thereon.
The Company opposed SUB largely on the basis of principle.2 2 It expressed no
position at all on separation pay, the only other item in the Union's demands, which, as
the Company in effect conceded, would have involved substantial additional costs.
,As to the Union's proposal that employees be given the right to transfer with their
work, Moore stated when that proposal was presented that he was unaware of any
company policy that would bar an employee from following his work but that he
wanted more information on local practices. When the Union asked why it would not
be possible to draft a simple understanding providing that employees should have the
right to go to new plants with their jobs, Moore stated in effect the Company had
studied and would continue to study that question, but, that his only immediate con-
cern was "to find the causes and sources" of the various employment-security prob-
lems. At a subsequent meeting, however, Moore stated that the Company was opposed
in principle to'the'proposal as well as unspecified others because it was an invasion of
management's rights. •
GE opposed the Union's proposals for a committee ion automation, giving as its
reason that such a committee could not solve the problem of employment stability.
It also stated that no special committee was needed, as the local union could sit down
with local management, utilizing the collective-bargaining procedure, to discuss any
specific automation problems it might have. But the Company did not reply when
the Union pointed out that the national agreement made no provision for discussion of
automation questions on a local level. Subsequently, when the Union suggested that
automation committees on national and local levels might function outside the griev-
ance procedure, the Company rejected that approach, terming it a "share the manage-
ment" proposition.
With respect to the Union's proposals for overtime and farm-out restrictions, the
Company took the position generally that these were not appropriate matters for the
national ' agreement but should be left for discussion by local unions with local
managements : Significantly, however, at a much later meeting, on September 27, in
response to a question by the Union, the Company declared that it flatly objected to
having the Union's noneconomic employment-security proposals negotiated even on a
local level as this "would get into the area of management rights."
-,At various times in 'the course of the Union's presentation, the Company asserted
that ithe, Union had presented no constructive solution to the problem of employment
security. The,Union requested GE to present its own solution, making it clear that it
was not wedded to its own proposals. On, a number of occasions the Union requested
GE to place its own employment-security proposals on the bargaining table prior to
August, 11, the date the early meetings limited to the subject of employment security
were scheduled to end. Moore replied that the Company did not have a proposal
written up and ready to put on the table. What the Company wanted to do first,
Moore , said; was to explore the pros and cons of what, was needed and useful for
employees. And toward that end the Company considered it necessary for the
negotiators to have more information from plant sources identifying the "causes and
sources of employment insecurity" and showing what had been done or could be done
to alleviate them.
- Beginning with the session of August 2 and continuing through six bargaining
meetings ending on August 11, the Company made its presentations. At the 'first 5
meetings the Company brought in some 10 employment relations managers from as
many plants, who, on the basis of previously prepared texts, made presentations con-
cerning the employment situations at their respective plants. Generally speaking, the
presentations dealt with the extent, if any, to which employment instability was-or
was not -.a problem in the respective plants and with the measures which management
itself had taken and was taking to stabilize employment through manpower planning
and other measures In some instances the presentations also underscored how prob-
lems:growing out of such factors as automation, "farm-out." overtime scheduling, or
transfer of operations were either nonexistent at the particular plant or had been
eliminated or minimized through corrective measures or practices voluntarily under-
taken by management. Through its presentations, the Company also sought to point
up, that the causes of unemployment instability varied widely from plant to plant;
F Although agreeing that unemployment compensation benefits in many States were
inadequate and should be raised to 50 percent of average pay, the Company stated that
as a matter of principle it believed that the situation should be corrected by amending
State laws rather than through contracts applicable+to individual employers. It also stated
that SUB costs added to the problem of job insecurity. , ,
222 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that highly competitive market conditions were the most serious potential cause of
employment instability; and that the solution to the problem was rooted in customers
and sales.
At the sixth and final session on August 11, the Company presented a detailed eco-
nomic analysis, also from a previously prepared text, summarizing the factors affect-
ing employment and unemployment in the nation as a whole and in GE in particular.
The analysis pointed up , inter alia, the serious and growing impact of foreign competi-
tion on GE's operations , the importance of attracting customers and sales to assure
steady employment, the linkage between profits and job, and the operating measures
GE itself had taken and intended to take to protect job security. The presentation
also sought to show why GE's practices with respect to subcontracting and overtime
scheduling were desirable and in the long-term interest of employees, and why any
restriction thereon beyond those self-imposed by the Company would imperil
employee job security.
Prior to making the August i l presentation, Moore told Carey that he was sure
the Union would find the presentation "interesting" and "useful" because the Com-
pany planned to make it "a subject in the local communications in the future." All
of the Company's presentations were thereafter printed in monograph form and
released to ERM's at all plant locations with the suggestion that the ERM's make
use of the material "in any way you feel that it can be helpful in your local
situation."
Before the ERM's made their presentations, Moore had assured the Union that
the ERM's would be ready to answer any questions related thereto. Nevertheless,
the Company thereafter strictly circumscribed the area of union questioning by
refusing to allow-the ERM's to express their views as to the desirability, feasibility, or
practicality of applying the Union's specific employment-security proposals to their
respective locations. The union negotiators sought to extract such information on a
number of occasions. Each time they were blocked either by Moore or by the ERM's
themselves. The Union was told that the ERM's had not appeared for that purpose
and that only Moore could or would comment on the Union's specific proposals.
The union negotiators complained from the beginning that the lengthy oral presen-
tations from prepared texts were a waste of time. They stated that the material should
be presented in written form; that the Company should submit its proposals on
employment security; and that the remaining time scheduled for consideration of the
employment-security subject should be devoted to collective bargaining, which, the
Union stated, could only really begin after the proposals of both sides were on the
table. With this the Company disagreed. It stated that the presentations being made
were part of the process of collective bargaining. The information being supplied by
the local managers, asserted the Company, was needed by GE's national, negotiators
for factfinding purposes. In point of fact, as the record adequately shows, although
this was in part disputed by one company witness, the material contained in GE's
presentation at the bargaining meetings was already known to its negotiators, having
theretofore been presented to them at a meeting of the plant ERM's, held in New
York about a week before the negotiations began.
At the close of the August I1 meeting, Moore read a statement in which he declared,
inter alia, that the Company did not have any part of its offer "actually in being," but
that ". . . we sincerely believe that we should have some proposals in our forthcoming
offer that are aimed at lessening-within limits available-the effects of [job] insta-
bility." When-as will later be seen-the Company did present its overall offer at the
end of the same month, the offer contained provisions related to the subject of employ-
ment security, more specifically, a program for retraining and reassignment and for
income extension aid.
However, during the 4 weeks of early negotiations, the Company gave no indication
whatever of the employment-security program which it eventually included in its
overall offer, later presented substantially simultaneously to the IUE and other
unions. The Union was thus afforded no opportunity to consider or comment on the
Company's proposals during the sessions specifically set aside for the negotiation of an
agreement on employment security. The Company asserts that it said nothing of its
forthcoming proposals on employment security because it has not yet decided upon its
offer at the time. The evidence shows, to be sure, that the Company's overall offer
was not finally decided upon until several days before it was presented.23 But the
23 This was questioned at the hearing by the General Counsel and the Union. Both
spent considerable time attempting to develop through cross-examination of the Company's
witnesses that the Company 's overall offer was already finally settled upon and known to
Company's negotiators before the early negotiations began. Their efforts in that direc-
tion, however , fell short of the mark. '
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 223
record also shows ' that the Company 's eventual offer, although .not finalized at the
time of the early negotiations , had been in the process of evolution for many months
theretofore and had already reached an advanced stage of development by the time
the early negotiations began 24 And there is reason to believe that the Company's
ultimate employment-security proposals , even though not finally buttoned down, were
at least within the area of 'the Company 's contemplation at the time.25
At any rate , it is quite clear that one of the Company 's reasons for not having
a proposal on employment security ready was that the Company never intended to
'reach an accord on that subject during the period of early negotiations , notwithstand-
ing the understanding upon which the early negotiations were entered into. Indeed,
that much was virtually conceded by Thomas F. Hilbert, GE's labor relations counsel
and one of its principal negotiators Asked whether there was any reason why the
Company did not have an offer in existence which could have been made during the
month of discussion , Hilbert testified:
No, it is that we wanted to see what the Union had ... and what the effects of our
presentation on employment security were and then we wanted to go into other
areas of discussion to get as full a discussion as we could of the elements of the
Union demands.
This was stated in even more explicit language in one of the Company 's plant publica-
tions issued the day after the early negotiations ended. The GE News published at
Louisville , Kentucky , on August 12, 1960, after declaring that the early sessions were
only "fact finding sessions ," stated:
There was no intent on the part of the Company to reach an "agreement" or
solution to this complex problem during the initial four weeks of talk.
GE utilized the early negotiations as a springboard from which to present directly
to employees its views on the employment-security issues. This was done through
teletyped accounts of the meetings that were used in turn by plant ERM's as source
material for transmittal to employees via the plant communication channels The
teletyped accounts were one-sided ; the positions of the Company were extolled and
those of the Union either not mentioned at all oi • mentioned only to be deprecated.
On several occasions the Union at the meetings complained about the incompleteness
of the reports made to employees , but to no avail . The presentations made by plant
ERM's to the national negotiators were in some instances alsb communicated to
employees at the particular plants 'covered thereby . At least at one plant-Bridge-
port-this was done orally at a series of informative employee meetings : The prin-'
cipal points stressed in the communications were that the Union 's proposals could not
solve the problem of employment instability ; that this could be done only through
customers and sales and through the Company's own voluntarily undertaken efforts to
correct the causes of employment instability . The monograph based on the August 11
presentation was also widely used ' as source material in plant communication media
for the purpose of impressing the Company 's arguments directly upon employees.
In his brief , the General Counsel in effect requests a finding that the Respondent
entered upon the first 4 weeks of "negotiations" without any intent of negotiating on
the subject of employment security in the sense agreed to on July 18, but rather with
the intent of utilizing the occasion for the twofold purpose of ( 1) impressing upon
employees that it was genuinely concerned with the problem of employment security
and was working hard to alleviate the sources and causes of that problem , - and (2)
presenting to employees , more than to the Union, its position and arguments on the
employment -security issues involved in the negotiations . The totality of circum-
stances present in this record validly supports , I find, an inference to that general effect.
24 In fact , by June 1960 , the officers and other officials responsible for drafting the Com-
pany 's proposal had already made two piesentations to GE's principal executive officers
and division general managers Moreover , by that time , cost estimates on a companywide
basis of the various alternatives under consideration had been prepared
- 21 Moore conceded while testifying that during the period of early negotiations he had
been thinking about at least one of the principal features of the income extension aid
program later proposed His only explanation tor not . mentioning it at all was that it
"would be something less than high standards of negotiations to indicate commitments
on specific items Moore ' s testimony elsewhere also discloses that during his trip'ar6und
the GE circuit in early 1960 , the subjects of retraining and reassignment and income
extension ' aid ^ came up as subjects of discussion with general managers
775-692-65-vol. 150-16 '
224 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
H. Meetings on Union's general demands, prior to submission of GE offer,
August 16 to 25
Six meetings were held between August 16 and 25. The Union presented its justifi-
cations in support of its demands for a union shop, revisions of noneconomic terms in
the national agreement, improvements in the pension and insurance plans, a-general
wage increase, improvements in vacations and holidays, and other proposed contract
changes not covered at the early employment-security meetings. GE took the general
position during these meetings that it was interested in ascertaining the facts on which
to base its determination of what should appropriately be included in its offer. GE,
however, did not decline to discuss the Union's demands. As to many of the demands,
principally in the area of noneconomic contract changes, GE declared a position. It
was almost invariably one of rejection. GE gave as its reasons for rejection, in the
case of the union shop, that it was opposed to this on principle, and in the case of other
changes, that they were either too costly, or would be too difficult to administer, or
would deprive the Company of flexibility. As to other union demands, GE indicated
that it was not satisfied with the Union's presentation and needed more facts and justi-
fications. In a few instances, such as the Union's requests for weekly instead of
biweekly dues deductions and for an added holiday, the Company stated that-it would
"give consideration" to the Union's proposals. The Company refused, however, to
commit itself as to any of the demands, declaring that it did not engage in bargaining
on an item-by-item basis, although it did regard itself as obliged to go through and
consider the Union's demands seriatim. -
During this period GE did not submit any proposals of its own. While leaving no
doubt that the Union's economic demands were unacceptable to it, GE declined to
give any indication of what it was affirmatively thinking on the subjects of wage
increases, pensions, insurance, or other economic benefits, except to make clear that it
intended to eliminate the cost-of-living escalator.26 GE stated that it was still attempt-
ing to assemble a common body of facts as a basis for negotiation and that its position
on all issues would become known when its offer was eventually prepared and
presented.
At various times, the Union asked GE to declare itself on how much it had available
for its entire package so that the Union might suggest how it desired the available
amount to be apportioned- among the various economic benefits it sought. Although
the Union indicated- that it might be prepared to modify or rearrange its original
demands accordingly, GE chose to ignore that request. GE, in turn, sought to have
the Union declare itself on the order of priority it gave its various demands, but the
Union refused to do so, stating at that point that all its demands were "musts."
On a number of occasions during this period the Union requested information.
But its requests were either ignored or brushed aside. Thus, on August 18, during a
discussion of the Union's proposal to eliminate certain deductibles from insurance
benefits, Swire, the Union's pension and insurance expert, asked Willis, the Company's
benefits specialist, the cost to the Company of eliminating the deductibles. Willis
replied that he did not have the figures. When Swire asked Willis to confirm a figure
of one-half cent per hour, which Willis had assertedly used in a speech, Willis stated,
"I don't talk in figures." But later when the Union's pension proposals were being
considered, Willis objected to them on the ground: "They will cost a lot." On Au-
gust 24, during a discussion of the Union's proposal for a fourth week of vacation for
employees with more than 20 years' service, the Union asked the Company for figures
on the number of employees falling within that category. The Company stated that
it did not have that information. In point of fact, as will later appear, that informa-
tion could have been obtained by it. Again while the Union's sick leave proposal was
the subject of the discussion, the Company termed the Union's demand an "expensive"
one. But it made no reply when asked for its estimate of the cost.
At the end of the six bargaining sessions, the parties were no nearer agreement than
at the beginning. The Union charged the Company with stalling. Declaring that it
was not there for educational purposes and that negotiations did not really begin until
the proposals of both sides were on the table, the Union urged the Company to come
forward with its offer.
In the meantime, GE's plant communications program continued along the lines
earlier stated, with constant reiteration of its arguments concerning competition, sales,
and profits and the dependence of jobs on GE's ability to keep its costs down. In
During this period, the Company cited the Union's election to terminate the then
current contract as a justification for its decision to eliminate the escalator clause. Sub-
sequently, the Company agreed that that was not the true reason for its decision.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 225
anticipation of the Company's forthcoming proposal, the communications now also
restated GE's declared bargaining policy. They stressed the careful research and
other practices that GE engaged in to assure that its offer would be "right," its fair,
firm offer approach, its unwillingness to engage in haggling or horsetrading, and its
refusal to make concessions beyond what it believed to be right because of a show of
belligerence by union officials. The communications during this period also criticized
the Union's demands and the Union's concept of collective bargaining. The Union
was accused of being disinterested in facts. Its unwillingness to rank its bargaining
demands in the order of their priority was particularly scored.
1. August 29 and 30: GE presents its offer to the Union
In the evening of August 29, Carey and Callahan met with Parker and Moore for
a dinner meeting , at Moore's request. The purpose of the meeting was to give the
IUE representatives a preview of the offer which Moore stated GE planned formally
to present the next day to the IUE and to the UE and thereafter to some 100 other
unions. Moore read a summary of the Company's offer from notes, stating that no
written copy was then available. The offer which Moore outlined on August 29 was
formally presented to the IUE in writing at a regular bargaining session the following
day. The proposals provided in substance for the following:
1. Contract duration: October 2, 1960 to September 29, 1963.
2. Wages: 3% increase effective October 2, 1960; 4% increase, effective
April 2, 1962; no cost-of-living escalator.27
3. Retraining and Reassignment: Local management at its discretion may
offer an employee having 3 years or more service a retraining or reassignment
opportunity in another job at 95% of the job rate of his former job in order to
equip the employee prior to any layoff for another job requiring other skills. The
period of training would not exceed one week for each year of service. Disputes
would not be subject to arbitration.28
4. Income Extension Aid: This made available for an employee with 3 or
more years service and not eligible for optional retirement a fund equal to one
week's pay for each year service for use in the event of layoff or plant closing.
The fund could be drawn upon under 4 options: (a) as payment for tuition while
attending a recognized school during a period of layoff to train for another job;
(b) as a lump sum payment available to the laid-off employee provided he elected
within 60 days after his layoff to terminate his employment and forgo recall rights
and service credits-but this option was available only if management determined
the layoff would exceed 6 months; (c) as weekly income at the rate of 50% of
normal pay if the laid-off employee remained unemployed after exhaustion of
State unemployment compensation benefits; or (d) as a lump sum payment on
plant closing-the last option modifying and superseding a provision for termina-
tion pay on plant closing contained in the 1955-1960 agreement.29
5. An Emergency Aid Plan- Exclusively under management control, provid-
ing for loans or grants not to exceed $500 in serious emergencies. This plan was
not to be effective at any IUE location until all existing local Relief and Loan
plans were liquidated.30
27 The Union's proposal had asked for annual productivity increases of 31/2 percent and
for continuance of the escalator clause.
21 The Union had not asked for this "employment security" provision. The Company
had never mentioned it as contemplated at any of the earlier negotiating meetings The
Company originally proposed to insert the "R & R" provision as well as the income ex-
tension aid provisions in the pension and insurance agreement so as to make clear that
disputes arising thereunder would not be arbitrable Later in the negotiations, however,
the Company agreed that these provisions might be put in the national agreement, with
the express understanding, however, that arbitration procedures would not extend to them
The Respondent in its brief points to this as a "concession," but it is quite clear that the
transfer did not involve any substantive change.
^ The "IEA" was new It had not been discussed with the Union in prior negotiations.
The only thing in the Union's proposals resembling it in part was the Union's demand for
separation pay for employees with 2 or more years' service who were laid off for more
than 12 months. The Union's SUB demand involved a different concept.
90 A number of IUE locals had such relief and loan plans which were controlled by the
employees or under a joint arrangement with management. This proposal was neither
requested by the TUE nor desired by it on the condition stated.
226 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
6. Pension Plan improvements 31
7. Insurance Plan improvements 32
8. Contract changes: The Company's proposal contained 3 items- (a) to
allow local negotiations on the subject of weekly checkoff; (b) to allow local
unions and local managements to negotiate to substitute a different holiday for
any of the listed ones; (c) to allow death in family time and jury duty time to be
considered as time worked for purposes of qualifying for holiday pay; and (d) to
increase maximum leave for Union officials from 5 to 8 years.33
At the August 29 informal meeting, Carey and Callahan expressed themselves
immediately as being, opposed to the company offer, protesting that it was not respon-
sive to the Union's proposals. The union representatives voiced their strong dis-
approval, among other things, to the Company's elimination of the cost-of-living
escalator provision, commenting that a 3-year contract without escalation and without
opportunity to review wage trends was wholly unacceptable. Moore at once asked
what they thought would be an adequate provision on that point.. They wanted a con-
tinuation of the escalator clause, the union representatives replied, Moore then asked
whether the Union would consider a wage reopener during the 3-year contract term,
at the same time making it "plain," as appears from his testimony, that he "was not
offering ... [the reopener] at that meeting because it was not a bargaining session."
The Union did not respond to that suggestion, expressing neither approval nor
disapproval.
Carey asked the Company to refrain from presenting its offer to the IUE negotiating
committee the next day, and also to withhold its release to other unions and the press.
To do so, Carey said, would tend to "freeze" the Company's position and place it on a
collision course. Carey urged that before the Company became publicly committed to
its offer, there should be further discussion by those-present to see what could be done
about changing the Company's proposals to make them more acceptable as a basis
for negotiations. The Company's representatives rejected Carey's request. They said
they did not consider that meeting a proper place to discuss the Company's proposals,
as it was not a formal negotiating session, only a courtesy preview meeting. The offer
they had come up with, they said in substance, was the product of great effort, exten-
sive research and surveys, and careful consideration of all relevant factors. The
Company considered it the best offer it could make in the balanced best interests of
employees and everyone else concerned, and one, moreover, that the union representa-
tives could "sell." This was the offer the Company was going to make. And the plan
to present it to the IUE and the UE the following day would not be altered. They
would, however, withhold public announcement and presentation of the offer to other
unions until the full IUE negotiating committee'had had an opportunity to consider it
and give the company negotiators some feel as to whether agreement was imminent
At the negotiating meeting on August 30, the Company formally presented its offer
to the IUE negotiating committee 34 Immediately following the reading, Moore
3' The Company's proposal contained some six improvements in the pension plan. Three
involved changes which did not reflect any proposal made by 'the Union, one involved a
change substantially as proposed by the Union, and two reflected in part union-proposed
changes. The proposal in effect rejected other changes the Union had proposed
3z Here, too, the Company's proposal contained some six improvements. At least two
concerned items not iaised by the Union Only one was precisely in the terms proposed
by the Union, amount of benefits aside The Union's basic proposals were rejected.
John Morris, a company consultant on insurance costs, testified that the improvements
proposed by the Company were basically different from those proposed by the Union, "an
entirely different scheme of things " -
33As to (a), the Union had asked for weekly dues deduction at the request of a local
without further negotiation , as to (b) and (c), these had not been specifically requested
by the Union at all, as to (d) the Union had requested elimination of the 5-year maximum
on total leave for union' officials These items were all of a relatively minor nature as
compared to many other more basic requests for contiact changes which the Union had
requested and which were rejected
34 During the reading of the Company's offer, a union negotiator asked Moore whether
the existing 10-percent cost-of-living adders were being incorporated in the base rates
Moore replied, "We haven't decided yet " There is only one other reference throughout
the negotiation minutes to the cost-of-living adders That appears in the September 7
minutes in the form of it peripheral and somewhat obscure colloquy in which, as nearly
as I can gather, Moore disclaimed an intent at any time not'to carry over into the new
proposed contract the 10-percent' cost-of-living adders. To have excluded the adders quite
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 227
announced that the Company was including in its offer an option to reopen the con-
tract on April 1 , 1962, for - wage negotiations with no commitment for a further wage
increase at that time, as an alternative to the proposed second phase wage increase
effective that date.
Carey again described the Company 's proposal as unresponsive . He proposed that
the next 3 days be spent negotiating without the pressures and glare of publicity, with
the company offer serving as a basis for discussion . And he again urged Moore not to
publicize the offer and thereby freeze the Company 's position . Moore responded that
the Company had not held back anything , and that its proposal was not just the first
of a series that would be put on the table. The Company , Moore stated , felt that the
employees should know what was , on the table . 3' Moore stated , however, that if the
Union wanted more time to consider the proposal , the Company would hold up its
release until the following day.36
At the opening of the session on August 31, the Company announced that its offer
was being released to the plants.
J. GE presents its offer directly to employees
On August 29, prior to the offer preview meeting that evening, the Company had
held a meeting of its plant ERM 's in New York .. The ERM's were each given a
package consisting of a script of a tape recording discussing GE's 1960 proposal,
reproductions of slides to be used in presenting that proposal to employees ; copies of
GE's offer letters to IUE and UE and a form of GE's offer letter for unions other
than IUE and UE; 37 a series of questions and answers about GE's proposals; a copy
of a GE News special edition describing the 1960 program in detail ; a model news-
paper ad designed as a report to GE plant communities concerning the contents and
virtues of the GE 1960 proposal; and a document entitled "Communications Program
Information ." The last-mentioned document adverted to the foregoing materials and
other materials to be supplied , including daily bulletins to be distributed to employees
highlighting various features of the offer , press releases , and radio and television
messages . It also contained recommendations as to the use ,of the materials "to help
the components inform their managers , supervisors , employees and others regarding
[GE's] offer." It was suggested , inter alia , that a copy of the script be given to all
supervisors "so that they will be prepared to answer questions raised by employees
regarding any point made in the presentation."
The script , entitled "General Electric 's 1960 Proposal for Job Opportunity and
Better Security ," 38 set forth and explained the Company 's proposal in detail, pointed
out and acclaimed the advantages to individual employees of the various features of
the proposal , and sought to demonstrate how the proposal so met the various needs of
the employees as to obviate any reason for a "long pay -losing strike in order to get the
things you want." In addition , the script expressed the Company 's concern over the
problem of job insecurity : spoke of the 2 years' thorough research ( including the early
negotiations ) in which GE had engaged to determine what makes for job security;
stated the conclusions that had been drawn therefrom (repeating in substance the
major points contained in its presentations at the early negotiations ); deprecated SUB
obviously would have resulted in a 7-percent immediate reduction in employees ' pay rather
than in a 3 -percent increase as represented by the Company to the Union and in its com-
munication to employees Notwithstanding Moore's above -quoted remark , I think it
clear that the Company never seriously contemplated excluding the adders The com-
ments made here are relevant only because the Respondent in its brief-relying solely on
the August 30 and September 7 colloquies above referred to-lists the ultimate inclusion
of the cost-of-living adders in the base rates as a change made in the Company ' s original
offer as a result of subsequent negotiations . I find this to be inaccurate
35 In a subsequent teletype to ERM's in the form of a suggested letter to employees,
Carey's request for a 3-day news blackout was criticized , the Company declaring that
it was unwilling to hide facts from employees
33 Other aspects of the August 30 meeting will be treated in the subsection below deal-
ing with the general course of negotiations -between August 30 and September 8.
37 The offer letters to the IUE and to other unions were identical so far as the economic
offer was concerned , with immaterial exceptions , even to the statement in the last para-
graph that "certain elements of the offer reflect our acceptance of concepts proposed by
your bargaining committee "
39 Elsewhere advertised as GE's 1960 "jobs program
228 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
as a solution ; 39 and pointed out how its proposal had been designed to do the things
its study showed could be done to help build job opportunities and better security for
employees and was therefore responsive to the needs and desires of the employees.
With respect to the proposed pay increases, the script stated that they were "good
increases" considered in the light of recent settlements by other companies and the
"other particularly expensive benefits" in the security provisions of the proposal. The
total package, the script went on, while worth enough to bring real gains to all
employees, nevertheless was "not so costly as to put the Company in an impossible
competitive position, thus endangering the jobs of all employees." In conclusion, the
script urged employees to "consider the proposals carefully ... discuss them with your
families-decide whether this is a program you want-and then advise your union
representative of your decision."
In one respect, the Company's explanation of the offer was inaccurate and mislead-
ing because of the omission of a material fact. Describing the income extension aid
feature, it stated:
If within 60 days after being laid off, an employee decided to voluntarily terminate
his employment, he could immediately collect the total amount available to him
in a lump sum along with backpay, vacation and other allowances due him.'
The Company's offer is explicit that the termination pay would be given only where
the Company was of the opinion that the employee would not be recalled within 6
months after the date of his layoff, and provided further that the employee must
abandon his recall rights. This was not an isolated instance of this omission. It is
found frequently repeated in other employee communications where the features of
income extension aid program are described.40
Beginning about August 31, 1960, ERM's or other responsible plant officials at most
of GE's plant locations conducted meetings of employees' usually in small groups, at
which they either played the tape recording or read the script of the prepared state-
ment relating to GE's proposal, utilizing the slides in conjunction therewith. The
presentations were made on company time and property or at premises rented by the
Company for the occasion.41 At some of the plant meetings , the plant officials added
to the prepared script comments of their own, either on their own initiative or in
response to questions from the floor, explaining in some instances why the Company
could not grant certain union demands desired by the employees 42
se The excerpt reads as follows.
Even those who advocate such programs as Supplemental Unemployment Benefits
realized, and publicly admitted, that such programs really did little or nothing to
make jobs more secure.
40 Indeed, the 6-month layoff condition appears to have been mentioned in only one of
the numerous employee communications adverting to the IEA program., Short refer-
ence to it appears in the questions and answers distributed to ERM's and thereafter pub-
lished at many but not all GE locations where the script above referred to was presented
to employees
di In some instances, local union officials were notified in advance of the Company's
Intention to hold the presentation meetings. But even where they objected-as the
record shows at least one did on the ground the Company was bypassing the Union and
engaging in direct bargaining with employees-their objections were ignored.
4i The General Counsel called employee witnesses from some 10 plants In an effort to
establish that in the course of such comments the officials also declared that the offer
made to the Union was a final one and the only offer the Company would make, adding
in some instances that no amount of negotiation could bring a better one The testimony
of the General Counsel's witnesses was met in many but not all instances by contradic-
tory testimony from witnesses called by the Respondent. Cross-examination of the Gen-
eral Counsel's witnesses developed in substantially every instance either admissions
rendering questionable the validity of the witnesses' testimony on direct, or, as was more
often true, evidence of a likelihood that the witnesses in their recollection had confused
statements assertedly made at the offer presentation meeting with statements subsequently
made either at other employee meetings or in written employee communications. This was
as much true in the case of.the General Counsel's witnesses, whose testimony was not met
by specific denial, as it was in the case of the others The confusion of the General Coun-
sel's witnesses is perhaps readily understandable in the light of the barrage of communica-
tions to which the employees were subjected throughout the negotiation period. But this
does not help the General Counsel Without further belaboring the point, suffice it to say
that I am not persuaded that the General Counsel has established with sufficient reliability
that company officials in their added comments at the "offer" meetings made the specific
"finality" declarations referred to above.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 229
Following the offer presentation meetings, wide use was made in employee com-
munications of the GE News special edition: questions and answers, daily bulletins,
letters to homes, and other materials as suggested in the communications program
given ERM's at the August 29 meeting.
The Company's contacts with employees relating to the offer were not confined,
however, to the plant meetings and written communications. At numerous locations,
plant management, through letters and other communications, invited and encouraged
employees to discuss with their supervisors or other management representatives any
questions they might have concerning the offer in general or its impact on them as
individuals. At one plant (KAPL) the employees were provided with a telephone
number-that of the plant ERM-which they were,urged to call for answers to any
questions they might have about the offer. At GE's Pittsfield plant-one of its
largest-the plant ERM conducted a series of roundtable meetings to which employees
were invited for the purpose of asking questions and discussing the offer with the
ERM. Documentary evidence reflects that the ERM did not confine himself to
explanations of the offer, but also presented economic and other justifications for posi-
tions taken by the Company.
Moreover, the record reflects that GE supervisors were expected both to impress
upon employees the merits of the offer and to ascertain employees reactions thereto.
Thus, for example, a teletype from GE headquarters to plant ERM's, dated Septem-
ber 1, sets out "pointers that you and other supervisors might find handy while talking
to employees about the soundness of our proposal." There is also in evidence a man-
agement newsletter, dated September 7, 1960, to all managers and supervisors at the
Holyoke plant, mentioning "some additional points that should be stressed by super-
visors" in their contacts with employees 43 Also in evidence is a memorandum dated
September 6, to section and subsection managers at the Schenectady plant, stating,
inter alia:
Individual departments have been charged with the job of getting maximum pos-
sible understanding of the offer among employees . . . . We would appreciate
receiving indications of reactions among your employees regarding the contract
proposals. There may be misunderstandings. Perhaps there may be benefits
that are desired and are not included in the offer, or there may be strong reaction
either positive or negative to the offer. Please jot down this information and
forward it to the Communications Office.
In addition, one of the Respondent's witnesses, a subsection manager in the Philadel-
phia plant, testified that a general meeting of supervision had been held at his plant on
August 31 to familiarize supervision with the contents of the Company's offer so that
they could communicate with employees concerning it. The record reflects similar
supervisors' meetings were held at other plants, at Lynn, for example.
The General Counsel called a number of witnesses to show that supervisors initiated
discussions with employees both to sound out their reactions to the company offer and
to endeavor to persuade them that the offer was one that should be accepted. The
testimony of these witnesses, to the extent credited, and as supplemented in some
instances by responsive testimony of supervisors involved, shows the following: In
Philadelphia, on the afternoon of the offer presentation meeting, a foreman questioned
an employee as to his reactions to the offer. When the employee declared his dissatis-
faction with certain aspects of the offer, the foreman said he thought this would be the
only offer. Several days later the same foreman asked him whether he had changed
his mind about the proposal. Another foreman told another employee that the offer
was a good one, stressing that it would be foolish not to accept it, as a strike would
cause the plant to lose work and jeopardize future job security.44 A subsection
manager, several days after the "offer meeting," sounded out an employee's reaction
to the offer, stating, after the employee had declared it inadequate, that the Com-
pany's offer was the product of careful research and was fair and reasonable; that
there was not room for more within the Company's ability to pay; and that nothing
further could be gained by going out-on strike.45 The same section manager admitted
43 The supervisors were told to stress, inter alia, that the Company had not really
eliminated cost-of-living escalation but had factored it into the second phase wage income ;
that this approach was beneficial to employees because wages could not go down ; that
it was also in keeping with the recent trend of contract settlements and designed better
to solve the problem of inflation.
44 The record does not clearly reflect the precise date of this conversation.
41 The subsection manager admitted having a conversation with the employee about
the offer, but denied making certain statements attributed to him. His denial, to the
extent inconsistent with the finding made above, is not credited.
230 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that he as well as other supervisors under him spoke to other employees about the
offer and sought to sound out employee reaction thereto. In Newark, an employee
steward was told by his general foreman on one occasion, and by the plant labor
relations manager on another, that the Company's final offer was on the table and it
was foolish for employees to go out on strike as a strike would not result in a better
offer. These statements were probably made in the latter part of September. In
Pittsfield, the manager of union relations on three separate occasions in September
approached a union steward, to whom he had never spoken before, to inquire about
employee reactions to the proposal. When the employee, indicated on the second and
third occasions that he was still opposed to the offer, the manager stated that a strike
could result in the loss of Government contracts and consequent loss of employee jobs.
The manager also stated on the third occasion that the company offer was final and
there would be no change .46 The manager conceded that he spoke to other employees
to the same effect.
At various times during the negotiations, union representatives complained, but to
no avail, about the Company's "propaganda blitzkrieg" directed at employees, accus-
ing GE of bypassing the Union and seeking to deal with employees directly. With
specific reference to the Company's plant offer presentation meetings, the Union asked
for equal time, and for permission to address the employees under the same conditions
utilized by the Company. The Company refused; declaring, "Get them over to the
union hall and you can talk to the employees."
K. Negotiating meetings August 30 through September 8 ,
There were seven negotiating meetings between August 30 and September 8., The
Union during this period indicated a willingness to drop or scale down some of, its
demands, particularly in the areas of contract changes, pensions, and insurance, but
continued to press for its major demands, including the union shop, a 31/2-percent
annual wage increase (as opposed to the slightly more than 2 percent offered by the
Company), continuation of the cost-of-living escalator, SUB,47 an added holiday,
and an extra week's vacation for employees with more than 20 years' service. The
Union also sought revision of the Company's retraining and reassignment proposal to
assure the protection of employee seniority rights 48 Even with respect to the fore-
going stated demands, however, the Union-indicated near the close of this series of
sessions that its position was flexible.
The Company declared that it had a fixed position on cost-of-living escalation, SUB,
and the union shop, but that it viewed other union demands as within the ; "areas of
collective bargaining." At the same time, the Company made it quite clear, however,
that it was willing at most to consider only such changes -as were within the framework
of its proposals. On various occasions, the Company indicated that it had not granted
certain union demands because it had put such money as it had available into improve-
4e The manager, who testified, did not deny these conversations He testified, however,
that the last conversation, in which the finality of the offer was mentioned, occurred in
the latter part of September after a statement had come out from New York to that
effect. His testimony in that respect is credited.
47 As to SUB, however, the Union modified its original demand to integrate it with the
Company's income extension aid proposal It accepted the principle that a fund be made
available for each employee at the rate of 1 week's wages for each year of service over
3, but proposed that the fund be used as a source of supplemental unemployment com-
pensation benefits, with any balance to an employee's credit remaining available for
termination pay.
48 The Union expressed concern that the R & R provision could be utilized by the Coin-
pany as a means of impairing or circumventing employee seniority rights ' The Company
disclaimed any such intent and explained that its R & R proposal contemplated the
negotiation of local supplements which would define the manner of selecting employees for
retraining and reassignment Subsequently , the Company submitted a more detailed draft
of its R & R plan , which stated, inter aua,'that local management would take seniority
into consideration as "an important factor" in selecting employees for retraining
Throughout, however, the Company made it ' clear that aiiy grievance arising out of the
R & R program , unlike other seniority grievances , would not 'be subject to the contract's
arbitration procedures The Union considered this inadequate protection of, employee
'seniority rights, and continued throughout the negotiations to oppose the, k & R proposal
as submitted , principally on that basis
J
GENERAL ELECTRIC 'COMPANY 231
ments which it had determined from its own research would best meet the employees'
needs and desires. The Company summarily rejected all union suggestions for revi-
sions entailing added costs, frequently citing that consideration as the basis for its
rejection.
The Union unsuccessfully sought to ascertain from the Company the estimated cost
of the company offer. It explained that it wanted the information so that it might be
able to tell the Company how it wanted the available money allocated among different
items. Moore stated that the Union had no right to decide what was best for the
employees , and also said that he did not know the cost of the Company 's proposal
"because it hasn 't occurred yet." Asked more specifically whether the Company's
offer would cost less than 9 cents an hour, Moore said the Company had not put a
figure on its package . When the Union insisted that the Company must have esti-
mated the cost of its proposal before submitting it, Moore denied having any such
estimate . "GE works on a level of benefits basis, not the cost per item ," he declared.
Actually, as the record shows, the various items in the Company 's proposal had all
been cost estimated by management representatives on a companywide basis prior to
its release.
The Company during this period similarly rejected, ignored , or brushed aside union
requests for cost or other information relating to specific items in issue. Thus, for
example, the Company resisted the Union 's request for an added holiday and an extra
week's vacation for employees with more than 20 years' service on the ground that it
would add to the Company's cost. But when the Union asked for the number of
employees who would be affected by the vacation proposal so that it might itself com-
pute the costs , Moore, shifting ground, stated in effect that such data was irrelevant
because the Company "discussed the level of benefits ." The Company took a similar
position with respect to the Union 's request for cost information in the area of pen-
sions and insurance .49 'The Company likewise refused cost information relevant to
the Union 's revised SUB demand .50 When the Union on September 8 asked' how
many people would have benefited by income extension aid on the basis of the Com-
pany's layoff experience over the past 2 years, Moore responded , "Somewhere between
zero and 100 percent ." Later, however, when Carey persisted in his demand for this
information , Moore told him to make the request' in writing . As will later appear,
the Union did thereafter submit such a written request , but the Company did not
supply the Union with the information until after the strike was over when it no
longer could do any good.
In other respects also, the Company registered impatience with the Union 's efforts
to have it justify bargaining positions it had taken . Thus, on September 6, after
Moore summarily rejected the Union 's principal justification for a 31/2 -percent annual
productivity increase , declaring "there is no direct relationship of productivity to
wages,", Lasser for the Union asked Moore to state the factors that had influenced the
Company's wage offer . Moore replied vaguely, "Many other factors , other settle-
ments, 'competition , etc." But when asked for further explication , particularly with
respect to a comparison of the Company 's wage offer with those in other settlements,
Moore evaded a direct reply . After lunch that day, Lasser asserted that the Com-
pany's offer was inferior to other settlements according to the Union 's information.
He asked Moore to disclose specific information with regard to the other settlements
on.which the Company relied. Moore declined to do so, stating that the information
was in the "public domain " and that Lasser should have prepared himself before
49 For example , during a discussion between the Union"s benefit expert ( Swire) and
the Company 's benefit expert (Willis ) relating to a union -requested improvement in mater-
nity benefits , the following colloquy occurred
SwiaE: We are asking for an,an improvement in maternity . We want the Com-
pany to pay everything up to $500, then co-insurance after that
WILLIS: Something like that is out of reach . Maternity is the most expensive item
SWIRE. What does it cost, Sid9
WILLIS: We talk level of benefits , not costs
GO,As noted above ,, the Union suggested SUB as a substitute for income extension aid,
to be financed in the same way by ,a fund for each employee equal to 1 week's pay for each
year's service The Company objected to this proposal on the ground that it would come
to 2 percent . But, when Carey sought to ascertain for comparative purposes the cost of
IEA, suggesting 1 percent as a likely, figure , Willis refused to say, stating, "We haven't
figured it out yet "
232 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
coming to -the meeting. On the following day, when Lasser again sought to ascertain
the Company 's reasoning behind its wage offer , accusing Moore of having evaded,an
answer the preceding day, Moore again declined to be specific , stating, "The wage
increase justified itself ." He further declared, "We bargain on what is the appro-
priate thing to do and the level of benefits."
Throughout the period in question , the Company adhered firmly to its offer as
presented ' to the Union on August 30, except for its clarification relating to retraining,
noted above, and except also for the early signing bonus proposal to be referred to
shortly below . 51 Other than as stated , the Company , at the-bargaining sessions here
under consideration , indicated a disposition toward flexibility only in ,one regard-the
substitution of holiday and.vacation improvements for part of the proffered wage,
increase . The facts as to this will be related in-the succeeding subsection of this report.
At the September 8 meeting, the Company announced that as a bonus for early,
acceptance it would make the -1960 wage increase effective on the Monday of the week
the new agreement was signed instead of on October 2, 1960, as originally proposed.
At the same time the Company pointed out that it was making the same bonus avail-
able for other unions. No such change in the Company 's offer had ever been requested
by the Union . When the offer was made , Moore indicated that he did not expect the
Union : to accept it because "you are going to the convention." , One of the tacks
thereafter taken in the Company 's communication program was that the IUE leader-
ship, by deliberately "stalling" negotiations because it assertedly wanted , a strike, was
depriving employees of the advantages of an early settlement.
The parties agreed when the IUE-GE negotiations were originally scheduled-that
there were - to be no meetings between September 8 and 20 because of the conflicting
IUE convention . Nevertheless , on September 8, the Company suggested the continua-
tion of negotiating meetings - during the convention -period. In a "Dear , Employee"
letter teletyped that day for use by ERM's, as well as in subsequent employee com-
munications , the Company made capital of the "cold reception " it received to its
suggestion for continued meetings Neither that letter nor_ earlier communications
mentioned , however, that on August 31 the Union had asked for meetings 5 days a
week but that the Company had then declined to modify the original schedule. Nor
did the letter mention that on August 31, Callahan had suggested extra meetings begin-
ning on September 19. .
L. The revision of GE's offer to include holiday-vacation options
After the Union made its offer , several members of the Union's negotiating'com-
mittee from old-line plants mentioned the importance which employees at their loca-
tions attached to the Union's demand for'an added holiday . and for a fourth week of
vacation for 20-year service employees . The Company indicated its interest in that
demand from the outset and. indicated a willingness -to listen to any "within-the-
framework" proposal the Union might , have relating to vacations and holidays. The
Union's negotiating committee , however, continued throughout this period to insist
that the holiday and vacation improvements be added to the offer. In the meantime,
the Company through its two-way employee communication channels began to get
"feedbacks" of employee reactions to its offer . These indicated that among employees
in old -line plants the holiday-vacation demand was a matter of special concern and
that there was considerable interest among such employees in working out an eighth
m The Respondent contends in its brief that during this period , It changed Its offer
in some five respects But this contention does not withstand the test of scrutiny. One
of the alleged " changes"-the inclusion of the reopener provision-formed part of the
August , 30 offer, and was, moreover , never requested by the Union . Three others-In-
elusion of the cost-of -living adders to the base rate and the transfer of the R & R and
IEA provisions from the pension and Insurance agreement to the national agreement-
have been adverted to above As has been seen, these did not Involve any act'ual'changes
at all The fifth-the Company 's assurance that seniority would be considered a factor
in selecting employees for retraining-also adverted to above-was by the Company's
own account not a change but simply a clarification of the Company 's original position.
Moreover , it failed to meet ' the Union 's basic objection that without arbitrability of
grievances employee seniority rights could not be adequately safeguarded. Another
change-the so -called exclusion K modification-is placed by the Respondent in a later
period although ' it more likely occurred during the early September meetings. That
change will be considered in a subsequent subsection of this report.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 233
holiday and fourth week of vacation in lieu of part of the wage increase . On Septem-
ber 7, and again on September 8, the Company invited a proposal from the Union to
have holiday and vacation improvements substituted for part of the wage increase.52
But the Union stated bluntly that it was unwilling to consider any such substitution,
explaining that it regarded the wage offer too low as it was. That was where the
matter rested when negotiations suspended for the IUE convention on September 8.
Notwithstanding the Union 's clearly expressed position on the subject , Moore, on
the morning of November 9 telephoned Callahan at his home to advise him that the
Company was offering the Union the option , of substituting an additional holiday and
a fourth week of vacation for employees with 25 years ' service in exchange for 1
percent of the 4 percent wage increase proposed to take effect on April 2, 1962.
Moore then also declared or at least clearly intimated that the option might also be
taken by the Union on a local-by-local basis.53 , The Company about the same time
also revised its offer to other unions to provide for the same option . 54 The informal
submission of the vacation -holiday option proposals was publicized to employees
almost at once , without waiting for negotiations to resume . In some of,its employee
communications the Company stressed that the options were being offered as a direct
consequence of employee reactions to its original offer. Thus the following
appears from script , in evidence , of a Schenectady GE television commercial on
September 13:
[Announcer]: Over the years , Schenectady General Electric has been trying to
develop a relationship with its employees which simply stated means that the
Company tries to be as responsive as it can to the real needs of its people. A
good example took place a couple of weeks ago when General Electric made a
proposal to the unions with which it is trying to negotiate new contract settle-
ments. The proposal was a good one. But, during the.course of explaining it
to union employees at Schenectady General Electric, it became clear that many
of these people would rather see the proposal revised . As a result , the Company
responded late last week with an alternate proposal . as the basis for a contract
settlement . Let's discuss this proposal with Robert J . Buckley, manager of Union
Relations at General Electric .... Bob, what was wrong with the initial proposal
made by General Electric?
BUCKLEY: Bill, there's nothing "wrong " with the offer we made. It's just
that many of our union employees told us they would rather have some other
things in the place of a wage increase.
M. The resolution at the IUE convention for a September 25 vote on the
recommendations of the negotiating committee
At the IUE convention held at Miami Beach between September 12' and 15, Carey
and other speakers sharply attacked GE and its asserted bargaining and other policies.
The IUE-GE bargaining committee in a report to the convention criticized the Com-
pany's proposal and charged the Company with pursuing a "take-it-or-leave-it" bar-
gaining approach . The report in effect recommended rejection of The GE proposal
6'' On September 7, also, Moore , following up a remark by the Schenectady delegate,
indicated the Company 's amenability to having this worked out on a local option basis
But Callahan , the IUE-GE Conference Board chairman , made it clear that the Union
bargained nationally and was not interested in local options
On this point there is a slight variance between , Callahan ' s and Moore's'testimony.
Callahan testified that the local-by-local option ' was unequivocally offered at the time
Moore, on the other band , testified that he said the Company was "thinking about a local
by local option ," but that he did not actually make that offer until some time later.
54 The annual cost of the extra holiday was the equivalent of about a 0 4 percent wage
increase Approximately , 10 percent of the employees had 25 ' years' service or more.
The annual cost of the proposed vacation improvement was thus'the equivalent of a 02
percent increase under the national option . Under the local -by-local option it was ex-
pectably somewhat higher because of the element of adverse selection involved. ' In either
case on a 3-year basis, the options offered were slightly more expensive to the Company
than the 1 percent in wages imposed as their price . This is so because the holiday and
vacations would have gone into - effect immediately whereas the compensating wage reduc-
tion would not have been applicable until the mid-point of the contract'. However, on a
long term basis , assuming a carryover beyond the contract term, the options were worth
less than the 1 percent in wages required to be forfeited.
234 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in its then present form. The'report further recommended that a Conference Board
meeting be held in New York City on September 30, following further negotiations, to
vote on whether to accept an agreement or call a strike. The IUE negotiating com-
mittee adopted the following resolution, which was approved at a meeting of the GE
delegates attending the IUE convention:
All locals which have not yet voted must vote on the recommendations of the
Negotiating Committee on [Sunday] September 25.
N. GE's reaction to the Union's call for a vote
1. Introduction
The IUE constitution empowers its GE Conference Board alone to determine
whether or not a strike should be called against the Company. Under the Union's
official view, the local balloting was to be mformative only, for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the employees favored acceptance or rejection of the Company's pro-
posal. The Company, however, chose to take a different view. In its union relations
bulletin,55 dated September 21, GE summed up its appraisal of the situation-as of that
time, as follows:
In Employees' Hands
The question of whether there will be a strike is squarely in the hands of
employees. Despite Carey's dark predictions in Miami last week that local votes
are purely "informative" in nature, and that the "strike-no strike decision will
be made by the Conference Board, we firmly believe that the Conference Board
will not be so foolish as to call a strike in the event of a wide-spread "no strike"
vote by the members back home.
And so the real scene of negotiations shifts from New York to all the IUE-
represented plants. The eventual outcome will be decided there-quite properly
-and quite soon. [Emphasis supplied.]
During the 2 weeks following the announcement of the local votes, the Company
directed its energies in an all-out effort to assure that the "outcome" at the plant loca-
tions would be decided its way. Below is a general description of the various steps
it took.
2. GE attempts to induce local officials and employees to alter the time and
place of voting and the question to be voted on
Almost immediately after the Union announced that local votes would be taken,
GE loosed an attack on the Union's, election plans. In communications directed to
employees and plant communities, GE characterized the local votes as simply a further
step in Carey's plan to "steamroller" employees into a strike against GE in order to
further his personal, political ambitions. The communications charged that the local
votes had been scheduled to be "held away from the plant and on a Sunday so that
only local supporters will cast ballots," and that the ballots would be worded so that'
employees who did "make an extra effort to show up would not know what they
were voting for."
On or about September 1`5, the ERM's or other responsible plant officials at most
of GE's locations, acting at the suggestion of New York headquarters, sent open
letters to the top IUE local officials at their respective locations. It was stipulated
that the content of all letters was to the same general effect as in a sample letter in
evidence. The letters stated that just as GE employees "have a, right to strike if'that
Is what they really believe is their only alternative," so, too, the Company has the
"right to take a strike." However-the letters went on-such a strike, should it occur,
was likely, to be a long one that would be "just plain disastrous" for the employees as
well as for the community, and one, therefore; that should not be resorted to unless
"it unquestionably has the support of the vast majority of employees." Consequently,
and "in order to encourage a maximum turnout for this important decision," GE was
proposing to the local officials that: (a) the strike vote announced for Sunday, Sep-
tember 25, be conducted instead on the preceding Friday or following Monday on
company time and premises; (b) as an alternative, should the local object to a vote
on company premises, the vote be held at a nearby outside site to be obtained by the
Company, with the Company paying for 'all necessary transportation as'well'as for
employee time lost in voting; (c) the vote be taken by secret ballot under the super-
es The union relations bulletin was prepared under the supervision of Moore "for in-
formation of all [GE] management."
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 235
vision of impartial outsiders -and on the basis of eligibility lists prepared from current
company records; and (d)-a point particularly stressed-the ballot question be
framed in clear-cut language so that employees would clearly understand that it was
an actual strike vote and not something else, as, for example, a vote "to support the
Union and strike if necessary."
The Company did not, prior to, sending the aforesaid letters, nor thereafter, consult
with or attempt to obtain the approval of the Conference Board's negotiating com-
mittee with respect to the proposals made.
With possibly a few exceptions, the IUE locals declined to accept the proposal made
by the Company with regard to the local voting. Later that same week-as appears
from the same stipulation-the Company addressed letters directly to the IUE-
represented employees informing them of the proposals it had made to their local.
The letters pointed out that the local's "first reaction" was "not favorable" but that
the Company still hoped that the local "which should reflect the views of its members,"
would reconsider the matter if, as was suggested, the employees urged their local
officers to do so. The letters stressed that it would be more convenient for the em-
ployees to vote during regular working hours with no loss of pay, rather than on a
Sunday, and also pointed out that one IUE local had already accepted the Company's
proposal. In the same letters, the Company suggested that the question of a strike
had suddenly been "thrust upon" employees by the Union for reasons unrelated to
the employees' interests. The letters stated (inaccurately) that the Company had
offered three alternative proposals "in,response to suggestions from the negotiating
committee," but that "just as it'appeared that progress was being made," the Union's
negotiating committee had departed for a full week's convention in Miami. There-
the letters went on, again inaccurately-"700 delegates ... had directed that locals
conduct a vote on Sunday, September 25," and "85% of [such] delegates ... were
from companies ... [which] are direct competitors of some General Electric compo-
nent." The offer made by the Company, the letters emphasized, was "within the
limitations imposed by the bitter competitive situation which the Company faces."
The "major impact" of a strike, it pointed out, would "be on individual employees
and their families." The Company would suffer too, "but lost customers can only
mean lost jobs as well."
Through additional communications to employees, as well as through press re-
leases and newspaper ads, the Company further sought to build up a ground swell of
employee and community sentiment to force local acceptance of the Company's pro-
posal as to the time, place, and conditions of the local votes.
On September 20, when formal negotiations resumed, the Union complained of the
Company's "election interference" and announced, "The Union rejects ... [the Com-
pany's proposals for local voting] nationally." The Company nevertheless thereafter
continued its efforts along the lines aforementioned.
3. GE announces to employees that its offer is now final and reiterates its policy
not to make concessions because of a strike or threat of strike
As noted above, the Company had criticized the Union's negotiating committee for
suspending negotiations for the IUE convention, implying to employees that but for
such suspension progress might have been made in the negotiations. However, follow-
ing the announcement of the local votes, the Company, without waiting for negotia-
tions to resume, took steps to impress upon employees that its full offer was now on
the table and that the employees could expect to gain nothing more by reason of a
strike or threat of strike.
Thus in a teletype, dated September 16, 1960, GE headquarters suggested to ERM's
that they construct their communications to employees around several "major points."
Two of them were:
The Company has offered everything that appears to be right in view of the
facts revealed by our own independent studies, our negotiations with union repre-
sentatives and today's highly competitive business situation.
The Company will not "up" the offer because of strike threats or strike action.
Appended to the teletype was the text of a suggested letter to be "mailed to employees
homes this afternoon or this evening." The letter stated in part:
The Company's proposal is on the table, and no one should be fooled into
thinking that a strike threat, or a strike itself will add more to the proposal. It
never has in the past, and it won't now.56
w This letter was mailed to employees' homes that day as suggested at least at some
locations.
236 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
,On September - 19, GE headquarters sent the ERM 's a "Dear Employee" letter in
Negotiation News format for release the following day when negotiations were to
resume. The letter , subsequently - used at plant locations , stated in part:
At some locations it is reported that union officials are manufacturing a rumor
that the Company can be persuaded .to come up with some new proposal if em-
ployees will only show enough strike sentiment . It is doubtful that many' em-
ployees will be misled into ' thinking that the Company would be indulging in
last minute haggling. It is generally, well understood by the union official 's across
the bargaining table that the Company is not holding anything back and that
the whole offer is now on the table. [Emphasis supplied.]
When negotiations resumed on September 20,,the Company advised the Union that
its full offer was now on the table. "Come October 2 , Thanksgiving , Christmas, and
Easter , it won 't be any different ," declared Moore . At almost each negotiating meet-
ing thereafter , the Company made statements of similar import. The finality of the
position taken by the , Company at the bargaining table was repeatedly reported to
employees . One further example should suffice. The following is, from asuggested
employee letter in Negotiation News format , dated September 21, and thereafter pub-
lished at plant locations:
We closed , by saying again, that everything that we are going to propose is on
the bargaining table now, and there is simply nothing more to 'come.... It has
become apparent that all the facts are in ... and that we have gone as far as
we can go without endangering the jobs of employees.
The repeated references to the finality of the offer , not only in written employee
communications , but, as the record shows, also in oral communications by super-
visors, , were coupled throughout the remaining period of negotiations with declarations
pointing up the inevitable futility of a strike, regardless of its duration ; in the light of
the Company 's policy not to give more simply to avert a strike. Again one example
should suffice. ' The general manager of the Bridgeport plant in a letter to employees,
dated September 21, stated: ,
Recently, a few questions have come to my attention as to why we modified our
wage offer by offering an alternative extra holiday and fourth week of vacation.
Actually, the optional proposal simply represents a rearrangement of our original
offer and not something that was added to the Company offer. I mention this so
that there can be no misunderstanding as to whether'a strike threat ; or a strike
'itself, will add more to the Company proposal than is now on the table. It never
has in the 'past, and it won't now.
4. GE intensifies its attack upon the motives of,IUE 's leadership
As earlier noted , the Company in its communications ' to employees had suggested
right along, beginning even before the start of negotiations , that the IUE top leader-
ship, particularly Carey, was determined to strike GE in 1960 for reasons unrelated
to the interests of the employees and regardless of the fairness of the Company's
proposal . The employee communications began to concentrate sharply on this theme
about the time the negotiations recessed for' the convention . 'While the convention
was in progress , and even more so after the announcement of the local votes, the
Company's attacks upon Carey mounted in volume and vigor.
The employees were told,-inter alia, that Carey never had any intent of reaching a
peaceful settlement with the Company ; that he was not sincerely concerned with the
'employees ' interests but only with his personal and political ambition ; that Carey,
in furtherance of his ambition and in reckless disregard bf employee interests, was
determined to obtain a strike come what may; that to assure a strike he had come up
with a "set of demands so fantastic-that no company could possibly , agree to them
without driving itself out of business and employees out of -jobs"; that toward that
end he had stalled negotiations , had deliberately avoided reaching an agreement, and
had finally broken off negotiations completely to "attend - a union convention in a
plush Miami hotel '-'; that he had set in motion a "strike steamroller " at the IUE con-
vention with the aid and support of delegates representing employees of competing
companies whose employees would profit at the expense of GE employees ' job security
should a strike occur; that now he was trying to "sneak" through by a Sunday vote a
quick "no contract-no work" vote which could only lead to a 156-day Westinghouse-
type of strike doomed for failure; that he was willfully misleading employees into a
false assumption that the Company was holding something back, that it might yield
'GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY" 237
in, a'strike; that with Carey at the bargaining table there was no hope for any real
attempt to reach agreement by the Union; that there was was no more the Company
could do to prevent a strike; and that only the employees themselves could prevent
a'lohg Carey-dictated strike.
5. GE makes its offer effective'for nonrepresented employees
Reference has earlier been made to the Company's practice, under its uniformity
policy of putting into effect for nonrepresented employees the wage and benefit im-
provements contained in its basic offer to unions. ;Prior to 1960, however, the Com-
pany had always withheld such action until either the effective date of its new agree-
ment with the IUE or the terminal date of the old.IUE contract, that is, the date, that
would correspond to October 2 in the instant case. In 1960, the Company at some
of its locations, while presenting to nonrepresented employees the details of its pro-
posal,to the unions, had advised them that the program would be put into effect for
ithem on October 2, with, as was stated at one plant, any modification that "may
arise after further study."
Contrary to past practice, the Company in 1960, decided to accelerate the effective
date-for nonrepresented employees. The decision to;do so was made after consulta-
tion with Moore about September 18 or 19. On September 20, GE headquarters by
letter authorized operating managers to make effective for nonrepresented employees,
as of September 12 if they desired, the 3-percent first-phase wage increase as provided
for in the Company's offer to unions, and, in addition, to announce the changes in
employee benefit plans which were to be effective October 2, 1960, including the
improvements in the insurance plan and ; the new income extension aid plan.57 It
was suggested, however, that changes in other benefits such as pensions,, vacations, and
holidays "be announced at a later date, when a clear picture emerges with respect to
the application of the various options." Under the Company's proposal, the pension
changes were not to be applicable until January 1,, 1961. Nevertheless, on either
September 22 or 23-only 2 days or so after suggesting that such announcement be
withheld-the,Company proceeded to' announce that the pension changes were being
put into effect for nonrepresented employees. Moore at the negotiating meeting of
September- 22'advised Carey of the Company's intention to make the announcement
that day. The following colloquy then occurred:
CAREY: Mr.' Moore, don't you think that will inhibit you from making any
modification to the arrangements that you proposed for us. , : •
,MOORE: It is a factor that we have to take into consideration. , , J
It will be recalled that GE Vice President Day testified in substance that once GE
has put into effect a pension plan for other bargaining units or for nonrepresented
employees, the freedom of negotiators to negotiate variances therein for other units
is, curbed. -
'Moore testified that his reasons for recommending that the wage and benefit im-
provements 'be put. into effect at that-time for nonrepresented employees were four-
fold: -(a) The Company's offer to the unions had been public knowledge for 3 weeks;
(b) it seemed evident at that time that, an agreement with the IUE was not imminent; 58
(c) the Company was getting "a considerable amount of pressure from [its] operating
'people-as to when'they could be in'a position to tell the nonrepresented employees
what -improvement in wages, benefits were in store for them and when they would
be effective"; and (d) the Company had begun to receive acceptance of its proposal
from other unions. . (Actually, as the record shows, the Company up to then had
received acceptances' from only 9 local unions representing ' a total of 845 employees
out of about 120,000 union-represented employees.) ` -
' The reasons given by Moore are not persuasive. Those listed above as (a) and (b)
are complete' non sequiturs to the critical question of why the 'Company thought it
desirable to depart from past practice to accelerate effectiveness for nonrepresented
employees. The reason cited as (c) I find wholly unconvincing. Not only was it
not buttressed by detail, but no- reason appears why "pressure" could not just as easily
have been relieved by telling the operating managers that•the effective date would be
October 1; in accordance with past practice, as; indeed, the record shows some of
the operating managers had already told nonrepresented employees. ` It does not ex-
57The record shows that at substantially all'GE^locations'the' 3-percent increase was
actually made effective for nonrepresented employees as of September 12.
51 But Moore could not recall this reason on cross-examination.
238 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
plain the need for acceleration . 59 As for reason ( d), the connection between this and
the decision to deviate from established custom is not apparent , and was not clarified
by Moore while testifying . Even if it be assumed that the Company considered it
unfair to deprive nonrepresented employees of wage increments already available to
even a handful of organized employees , this would not explain why the Company
considered it necessary to accelerate announcements of other benefits which, as in
the case of the insured benefits and income extension aid, was not to be operative
in any event until October 2, or, as in the case of pension changes, would have to
await the turn of the year for their effectiveness.
The General Counsel and the Union suggest that the Company 's true motivation
for accelerating the announcement was to influence union employees to press for
union acceptance of the Company 's offer, by proving to them that the Company's
position was already frozen, while at the same time demonstrating to them that the
IUE's reluctance and failure to accept the company proposals was depriving them
of immediate benefits. I am persuaded that the suggested inference is fairly. war-
ranted, taking into account ( a) the inadequacy of the Company 's explanation; (b)
the fact that the Company had just launched a vigorous campaign to get employee
support in the upcoming votes on its offer; and (c) GE's representations as part of
that campaign that the Company 's full offer was on the table and that nothing could
be gained by strike action . It is to be recalled , moreover , that among the communica-
tion topics prepared by the Company months before for the 1960 negotiations was
this: -"Show how employees not represented by unions get their wages and benefits
improvements without possible delay of waiting for union acceptance ." This not
only confirms the inference drawn above, but it shows that the acceleration action
designed to influence directly employee attitudes ' was part of the Company 's precon-
ceived bargaining approach.
6. GE in its communications emphasizes danger to employee job security
if its offer were enlarged or if a strike ensued
Note has already been made of the great mass of employee communications to
which GE employees were subjected during the period following the IUE conven-
tion , as well as of the apparent purpose of the communications to impair employee
faith and confidence in the motives of the IUE top leadership , to induce a form of
vote more to the Company's liking, and to impress upon employees the finality of
the Company 's position and the futility of strike action.
During the same period , the Company in its communications continued to plug
hard on the merits of the company offer. The communications did not always con-
fine themselves to arguments that had been presented to the union negotiators. In
some instances the Company elaborated its arguments far more fully to employees
than it had at the bargaining table. In some others , the Company presented argu-
ments to employees that it had not presented at all to the union negotiators. The
following situation at Lynn presents an extreme example. At Lynn , local manage-
ment had sought to meet with representatives of the local union to discuss with them
the local management 's contemplated application at Lynn of the Company 's proposed
retraining and reassignment program. The avowed object of the proposed meetings
was to persuade the local that the Company 's proposed retraining program , as well
as its employment security program , generally, offered particular advantages to
Lynn employees and should be accepted . The local , however, refused to meet sep-
arately with the Company for that purpose, taking the position that local discussions
at that time on retraining and employment security were improper and premature
• since the subjects were then under negotiation at the national level . Any proposals
Lynn management cared to offer on those subjects , the local stated, should be sub-
mitted to the national negotiators . The local adhered to that position notwithstanding
several attempts by local management to obtain a meeting . Unsuccessful in its efforts
0
ce When this was pointed out to Moore , on cross-examination, Moore testified that the
earlier representations to employees were not enough to relieve the "pressure " because
the employees had been told they would have the benefits of the proposal "plus whatever
may further come out of negotiations " and therefore did not have "the details of what
would be effective ," a matter on which "they retained a high degree of interest." But
this answer , if taken at face value , simply confirms the General Counsel 's thesis that_the
acceleration was a "freezing" action, precluding bargaining flexibility thereafter. .
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 239
to meet with local officials , Lynn management proceeded to go directly to the em-
ployees. On September 19, the GE News at Lynn devoted three of its four pages
to a detailed discussion of its local plans for retraining and makeup that it had wanted
to discuss with the local union . The discussion pointed up the advantages to em-
ployees of the Company 's proposed program . The last page of the GE News con-
tained an editorial charging that "Top IUE officials, aided by a few local union
officers," were "trying to railroad Lynn employees into participating in a strike." The
editorial also sharply criticized the local officers for "trying to shut out the member-
ship from learning how the retraining and makeup proposal could be worked out
locally."
The Company 's employee communications during this period emphasized particu-
larly that GE had gone as far as it could without endangering its own competitive
position and the security of employee jobs. For example , in Schenectady , on Sep-
tember 20 , GE Vice President Ginn in a television address, printed the next day in
the GE News , declared:
Even without the threat of a strike , Schenectady departments are in a competitive
fight for their lives. The way you vote ... could go a long way toward deciding
whether your department has an even chance in this fight....
In Philadelphia , the Company on September 20 wrote each "Dear Fellow Employee"
that any improvement in the Company 's offer involving any additional cost would
"result in fewer jobs here." And in the same plant, on September 23, the general
manager of the switchgear division stated in a message to employees that in view
of increasing competition the decision the IUE members made "may well determine
the future of our switchgear business."
In discussing bargaining issues with employees , the Company did not always adhere
to the positions expressed by its negotiators at the bargaining table. Thus, it will be
recalled that when the IUE negotiators at the negotiation meetings sought to ascertain
the cost of a fourth week of vacation for 20 -year service people, the Company took
the position that costs were irrelevant , declaring that it negotiated solely on the basis
of "level of benefits" and what was the appropriate thing to do. However, A. C.
Stevens, Schenectady 's ERM , in a talk to employees on September 21, stated in part:
I know there's a lot of talk going around the shop that the whole proposition
looks pretty good and would be ok if the Company would just make the 4 weeks'
vacation available to people after 20 years' service . But the difference represents
a very sizeable increase in cost . . . and we just don't dare incur the extra cost
with the uncertain future that faces us at this time ... there 's a limit beyond
which we don't dare go at this time without jeopardizing the future of our busi-
ness and the very jobs we're trying to make more secure.
In addition , the Company in its communications and local advertisements repeat-
edly warned the employees and the communities that a vote against the company
offer-which it always referred to as a vote to strike-would jeopardize employee
jobs and inflict serious harm upon the communities . The warnings , with few excep-
tions, were couched in the language of general predictions as to asserted permanent
losses of business that would flow from a strike . But the constant repetition of this
theme and the manner of its presentation quite clearly reflect a purposeful design to
play on employee fears and insecurities . Pittsfield serves as an example . At that
location , a GE advertisement in the Pittsfield Berkshire Eagle for September 21 in-
cluded the following statement:
If our employees vote to strike next week they could seriously jeopardize their
job security-and jobs-for months and/or even years to come.
Another full -page advertisement in the same newspaper the following day stated that:
If members of IUE vote Sunday to strike General Electric they will most cer-
tainly jeopardize the welfare of their families and their communities for years
to come. A vote to strike would also jeopardize General Electric 's jobs in
Pittsfield in the future.
The next day a full-page display in the Pittsfield GE News stated:
Make your vote count Sunday ! If you vote for a strike ... you will jeopardize
your pay, your families' welfare and your job. _
775-692-65-vol. 150-17
240 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In a press-radio release 1 day-later, Pittsfield management stated:
General Electric's Power Transformer Department will automatically be ex-
cluded from bidding on 30 to 45 transformer transactions each month if a strike
occurs at the local plant.
No reason was stated for the alleged automatic exclusion.60
- At some plants, the Company's warnings were most specific. Thus, at Waterford
the manufacturing manager in a letter to employees, dated September 16, stated that
the "strike" vote,
. represents a fork in the road in determining our plant's future. It may
well determine whether it will keep on growing .,.. a strike would wipe out
indefinitely all of the 75 new jobs created ... since ... 1958. It would also bring
about a direct reversal of promotions. and result in a great many downgradings
'in reassignment. [Emphasis supplied.]
On September 22-after the Waterford employees had voted to reject the offer-the
Waterford general manager in a letter to employees termed those who voted for a
strike as "voting to destroy the business," also repeating in that letter that "the offer
will not be changed by a strike threat." At Waterford, also, the Company sought to
bring secondary pressures to bear on employees. On September 26, the local man-
agement sent a letter to "community neighbors." The letter enclosed a list of GE
employees residing in the "neighbor's" community. It suggested' that the neighbor
"contact personally any of our employees whom you know and have them impress
the seriousness of the situation on their union leaders." The letter emphasized that
"many hundreds of local jobs [are] at stake" with a potentially harmful effect on com-
munity business.
At one of the Company's largest and oldest plants-Lynn-foremen warned em-
ployees that there was a serious possibility that a strike might cause GE top manage-
ment to close down the Lynn plant entirely. In a management newsletter, dated Sep-
tember '22, the supervisors were given a "message" headed "Lynn Hangs in the Bal-
ance," which they were told "you should get across to IUE members to-day." The
message stated in part:
But there is more at stake than just a long strike.... As you know the Com-
pany has more and more in recent years looked to the south and the west for
its growth and expansion.... General Electric has not forsaken its old-line plants.
. Despite the greater costs, it has maintained respectable employment levels
and has continued to invest money in them. '
But it just does not make sense to continue to invest money in the older plants
when they may, upon the whims of union officials, be shut down at any moment.
... There is no reason why the Company should continue to keep all its eggs in
several large baskets-unless employees and management can demonstrate that
they, are, willing to compete with newer locations.... But we can very frankly
see all our, efforts going down the drain if we are struck by the very employees
toward whom the 1960 contract is specifically aimed.
So, as Lynn IUE members come up to the day of decision on their strike vote,
they are, in a very real sense, voting upon their futures ... a pro strike vote ...
will have disastrous consequences that reach far beyond a strike itself.
Credited testimony in the record reflects that about this time foremen at Lynn were
speaking to employees and telling them that the Company's offer was a good one
that should be accepted; that it would be "crazy" for employees to strike; that a strike
would cause the Company to move out of Lynn.sl
60 Moreover, the manager of union relations at Pittsfield admitted while testifying that
during this period he engaged plant employees in conversations in which he told them
that ,a strike could result in loss of Government contracts and consequent loss of em-
ployee jobs.,
"The General Counsel's witnesses giving such testimony referred to two foremen
specifically. One of them was no longer in the Respondent's employ at the time of the
hearing. The other, who appeared as a witness, testified at first that he could not "recall"
making the statements, but, later conceded that he might have told the employees it would
be "crazy" for them to strike. Although he did not concede saying anything about plant
removal, I think it entirely plausible that he did make such statements, as the General
Counsel's witnesses testified, in view of the newsletter referred to above. I find
accordingly.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 241
Also at Lynn on September 22, the Company in a plant newspaper told employees,
in its aircraft accessory turbine department that before making up their minds on'
the company offer and the union strike vote, employees should consider, inter alia, that
Right-now these old line plants are under a severe competitive handicap:- In
fact, the most severe handicap possible. We find it hard'to compete with newer
plants in our own company. We find it harder to'compete with newer plants of
our competitors. And we find it hardest to compete with foreign companies.
' All of us can look around and see that 'much heavy industry is disappearing
from New England.... A strike may not put the old plants out of business-
but it sure will make the job of keeping them competitive a lot'more difficult.
0. Negotiating meetings between September 20 and October 1'
Negotiating meetings resumed September 20, following the recess for the IUE con-
vention. Under the schedule as originally agreed upon, negotiations were to continue
through September unless an agreement was earlier reached. Ten formal negotiating
meetings were held between September 20 and October 1, before the strike began.
During that period, there were also three so-called "sidebar" (informal) meetings,
to which more specific reference will be made below. Beginning .on September 21,
Federal mediators, who were called in at the request of the Union, attended the
formal meetings.
As earlier noted, GE advised the Union'on•September 20 that its full offer was
now on the table and would remain unchanged regardless of how long negotiations
continued. Throughout the period now under consideration, the Company constantly
reiterated that position.62 '
The Company asserts that it nevertheless did in fact negotiate "changes in or addi-
tions to" its original offer during the period under consideration, and cites four in
its brief. Two, however, did no more than provide for the furnishing of certain
information relating to the operations of the GE pension and insurance plans. The
information was of a kind that GE in the past had voluntarily furnished the-Union
and would. have been legally required to furnish on request even in the absence of
contractual covenant. The inclusion of the contractual requirement reflected simply
an-affirmation of 'an existing practice rather than, a "change" through negotiation.
The third asserted change involved a reduction in the amount which GE employees
on leave as union representatives had to pay to maintain their interest in, the GE,
pension plan. Under the IUE-GE union representatives pension agreement, a col-
lateral agreement , GE's entire cost of-maintaining the union representatives pension
plan'interests was billed to the Union. The Union, in its detailed,pension proposals
submitted on August 18, had requested, inter alia, that GE modify the agreement,
so as to compute the cost to the Union on the basis of the current actuarial assump-
tions rather than on the basis of the higher 1955 assumptions. The Company's offer
had made no reference to the union representatives pension agreement. Nor, -so far as,
appears, was this matter considered in negotiations at any time prior to September 21,
when it was collaterally raised -during a discussion of another pension issue., At
that time, Moore simply stated, "We reduced this [the cost of maintaining the union
representatives interest] by one-third, you know." Later, Willis, the Company's bene-
fits expert, made clear that the reduced amount was in line with the Company' s "esti-
mate" in rounded figures of what the actual cost would be during the new contract
term. It would appear from all the evidence that this item did not involve a nego-
tiated "change" or concession but simply an original declaration by the, Company
of its position.
The fourth asserted change relates to a provision in the insurance plan known as
exclusion K, also sometimes referred to as the "spouse" provision. That provision
barred recovery by employees of medical expenses incurred by dependents, or even
themselves, where coverage for such expenses was also provided for under another
62 For example, at the September 21 meeting, Moore, reading from a prepared statement,
declared, "`Everything we are going to propose is before you now. There is simply nothing
more to come " On September 22, when ,Carey asked whether there was any item in the
Company's proposal'that Moore could change, Moore replied, "Mr., Carey, ,I don't know
who you are used 'to dealing with, but you should know by now, that, the GE proposal
is on the table. It is here, Mr. Carey. That is all there is." Statements by Moore to
like effect are to be found interspersed throughout the negotiating minutes during this
period. .
242 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
group program.63 The Union in its original demands had requested the total elimina-
tion of exclusion K. The "spouse" provision was discussed at the meetings of Au-
gust 30 and September 1. The Union pointed out that under the GE insurance plan an
employee desiring to participate in any part of the insurance program-which pro-
vided for a number of other coverages besides medical care-had to participate in the
entire program. The Union complained that it was unfair to require an employee to
pay premiums for health insurance where benefits thereunder were precluded by ex-
clusion K. Subsequently the Union modified its demand on "spouse coverage" to state
specifically: "Provisions should be made whereby employees have the option of pur-
chasing the entire insurance and health program or the insurance program alone."
The negotiating minutes in evidence show no further mention of the "spouse" issue
at any time between September 1 and 26. It came up on September 26 in the follow-
ing way: The Union that day had submitted for the consideration of the mediators a
summary of the status of negotiations, listing, inter alia, the Union's revised "spouse"
demand as an outstanding issue. While reviewing the Union's summary, Willis for
the Company stated that the inclusion of the "spouse" demand as an outstanding
issue was in error. The Company, he explained, had earlier agreed to revise exclusion
K so as to make it inapplicable to situations where those insured under the other group
plan paid the entire premium cost without any employer contribution. The Com-
pany's revision of exclusion K was of limited application and of negligible cost to
the Company on a per employee basis. Though the revision did not meet its basic
objection, the Union considered it a good improvement over the former exclusion K
and did not press its position on the "spouse issue" further. The Respondent states in
its brief that the exclusion K modification was effected on September 26. It is evi-
dent from what has been said above, however, that the Company must have changed
its offer in that respect sometime earlier, but just when-whether before or after
September 20-the record does not show 64
In any case, it is clear that the Company did not regard any of the aforesaid changes,
when made, as a matter of any significance. They were never so much as mentioned
in employee communications or in outside releases during the entire period of nego-
tiations. In a teletype issued on October 2, GE, answering a New York Times article
which had characterized its attitude as being "take-it-or-leave-it," referred to the
various changes which, so it stated, had been "made in direct response to declarations
of the union bargaining committee." The only ones listed were (1) the wage re-
opener, (2) the holiday-vacation option, on a national basis, and (3) the holiday-
vacation option on a local-by-local basis.65
During the period in question, the Union indicated its willingness further to reduce
or modify some of its proposals and suggested compromise solutions as to others.
Except for the two information "changes" noted above, all union-suggested revisions
were summarily rejected.
The Company's attitude at this stage of the negotiations is pointed up by its position
on retraining and reassignment. Prior to the IUE convention, the Company had
03 For example, if a GE female employee's husband working for another company was
a participant at the other company in a group plan providing medical coverage for him-
self and his spouse, the GE employee could not claim benefits for medical expenses in-
curred either by her spouse or herself even though she paid for the GE insurance. However,
if the husband had an individual policy which provided coverage for his wife, the GE
employee could recover for such medical expenses even though the husband also separately
recovered under his own policy.
"This view is confirmed by other evidence. In the Company's teletype report of the
day's negotiations, the Company characterized the day's session as "fruitless," making no
mention of the revision. Moreover, at the meeting of September 29, Swire, who had not
been present on the 26th, expressed surprise over the exclusion K change, explaining
that "the [Union] committee said we did not hear it across the table." Moore replied,
"I thought this was covered across the table very thoroughly, in fact I went to the trouble
of making it very clear to Mr. Lawalin." If so, this must have been before the 26th,
because Lawalin, a union committeeman, was not present on the 26th. Bearing in mind
that Moore had announced on September 20 that there would be no further changes in the
offer and that the Union had not pressed its "spouse" demand in the interim, there is
reason to infer that the exclusion K revision occurred prior to September 20. Further
support for such an inference is found in a statement by Moore at a subsequent meeting
that GE 's position "hasn 't changed and will not change under threat of a strike."
OsActually , as has been seen , none of these were requested by the Union's bargaining
committee.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 243
implied a willingness to drop the R & R provision from the national agreement if
that were the Union's wish. The Union had then stated that it did not want the
provisions dropped altogether, but wanted it "fixed" to meet its specific objections.
This the Respondent had not done to the Union's satisfaction. After the resumption
of negotiations, the Union several times requested that the R & R be kept out of the
national agreement and be left entirely for local negotiations.66 But the Company
now refused. It continued thereafter to maintain that position until the Union's
strike capitulation. Then, when it could no longer be said that the Company had
been forced to yield by reason of a strike or threat of strike, the Company acceded
to the Union's request.
The Company also declined as it had done before to provide the Union with cost
or other information relevant to bargaining issues. On September 21, the Company
rejected a union request for a pension plan modification because of the cost involved.
But on the following day, when the Union requested the Company to specify the
difference in cost , the Company fell back on its familiar refrain, "We talk level of
benefits, not costs." On September 27, when the Union asked the Company for the
cost to it of the vacation-holiday option which the Company had offered at the price
of a 1-percent wage reduction, the Company declined the information, stating that it
did not make its offer on the basis of costs but on the basis of reasonableness. The
Company for the same reason declined to supply information as to the cost to it
of a fourth week of vacation extended to employees with 20 or more years' service.
But only a few days before the ERM at Schenectady had told employees that the
difference between a fourth week of vacation for employees with 25 years' service
and one for employees with 20 years' service was a "sizeable" one that the Company
did not dare incur without jeopardizing its business and the security of employee jobs.
On September 22, the Union by letter made a detailed written request for information
relating to various matters involved in the negotiations, including some of the informa-
tion that had previously been requested orally. The request was not complied with
until after the strike when the information was no longer of any value for negotiations,
and even then only in part. This particular aspect of the case, including the Com-
pany's specific defenses, will be considered in greater detail in a separate section of
this report, below.
The Company's avoidance of justifications for positions taken was also reflected in
other ways. Its stand on, pensions provides a good illustration. The Company's pen-
sion proposals provided, inter alia, that the guaranteed minimum monthly pensions
for each year of service were to be increased to $2.40 (from $2.25), with a second
stage increase to $2.50 on April 2, 1962, the midpoint of the proposed contract. The
raise from $2.25 to $2.40, however, was not to become effective until January 1, 1961.
The Union took the position from the outset that the effective dates of the new con-
tract and of the initial increment should coincide so as not to prejudice employees
retiring between the contract date and January 1, 1961. And in the course of time
that issue became the only obstacle to complete agreement on the pension aspect of
the contract. When the question first arose on September 1, the Company justified
the January 1 date on the asserted ground that it had always been its practice to effect
pension changes on the first of the year. That justification was dropped, however,
after the Union pointed out that in 1955 the effective date of the pension changes had
coincided with the new contract date. When the subject came up again on Septem-
ber 21, the Company indicated that its justification was related to costs. But on the
following day when the Union asked for the difference in costs between its proposed
effective date and the one proposed by the Company, Moore refused to provide the
information, declaring, "We don't talk costs. We talk level of-benefits." The Com-
pany declined to give any reason for fixing January 1 as the effective date, except to
say it considered that the "appropriate date" and the burden was on the Union to
convince the Company differently. When the Union asked why April 2, 1962, had
been set as the effective date for the second phase, Hilbert explained that it was the
midpoint of the contract when the wage structure was to be changed. The Union then
argued that by the same reasoning the initial increment should also coincide with the
first phase wage increase. At that point Hilbert declared that the Company would
"consider" doing so. During the afternoon session that same day, Carey referred to
Hilbert's earlier declaration and stated that with that issue out of the way the Union
now believed it had reached full agreement with the Company on pensions . Moore,
however, promptly repudiated Hilbert's expressed willingness to "consider" a change
0 The Company had stated from the beginning that the R & R plan would not be
utilized at any location unless a separate agreement with respect to its operations was
worked out between the local management and the local union.
244 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in the effective date. The Company, he said , was not "taking anything under advise-
ment for later consideration," even on a tentative basis. "We have everything there
is on the table," Moore added. The Company never did attempt to meet the Union's
argument on that issue. At the September 27 meeting, when the Union again asked
why the January 1 date was chosen, Hilbert stated, "You know it's the beginning of
the year and it's the time that you make all the resolutions for the New Year's and
all that." Willis' accompanying response was scarcely more illuminating. "We think
it is the appropriate date," was all he would say. Willis' laconic response was typical
of many others the Company made in response to union arguments during this period.
Perhaps the clearest revelation of the Company's bargaining frame of mind came
at the meeting on September 28. At the time there were still three scheduled negotiat-
ing meetings left before the contract was to expire. The Union had theretofore sev-
eral times reduced its demand for SUB in an effort to meet company objections. Its
last previous proposal had been rejected on the ground of costs. On September 28,
Jandreau, the Schenectady delegate on the IUE negotiating committee, suggested as a
possible solution "within the framework of the [Company's] costs" that the Company
provide an additional option (presumably on a local-by-local basis). Under it 1 per-
cent of the Company's proposed wage increase along with money available under
income extension aid would be used to set up a fund upon which employees might
draw to bring their unemployment compensation up to 50 percent of earnings. Jan-
dreau made it clear that the plan he proposed working out along those lines was not
to add to the costs of the Company's proposals. Jandreau's suggestion was rejected
by the Company. Later at the meeting the following colloquy occurred:
JANDREAU: Mr. Moore, can I ask a question? Is it possible to change the
company proposal one way or another? I ask this because you said to me and
McManus that this is it. It is all on the table. Is there any chance of changing
your position one iota?
MooRE: There are two things, Mr. Jandreau. After all our month of bar-
gaining and after telling the employees before they went to vote that this is it,
we would look ridiculous to change it at this late date; and secondly the answer
is no. We aren't changing anything come a strike or high water. [Emphasis
supplied.]
JANDREAU: There is no sense in being here.
MOORE: Unless there is anything you want us to hear. If you have some-
thing new or persuasive, persuade us.
CALLAHAN: You said you wouldn't change the proposal before, because of
the employees.
MooRES I said two things-one, that everything we think we should do is in
the proposal and we told the employees that, and we would look ridiculous if
we changed it.
Later, Hilbert adverted specifically to Jandreau's aforementioned suggestion for an
additional option within the framework of the Company's costs, and declared:
I think we are in the final stage of negotiations, and I think it is frivolous for
the union to make proposals for changes at this time in the nature of Mr. Jan-
dreau's. There would be three possible reasons why we would make a change
at this time. First, if we had intentionally held something back and if we had
done that and we revealed it now we would look foolish in the eyes of employees
and others.... Secondly, if we made a serious error, an inadvertent error in the
offer, and we have no such evidence of that, to warrant a change. Third, if we
were so frightened of a strike that we would change the offer just to avoid it and
then we would look even more foolish in the eyes of our people and of the
country. We don't think any of the three apply to this case. [Emphasis supplied.]
Later:
JANDREAU:. . I am not trying to build up a ratchet situation. I am trying
to work within the proposal.
HILBERT: I am not sure you are saying that seriously, Leo.
JANDREAU: I am speaking seriously and I am seeing whether you are following
Boulwareism or not.
HILBERT: What do you mean, Boulwareism?
JANDREAU: Your take it or leave it. Moore said that that is all and there isn't
any more, and you have just backed him up with your three types of reasons.
HILBERT: What other reasons could there be?
JANDREAU: Option 4 we put forth.
HILBERT : That falls into reason 3.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 245
The negotiating minutes and other evidence relating to this period do not bear out
GE's representations to employees that Carey was determined to force a strike on
GE, come what may. On the contrary, the record reflects that Carey, while unwilling
to capitulate to the Company's position, was anxious to open up some other avenue
that might possibly lead to a peaceful solution on terms more to his liking. J le
Company showed little inclination to aid him.
Carey had long complained-whether correctly or not is not in issue-that the
Company's principal negotiator,, Moore, lacked the requisite authority to deviate in
any significant way from GE's offer. On a number of occasions, Carey unsuccessfully
sought an opportunity to meet and confer with Vice President Parker, the GE officer
having primary responsibility in the area of labor relations. On September 26, the
mediators requested that such a meeting be arranged. In response, Moore stated
that Parker would meet with Carey that evening "if Carey wanted to hear from Mr;
Parker that that's all there was and that it [the full offer] was on the table." At the
sidebar meeting that evening-attended by Carey, Callahan, and Fitzmaurice for
the Union and by Parker, Ritter, and Moore for the Company-Parker declined,to
do any more than state what Moore had said he would state. When Carey sought
to discuss with him some of the issues in dispute, Parker refused to be drawn into
any such discussion, declaring that that was not a negotiating session. He told Carey
that "as far as the Company is concerned, we have no more to offer, but if you want
to talk about it at the bargaining table you go ahead and do it." Parker's assertion
that the Company's offer would not be changed was thereafter broadly publicized by
the Company to its employees as positive confirmation of the Company's earlier
declarations that employees could hope to gain nothing further through strike action.
Also at the sidebar meeting on September 26, Carey specifically proposed that the
six people then meeting should spend some time in an effort to hammer out some
agreement in principle. Carey explained that it was his experience that a meeting
of that nature was more conducive to the settlement of issues than larger meetings
of the kind engaged in at formal negotiating meetings . The Company rejected Carey's
request. Moore at the hearing testified that his stated and actual objection to Carey Is
proposal for a reduced bargaining committee was his "sincere belief" that:
... collective bargaining takes place across the bargaining table with the full
committee and is not to take place at any sidebar meetings or with any side
deals not in full view of the public and the negotiating committee,on the union
side. [Emphasis supplied.]
On September 26, Carey in a letter to Ralph J. Cordiner, chairman of the GE
board, proposed that the issues between the parties be submitted to either (1) a fact-
finding board without authority to make binding recommendations, or (2) an arbitra-
tion board with power to make a binding award, the choice to be left to the Company.
The matter was referred to Moore who rejected the request, stating numerous reasons.
The reasons are not detailed here, because, contrary to the Union's contention, I do
not consider the Company's rejection of third party intervention as having evidentiary
value on the issue of whether the Company bargained in good faith. The Union's
request for such intervention is cited here only because of its-bearing on GE's repre-
sentations to employees concerning Carey's strike motives.
Cordiner in his direct reply to Carey's letter of September 20, while reasserting
that Moore had "full authority and responsibility" to represent the Company in its
negotiations with the Union, told Carey that Parker "as the senior officer in this
important area of responsibility" would continue to be "available for meetings, outside
the negotiations. On the strength of that statement Carey arranged further sidebar
meetings with Parker-also attended by others on each side-on September 29 and
October 1. These meetings took substantially the same course as the sidebar meeting
of September 26.
During the last days of September, as the contract's expiration date neared, the
Union sought an extension of the contract so that efforts to reach agreement might
continue without a strike. Prior to September,29, all of the Union's extension pro-
posals were tied to other requests, either that the Company arrange to have an officer,
participate in negotiations or that the Company consent to factfinding or arbitration.
The Union's extension proposals were "categorically" rejected by the Company, pri-
marily on the ground that it was the Union and not the Company that had elected to,
terminate the contract on its expiration date. The Company made it quite-clear
that it was opposed , even in the absence of conditions, to any contract extension, or,
for that matter, to any "delay in settling the strike question-one way or another."
At the September 29 formal negotiating meetings, the mediators proposed that the
parties continue to bargain without interruption of production and preserve the
246 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
"status quo" (which they explained contemplated the extension of the contract)
until a new agreement was reached . In a private session with the mediators the previ-
ous day, Carey had indicated his willingness to agree to an unconditional contract
extension . Both he and the mediators believed , however, that the chances of a
cordial reception by GE would be greater if the proposal came from the mediators
rather than from the Union , and if the Union were to withhold formal acceptance
until the Company replied . It had been arranged to proceed accordingly. When
the mediators on September 29 made the proposal , Carey immediately responded
that the union committee would withhold its reply until after it received the Company's
answer and had reported to the Conference Board. The Company, however, after
ascertaining that the proposal contemplated an extension of the contract , promptly
declared that its answer had already been given . The Company's reference was to
its "categorical" refusal at the bargaining session the day before to agree to any
extension beyond the contract 's expiration date. Though not so told at the meeting,
it appears that the Company was aware that the mediators ' proposal had the prior
blessing of the Union.67
Later in the session the Company formally declared its position as follows:
... we must point out that on October 1 the IUE agreement will terminate as a
result of notice given by the IUE to us several weeks ago . There will be no
extension of the contract beyond that termination date ... for 15 days, 10 days,
for five days or even one day. With that termination , the cost of living escalator
arrangement will terminate . In addition such matters as union dues checkoff,
pay to union officials for grievance time and superseniority for union officials
and related matters will have to be considered and reconsidered by us as they
will no longer be binding.... The current pay, seniority , pension and insurance
and other benefits will be continued in effect for all employees who report for
work.... [Emphasis supplied.]
At the opening of the September 30 session , Carey announced that the IUE-GE
Conference Board had adopted the recommendations of its negotiating committee
to reject GE's offer and to shut down GE plants on October 2 because of GE's refusal
to continue the contract.
On October 2, the strike began as scheduled , with only the Schenectady local
remaining at work.68
P. Alleged local bargaining; other events during the strike
1. Offer at Schenectady and Pittsfield of more favorable truce terms than
those theretofore offered the Union
In rejecting the truce proposal made on September 29, the Company stated it
would commit itself only to maintain in effect the then current pay and fringe
benefits for employees reporting to work after October 1. The Company made clear
that after October 1, it would regard its contractual obligations as having come to an
end. Among those which it specified it would thereafter regard as no longer binding
were "such matters as union dues checkoff , pay for union officials for grievance time
and superseniority for union officials." As to such union-related terms and condi-
tions, the Company stated that it would have to "consider " later whether or not and
under what circumstances the Company might retain them in effect.
The Company did not thereafter in the national negotiations say anything further
about what it proposed to do with regard to the union-related conditions until Octo-
ber 7 at the earliest , although there were several negotiating meetings in the interim.
In the meantime , on September 29-the very day the Company in national negotia-
tions expressed uncertainty on this point-a company consultant , acting pursuant to
a policy decision arrived at by Moore and his staff in New York , authorized Employee
Relations Manager Stevens of Schenectady to maintain in effect at that location,
provided that the employees there did not strike, all preexisting terms and conditions
of the expiring contract (except for the cost-of-living escalator ) including the union-
related and grievance-related conditions . On September 30, the Company announced
to its Schenectady employees that the plant would be open on Monday , that all pre-
existing practices , policies, pay rates, 'and benefits would continue in effect , and that
the Company would "continue to recognize all present local union relationships,
e7 This is apparent from a company teletype , dated October 1, wherein it was stated
that "he [Carey ] got the mediators to make a proposal for him to extend the contract."
68 Schenectady , however , joined the strike on October 6.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 247
including superseniority for shop stewards, the grievance procedure, etc." The Sche-
nectady IUE local had theretofore voted not to strike. No similar announcement was
made at that time at any other IUE-represented plant, except at Knolls Atomic Power
-Laboratory, a satellite of the Schenectady plant, also under the jurisdiction of ERM
Stevens.69
On October 3, Business Agent Leo Jandreau of the Schenectady local stated in a
message to the local membership that because of the Company's refusal to continue
the contract beyond October 1, 1960, "the contract provisions for grievance machinery,
protection covering working conditions, seniority, prices, wages and many other condi-
tions [including recognition of elected union representatives] can no longer be
enforced.' Jandreau recommended a "no contract-no work" course.
In evident response to Jandreau's message, ERM Stevens issued a statement to
members of the Schenectady local that same day, in which he declared the Com-
pany's intent to "commit" itself to retain in effect all "protections of the contract"
so long as the local was not on strike. Stevens that same day also made a similar
commitment to Jandreau-confirmed in a letter, dated October 4, reading as follows:
Dear Mr. Jandreau:
This is in response to your suggestion that I put on paper our agreement to
continue protections of the Company-Union contract which was terminated by
the International as of October 1, 1960. I am pleased to do so herewith:
We agree to extend to you protection of the recent contract, including griev-
ance machinery, protection covering working conditions, seniority, prices,
wage rates, and any other condition of employment recited in the contract.
Current cost-of-living adders will remain in effect. We will continue union
representation recognition as presently constituted and all the above will
remain in effect so long as we are not on strike.
Very truly yours,
A. C. Stevens.
In publicity to employees at Schenectady, the Company declared that "the same
offer had been made by General Electric negotiators in New York to IUE President
James B. Carey before Carey called a strike against the Company [and that] Carey
refused the offer." That was not true.
The same truce terms were also offered on October 4 to the IUE Pittsfield local.
That local had also theretofore voted to accept the company offer, but, unlike Schenec-
tady, had joined the strike at its inception. On October 4, ERM Arthur Mellikan of
Pittsfield offered the local union at that plant the same truce conditions that were
given Jandreau in Schenectady.70 Mellikan's offer was broadly publicized to employ-
ees at Pittsfield, through press releases, plant communications, and individual letters
to employees.
2. Direct dealings with other IUE locals regarding truce terms
On October 4, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Company
based in part on the offer to Local 301 at Schenectady for a separate truce agreement.
Some.time after the charge was filed, the Company informed the IUE national nego-
tiators that the conditions offered the Schenectady local were generally available to
all IUE locals not on strike. There is a dispute as to the date this was done. The
Company claims such a proposal was orally made on October 7 by Counsel Hilbert
for the Company to Counsel Sigal for the Union. The Union, on the other hand,
claims that the proposal was not made until October 10, when it was made in writing.
Because it is undisputed in any event that the proposal was made on October 10
and nothing of consequence to the issues herein occurred in the interim, I find it
unnecessary to resolve the sharp conflict on that point.
09 The KAPL employees, who are organized into a separate IUE local, had theretofore
voted to reject the Company' s offer.
00 The Company's assertion in its brief that the offer at Pittsfield was solicited by the
local is not supported by probative evidence and is found to be contrary to fact. Moore
testified that before the offer was made he had been informed that an unidentified local
official had inquired of Mellikan whether the local there could have the Schenectady terms
if it returned to work. Moore's testimony, however, was based on hearsay twice removed,
and is in conflict with the direct testimony of Arthur LaBlue, the Pittsfield Local's busi-
ness agent to whom Mellikan made the offer. Mellikan did not testify. LaBlue is
credited.
248 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Company's written proposal on October 10 was "to reestablish in any,IUE
unit which is not on strike" all terms and conditions of the expired contract (except
the escalator clause) including such matters as checkoff, grievance procedures, and
privileges of union officials. Elsewhere the Company made clear that the union-
related conditions would be reestablished only in units where local officials publicly
announced a return to work and employees returned accordingly.
The Company's October 10 truce proposal was not accepted by the IUE national
negotiators. Notwithstanding its rejection at the national. level, the Company sought
at some plants to obtain its acceptance at local levels through direct contacts with
local officials as well as by appeals to employees.
Thus, at Lynn, ERM Bums wrote Local Business Agent McManus on October 10,
requesting a meeting to discuss, among other things, a strike truce. He specifically
proposed working out a separate memorandum of intent applicable at Lynn for, an
interim agreement reestablishing all former contract provisions (except the escalator
clause ) and for the return of Lynn's employees to work while national negotiations
continued. The refusal of the Lynn local officials to discuss a separate truce proposal
was thereafter criticized in communications to employees. The employees were urged
to let their union officials know how they felt about a "truce" proposal. The Com-
pany's communications to employees emphasized that a continuation of the strike
would cause loss of jobs through loss of contracts, diversion of work to other GE
plants, and the like. '
At Waterford, the Company wrote the president of the IUE local, informing him
of the proposal made at the national level and inviting separate acceptance by the
IUE local. About the same time, the company foremen telephoned the Waterford
strikers individually to advise them of the proposal given their local president and
to urge its acceptance at a membership meeting, which they stated ought to be called
for that purpose. At a meeting with the local officials on October 14, called by the
Company, the Company stressed that a substantial number of Waterford jobs would
be permanently lost if the Waterford plant did not soon return to production, and
again urged local acceptance of the truce proposal. The meeting was followed by
further telephone calls made by foremen to the employees summarizing the informa-
tion given local officials as to the number of jobs being endangered by the continuation
of the strike. The employees were again urged to convince their local officers to
abandon the strike "under the protection of the Company's truce offer."
At Louisville and at Bridgeville, the Company in letters to the IUE local presidents,
dated respectively October 14 and 20, similarly invited separate local acceptance of
the truce proposal made in national negotiations and there rejected.
At Syracuse, on October 17, 1960, Loren Vinal, president of the Syracuse local,
telephoned James Delmonico, the union relations manager of the GE Syracuse plant,
regarding the vacation pay of a, striking employee. Following discussion on that
point, Delmonico suggested that Vinal might want to bring the employees at Syracuse'
back to work as Jandreau had done in Schenectady.71 Mentioning how popular
Jandreau had made himself at Schenectady, Delmonico told Vinal that he would be
as highly regarded in Syracuse if he followed Jandreau's example. Vinal was then
under suspension for alleged strike misconduct. When he pointed this out to Del-
tnonico, the latter assured him that his suspension would be taken care of if he
brought the employees back. When Vinal mentioned that 16 other Syracuse employ-
ees were also under suspension, Delmonico replied that their suspension, too, could
be discussed if Vinal were serious. Delmonico told Vinal that if the employees
returned to work, they would receive the benefits of the old contract, except for the
escalator clause. Vinal declined to bring the employees back.72
The General Counsel in his brief refers to other instances-not detailed here-
of asserted attempts by the Company to undercut national bargaining by direct deal-
71 The Schenectady local had returned to work that morning.
zz The above findings are based on Vinal 's credited testimony, corroborated in substan-
tial part by employee Robert Robinson who heard Vinal 's end of the conversation. Del-
monico admitted having a conversation with Vinal in which the Schenectady development
was discussed and in which there was some talk about how Vinal would be regarded if
he brought the employees back to work, but he specifically denied saying anything about
lifting Vinal 's suspension or that of others . Vinal had previously given substantially
the same testimony without contradiction at an arbitration bearing at which Delmonico
was present . He impressed me as a credible witness.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 249
ings with IUE locals during this and earlier periods. They are found not to support
the General Counsel's position,on that point.73
3., Employee communications
To a substantial extent, the Company's communications to employees during the
strike period were concerned with strike activities and developments, advice to er if
ployees as to their legal rights to work without molestation during the,strike, restate-
ments of the Company 's position on bargaining issues, justifications of its refusal to
agree to outside intervention, and the like. At the same time, however, the Company
continued in much the same vein as before to impress upon employees that GE's
full and final offer was on the table and to attack the motives of the IUE top leader-
ship. The employees were frequently reminded that they ought not consider them-
selves bound by the "irresponsible" strike action which Carey had promoted in fur-
therance of his "personal" and "political" ambitions. Prior to October 10, the Com-
pany's communications constantly reiterated that the Union's asserted "no contract-
no work" obligation was a meaningless fiction; that GE employees and managers in'
the past had satisfactorily worked together for long periods of time without a contract;
and that the absence of a contract was a matter more of concern to union officials
than to employees. Beginning about that date, the communications stressed how the
Company's truce proposal would adequately safeguard employee contractual protec-
tions and urged employees to contact their union officers and persuade them either to
accept the Company's offer or the Company's interim truce proposal, or else to
demonstrate by themselves returning to work that the "unnecessary" strike should be
called off. The communications also continually peppered the employees with reports
of the increasing number of acceptances of the Company's offer by other unions, of
the strike's lack of success at other IUE locations, and of back-to-work movements
at other plants. Stories of dissension in the ranks of the IUE bargaining committee
were also reported and blown up.
Throughout, the Company's communications, particularly at the old line plants,
continued to point up-as they had done throughout the negotiations, and even before
-the precarious competitive situation with which GE was confronted. Employees
were told that in view of the Company's competitive situation, no enlargement of its
offer could be effected without generating unemployment in GE plants. The damag-
ing effect of the strike on employee jobs was also constantly accentuated. Mention
was made without specifics of orders lost or in danger of loss, and employees were,
warned that a continuation of-the strike would affect the availability of employee jobs
for months or even years to come,-if not indeed permanently. In some instances the
warnings of potential job loss took a somewhat different slant.
Thus, at the Oakland plant of GE's wire and cable department, the plant manager
in a letter to striking employees, dated October 7, stated, inter alia:
Within the Wire and Cable 'Department, Oakland is the only plant with a
significant stoppage in effect. Lowell is not on strike and two-thirds of the
Bridgeport hourly people are back at work.
Any cable normally made' at Oakland can easily be made in Bridgeport or
Lowell.
On October 14, in a further letter to employees, the plant manager stated, inter alia:
Our Bridgeport Plant, which is an IUE represented location, is completely
back to normal operation and is now supplying wire and cable which you could
have made. . . . This is a time for decision for the Oakland plant. My boss,
Mr. Obert, will visit the plant this month at which time our future plans will be
determined. You can best assure continued operation if you are at your jobs
rather than on the picket line.
73 Thus, for example, the General Counsel,refers to certain incidents at Worcester But
these establish at most a refusal to; bargain with the Worcester local on purely local issues,
and do not bear on the particular issues in this case . The General Counsel also refers to
persistent efforts by the Lynn management to discuss with the Lynn local the manner
in which the proposed retraining and reassignment plan would be applied at Lynn. That
plan, however, contemplated implementation at local levels, and it is quite clear that the
local management simply sought to clarify for the benefit of the local certain proposed
details which the ,national proposal contemplated were to he reserved for separate local
negotiation , and agreement. ,
250 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
At Lynn, the senior company official at that plant addressed a letter to employees
on October 14, in which he pointed out that Lynn management had offered to agree
to a truce that would bring employees back to work, but that "your local union has
refused even to sit down with us," and expressed the "hope" that the employees "will
let your union officers know how you feel about this." In the course of his letter,
he commented:
At the moment, some of the Lynn departments have certain contractual com-
mitments with the United States Government and must, in the interests of
critical defense programs, decide whether to have the work done here or else-
where.
I'm sure you realize that if the work is moved to other plants or companies,
it will be very difficult for us to get it back.
In a press release issued 2 days later, the same Lynn official pointed out that GE
had facilities and open capacity at other plants to do work performed at Lynn; declared
that if the Lynn local continued on strike while other GE plants were operating,
Lynn would have "trouble retaining some of the operations assigned here," with a
consequent drying up of Lynn jobs, and expressed the "hope" that the Lynn employees
would vote at a forthcoming meeting to follow the example of Schenectady and
return to work.
Q. Negotiating meetings October 4 to 19
There were eight formal negotiating sessions and one further sidebar meeting
between October 2, when the strike began, and October 19, when the Company
announced it considered an impasse had been reached and saw no purpose to further
meetings.
The Company's bargaining position remained fixed throughout this period. Moore
summed up the Company's stand at the October 4 meeting. "Relating to the GE posi-
tion," he declared, "it hasn't changed and it will not change under the threat of a
strike." All efforts of the Union to induce the Company to modify its position in
some respect proved futile. The Union's last-ditch proposal made on October 19 was
for a settlement on the basis of an 18-month contract with a 31/2-percent wage increase
(as opposed to the 3-percent increase offered by the Company for the first 18 months)
and without any escalator clause. In rejecting the Union's proposal, the Company
characterized it as "shake down bargaining" designed to force the Company to buy
"peace."
Various exploratory efforts by the mediators to find some compromise basis for
settlement-such as for example their suggestion that the Company put a "price tag"
on a 2-year contract-were rebuffed. The Company made it clear to the mediators
that it saw no possibility of any movement in its offer even within the framework of
its costs.
Both the General Counsel and the Union make much in their briefs of the Com-
pany's asserted refusal to supply the Union with contract language during this period.
The relevant facts are set out below.
At the meeting on October 1, Carey had requested that a subcommittee consisting of
the Union's and Company's counsel meet to work on contract language as to items
substantially agreed upon.74 On October 6, in accordance with arrangements made,
Sigal for the Union met with Hilbert and Willis for the Company for the purpose of
settling the definitive language of changes in the pension and insurance agreement and
related insurance plan and pension plan. Hilbert at that time handed Sigal drafts of
the first two documents, but not of the pension plan. Hilbert told Sigal that the Com-
pany was still working on the pension plan changes and that it would be ready in 2 or
3 days. The subcommittee did not complete its work on the available drafts on
October 6. The next meeting was held on October 14. At that meeting, Sigal asked
for the pension language, but it was not provided. As appears from Sigal's testimony,
credited in this respect, Hilbert stated he would not produce the pension plan language
until agreement was reached on the documents which had been presented on Octo-
ber 6. No further meeting of the subcommittee was scheduled. The pension language
was not delivered to the Union until October 27. There is nothing in the record to
show that the delay in providing the pension plan language actually impeded the
course of bargaining in any way; indeed Sigal conceded while testifying that it did not.
74 The Company's offer was drawn in the form Of a detailed outline of its proposals rather
than in the form of definitive contract language. The Company had earlier submitted
to the Union a draft of proposed contract language with respect to retraining and reas-
signment and income extension aid, but not as to other items.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 251
At the meeting of October 18 , the Union demanded that the Company put on the
table the contract language in full in the form of the documents it was prepared to
sign to settle all issues in dispute . 75 Moore refused to do so unless and until the Union
stated what option it wanted . 76 Moore told Carey, however , that the Company had
a document that would permit agreement.
Later that day the Company sent 25 copies of a proposed short form memorandum
of settlement to the Union 's Conference Board meeting that was being held that after-
noon. The document provided briefly that the Union was to accept the Company's
proposal as theretofore made, that a finding agreement achieving settlement of all
issues would be executed within 30 days thereafter , and that in the interim the Union
would determine which of the options it would accept.
At the opening of the October 19 negotiating meeting, Carey presented the union
proposal , referred to above, for settlement on the basis of an 18-month contract with
a 3V2 -percent increase . When the mediators suggested a private meeting with the
Company, Moore refused , charging the mediators with having rehearsed the proposal
with the Union , a charge which the mediators denied. After the Company rejected
the Union 's offer, accusing the Union of "shake down" bargaining , the Union left the
meeting and separate sessions were held until early evening.
On reconvening , Moore stated that the parties were at a legal impasse and that the
Company saw no useful purpose in any further meetings. The Union objected to the
Company's assertion that there was a legal impasse, declaring there could be no legal
impasse in the absence of good-faith bargaining.
The Union thereupon again noted that the Company had refused to put on the table
a document including the complete agreement it was prepared to sign. Hilbert for the
Company replied , "We can't do it until we have agreement ," adding, "Tell us the
option and we will have it on the table ." Moore referred the Union to the Company's
proposed short form memorandum of settlement and insisted that that was sufficient,
at least to end the strike . The Union responded that the short form was too vague and
general "to serve as something to be binding."
At that point Carey indicated for the first time the Union 's readiness to capitulate,
stating he would like to have an opportunity to discuss with the Company a strike
settlement agreement . He handed Moore a union proposal in the form of a bilateral
agreement , providing for the immediate settlement of the strike , the simultaneous
execution of the new national agreement , and various conditions and protections that
were to apply to the reinstatement of returning strikers.
The Company responded that the Union had put "the cart before the horse" in
presenting a strike settlement agreement before reaching full accord on the national
agreement , the wage agreement , and the pension and insurance agreement. The
Company stated it would not look at the provisions of the strike settlement agreement
until after agreement had been reached on the other agreements.
The Union then again demanded that the Company put its full contract language on
the table. The Company said it would do so, as soon as the Union advised the Com-
pany it was in agreement with the Company 's proposals and declared the option it
wanted . The Union stated it was in "substantial " agreement but was unwilling to
consent in advance to a contract it had not seen . The Company replied that the
Union would have to express its unqualified agreement to the Company's proposals,
eliminating the word "substantial ," before it would produce the full definitive contract
language.
Nothing further was accomplished that day. Because of the Company's unwilling-
ness to meet any further, the mediators , over the objection of the Union, adjourned
, the meeting subject to further call.
R. The strike settlement meetings on October 21 and 22
The next meeting was held on October 21. Prior to the meeting , the company
representatives met separately with the mediators. Moore reported to the mediators
that the Company had completed its drafts of contract language. With respect to the
Union 's proposed strike settlement agreement , the Company indicated that it was
prepared to go along voluntarily with some of the items of the Union 's proposal in
75 At the meeting of October 1 and again at the meeting of October 5, Moore had stated
that the Company had the contract language available.
70 In its teletype that day, the Company disparaged the request , stating it had "no
intention of confusing the issue by putting another document on the table."
252 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
accordance with its established practice; that some of the others would be taken'care
of under the new contract in any event; but that it saw no need for and did not intend
to enter into a separate strike settlement agreement. Moore told the mediators:
We are prepared to listen to what they have on a strike agreement but our posi-
tion is one of "thanks" but "no thanks." We haven't signed them in the past and
we don't intend to.
At the opening of the joint meeting that day, the mediators inquired if the Company
had the contract language written up. Hilbert answered only "Yes." He did not,
however, offer the contract draft to the Union. Nor did the Union again ask for it.
The Union then presented a new proposal which included two separate agreements-
(1) the strike settlement agreement it had earlier presented, slightly revised, and (2)
a short form memorandum substantially in the form submitted by the Company on
October 18, except for an item calling for elimination from the Company's proposal of
the retraining provision.
In presenting the Union's proposal,. Carey expressly acknowledged his awareness
that the Company was now "in a position to insist on [retraining]." But he neverthe-
less urged Moore to reconsider, pointing out that the prospect of getting local agree-
ments on retraining would be improved if limiting language were removed, from the
national agreement . - ' '
As previously noted, the Company during the early days of September had indicated
its willingness at least to consider dropping retraining from its offer if that were the
wish of the Union. But after the resumption of negotiations on September 20; the
Company had insisted that that provision must be part of the package notwithstanding
the Union's request for its removal. At the October meetings, the Union had continued
to press for the deletion of the retraining provision. It had, argued that as retraining
was not to be put into effect at any location unless the details were agreed upon in local
negotiations , and as local supplements were subject to national approval in any event,
the national agreement should at most authorize local negotiations and should not
impose limitations that might hamper the freedom of local unions and local manage-
ments to negotiate fully in the light of their particular local situations. The Com-
pany, however, had refused to modify its position and had remained unyielding. '
Now, with the Union's complete capitulation at hand, the Company relaxed its
position. Moore told Carey that he would reserve comment on Carey's request for
reconsideration. At the final meeting the next day, the Company advised the Union
that it was deleting the retraining and reassignment provisions from its proposal and
leaving the subject entirely for local negotiations. '
On October 21, after discussing briefly the Union's proposed memorandum of
settlement,77 the parties turned to a consideration of the strike settlement agreement.
The Company adhered to its expressed opposition to the execution of a separate
strike settlement agreement . But it nevertheless discussed with the Union the various
items in the Union's proposal, stated its views thereon and gave its reasons for such
views. It indicated its agreement in principle as to some of the items, its objections
as to others.
At the opening of the meeting on October 22, the Union presented a single docu-
ment labeled "Memorandum of Settlement," which combined in one instrument the
provisions of its strike settlement agreement and of its memorandum of settlement
as previously proposed. The Union explained that the revision in form was made to
meet the Company's objection to a separate strike settlement agreement.'
The Company then announced that in the place of the strike settlement agreement
theretofore proposed by the Union, it was prepared to give the Union a "letter of
intent." It presented a draft letter stating how the Company "intends to handle .. .
certain matters relating to the resumption of work." The letter provided more spe-
cifically that: (I) Strikers would be recalled "as quickly as their services are needed";
(2) strikers would not be discriminated against merely for strike activity; ( 3) penalties
imposed by GE after the end of the strike for strike misconduct would be handled in
the usual way under the new contract and be subject to arbitration; (4) all pending
criminal prosecutions and court and administrative processes based upon, strike mis-
conduct would "continue to follow their natural course"; (5) the' Company "has
77 Two points were specifically touched upon. One involved the 'question of retrain-
ing which, as already noted, was temporarily left open. The other concerned the effective
date of the new contract. Moore suggested October 17, in accordance with the Com-
pany's offer to make it effective on Monday of the week agreement was concluded. The
Union wanted October 24, apparently on the theory that the earlier date could only benefit
nonstrikers. Moore was agreeable to accepting the Union's date.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 253
carried employees insurance coverage during the strike and will make the necessary
adjustments in order to reimburse itself"; (6) "in accordance with long standing
practice" strike absence would be included for relative seniority standing but not for
computing. employee benefits"; and (7) grievances pending or based on action taken
before-the expiration date of the last contract would be processed in the regular way
with time periods tolled. To the foregoing, the letter of intent added that the Com-
pany had "offered to make the wage increase effective October 17" but "that the Union
has, for reasons of its own, chosen the October 24th date." In short, the letter
revealed that the Company was in agreement with many but not all the provisions the
Union had asked to have included in a strike settlement. The Union strongly objected
both to the form of the document and to its failure to provide the full measure of
protection embodied in the Union's proposed strike settlement agreement.
With respect to the substantive variances, the Company, in the course of the discus-
sions which followed, listened to the Union's arguments and stated its own reasons for
the positions it had taken. On one point, it yielded to the Union's position, and
added to its letter of intent a provision that discharges for strike misconduct effectu-
ated during the period of the strike would "be subject to arbitration under voluntary
arbitration submissions which the Company would be willing to sign." Throughout,
however, the Company adhered to its position that it would not agree to a strike
settlement agreement, labeled as such, but would agree only to have the strike settle-
ment provisions embodied in a letter of intent. To the Union's objection that the
letter was not a legally binding agreement but only a unilateral statement of intention,
the Company responded the Union could, if it wished, initial the letter and thereby, it
said, make it a letter agreement. It is quite clear, however, that the Union was
opposed to signing the letter both because of its unilateral form and because of some
of its content. Sigal requested-at one point that the Company drop from the letter
the provision that pending criminal prosecutions and court and administrative
processes would follow their usual course, pointing out in effect that this was simply
surplusage adding nothing to the Company's undertaking. The Company refused.
"We'll leave the letter as it is," was all Moore would say.
At the hearing, the Respondent gave no persuasive explanation as to why it was
opposed to a strike settlement agreement in bilateral form. Hilbert testified-
although he did not mention this at the negotiations-that the Company probably
would not have opposed a bilateral agreement labeled "Return to Work Terms." The
significance of the distinction escapes me.
In the end, the Union yielded to the Company's terms. On the afternoon of
October 22, it signed along with the Company the short form settlement agreement.
The Company alone signed the letter of intent. Up to that time, the Company had
not yet presented to the Union, save in the partial respects referred to above, the
actual contract language.- It was agreed that counsel for the parties would meet in the
very near future to work out the contract language, but that the national agreement
would go into effect immediately without checkoff authorizations that had not been
revoked would continue in effect. Apart from contract language, two matters were
specifically left open for later negotiation-one concerned article XI, section 3, the
other the revision of the checkoff provision. These will be considered shortly below.
The Union terminated its strike as of Monday, October 24, 1960.
S. Postsettlement meetings
Postsettlement meetings were held on October 27 and 28 and November 2 and 3,
primarily for the purpose of reaching agreement on definitive contract language.
Several disputes arose during this period as to substantive terms of the agreement. It
is claimed by the Union, more than by the General Counsel, that the Company's bad-
faith approach to bargaining spilled over into this period. The Respondent, oppositely,
points to a number of asserted charges and modifications made by it in the post-
settlement negotiations as being the clearest evidence of its good faith throughout.
Reserving evaluation for later, I turn to a consideration of the pertinent facts.
As noted above, two items were specifically left open at the time of the strike settle-
ment . Both involved at least in part considerations of illegality arising out of then
recent Board decisions.
One concerned article XI, section 3, of the 1955 'agreement, reading in pertinent
part as follows:
Employees-transferred to jobs outside the bargaining units may be returned to
their former classification in the bargaining unit in accordance with their total
length of continuous service. Employees in any plant who have been certified in
a bargaining unit not covered by this agreement shall have no rights under this
agreement.
254 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Union in its original contract proposals had sought revision of this entire clause
to provide without more that employees transferred out of any bargaining unit would
lose their seniority in that unit . The Company in its offer had made no reference to
the Union's request. So far as appears, there was no discussion at all about this par-
ticular provision until the meeting of October 11, when fleeting reference was made to
it as a result of a then recent claim made by the Union in an injunction action at Lynn
that article XI, section 3, was unlawful under the Board's Menasco rule (123 NLRB
627)78 At that meeting, the Company had indicated its willingness to delete the
second sentence of the section to cure the asserted illegality under Menasco. The
Union's objection to article XI, section 3, went further, however, and it was ultimately
agreed that the subject would be reserved for later negotiation. The first sentence of
the section had originally been written into the contract in 1950 at the request of the
Company and the qualifying second sentence had then been added at the request of
the Union. At the postsettlement meetings, the Union sought to negotiate a new pro-
vision in line with its demand. The Company's representative stated that negotiations
were not in order at that stage. However, the Company was willing, he added, to
eliminate the illegal sentence if the Union wished, but there would be no other change.
During the discussion that followed, however, the Company fully stated its reasons
for desiring retention of the first sentence, principally that its removal would dis-
courage rank-and-file employees from accepting supervisory positions and thus hamper
promotion from within. The Company did not yield further, the Union finally did,
and article XI, section 3, was retained except for the deletion of the second sentence.
The Respondent in its brief cites this change as a concession . Actually the change was
an improvement from its point of view.
The other item left open involved a checkoff provision. The old contract had
required an employee to give notice to the Union as well as the Company of revoca-
tion of his checkoff authorization. The legality of that requirement was then in ques-
tion because of the Board's decision in Boston Gas Company, 129 NLRB 369, Octo-
ber 12, 1960; later reconsidered and reversed, 130 NLRB 1230, March 6, 1961. Here
the Company simply accepted the Union' s suggestion to eliminate a requirement which
both parties then believed had to be surrendered to comply with law. The Company
gave up nothing.
During drafting, a dispute arose over the Company's proposed contract language
relating to the eighth holiday which was to be allowed if the Union chose the vacation-
holiday option. Holiday dates in the past had always been negotiated. Nothing had
been stated in the Company's option offer to the contrary. Moreover, at the October 1
meeting Moore had stated that the Company proposed to have holidays negotiated
locally. Nevertheless, the contract language submitted by the Company gave local
management the exclusive right to determine the eighth holiday without negotiation.
The Union protested. The Company justified its position principally on the ground
that that was the only way to assure uniformity in plants where there was more than
one union. The Company held fast to its position through several meetings, but the
parties finally agreed on Washington's Birthday as the eighth holiday, subject to the
right of local management and the local union to substitute a different holiday by
mutual consent.
A dispute also arose with regard to a letter known as the 20.4 letter, which had been
attached to the 1955-60 agreement, and which stated in substance that the parties were
in disagreement over a company policy relating to the arbitrability of discharges of
employees who had invoked the fifth amendment in certain circumstances. The Com-
pany requested reacknowledgment of the letter. The Union objected on the ground
that there had been no reference to the matter in negotiations. The Company, on the
other hand, took the position that when it made its offer, which the Union accepted, it
was its intention, as the Union should have understood, to retain everything in the
old agreement not specifically mentioned, and that the letter was part of that agree-
ment . It flatly refused to reopen that item for negotiation at that stage, but in an
effort to accommodate the Union did submit three different forms of reacknowledg-
ment of the 20.4 letter, one of which the Union ultimately accepted over protest.
Sigal for the Union ultimately conceded while testifying that if the letter had not been
reacknowledged, it would, by enlarging the area of arbitrability, have resulted in a
change of the 1955 agreement in a respect not specifically reserved for further nego-
tiation after the settlement date.
Another issue arose with regard to the inclusion under the agreement of two loca-
tions, Bucyrus and Burlington, involved in decertification petitions that had been filed
prior to October 22. The Company's offer had provided that its terms would not be
7e Hilbert testified that the Company had known of the Menasco decision since 1959, but
was waiting for the Union to raise the subject during negotiations.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 255
made applicable to employees in any bargaining unit "where there is pending an
NLRB representation petition without a waiver of objections by any other interested
union ." The Company questioned the legality of listing Bucyrus and Burlington
among the contract-covered units in view of the Board's Midwest Piping doctrine (63
NLRB 1060). Sigal for the Union expressed his legal opinion that that doctrine did
not apply to decertification cases. The Company, after considering this matter, agreed
to include Bucyrus and Burlington.
In addition, the Company, during drafting, agreed to a few minor changes not
theretofore negotiated. One provided for emergency meetings at the third step
(national ) of the grievance procedure if the Union requested it. A second provided
for written answers at the second step of the grievance procedure. But this only
restated a long time general practice, and was requested because one local manage-
ment was lax. The third change provided authority for local managements to nego-
tiate with local unions for travel allowances in excess of 8 cents per mile. The Union
had asked for 10 cents per mile nationally, and this had been rejected. Under the,
change, as construed by the Company, however, a local union, while free to demand a
higher allowance, could not strike in support of its demand if negotiations failed.79
The formal agreements were finally concluded and executed on November 10, 1960,
after the Conference Board elected the holiday-vacation option on a local-by-local
basis.
T. Alleged threat and discrimination at Augusta, Georgia
At the Company's Augusta, Georgia, tube plant,s° the plant manager on October 5,
1960, sent a letter to three local union officials and one other employee, who at the
time were the only employees on strike, stating that if they did not return to work by
the start of their regular shift, Monday, October 10, their employment with GE would
be terminated and replacements would be hired. Thereafter, on October 13, 1960,
the plant manager sent the same four employees telegrams, followed by confirmatory
letters, in which he asked them to disregard the aforesaid statement in the October 5
letter, informed them that their service with GE had not been terminated, but added
that if they did not return to work by the following Tuesday, their positions would be
filled by new employees. In the meantime a Board agent had directed the attention
of Hilbert, GE's labor relations counsel, to the October 5 letter, and Hilbert in turn
had communicated his views to the plant manager as to the propriety of the October 5
letter.
More employees at Augusta joined the strike after October 5 including the 20
employees whose names are listed in the complaint and in the attached Appendix A.
On October 24, 1960, the 20 listed employees made unconditional offer to return to
work, but the Company failed and refused to reinstate them. While on strike, all of
them had been replaced by other employees.
On October 31, the Company offered employment to one of the listed employees-
W. A. Chalker-conditioned upon his ability to pass a physical examination. On
November 3, Chalker was reemployed and assigned to his old job at his old rate of pay.
On November 4, 1960, the Company offered employment to another-J. L. Cline-
subject to the same condition. Cline did not pass the physical and was not reinstated.
Thereafter, on November 5, the Company offered employment to Lonnie M. Usry,
who, after passing the physical, was reemployed on November 7, 1960, in his former
classification and at his former rate of pay, but on a different shift.
79 The Company's brief lists two other relatively inconsequential "changes" or "addi-
tions," as to the origin of which there is no specific record evidence, however. One, con-
tained in the new contract, but not found in the old one, provides that time paid for
death-in-family absence shall be counted as time worked in computing vacation pay. The
Company in its brief cites no evidence, nor have I been able to find any, to show that the
Union ever asked for this or that it was ever a subject of discussion. The other listed item
also, so far as appears, was never requested by the Union. It was first included in a
draft submitted by the Company about September 20 relating to its income extension aid
proposal. The item relates to situations where on plant closings a laid-off or terminated
employee who is then within 1 year of optional retirement-60-may instead of termina-
tion pay elect to take optional retirement when he reaches optional retirement age. The
asserted "change" or "addition" simply provides that such an employee would have his
service (recall rights) protected until he reaches such age But this seems to have little
meaning because the only plant to which he can be recalled is closed.
eo This is a small plant. At the times here relevant there were only 69 employees in
the IUE unit at that plant.
775-692-65-vol. 150-18
256 DECISIONS 'OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It is'GE's general practice to require physical examinations of employees away from
their jobs' for more than 2 weeks. However, at the conclusion of the 1960 strike, the
Company did not generally apply that practice. So far as appears, it was applied only
at the Augusta plant.
The complaint alleges that the Company independently violated Section 8(a) (1) by
reason of the October 5 letter, and 8(a)(1) and (3) by its refusal to reinstate the
Augusta strikers. It appears to be generally conceded by all parties that the resolution
of the discrimination issues in this case must turn on whether or not the strike is found
to have been an unfair labor practice strike. That issue, as well as the independent
8 (a) (1) issue, is deferred for later consideration.
U. The alleged independent violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
1. Preliminary statement
As noted in the statement of the case, above, the complaint alleges broadly that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by reason of its overall bad-faith dealing with
the Union, as reflected by its conduct both at and away from the bargaining table;
Without limiting the generality of the broad claim, the complaint also contains a
number, of specific allegations. Three of such specific allegations are relied upon by
the General Counsel not only as lending support to the broad bad-faith bargaining
allegation, but also as spelling out in themselves independent violations of Section
8(a)(5) and (1). Two relate to the Respondent's failure and refusal to supply infor-
mation requested by the Union; the third, to the Respondent's attempts to engage in
direct bargaining at local levels in derogation of the Union's status as national bar-
gaining agent.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the central issue of overall bad-faith bargaining,
I shall consider first the alleged independent violations.
2. Refusal to furnish information
a. The specific allegations of the complaint
Numerous references have been made above to the Company's reactions to union
requests for cost and other information during the course of negotiations. All of
them are relied upon by the General Counsel-he so made clear at the hearing-as
evidence of an attitude antithetical to good-faith bargaining. But the specific items on
which he would predicate findings of independent violations are those alleged in the
complaint as follows:
[12] f. Since on or about August 31, 1960, Respondent has refused timely. to
furnish to the Union data in its possession requested by the Union on August 31,
1960, and at various times thereafter, relating to the cost of a fourth week of
vacation for employees with more than 20 years of service.
g. Since on or about September 22, 1960... Respondent has refused timely to
furnish to the Union data ... relating to: (1) The cost of various pension and
insurance proposals; (2) The number and categories of laid off and recalled
employees for each of the units described in Appendix A; and (3) the number of
employees in each of such units with between 20 and 25 years of continuous
service with the Respondent.
The facts relating to the foregoing allegations , although heretofore touched upon
in part, have not yet been fully developed. This will be done now.
b. The applicable facts
The facts with respect to 12(f) are as follows: On August 24, 1960, 81 during a
discussion of the Union's vacation and holiday demands, Jandreau for the Union
asked the Company to "get for us the actual number of people that you have with one
year of service and the actual number of people you have with 20 years of service so
we can understand the problem." Shortly thereafter, Carey made it clear that the
Union desired the information to determine the costs in cents per hour of the Union's
demand for a fourth week of vacation for employees with 20 years' or more service,
pointing out that the Company had put costs in issue by labeling the Union's demands
as "astronomical.," ,In response to Jandreau's specific request, Hilbert stated, "I don't
think we have that information," adding that the Company had already spent a con-
siderable sum in supplying other information to the Union earlier that year. Although
Jandreau stated his belief that the Company did have the information, Hilbert
81 The August 31 date alleged in the complaint is inexact , but the variance is found
immaterial.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY ' 1 257
expressed no willingness to find out . The ensuing discussion of the Union 's request
was in terms of companywide costs, the Company making clear that any benefits it
offered the Union would also have to be extended to other employees . The record
shows that the Company actually had at its New York headquarters figures showing
the number of employees with 20 years' service on a companywide basis. It did not
have such figures broken down according to IUE units. But even if it interpreted the
Union 's request to call for that breakdown , such information was readily obtainable
through plant location sources.
At the August 31 meeting, Jandreau repeated his request of the week before, explain-
ing that he wanted that information because the Company was so concerned about
costs. Moore's only reply was that the Company "discussed the level of benefits." 82
As will later be shown , the Company did not provide the Union with the informa-
tion first requested on August 24, until more than 2 ; months later, after the end of the
strike. - ." ' ' l 1 "
The facts with respect to paragraph 12(g) of the complaint are as follows: '
Prior to September 22, the Union made a number of oral requests for information
relating to the costs of the Company 's overall offer. The Company 's response invari-
ably was that it did not know, or that it bargained on the level of benefits, not-costs.,
At the meeting of September 8-the last one before the IUE convention-the
Union, during a discussion of its request that a modified SUB program be substituted
for income extension aid, sought information as to the number of employees who
might be expected to benefit under the Company's IEA proposal . More specifically,
it asked for the number of employees who on the basis 'of the Company 's past 2 years'
experience were laid off for more than 6 months and 'who would, therefore , have quali-
fied under the Company 's proposed IEA plan . Moore replied, "Somewhere between
zero and 100%." When the Union persisted , Moore stated that the Company would
take the Union 's request under consideration if it were made in writing. '
At the September 22 meeting , Carey handed Moore a letter requesting the following
information- with respect to the employees in each of the GE bargaining units repre-
sented by the Union and its locals:
A. Cost per employee, and also for employee dependents, of each proposed
new insurance benefit, and or each proposed increment in existing benefits, broken
down into:
(1) Cents per month premium, and
(2) Cents per month net cost estimated on basis of the Company's 1959
experience.
B. Cost in cents per hour per employee of the proposed increment in each of
the pension benefits.
C. Number of employees on the Company's recall list as of June 30, 1960, for
(1) Less than 6 months
(2) More than 6 months and less than 1 year
(3) More than 1 year
D. Number of employees who have been recalled since January 1, 1960, and
who, prior to their recall, had been laid off.
(1) Less than 6 months
(2) More than 6 months
(3) More than 1 year
E. Number of employees with (a) 20 years (b) 25 years or more continuous
service. -
The letter stated that the information requested was necessary to allow the Union' to
"appraise the cost of [GE's] proposals" and "determine the number of people who
might benefit by them." The Union asked that this information be furnished without-
delay.
..
•
After reading the letter, Moore said that the request only repeated items that-had
been asked for previously; that the information was not pertinent; and that the Com-
pany either did not have it or would have to go to great expense to get it. He declined
to comment specifically on any separate item in the request, but said the Union would
as Moore testified that the Company did not regard information requests "as serious
requests until they are pressed through a letter." But Moore did not tell` this to' the
Union, basing the refusal on another ground. There is no record support for the asser-
tion in the Respondent's brief that it was the "uncontroverted practice" of the parties
to require consideration only of written requests.
258 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
receive a reply to its letter. Hilbert asked how the information requested would
advance bargaining. The union representatives answered that complete information
always advanced bargaining; that, for example, a showing that the difference in cost
was slight would advance the Union's position that an extra week's vacation should be
granted after 20 years' instead of after 25 years' service. The Union also pointed out
that the Company had talked of costs when the Union was presenting its demands, but
that now that the Company's offer was in, the Company talked in terms of level of
benefits.
The Company treated the Union's request both casually and with extreme literalness.
Sometime during the following week, on September 26 or 27, Hilbert made inquiry of
the Company's accounting services consultants as to the availability of the requested
information. The pension consultant was asked if the information was available in
the form requested. He said it was not and that it would be a major job to compile it
in that particular form. He was asked no further questions. The insurance consultant
also stated that he did not have the requested information in the form requested. He
was asked no further questions. The consultant handling layoff and other information
said the information in the form requested was not available in New York and would
have to be obtained by contacting the plant locations. Hilbert, as appears from his
testimony, told that consultant not to bother doing anything further at that time. His
stated reason: He was hopeful the Union would drop the whole thing after the Com-
pany submitted its reply.
With respect to the availability of the specific information in the form requested,
the record shows the following:
The Company's insurance plan was maintained on a companywide basis. It was
administered by an insurance carrier under a contract providing for negotiated
premium rates for each type of coverage. The negotiated rates were, however, subject
to revision based upon actual experience, so that its actual costs, over any given period,
could not be determined until the experience was incurred. On the basis of the negoti-
ated rates the Company could have responded to item A (l) since the premium rates
were alike on any given coverage for all participating employees throughout the Com-
pany.83 With respect to data requested in A(2), the Company had available its esti-
mated costs for each proposed increment in existing benefits on a companywide basis.
The Company does not maintain separate experience information tied to separate
IUE units or locations. For it to have produced separate cost estimates on that basis
would have involved a substantial cost (estimated at the hearing at $65,000) and
many months to compile. Because of variable experience factors, the actual cost at
one location will of course differ from that of another. But the Company operates its
insurance plan on a companywide basis as a single plan and computes its own costs,
just as the insurance carrier computes its premiums, without group distinctions based
on locations or bargaining units. The company witness conceded at the hearing, that
on the basis of the available companywide estimates, it would have been a matter of
simple arithmetic for the Company to have calculated the average cost of the insurance
improvements, in terms of costs per hour per employee, on a companywide basis. The
Company had no certain knowledge that this would not have satisfied the Union.
What has been said about the insurance information applies equally to the pension
cost information requested in item B of the Union's letter. The pension plan also is
operated on a companywide basis and the Company makes its cost computations and
estimates on that basis. Of course, on a fragmentized basis, the average per employee
cost would differ from unit to unit because of such variables as average length of serv-
ice, earnings, turnover, and the like. For the Company to have gathered the informa-
tion and made the actual studies to determine the cost per hour per employee of the
pension benefit increments for each IUE unit separately would have cost it-accord-
ing to an estimate it has since made-several hundred thousand dollars and have taken
months to compile. But the Company on the basis of the companywide estimates it
had on hand could have readily provided the Union with average cost per hour per
employee figures. When pension information had been offered the Union in the past
on a companywide basis, the Union had accepted it.
83 It is noted, however, that only one of the Company's proposed insurance changes-
an increase in maternity benefits-involved a change In premium rate Three others in-
volved changes in the relative share of overall insurance costs to be borne by the Company
under the contributory plan, but no added premium. They were waiver of contributions
for laid-off employees with 3 or more years' service ; 31 days continuation of dependent
coverage for dependents of deceased employees ; and waiver, for 1 year, of contributions
for dependent coverage for totally disabled employees. The final change-medical expense
conversion privilege for terminated employee-involved no added premium or cost.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 259
As for the information referred to in items C, D, and E, it appears that the Com-
pany also had such information available at its New York headquarters compiled on
a companywide basis, but without any separate breakdown for IUE units. The in-
formation in the specific form requested was readily obtainable from plant locations.
Although this would involve some delay, the expense and effort of getting it would not
have been unduly burdensome.
To resume the chronology of events: At the September 27 meeting, Carey com-
plained about the Company's failure to supply the information the Union asked for in
its September 22 letter, again pointed out the Union's need for the information, and
requested the mediators' aid in obtaining it. Moore told Carey, "You'll get the infor-
mation when we get it, Mr. Carey, or if we feel we should get it for you."
On September 28, Moore in a letter to Carey expressed surprise at the IUE's Septem-
ber 22 request, complained of its "eleventh hour timing," stated that the Company had
referred the Union's request to its accountants to determine the availability of the
information, and said it "should have this answer within a few days." 84 The letter
then went on to comment on specific items embodied in the Union's September 22
request.
As for the information requested in items A and B, the letter stated that the infor-
mation was "not available," that it was "on its face purely speculative," and that,
furthermore, "the cost to the Company of any of its proposals [had] no proper place
in our negotiations." The Company did not disclose that the reason for the asserted
unavailability was that it kept its records and prepared its cost estimates on a company-
wide basis.85 It neither offered the information in the alternative forms that were
available nor inquired whether the alternative forms would satisfy the Union's needs.
Its reticence here is in sharp contrast with its conduct during the prenegotiation period
when, as earlier found, it displayed a cooperative attitude with regard to furnishing
union-requested information.86
As for items C and D, the letter simply stated that it "would probably take some
time to dig out" the information.
As for item E, the letter stated that the Company did not have the figures available
on a unit-by-unit basis, but added that the Company's "accounting people a few weeks
ago set out to make a companywide estimate in response to an oral request for com-
panywide figures from one of the members of your bargaining team." The letter
reported that the estimate so made indicated that the number of employees with 25 or
more years' service averaged just under 10 percent of the Company's employees. The
letter did not report the percentage of employees with 20 or more years' service.
Actually, the only "oral request" made "a few weeks ago" was for employees in the
20-year bracket. Hilbert admitted, while testifying, that the Company had readily
available at that time information that would have enabled it to provide an estimate
of the percentage of employees in the 20-year bracket on the same companywide basis.
The Company gave no explanation for its failure to provide that figure, even though
it was aware of the importance attached to it by the Union, to advance its position that
a fourth week of vacation should be allowed after 20 rather than 25 years' service.87
84 This does not square with Hilbert's testimony, earlier referred to, that the Company
had already received a report from its accountants.
ss Compare the Company's disclosure of that fact with respect to the 25-year service
information , infra.
On March 7, 1960, the Union had made a written request for information relating
to layoffs and other matters. The information was requested for each bargaining unit on
a monthly basis. When the Company sent the Union some of the information on April 8,
1960, much of it was not in the form specified. As to other information, the Company
then explained:
Although the precise information requested cannot be obtained without undue
expense, we can provide that type of information . . . on a plant-by-plant basis
rather than a unit-by-unit basis. If you believe such substitute information will
be useful to you, please let us know and we will have it put together.
Later, the Union informed the Company it would accept the information in the form
convenient to the Company.
87 Both figures were needed by the Union to calculate the difference in costs. The
relevance of this cost information is pointed up by what the Company was telling em-
ployees in its communications . It will be recalled that in a talk to Schenectady em-
ployees on September 21, Stevens emphasized the "very sizeable increase in cost" that
would be involved in extending the fourth week of vacation to 20-year service employees,
adding that the Company could not incur the added cost without jeopardizing .the future
of its business and the security of employee jobs.
260 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
At, the October .7 meeting, the Union renewed its request for the information
referred,to in its letter of September 22. In response, Moore told the mediator that
the .Union had already received the Company's answer. To this, Hilbert added that
since the matter was now before the National Labor Relations Board, the Company
would let the Board take care of the request.88 No other reason was given.
The Company admittedly made no effort at any time to obtain the information
called for in terms A and B of the Union's written request. It took no active steps to
collect the information requested in items C, D, and E until after the end of the strike.
At the, contract drafting meeting on October 27, Hilbert asked Sigal if the Union
was still interested in receiving the information requested on September 22. Sigal
said yes. Hilbert then said the Company would not provide the information requested
in items A and B but would supply the rest. Thereafter, the Company furnished the
Union with information on the 25-year service employees in two installments; on
October 28 and November 7. Reports on the balance of the C, D, and E information
were, furnished, on November 7, 1960, and February 10, 1961.
c. Consideration of Respondent's defenses and concluding findings
There'can be little doubt that all the information requested in the Union's Septem-
ber 22 letter was both relevant to matters under negotiation and necessary to enable
the Union to bargain intelligently. The cost of the added pension and insurance bene-
fits requested in items A and B was relevant and necessary not only to enable the
Union to appraise the value of the economic package the Company was offering, but
also to allow it to assess the validity of arguments the Company was making, such as,
for example, the Company's contention that its economic offer compared favorably
in value with then current wage settlement patterns. Further, notwithstanding the
Company's claim made whenever cost information was sought that it considered only
level of benefits, much of the Company's justification for its offer both in and out of
the conference room, and particularly in its communications to employees, was based
on overall costs and the asserted jeopardy to the success of its business and to employee
jobs that any enlargement of the costs of its offer would entail. In so doing, the
Company itself made costs a relevant bargaining issue. The Respondent's contention
that'the costs to an employer of pension and insurance programs, as distinguished from
the employee benefits thereby provided, are unrelated to wages and conditions of
employment and therefore of no concern to employees, has been considered and
rejected by the Board in earlier cases holding that an employer is obligated under the
act' to make such pension and insurance cost information available to a union.89 The
information requested in items C and D was quite clearly relevant and necessary for
an intelligent appraisal by the Union of the Company's income extension aid proposal;
both with respect to the number of employees who stood likely to benefit from it-the
precise information sought-and the probable cost of that proposal to the Company:
The information was pertinent, moreover, to the issues arising from the Union's
demand for SUB as an alternative to or in conjunction with income extension aid:
The 25-year service information requested in item E was obviously necessary to allow
the Union to compare the value of the holiday-vacation options with the 1 percent
wage'reduction the Union-would have to yield as the price therefor; also to assess the
value of the options in terms of the number of employees who might benefit thereby.
The particular relevance of the 20-year service information requested in the same item
has already been pointed out above.
89 On October 4, the Union had filed a refusal-to-bargain charge based in part upon the
Company's refusal to supply requested information.
w Sylvania Electric Products, Inc, 127 NLRB 924; John S. Swift Co., Inc., 124 NLRB
394; Stowe-Woodward, Inc., 123 NLRB 287; Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation,
101 NLRB 360. Although Sylvania was reversed by the First Circuit in N.L.R.B. v.
Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., 291 F 2d 128-the case upon which the Respondent
principally relies-the Board has since expressed its nonacquiescence in the court's
decision. Electric Furnace Co., at at., 137 NLRB 1077. Moreover, the instant case is
distinguishable from the court's decision in Sylvania because here, unlike Sylvania, costs
were in issue and, besides, the benefits plans were contributory. True, the costs of
proposed new increments in the benefits plans were to be borne entirely by the Company.
But such added costs affected the proportionate shares of the total costs payable by the
Company and the employees respectively as joint contributors. * The extent to which they
did so were matters of relevant interest to the Union and information it was entitled to
have. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation, supra; Skyland Hosiery Mills, Inc.,
108 NLRB 1600. ,
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 261
' . As shown, the Company refused to provide any of the information called for in
items A and B, just as it had theretofore consistently refused to supply any, other
information relating to the costs of its offer. As to those items the Company defends
its refusal on three grounds.
First, it contends that cost information as to its pension and insurance proposals
could not be legally required because employees were not being asked to bear any
part of the cost of the new increments. That contention is rejected on the authority
of the Board's decision in Sylvania and for other reasons set out above.
Secondly, the Company contends that the information sought was "speculative."
It is quite true that, except for the premium figures, the information requested in items
A and B was aimed at obtaining cost estimates, the accuracy of which could not be
determined with finality until after actual operating experience. But, estimates are, not
"speculative" except in the loosest sense of the term, simply because they are estimates.
And particularly is this so where the estimates are based on the application of actuarial
standards as in the case of pensions and insurance. In composing its offer the Com-
pany considered the cost estimates prepared by its experts as sufficiently reliable for
it to support a business judgment thereon. The Company was not being asked to
guarantee that future experience would prove its cost projections accurate. The fact
that the estimates might be subject to a possible margin of error neither destroyed
their value to the negotiators nor excused their withholding.
Finally, the Company defends on the ground of unavailability. The Company, to
be sure, did not have and could not have produced without undue burden the requested
cost information.predicated on the artificial assumption that each IUE unit also con-
stituted a separate pension and insurance unit for purposes of actuarial computations.
But it did have estimates from which it could have readily furnished the per employee
cost information computed on a companywide basis. The latter would have con-
formed to the unit basis on which the Company operates its insurance and pension
plans and computes its premium and other costs thereunder. In these circumstances,
the, Company was not obliged to furnish the information requested in the exact form
called for by a literal reading of the Union's letter. But if the Company's strict con-
struction of the Union's request was in truth the basis for its refusal, minimum stand-
ards of good faith required the Company at least to inform the Union as to the specific
reason for unavailability, to disclose the alternative basis on which such information
might be made available, and to inquire whether that alternative would be accept-
able.90 In the past, the Union had accepted information in alternative forms where
it was not available in the precise form requested. The Company had no affirmative
basis for belief that the Union would not also have done so in this instance rather than
get no information at all. The Company's consistent prior refusals to comply with
oral requests for cost information-assertedly on the ground that only levels of bene-
fit were relevant-as well as the additional reasons stated for its refusal in this instance,
confirm that the Company's true reason for withholding the information which it did
have available, and which would have substantially met the purposes of the Union's
request, was not unavailability but unwillingness to disclose the cost information to
the Union in any form. I find on all the evidence that the Company's failure to tender
the cost information it had available on a companywide basis constituted bad faith.
As found, the information called for in items C, D, and E was eventually furnished,
but not until after the end of the strike when it no longer had value in the negotiations.
The law is of course clear that the obligation to furnish on request relevant information
must be honored within a reasonable time and is not satisfied by late submission where
diligent efforts to furnish it timely have not been made.91 The Company stresses that
it did not have the information in the form requested available in New York and had
to collect it from IUE locations. That is true. But the record does not support a
finding that this would have imposed an undue burden on the Company. All its
New York headquarters had to do was to broadcast a letter or teletype request to the
plant locations; the rest was merely a matter of mechanical collection from records
already at hand. The important fact is that GE headquarters chose to wait more
than a month until after the strike was over before it so much as initiated the process
of collection by communicating a request for the information to IUE locations. In an
attempt to justify the long delay, the Company adduced testimony to the effect that it
was decided on September 29 not to send out a request to the locations because the
B°J. I. Case Co. ( Rockland, Illinois ), 118 NLRB 520, 523, enfd. 253 F. 2d 149 (C.A. 7) ;
Peyton Packing Company, Inc., 129 NLRB 1358, 1362. Cf. Old Line Life Insurance Com-
pany of America, 96 NLRB 499, 502-503.
01 Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 111 NLRB 58, 63, enfd . 299 F. 2d 575 (C.A. 2) ; Reed
a Prince Manufacturing Company, 96 NLRB 850, 853, enfd. 205 F . 2d 131 (C.A. 1).
262 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
locations were then busily engaged in making preparations for the strike that appeared
then to be imminent, and that nothing further was done during the strike because the
Union was engaging in mass picketing and violence at some of the locations, thereby
restraining administrative personnel as well as other employees from coming to work.
The foregoing explanation, even if credited, would not of course account for the Com-
pany's inaction during the week preceding September 29. And as for the period dur-
ing the strike, the asserted difficulties in collecting the data are at best theoretical
because the Company concededly made no effort to do so, not only at these plants
where the Union is said to have engaged in mass picketing and violence, but at
numerous other plants where no such conduct is charged. At any rate, the explanation
so given , stated for the first time at the hearing, impressed me as one contrived in
retrospect, and I do not credit it. It seems to me that if that were the true reason for
the Company's inaction, the Company would not have hesitated to declare it to the
Union. Yet on October 7, when the Union repeated its request for the information,
the Company made no mention of any such reason to explain its failure to comply.
The only reason then given was that the Union had filed a charge with the Board and
that the Company would now let the Board take care of the request. That position
of course is indefensible. An employer's obligation to bargain is not suspended by the
filing of charges.92
The other defenses urged by the Company as to the C, D, and E information relate,
not to the delay, but to the Company's claim that it was under no obligation to honor
the Union's request at all. Thus the Company suggests that it was free to ignore the
request because the request was untimely "both in terms of its remoteness from the
start of bargaining and its proximity to the end of the contract." But that position is
patently untenable, particularly when one considers the specific bargaining issues to
which the desired information was related and the prior oral requests which had been
disregarded.93 The Company further contends that the information was not available
at company headquarters and would have taken some time to collect. But the fact is
that the company negotiators did not so much as check with the plant locations to
determine how long it would take, let alone ask for it, despite the conceded relevance
of this information to bargaining issues. Quite clearly the Company did not consider
the task of collection an "unreasonable burden" once the Union had capitulated and
bargaining was over. The Company in its brief also contends that all of the informa-
tion sought by items C, D. and E was already in the possession of IUE local union
officials at the time of the Union's request. No such justification was ever advanced
to the Union, however, and the record as it stands does not substantially support the
factual predicate for that contention-a contention which was not raised or litigated
at the hearing and is mentioned as an apparent afterthought for the first time in the
Company's brief.94
I conclude and find that the record substantially supports the allegations of para-
graphs 12(f) and (g) of the complaint, and that the Respondent's conduct therein
alleged, considered in the light of the entire record in this case, was violative of Section
8(a)(S) and (1) of the Act.
3. Local bargaining
The relevant facts relating to local bargaining-to the extent found established by
the record-have been set out in detail in section 9, above. They are to be considered
along with the findings relating to IUE's status as national bargaining representative
made in section B , above.
02 Samuel Bingham's Sons Mfg. Co., 111 NLRB 508, 510, enfd. 277 F. 2d (C.A 5).
e3 The recall information related primarily to income extension aid which was first placed
on the bargaining table on August 30. An oral request for the same information had been
made on September 8. The 25-year service information related to the holiday vacation
option which was first formally put on the bargaining table on September 20. The 20-year
service information had been orally requested as far back as August 24.
94 To support that contention , the Company has directed attention in its brief to an
article in the 1955-60 agreement requiring the Company to supply local IUE officials
with information concerning layoffs and recalls. There is, however, no record
evidence to show whether such information was in fact furnished and, if so, whether it
was furnished in such written or other durable form as to have been available to the
Union when it made its request . If the Company actually believed at the time that the
information was already available to the Union through its locals, and was guided accord-
ingly, I think it highly unlikely that the Company would have refrained from expressly
mentioning this to the Union as a reason for noncompliance.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 263
As found above, the Respondent on September 30, 1960, by direct communication
to its Schenectady employees offered to keep in effect at that plant beyond October 1,
provided the employees there did not strike, all terms of the old contract (except the
escalator clause), including union-related and grievance-related conditions. Shortly
thereafter, the Respondent's representative at that plant made or offered to make a
separate agreement to that effect with the Schenectady Local' s business agent, con-
firmed in writing on October 4. Respondent offered the same separate agreement
that day to the Pittsfield local and broadly publicized it to Pittsfield employees. The
strike-truce conditions offered the Schenectady and Pittsfield locals were more favor-
able than those theretofore offered the IUE in national negotiations. It was not until
after a charge was filed, based in part on the offer made to the Schenectady local, that
the Respondent made the same offer to the IUE negotiating committee. Notwith-
standing the Union's rejection of the offer, the Respondent thereafter proceeded to
make it on a separate local-by-local basis at various locations, including Lynn, Water-
ford, Louisville, and Bridgeville, through direct contact with local officials, combined
with appeals to employees urging them to induce local acceptance. At Syracuse, the
Respondent solicited the local, through its president, to abandon the strike locally and
to return employees to work on the basis of the nationally rejected truce proposal
which Schenectady had since accepted. The Syracuse solicitation was accompanied
by a promise of benefit to the local president and possibly also to some 16 other
suspended strikers.
The General Counsel contends in substance that the Respondent, in derogation of
the Union's status as national bargaining agent and in order to undermine the Union's
authority as such bargaining agent, sought by the aforesaid conduct to bypass the
Union and to deal directly with locals and,/or employees with respect to terms and
conditions of employment and other matters properly subject to national negotia-
tions.95 The General Counsel takes the position that the Respondent's conduct now
specifically under scrutiny must, when considered in the context of the entire record,
be viewed not only as evidence of the Respondent's overall bad faith, but also as
independently violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1). On all the relevant evidence, I
am persuaded that the General Counsel's position is substantially supported.
The law is, of course, well settled that it is the duty of an employer to bargain
exclusively with the chosen representative of his employees, an obligation which
"exacts the negative duty to treat with no other." Medo Photo Supply Corporation v.
N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678. It has frequently been held violative of 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act for an employer to attempt to bypass a designated bargaining agent by dealing
directly with employees, individually or as a group, or, for that matter, similar to the
situation here, with a representative of a segment of a bargaining unit, such as, for
example, with a local where an International union is the bargaining agent for a
broader group. See, e.g., Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway Company, 110 NLRB
1963; John L. Clemmey Company, Inc., 118 NLRB 599; Quaker State Oil Refinery
Corporation, 121 NLRB 334, 338, 367, 368, enfd. 270 F. 2d 40, 45-46, cert. denied
361 U.S. 917; Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corporation, 113 NLRB 1288, 1296,
1328, enfd. insofar as material 236 F. 2d 898 (C.A. 6); Giustina Bros. Lumber Co.,
116 NLRB 700, 727.
The Respondent would distinguish the situation here as to some of the incidents
complained of on the ground that they occurred at locations where IUE locals rather
than the IUE itself had been certified by the Board as the bargaining representatives.
That was so at Schenectady, Pittsfield, Lynn, and Syracuse, but not at Louisville,
Waterford, and Bridgeville, where the IUE itself was certified 96 As related to the
locals separately certified, the Respondent contends that the General Counsel' s allega-
tions of unlawful direct dealing must be found fatally defective as a matter of law on
the theory, so stated by it, that "it is perfectly appropriate for an employer to deal with
a certified bargaining representative at any time."
55 As supporting evidence of the Respondent's purpose to undermine, the General Coun-
sel points particularly to the Respondent's contemporaneous efforts through its massive
communications program to impair the prestige, authority, and effectiveness of the Union
as bargaining agent, by seeking to discredit the IUE top officials in the eyes of the em-
ployees and to induce and encourage employees not to follow the leadership of the IUE
national negotiators with respect to bargaining and strike decisions, all as reflected by
factual findings made above.
96 As found above, the IUE at plants where it is directly certified has local unions
which represent employees at local levels in substantially the same manner as do the IUE
locals which are directly certified.
264 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In the particular circumstances of this case, I am unable to agree. It has already
been found (see section B, above) that as a result of the historical pattern of bargain-
ing followed by the IUE and GE, and concurred in as well by the IUE locals involved,
the parties have established a workable relationship under which the IUE, through its
GE Conference Board, is considered with respect to the negotiation of national agree-
ments and matters related thereto the sole bargaining agent-so recognized and
acknowledged by GE-for all employees in the aggregate of IUE units represented on
the Conference Board 97 The relationship so established is analogous in kind to that
which exists between an employers' association authorized to bargain on behalf of a
multiemployer, group and a single union which has historically bargained with the
association on the basis of the multiemployer unit. In fact, the situation here presents
a stronger case for indivisible bargaining; for unlike employers whose bonds are arti-
ficial and who are free at appropriate periods to withdraw at will, the locals are all
bound together and to their parent by virtue of their common affiliation and the
Union's constitutional provisions imposing joint bargaining on them in circumstances
like those in the instant case. The same underlying principles that make it improper in
a multiemployer situation for a union to attempt through direct dealing with individual
employer members to fragmentize the multiemployer group apply with equal strength
to the converse situation that is here presented. Where, as here, a party to negotia-
tions has consented in advance thereof to recognize and deal with a common bargain-
ing agent authorized to act for and bind all members of a multiple group on a joint
basis, and has entered into negotiations with the group bargaining agent on that basis,
fair dealing requires that party, at least while negotiations are still in progress, to
honor fully the recognition that has been accorded and to comply exactly with the
form of single dealing that has been undertaken. Separate or attempted separate
dealing during such negotiations with a member or fraction of the multiple group
undercuts the authority to deal for all that has been delegated to the recognized bar-
gaining agent, denies that agent the full measure of recognition that is its due, tends
to subvert the agreed upon mode of bargaining, and is wholly repugnant to basic
standards of good faith. To hold in the particular circumstances of this case that the
Respondent was justified simply because of the locals' separate certifications in ignor-
ing the locals' delegation of bargaining authority to the IUE and in disregarding the
historical and agreed upon method of bargaining, would be to fly in the teeth of the
foregoing principles, exalting form over substance98
What has just been said is not to be read as impliedly holding that the Respondent,
having once consented to and participated in multiunit bargaining with the IUE, is
foreclosed forever from withdrawing from that arrangement without the Union's con-
sent. That question is not now before the Board and is not here decided. It is held,
however, that at the very least the principles enunciated in Retail Associates, Inc., 120
NLRB 388, 390, are applicable. In other words, assuming the Respondent's freedom
to withdraw, the Respondent was required to declare an unequivocal election to do so
at an appropriate time. It could not, however, in good conscience and good faith
deal with the Union as bargaining agent and at the same time seek to undercut the
Union's authority as such agent. Here the Respondent participated in multiunit
negotiations with the Union as the recognized representative alone authorized to
engage in national negotiations, not only before and after, but at the very time it was
seeking to deal separately with locals on strike-truce arrangements. Under the circum-
stances, the Company is now estopped from asserting that it was also entitled to bar-
gain on a separate local-by-local basis. See Detroit Window Cleaners Union, Local
139 etc. (Dallyte Service Company), 126 NLRB 63; cf. Eastern Massachusetts Street
Railway Company, supra.
It is quite clear that the subject of strike-truce conditions fell within the compass of
the Union's delegated and recognized authority as national bargaining agent under
the historical pattern of bargaining as developed by the parties. The strike grew out
of national negotiations. Whether or not there was to be a truce and, if so, the terms
and conditions of employment that were to apply in that event, were, therefore, sub-
jects to be,dealt with in national negotiations. It was the Respondent's clear duty to
07 Cf. Radio Corporation of America, 135 NLRB 980.
98 Cheney California Lumber Company, 130 NLRB 235, upon which the Respondent
principally relies, is not authority to the contrary. In Cheney, the Board particularly
stressed that the employer, for whose employees the respondent union in that case had
theretofore been separately certified, had designated the employer association to act as
bargaining agent "for the purpose of recommendation only" and had "retained full free-
dom to accept or reject recommendations that might be made by [the Association]." Other
cases cited by the Respondent have been considered and are found wholly inapposite.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 265
bargain on that subject exclusively with the IUE and not to attempt to bypass it
through separate dealings with locals on whose behalf the IUE was then acting as
bargaining agent.
As found, the truce condition offered the Schenectady and Pittsfield locals were
more favorable than those theretofore offered the IUE. Apart from the legal defense
already considered and rejected, the Respondent in its brief claims it was justified in
bypassing the IUE at those locations for a variety of other stated reasons. They are
found insufficient. The Respondent stresses that at the September 29 meeting it had
not refused union-related conditions but had simply declared that it would have to
"consider" later whether and under what conditions it might retain them in effect after
the contract's expiration date. The Schenectady local's original decision not to partic-
ipate in the strike, says the Respondent, compelled it to decide with regard to that
location the question it had told the national negotiators it would have to "consider."
But this neither explains nor excuses the Respondent's failure to communicate. its
decision first to the national negotiators. It is undisputed that the decision to keep in
effect at Schenectady all contract conditions except for escalation, so long as Schenec-
tady remained at work, was made on September 29. That was the very. day the
Respondent had reiterated that it would regard its contractual commitments as having
come to an end on October 1, and had declined in response to the mediators' strike-
truce proposal to commit itself to do more than maintain in effect the then current pay
and fringe benefits, adding only that it would have to "consider" what to do about
union-related conditions. It is noted that two bargaining meetings were held between
September 29 and the start of the strike, at which the Respondent could have com-
municated to the Union its decision on the reserved question and at least have given
the Union an opportunity to consider it. Yet it chose to remain silent at the national
negotiations while speaking out at Schenectady, thereby revealing a deliberate purpose
to bypass the Union and to offer Schenectady a special incentive to encourage its
nonsupport of the Union's strike decision.°9 Certainly, the excuse offered as to
Schenectady could have no application to Pittsfield where the local, although pre-
viously voting not to strike, had joined the strike at its inception. The offer there,
which, as the record shows, was authorized by,GE headquarters during the strike.
could have had as its only purpose the proffer of a special inducement to the local to
abandon the strike. By way of further excuse for its failure to communicate to the
Union the strike-truce conditions it offered directly to the locals, the Respondent
points to the fact that a chainwide strike had in the meantime intervened and asserts
that it had reason to believe the Union would reject any contract extension offer that
did not include the escalator clause. But the intervention of the strike did not reduce
the Respondent's bargaining obligations to the Union. And the assertion of antici-
patory rejection serves only to highlight the Respondent's aim to undermine the
Union's agency authority.
The alleged offers of separate strike-truce terms on a local-by-local basis at Lynn,
Waterford, Louisville, and Bridgeville differ from the Schenectady and Pittsfield situa-
tions in that they were made after the same offer had already been presented to and
rejected by the IUE negotiating committee. The Respondent contends that as a conse-
quence of the NE's rejection it was entirely lawful for it to reiterate to local officials
the terms and conditions which it had already told the IUE it was prepared to reestab-
lish at any IUE unit not on strike. Its conduct, argues the Respondent, must at worst
be viewed as standing-on the same legal footing as that of an employer who, absent
threats or promises, solicits strikers to return to work upon terms and conditions
previously offered their union.
Though the Respondent's position appears at first blush to have plausibility, it does
not withstand the test of closer analysis. To begin with, I am unable to agree that
the Respondent in contacting local officials was simply interested in reporting the offer
it had made at the national level. At Lynn, the Respondent expressly proposed the
negotiation of a separate memorandum of intent. The Respondent's letter there made
no reference at all to the Respondent's proposal in national negotiations. At Water-
ford, Louisville, and Bridgeville, to be sure, no separate written agreement was pro-
posed. But when the content of the letter and the obviously pointed purpose in
directing the letters to top local officials is considered along with the explanations
19 The Respondent's calculated purpose to undercut the authority of the Union as na-
tional bargaining agent is further reflected by the alacrity with which ERM Stevens
responded to Jandreau's message to Schenectady local members, relating to the absence
of contractual protections, with a written commitment to continue in effect the provisions
of the old contract as long as the local was not on strike:
266 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
therefor in contemporaneous employee communications, there can be little doubt that
the Respondent was inviting, if not indeed affirmatively proposing, separate local
strike-truce arrangements.
As for the Respondent's suggested legal analogy, it cannot be doubted of course that
an employer has a lawful right after good-faith bargaining to an impasse to put into
effect unilaterally new terms and conditions he has already offered a union and to
solicit strikers to return to work on that basis. But that is not the situation here, even
if it be assumed both that the Respondent had otherwise met the standards of good-
faith bargaining and that a legally sufficient impasse situation might be found to exist
separately on the strike-truce issue while negotiations were still proceeding without an
impasse on other bargaining issues.100 Here the Respondent had not already put into
effect the contract conditions referred to in its proposal. As matters then stood GE
was operating its struck plants under terms and conditions of employment that pro-
vided only for the continuation of current pay and fringe benefits for employees work-
ing during the strike or for strikers returning to work as individuals. Under the
Respondent's proposal, the reestablishment at any JUE unit of other contract condi-
tions, such as the union-related and grievance-related conditions, was contingent, not
only upon the return of strikers to work, but on official local union action, supported
by public announcement to that effect by local union officials, calling the strike to a
halt. In other words, the Respondent's strike-truce proposal as directed to individual
locals called in substance for separate local union acceptance, without regard to IUE
national acceptance, of the Respondent's strike-truce proposal as the quid pro quo
for reestablishment. For reasons earlier indicated, this quite clearly was an attempt
by the Respondent to bypass the Union by dealing directly with a segment of the group
represented by the Union,. tantamount to dealing directly with employees. As such,
it was in clear derogation of the Union's status and authority as the national bargain-
ing agent. See Giustina Bros. Lumber Co., 116 NLRB 700, 727; The Stanley Works,
108 NLRB 734, 735-736.
Apart from being in derogation of the Union's agency status, the Respondent's
conduct now under consideration constituted, it is found, unlawful solicitations to
induce employee abandonment of the strike.101 This was clearly so at Syracuse,
Schenectady, and Pittsfield, where the Respondent held out an offer of special benefits
in return-at Syracuse in the form of a promise to lift the suspension of the local's
president and perhaps others, and at Schenectady and Pittsfield in the form of prof-
fered reinstatement of contract conditions then not available to other locals. At
Lynn, Waterford, Louisville, and Pittsfield, the benefits offered were by then
already available to all other locals. But there, no less than at Schenectady and Pitts-
field, the solicitations were of a kind reasonably calculated to undermine the authority
of the Union-and this for reasons earlier indicated. That such was the Respondent's
actual purpose is fairly to be inferred, moreover, from the surrounding circumstances.
Particular reference is made to the Respondent's contemporaneous efforts through its
communications program to discredit the motives of the 1UE's top leadership and to
induce and encourage employee nonsupport of the Union's bargaining and strike
decisions.
On all the evidence, I conclude and find that the Respondent's aforesaid attempts
while engaged in national negotiations with the Union to deal separately with locals
on matters properly the subject of national negotiations and its solicitations of locals
separately to abandon or refrain from supporting the strike-when considered in the
context of all the circumstances of this case-constituted conduct violative of Sec-
tion 8 (a) (5) and (1).
V. Analysis and concluding findings as to the alleged overall bad-faith bargaining
(1)
I here consider the broad allegation of the complaint that the Respondent at all
times since June 13, 1960, negotiated with the Union in bad faith. This allegation
places in issue the Respondent's overall course of conduct, both at and away from
the conference room, as it bears on the Respondent's bargaining frame of mind during
100 Cf. Herman Sausage Co., Inc., 122 NLRB 168, 171-172, enfd. 275 F. 2d 299 (C.A. 5).
101 See, e.g., The Tewas Company, 93 NLRB 1358; West Coast Luggage Co., 105 NLRB
414, 420; Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 113 NLRB 1288, 1296, 1328, enfd.
insofar as material 236 F. 2d 898; Giustina Bros. Lumber Co., supra; Federal Dairy
Company, Inc., 130 NLRB 1158, 1170, 1172.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 267
the entire period of negotiations. Included within the framework of that issue are
the specific allegations of the complaint adverted to in section A, above, among them
the alleged independent violations that have already been considered and ruled upon.
In considering this issue, we are faced with the threshold question as to the appli-
cable principles that must govern decision. The Respondent places principal reliance
upon the caveat in Section 8(d) that the bargaining obligation "does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." The
Respondent would have the Board read 8(d)-in a situation where, as here, an
employer has met and conferred with a union and has not insisted upon the inclusion
of unlawful or nonmandatory contractual provisions-as allowing a finding of bad-
faith bargaining only where it is established that the employer negotiated with a
desire not to reach an agreement. The state of mind with which an employer nego-
tiates, argues the Respondent, is material solely to the narrow issue of whether the
employer was genuinely desirous of entering into an agreement with the union,
though only on his own terms, or was desirous instead of evading agreement alto-
gether. But, says the Respondent, once it has been established, as it has been in
this case, that the employer was willing to enter into a collective-bargaining agreement,
no issue of good faith remains, and the Board has no more business to intrude itself
into the manner in which negotiations were conducted or the methods or techniques
used by the employer to achieve his bargaining objectives than it has to intermeddle
with the substantive terms of the bargain.
The narrow standard urged by the Respondent undoubtedly provides one test for
assessing the presence or absence of bargaining good faith. But it can by no means
be regarded as an exclusive one. It is obviously at odds with the numerous cases in
which an employer' s willingness to enter into a collective-bargaining contract on his
own terms, or even his actual execution of one, was insufficient to preclude a conclu-
sion of bad-faith bargaining.102 It is also at variance with Congress' primary purpose
in enacting Section 8(b)(3), the counterpart of 8(a )(5). As was pointed out in
N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents International Association, AFL-CIO (Prudential Ins.
Co.), 361 U.S. 477, 487, Section 8(b) (3) was primarily intended "to prevent employee
representatives from putting forth the same take it or leave it attitude that had been
condemned in management." The bargaining objective of a union is almost always
to obtain an agreement, and the take-it-or-leave-it bargaining attitude at which
8(b)(3) is largely aimed presumes willingness to enter into an agreement.103 It is
of course clear that the duty to bargain imposed on unions was intended to be the
same as that imposed on employers.
Section 8(d) lays down no rigid yardsticks for the measurement of good faith,
and understandably so, for "good faith" is an elastic concept that can have " meaning
only in its application to the particular facts of a particular case." N.L.R.B. v. Amer-
ican National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 410. Certain broad principles of general
application have become well estabished, however. The statutory injunction to "con-
fer in good faith," as is obvious from its own terms, calls for more than ritualistic
performance, even where a collective-bargaining relationship is not sought to be
avoided.104 Good faith, to be sure, does not require the yielding of positions fairly
maintained. And no inference of bad faith may be drawn solely from a party's failure
to retreat from originally declared positions (Bethlehem Steel Company (Shipbuilding
Division), 133 NLRB 1347).105 However, intransigence coupled with other evidence
107 See, e.g., Southern Saddlery Company, 90 NLRB 1205, 1207-1208, and cases cited
therein ; N.L.R.B. V. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149; N.L.R.B. v. Sharon Hats, Inc., 289
F. 2d 628 (C.A. 5), enfg. 127 NLRB 947; "M" System, Inc., Mobile Home Division Mid-
States Corporation, 129 NLRB 527; Clinton Foods, Inc., 112 NLRB 239, 261; Phelps
Dodge Copper Products Corporation, 101 NLRB 360; The Andrew Jergens Company, 76
NLRB 363.
103 The proponents of Section 8(b) (3) made it clear that their target was the elimina-
tion of take-it-or-leave-it bargaining occurring in meetings and conferences as well as in
attempts to impose agreements on employers without formal meetings and conferences.
Senator Ellender, 2 Leg. Hist. 1062, 1244; Senator Knowland, 2 Leg. Hist. 1172; Senator
Morse, 2 Leg. Hist, 982; Senator Taft, 2 Leg. Hist. 1012.
104 As stated in the Insurance Agents' case, supra, at 485, "Collective bargaining, then,
is not simply an occasion for purely formal meetings between management and labor, while
each maintains an attitude of take-it-or-leave-it. It presupposes a desire to reach ultimate
agreement .. . ..
10513y the same token, the fact that a party has made "concessions here and there"
does not alone conclusively establish his good faith. N.L.R.B. v. Herman Sausage Com-
pany, Inc., 275 F. 2d 229, 231-232 (C.A. 5) ; N.L.R.B. v. Fitzgerald Mills Corporation,
313 F. 2d 260 (C.A. 2).
268 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
may under certain circumstances support a finding of an uncompromising attitude
indicative of bad faith. (N.L.R.B. v. Fitzgerald Mills Corporation, supra.) The 8(d),
caveat on which the Respondentrelies was not designed as a shield to protect "surface
bargaining." 106 Good faith requires parties to negotiation not only to have a sincere
desire to reach agreement, but also to make an earnest effort to reach common
ground through the processes of collective bargaining.107 The latter requirement does
not mean that an employer (or union) must yield its freedom to reject proposals or to
refrain from making concessions unacceptable to him. But it does mean , inter alia,
that the negotiating parties must approach bargaining with a mind accessible to per-
suasion; that they must follow-procedures increasing the prospects of a negotiated
agreement; that they must regard gall proper issues before them as issues to be
resolved through the processes and procedures of collective bargaining; that they must
be willing "to discuss freely and fully their respective claims and demands, and, when
these are opposed to justify them on reason"; 108 and that they must be willing at
least to consider and explore with an open mind compromise proposals or other pos-
sible solutions of their differences in an effort to find a mutually satisfactory basis for
agreement.109 -
• "[The] duty of management to bargain in good faith is essentially a corollary of its
duty to recognize the union:" 110 Performance of that duty therefore also contem-
plates full acceptance by management of the representative status of the union, not as
a bare adviser, but as a joint participant in the establishment of wages, hours, and
working conditions. Conduct reflecting a rejection of the principle of collective
bargaining or an underlying purpose to bypass or undermine the status, authority, or
prestige of the union while negotiations are in progress evidences the absence of a
good-faith effort to compose differences and to reach agreement in the manner the
Act commands.'11 The same is true of conduct which "minimizes the influence of
organized bargaining" and emphasizes to employees "that there is no necessity for a
collective bargaining agent." 112
Compliance with the bargaining obligation also requires-as was most recently
stated by the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Benne Katz, etc., d/b/a Williamsburg
Steel Products Co., 369 U.S. 736, 747-that the negotiating parties refrain from:
.,behavior which is in effect a refusal to bargain, or which directly obstructs o,•
inhibits the actual process of discussion, or which reflects a'cast of mind against
reaching agreement. [Emphasis supplied.]
Good faith, or the want of it, is concerned essentially with the state of mind with
which the party charged with a refusal to bargain has entered into and participated in
the bargaining process. In determining whether a party has bargained in bad faith, the
Board is not confined to a consideration of what was said or done in the conference
room, but may also take into account other related conduct. Determination of that
issue, -
. , . normally can rest only on an 'inference based upon more or less persuasive
manifestations of [that] state of mind. The previous relations of the parties,
antecedent events explaining behavior at the bargaining table, and the course
of negotiations constitute the raw facts for reaching such a determination.
[N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., supra, at 155.]
100 N.L R.B. v. Herman Sausage Company, Inc, supra.
137 Cox, Good Faith Bargaining, 71 Harvard L. Rev 1401, ,1416-1418. See, too,
Section 204(a)(1) of the Act which requires employers and unions to "exert every rea-
sonable effort to, make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, hours, and
working conditions." In N L.R B v. Truitt Mfg.,Co , 351 U.S. 149, 152, the Court equated
the 204(a)(1) duty with the duty under Section 8(a)(5) and 8(d).
108 N.L.R B. v. George P. Pilling & Sons, 119 F. 2d 32, 37 (C A. 3).
106 N.L.R B. v. Insurance Agents' International Association, AFL-CIO (Prudential Ins.
Cb ), supra, at 485-488; Globe Cotton Mills v. N.L.RB., 103 F 2d 91, 94 (CA. 5) See;
also, Cox, supra, note at 1411, 1418. Cox and' Dunlop, Regulation of Collective
Bargaining by the' National Labor Relations Board, 63 Harv: L. Rev 389, 422.
il0 N.L.R.B. V. ,Insurance Agents' International Association, AFL-CIO (Prudential Ins.
Co.); supra, at 484-485
1u "M" System, Inc, Mobile'Home Division Mid-States Corporation, 129 NLRB 527, 547;
N.LR'B. v. Fitzgerald Mills Corporation, supra.
112May Department Stores d/b/a Famous-Barr Company v. N,L.R,B,, 326 U.S. 376.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 269
All aspects of the Respondent' s bargaining and related conduct must be considered,
not as separate fragments, each to be assessed in isolation, but in unity. As stated by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his separate opinion in the Insurance Agents' case, supra,
at 506,
Activities in isolation may be wholly innocent, lawful and "protected" by the
Act, but that ought not to bar the Board from finding, if the record justifies it,
that the isolated parts "are bound together as the parts of a single plan [to frus-
trate agreement]. The plan may make the parts unlawful." [Swift & Co. v. U.S.,
196 U.S. 375, 396.]
Applying to this case the principles set forth above, I am satified that the General
Counsel has sustained the allegation of overall bad-faith bargaining. I reach that
conclusion on the basis of the totality of the Respondent's conduct, both at and away
from the bargaining table, taking particularly into account the cumulative force of
considerations to be pointed up below, but only after weighing all other relevant cir-
cumstances in this case, those favorable to the Respondent as well as those opposed.
(2)
The complaint, as amended, alleges that the Respondent bargained in bad faith on
and after June 13, 1960. The date stated is the date the Union presented its offer at an
informal meeting. Formal contract negotiations, however, did not actually begin
until July 19, 1960. Apart from the employee communications criticizing the offer-a
subject to be dealt with later-the only matter of consequence that occurred in the
interim related to the personal accident insurance matter, the facts of which are
reported in section D, above. As appears from the findings there made, the personal
accident insurance matter is outside the mainstream of this case since it was not directly
involved in the subsequent contract negotiations. However, it was specifically referred
to by the General Counsel in his bill of particulars as an item on which he relied to
support his broad bad-faith bargaining allegation.113 Although the General Counsel
stated at the hearing that he was not contending that it was a "per se violation," the
issue relating to it was fully litigated and briefed by all parties as a distinct element in
the case.114 On the basis of the facts developed, it is quite clear-and, indeed the
Respondent does not dispute-that the-proposed additional accident'insurance, though
to be paid for entirely by the employees, involved a bargainable subject, no less than
contributory insurance. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation, 101 NLRB
360; General Motors Corporation, 81 NLRB 779, enfd. 179 F. 2d 221 (C.A. 2). On
the strength of the Board's decision in Equitable Life Insurance Company, 133 NLRB
1675,.1688-1694, which is clearly controlling, I find that the Respondent's presenta-
tion of its personal accident insurance proposal to the Union on a conceded take-it-or-
leave-it basis constituted a rejection of the principle of collective bargaining, violative
of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act, thereby reflecting adversely on the Respondent's gen-
eral attitude toward collective bargaining.115
(3)
The Respondent's negotiating frame of mind during the negotiations which formally
began on July 13 must be assessed against the backdrop of its bargaining philosophy,
outlined in section C, 1, above. Analysis of the record shows that the Respondent
substantially adhered to that philosophy during its 1960 contract negotiations with
the IUE.
U The bill alleged: "Commencing on or about June 13, 1960, Respondent refused to
negotiate in good faith with the Union concerning Respondent 's offer to make Personal
Accident Insurance available to Union represented employees."
v* A finding of a separate violation based thereon was requested by the Union in its
brief and at oral argument
ne I find no merit to the Respondent ' s defense that its conduct was justified because
under an express waiver provision in the 1955 pension and insurance agreement neither
party could require the other during the life of the agreement to bargain with respect
to insurance and pension matters. Substantially the same defense was raised and rejected
in Equitable-though there based on the statutory 8(d) provision to like effect. Nor do
I find it a valid basis for distinction, as urged by the Respondent, that Equitable involved
wages, whereas the instant situation involved a "relatively insignificant [ item] in terms
of the total wage and benefit program in effect." The obligation to bargain on mandatory
subjects does not turn on the value of the item to be bargained about.
270 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Some 6 weeks of meetings ( 18 sessions ) preceded the presentation of the Respond-
ent's offer. During that time the Union was afforded an opportunity formally to pre-
sent and argue its contract demands. It is quite clear, however, that the Respondent
regarded the preoffer meetings primarily as "listening" sessions , forming but one
element of the "research" in which it engages before making its unilateral determina-
tion of "everything it believes to be right" for incorporation in its "fair, firm offer."
There can be little doubt of the Respondent's bargaining bad faith during at least
the 4 weeks (12 sessions) of early negotiations devoted to employment security
matters. As found in section F, 1, above, the parties had agreed that the early meetings
would be negotiating and not simply review meetings, and that an effort would be
made to reach agreement on employment security subjects before the negotiations
turned to other subjects beginning August 16, 1960. Nevertheless, as the findings in
section G, above, show, the Respondent entered into and participated in the early
meetings without any intent to attempt to reach agreement on employment security.
Long before the early negotiations, the Respondent in its communications program to
employees had in effect committed itself to reject the Union's employment security
proposals and at the meetings simply reiterated, albeit with greater detail, positions
already publicly taken. In some instances, the Respondent also gave reasons for
rejection shown by later developments not to have been its true reasons. During the
4 weeks of early negotiations, the Respondent gave no indication whatever to the
Union of the employment security program it was eventually to include in its offer
to the IUE and other unions. The Union was thus denied an opportunity to consider,
comment on, or propose compromise or other alternatives to the Respondent's employ-
ment security program during the sessions that had been specifically set aside for the
negotiation of employment security items, and prior to the time the Respondent's
position was bound to become hardened by virtue of its "fair, firm offer" and uni-
formity policies.
During the 2 weeks devoted to the presentation of the Union's general demands,
other than employment security, the Respondent continued to take the position that it
was primarily interested in "fact finding," thus following the script of its approach
to collective bargaining as set out in section C, 1, above. Though the Respondent
discussed with the Union the latter's specific demands and in many instances expressed
positions on such demands, where its position was one of rejection, it declined to
declare any affirmative views on the key subjects of wage increases, pensions, insur-
ance, and other economic benefits, except to make clear that it intended to eliminate
the escalator clause. Standing alone, no inference of bad faith may be drawn from
the Respondent's failure to declare itself affirmatively at this time. Whether an
employer declares his affirmative thinking on each item of a union's proposal before
passing on to the next, or elects instead to hear out the union on all its demands before
making any counterproposals, is normally a matter of bargaining technique that lies
outside the scrutiny of the Board. Listening to a union's demands is part of the process
of collective bargaining, though not the fulfillment thereof. In this case, as in others,
however, the Respondent's conduct must be examined in the light of whether it was
prepared in truth, not merely in form, to complete the processs of bargaining later.
To suggest, as the Respondent's declared bargaining appproach appears to do, that an
employer need only listen to a union's demands and supporting arguments as part of
a broader research program, frame an offer on the basis of his own overall research,
and then consider only such new information as might reveal a factual error in the
offer, is to place a union in the role of an adviser rather than a participant in the deter-
mination of employment terms through the process of collective bargaining; it is to
deny the union the status to which the Act entitles it. At any rate, the fact remains
that until the Respondent gave specific indication of its own line of thinking on key
issues, there could be no full or meaningful bargaining, for, without issue joined,
discussions could take place only in a vacuum, precluding any possibility of give-and-
take that might be necessary to forge agreement.
Thus, if any genuine bargaining were to occur, it had to begin at the time the
Respondent's offer was made.
(4)
When the Respondent formally presented its offer on August 30, it was responsive
to the Union's demands only in small part. It contained features relating to benefits,
employment security, and even contract language that were entirely different from
those that had been requested by the Union. During the earlier negotiations there
had been neither mention nor discussion of them as contemplated alternatives to the
Union's proposals . The Respondent explained to the Union, as it did later to the
employees, that it had made its offer responsive to "employee desires" as determined
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 271
by its own extensive research and surveys. The Respondent thus made it plain that
it assigned the Union a subordinate or at most only a contributing role as the
spokesman for employees.
The Union declared the same day that the offer was unacceptable, and that the
proposals of both parties should form the basis of collective bargaining. It requested
that negotiations continue for 3 days without the pressures and glare of publicity. The
Respondent, however, rejected the Union's request, giving as its reason that em-
ployees should know at once what was on the table. And the following morning,
it proceeded to publicize its offer, release it to other unions, and present it directly to
employees at plant meetings as well as through employee communication channels, dis-
regarding the Union's vigorous objection that to do so would prematurely "freeze" its
position and thereby interfere with good-faith negotiations.
In the particular circumstances of this case, I find that the Respondent's haste to
publicize its offer reflected the want of an earnest effort on its part to seek through
the processes of collective bargaining a possible basis for mutual agreement, and con-
stituted clear evidence of bad faith
The Union's objection that publication would operate to "freeze" the Respondent's
position was well-founded. The Respondent's action must be considered, not in the
abstract, but in the context of its "fair firm offer" approach to bargaining and its
uniformity policy, as outlined in section C, 1, above.116 The Respondent's "fair firm
offer" approach, although assertedly leaving room for the correction of factual error
disclosed by additional information from any source or a subsequent significant eco-
nomic change, rejects in effect concessions, trading, or compromise as a means of
finding common ground. In the light of the Respondent's widely advertised bargaining
philosophy, the publication of the offer was a clear indication that the Respondent
as a matter of policy would not thereafter consider with an open mind proposed con-
cessions, compromises, or other suggested solutions of differences between the parties
aimed at achieving through the give-and-take of collective bargaining an accommoda-
tion of conflicting positions.117
The Respondent's publication of its offer and simultaneous presentation to other
unions also brought into play a further constricting factor-the Respondent's uni-
formity policy, to which the Respondent was likewise committed. That policy, had it
stood alone, would not of course preclude the Respondent from adding to its offer to
the Union and then making the additions available to other unions and nonrepre-
sented employees. But it does not stand alone, and taken in conjunction with the
"fair, firm offer" policy does have such a preclusive effect. Even were that not so, the
uniformity policy nevertheless had the operative effect-once the Respondent's basic
offer was published-of obstructing openminded consideration by the Respondent of
modifications in or alternatives to its basic offer that might be proposed by the Union
but not be desired by other labor organizations with which the Respondent dealt. This
was especially true in the areas relating to companywide benefit plans, such as pen-
sions and insurance and income extension aid, where the Respondent considered com-
plete uniformity important or, as in the case of pension benefits at least, absolutely
essential. This is not to condemn the Respondent's desire for uniformity as such, nor is
it to suggest that the Respondent was dutybound to complete its negotiations with the
Union before presenting its offer to other unions. The point I make is that, as a mini-
mum, good-faith bargaining required the Respondent, before chaining itself to its
uniformity policy, to give the Union an adequate opportunity to present and argue its
demands and priority desires, not in a vacuum, but in the light of the Respondent's
disclosed affirmative positions, and in that context to explore with the Union possible
alternative courses or compromise solutions that might lead to a mutually satis-
factory accord.
ue The Respondent's intention to follow in 1960 the "Boulware" approach to bargaining
is reflected by Vice President Parker's comments to plant managers and other members
of GE supervision in early 1960, as reported in section C, 2, above It will be recalled
that Parker described that approach as follows:
The Boulware approach to this has been that we would go forward and do the
things we felt appropriate. We would then offer these to the Union, and if they
saw fit to accept them, why God bless them, but if they didn't well they could
do something else.
117 Cf California Girl, Inc, 129 NLRB 209, 219. "While the Act does not require that
either party yield to the other's proposals, there must be at least a capacity and poten-
11tiality for yielding .. . .
775-692-65-vol. 150-19
272 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
That does not mean of course that the Respondent had to submit to endless discus-
sions before finalizing its offer. It is quite clear, however, considering the magnitude
of the negotiations here involved, that 1 day was far too little and 3 days certainly
not too much. The situation here might have been different had the Respondent dis-
closed to the Union during the earlier negotiations-before it announced its offer-
the affirmative proposals it had under consideration and had then provided an ade-
quate opportunity for discussion, exploration, and consideration of alternative courses
or solutions that might bring the parties together. But this it did not do.118 It chose
instead to disclose its affirmative positions for the first time in its "fair, firm offer"-
an offer which in most basic respects was unresponsive to the Union's demands, sub-
stituting for some of them different approaches never theretofore explored in the
negotiations-and to bind its offer after only 1 day's discussion to policies inhibiting
and obstructing its bona fide consideration thereafter of conflicting union positions
on contract issues. The course the Respondent chose amounted in effect to a unilateral
determination of employment terms, leaving negotiations thereafter-unless it devi-
ated from its own policies-an empty exercise with predetermined results.119
(5)
The course taken by, the Respondent in the negotiations is not alone enough to
establish, but neither is it such as to rebut, if found established by other circum-
stances, an inference that the Respondent negotiated with a fixed predetermination not
to deviate materially from its bargaining policies. During the approximately 25 meet-
ings that took place between August 30, when the Respondent presented its offer, and
October 19, when the Respondent declared an impasse, the Respondent made only
two changes in its offer that it considered of sufficient consequence to mention in its
employee communications. One was the "early signing bonus" change, not requested
by the Union, which was announced just before the IUE convention recess and was
thereafter capitalized upon in the Respondent's communication program aimed at
weakening employee support of the Union. The other was the holiday-vacation option
which was offered in the face of the Union's theretofore declared opposition thereto
and was represented to employees as being a voluntary rearrangement of its offer in
response to employee desires. Far from showing good faith, or a departure from the
Respondent's declared bargaining policies, the circumstances surrounding the original
offer of the holiday-vacation option-set out in section L, above-evidence, it is
found, precisely the opposite. Of the remaining three changes made during the period
stated, two-providing for the furnishing of actuarial information relating to the pen-
sion and insurance plans-did no more than confirm an already existing practice.
Moreover, they involved noneconomic changes outside the Respondent's basic offer.
The third-the exclusion K change, of uncertain date-129 involved a minor revision
in the companywide insurance plan. Although regarded as an improvement by the
Union, it was not a concession in the sense that it met a specific union demand, nor
was it a change specifically negotiated. This, in the Respondent's view, may well have
fallen within the category of a voluntary adjustment of "error" disclosed by new
information. The elimination of the retraining provision, stressed by the Respondent
in its brief, occurred after the Union strike capitulation, and, as shown by the find-
ings in section R, above, reflects, if anything, not a deviation from but a stubborn
adherence to its bargaining policies during the period of negotiations when the
Respondent was seeking to impress on employees that its offer was immutable. The
remaining modifications, reported in section 0, above, occurred during the post-
vs In the respect stated, among others, this case is clearly distinguishable from The
Philip Carey Manufacturing Company, etc ., case, 140 NLRB 1103, recently decided by
the Board.
It may.well be that any other course would have confronted the Respondent with
practical procedural difficulties in achieving its aim for substantial contract uniformity
in its multiple union relationships . That aim, however , while entirely legitimate in it-
self, cannot be elevated to a principle excusing noncompliance with good -faith bargaining
procedures . Just because the Respondent might find it procedurally inconvenient or im-
practicable to realize its uniformity goal by engaging in full bargaining with all unions
before freezing its offer is no justification for its failure to bargain with any one union-
and particularly the IDE, by far the largest union in its chain. Inland Steel Company,
77 NLRB 1, 11, 32, enfd . 170 F. 2d 247 (C.A. 7), cert. denied 336 U.S. 960 . Effectuation
of the Respondent 's private policies cannot be made paramount to the Act 's command.
m See section 0, above.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 273
settlement meetings and are of little value in appraising the Respondent's bargaining
frame of mind during the period of actual negotiations. 121
As already noted, the ultimate issue in this case, whether the Respondent's overall
conduct in the negotiations constituted good- or bad-faith bargaining, cannot be
decided on the basis of the substantive positions the Respondent took, but must rest on
"inference based on more or less persuasive manifestations of [its] state of mind."
Some of the considerations bearing on that point have already been stated. Others,
disclosed by its contemporaneous conduct away from the conference room and by its
behavior at the bargaining table, other than as shown by its stand on substantive issues,
will be covered below.
(6)
The Respondent's communications program and related conduct, now to be con-
sidered, bears significantly on the frame of mind with which the Respondent partici-
pated in the 1960 negotiations.
The Respondent's communications program has been dealt with in various sections,
above.122 As has been seen, the Respondent through its extensive employee com-
munication system (a) anticipated the Union's major bargaining demands long before
the start of negotiations and began to condition employee attitudes to a favorable
reception of its views and rejection of the Union's conflicting positions; (b) after the
presentation of the Union's demands but before the actual start of negotiations, vig-
orously criticized the Union's demands as endangering job security and questioned the
motives of the IUE leadership; (c) during the negotiations, continued along the lines
above indicated, and, in addition, presented, at some plants practically on a daily basis,
reports on the progress of negotiations, highly slanted in its favor; and (d) following
the presentation of its offer deluged employees with communications designed to induce
them to pressure the Union into acceptance of its offer, to discredit the motives and
integrity of the IUE leadership, and to achieve other objectives presently to be more
specifically adverted to.
It was found in section C, 1, above, that the Respondent's approach to collective
bargaining has as its keystone the direct marketing to employees of management bar-
gaining positions on bargaining issues designed to induce employee pressures for union
acceptance. The character of the communications the Respondent issued relating to
the 1960'negotiations confirms the validity of that finding.
As is evident from Parker's and Moore's remarks to managerial and supervisory
employees during their swing around the GE chain in the prenegotiation period-see
section C, 2, above-and as is apparent also from the content of the communications,
the Respondent's underlying approach appears to assume, where bargaining issues are
concerned, that its employees should be regarded as standing in the positior 'of cus-
tomers with both the Respondent and the Union competing for their allegiance, trade,
and support. Such an approach is scarcely conducive to good-faith bargaining, which
presuppposes that both parties will enter the conference room "with an open mind
and a sincere desire to reach an agreement in a spirit of amity and cooperation." 123
It discourages cooperation between management and the employees' bargaining repre-
sentative by setting off one against the other; breeds resentment, distrust, and friction;
tends to constrict bargaining mobility because of positions publicly taken; and intro-
duces into deliberations considerations extraneous to bargaining that serve to divert
the attention and energies of the negotiators from their main business at hand, the
negotiation of, an agreement. The underlying concept of the Respondent's apprdach,
that the Union is a competitor for employee support rather, than the voice, and ears of
the, employees it represents, reflects adversely on the quality of the Respondent's recog-
nition of the Union and on the degree of its acceptance of the principles,.piocesses, and
procedures of collective bargaining. While not controlling in itself, it is a circumstance
that must be taken into account in assessing,the Respondents other conduct in'this
case bearing on its negotiating frame of mind.
Izl As to practically all of them, the Respondent either gave up nothing or actually im-
proved its position. The Respondent points to its agreement to continue the Burlington
and Bucyrus units under the national agreement as the clearest evidence of its good faith.
However,,I do not understand that any claim,is being made in this case that the Respondent
was seeking to rid itself of the Union. The issue of good-or,bad-faith in this case
turns on entirely different considerations, to which the point made by the Respondent is
irrelevant.
I
122 For a general, summary covering the • period after the start of negotiations, see
section F, 3.
196 See, e.g., N.L R.B. v. Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company, 118 F. 2d 874, 875;
X.L.R.B. v. Atlanta Broadcasting Company, 193 F. 2d 641, 642 (C.A. 5).
274 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
What has just been said is not meant to suggest that it is unlawful as such for an
employer to communicate to his employees his positions on subjects involved in bar-
gaining or to report to employees on the progress of bargaining.124 Nor is it meant
to suggest that it is intrinsically unlawful for an employer to criticize during the course
of bargaining the union with which he deals or its leadership. What we are concerned
with here is not the legality of the Respondent's communications per se, but the
Respondent's 1960 bargaining frame of mind as it may be revealed in part by its use
of the communications.
I do not understand the General Counsel to claim more, though in one respect his
position appears equivocal. At oral argument, the General Counsel agreed-although
theretofore his position at the hearing had been variable-that he did not intend to
charge a "per se violation" by the allegation of his complaint relating to the Respond-
ent's efforts to persuade the employees to "accept" its August 30 offer.125 However,
the General Counsel continued to assert, as he does in his brief, that the Respondent's
direct appeals through its communications program to employees as individuals to
"accept"-the word is the General Counsel's, not the Respondent's-the Respondent's
bargaining positions constituted a form of "direct bargaining" within the interdiction
of the Medo Photo principle.126 If so, this would of course spell out a claim of an
independent violation. The point, however, is unimportant, for I am persuaded in any
event that, except for the direct local bargaining earlier considered, the Medo Photo
principle has no direct application to the facts of this case. The communications
program undoubtedly reflects that the Respondent sought primarily to deal with the
Union through the employees rather than with the employees through the Union, thus
distorting the accepted appproach. But the Respondent did not seek to conclude
agreements with the employees, or to displace the Union as the contracting party, only
to influence employees to bring pressure to bear on the Union's leadership that would
force the Union, as their bargaining agent, to accept the Respondent's terms.
But though the communications may have been lawful or even "protected," stand-
ing alone, they are nevertheless relevant to the ultimate issue here involved-the state
of mind with which the Respondent entered into and participated in the negotia-
tions.127 For example, the Respondent's very use of its communications program
supplies some basis, although not alone enough, for an inference that the Respondent,
having followed its "fair, firm offer" approach to bargaining in that respect, also fol-
lowed it in others, thereby precluding genuine bargaining for reasons earlier found.
More important, a showing that the Respondent's communications program was such
as to disclose a determination on its part to rely entirely on its effectiveness to achieve
acceptance of its contract proposals would provide a basis for an inference that it was
sitting out the negotiations while waiting for that program to have its corrosive effect,
and was therefore engaging in negotiation with an attitude that was one of evasion
rather than fulfillment of its statutory obligation. Of course that inference would not
alone be enough to establish the ultimate conclusion, and would have to be rejected,
for example, if shown to be inconsistent with the Respondent's actual conduct at the
bargaining table. On the other hand, other manifestations of bad faith at or away
from the bargaining table would buttress it. As stated by Frankfurter, J. in the Insur-
ance Agents' case, supra, at 508:
-The Board in a number of cases has declined to base 8 ( a) (5) findings upon such
communications alone, where " in their context and in the context of events [they] were
not shown to have been unlawfully motivated ." See Fitzgerald Mills Corporation, 133
NLRB 877 , 882, footnote 20, where the cases so holding are collected along with summary
descriptions of the nature of the communications involved in each. On the other hand,
the Board , with court approval , has considered employer communications to employees as
evidence of bad-faith bargaining , where it has found that the communications, in the
context of other relevant circumstances , reflected an intent , not simply to inform the em-
ployees, but to undermine the representative status, authority , or prestige of the Union,
as part of a program to evade bargaining obligations under the Act. See, e g., Fitzgerald
Mills Corporation, supra, enfd, 313 F. 2d 260, 268 (C.A. 2) ; N.L.R B. v. Reed & Prince
Manufacturing Company, 118 F. 2d 874, 882 (C.A. 1), enfg. 12 NLRB 944.
As to the companion allegation, relating to the Respondent's "campaign" to discredit
and impugn the motives and abilities of the IUE leadership , the General Counsel made
it clear from the beginning that he did not claim this as an independent violation.
Ise Medo Photo Supply Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678.
7 See quotation from separate opinion of Frankfurter , J., in the Insurance Agents' case,
supra. The Respondent 's defense that Section 8(c) precludes any consideration of the
communications as evidence will be considered later.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 275
The Board's function in the enforcement of the duty to bargain does not end when
it has properly drawn an inference unfavorable to the respondent from particular
conduct. It must weigh that inference as part of the totality of inferences which
may appropriately be drawn from the entire conduct of the repsondent, particu-
larly its conduct at the bargaining table.
Similarly, a showing that the Respondent considered itself bound by expressed
policies or positions that "obstruct[ed] or inhibit[ed] the actual process of discussion,
or-reflect[ed] a cast of mind against reaching agreement" 128 would also supply a
basis for an inference of bad faith.
The character, content, and volume of the Respondent's communications program
that followed the presentation of its offer-along with its other contemporaneous con-
duct, some of it containing independent indicia of bad faith-supports, I am persuaded,
the several inferences suggested above-and this for the reasons that follow.129
The factual findings earlier made leave little doubt of Respondent's determination
to rely primarily on its employee communications program rather than on negotiations
as the means of gaining acceptance of its offer. Thus, Moore in his swing around the
GE chain in early 1960 made clear to management personnel that the solution of the
1960 negotiating problems would depend on the Company establishing through its
written and oral communications its "credibility" on which it might draw "this fall
when the votes are cast whether the folks believe you or believe the opposition." Long
before negotiations began, the Respondent laid out, and thereafter followed, a care-
fully designed program to condition employee attitudes and opinions for the favorable
reception of the Respondent's offer and rejection of the Union's competing demands.
The paramount importance the Respondent assigned to direct employee persuasion
over negotiations is clearly illustrated by its insistent haste in pubicizing its offer so
that it might get underway the elaborate communications program it had in readiness,
despite the Union's reasonable request that such publication be withheld so as not to
interfere with bargaining. After presentation of its offer, the Respondent's communi-
cations program relating to the negotiations reached massive proportions, thereafter
maintained until the end of the strike.130 The offer, along with the Respondent's
justifications for it, was orally presented to employees at plant meetings in a manner
calculated to minimize the influence of collective bargaining, to impress upon
employees that the Respondent had gone as far as it could without endangering the
future of its business and the security of employee jobs, and to make it appear that
the only alternative to acceptance was a "long pay-losing strike." About the same
time, the Respondent began, and thereafter continued, to deluge employees with com-
munications, numbering at some plants at least one and sometimes as many as three
or four a day, in the form of plant newspapers, daily bulletins, letters to homes,
newspaper ads, radio and television messages, etc., extolling the merits of its offer and
advancing the Respondent's positions on other issues as they arose, while continuing
in the meantime to provide employees with reports, highly slanted in its favor, on the
daily course of the negotiations. The Respondent also instructed its supervisors not
only to impress upon employees the merits of the Respondent's bargaining position,
N L.R.B. v. Benno Katz etc., d/b/a Williamsburg Steel Products Co., supra.
The Respondent's communications program prior to August 30 also lends support
for such inferences, but only because of what followed. It should be noted, moreover,
that the Respondent's communications prior to August 30 are not wanting in independent
indicia of bad faith Thus, as appears from findings earlier made, the Respondent in its
communications to employees criticized to employees the Union's demands before first
discussing them with the Union, placed a cost estimate on the Union's demands that it
later declined during negotiations to justify to the Union, and as to some subjects argued
its positions more fully to employees than it did to the Union in the conference room,
thereby indicating that it was more concerned with marketing its positions to employees
than with persuading their bargaining agent. (Cf General Electric Co. v. Go)ack, 68
F. Supp. 686.) The Respondent's one-sided reporting to employees of the progress of
the negotiation, while professing a purpose to keep employees "fully informed," Is, I find,
a further reflection of a lack of good faith It is also noted that during this period the
Respondent, in anticipation of its upcoming offer, stressed its "fair, firm offer" approach to
collective bargaining, pointing out, inter also, its policy to put everything in its original
offer shown by its own thorough research to be "right," not to engage later in haggling
or horsetrading, and not to improve its offer because of union belligerence, or to avoid
a strike or threat of strike. Taken by and large, however, the communications prior to
August 30, had they stood in this case alone, would not, in my opinion , have been suf-
ficient to support a substantial inference of bad-faith bargaining.
230 See sections F, 3, J, N, and P, 3, above.
276 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
but also to sound out employee reactions thereto. In addition, the Respondent
invited and encouraged employees to discuss directly with plant management ques-
tions they might have about the offer, and at one large plant held a series of round-
table meetings for that purpose. The Board has held it to be a form of bypassing, and
hence evidence of bad faith, for an employer to invite employees to talk directly to
management about bargaining matters, or to seek to learn directly from employees
their reactions to his bargaining position.131 It is accordingly so found in this case.
The very massiveness of the communications program is itself a measure of the
Respondent's determination to deal essentially, not with the employees through the
Union, but with the Union through the employees, evidencing, I find, a purpose to
undercut not only the Union's bargaining position, but its authority as bargaining
agent as well. The Respondent, to be sure, was not seeking to undermine the Union
in the sense of displacing it as the employee representative whose ultimate consent
would be required for a contract. But the question here is not whether the Respond-
ent's conduct was illegal per se-I have already found it was not. Rather, it is whether
such conduct tends to support at least a tentative inference of a frame of mind
antithetical to simultaneous good-faith bargaining in the conference room. I think
clearly it does.
Clear corroborating support for such an inference is found in the 'Respondent's
course of conduct which immediately followed the IUE convention, at which the
IUE negotiating committee passed a resolution calling for local votes on the question
of acceptance or rejection of the Respondent's offer. The Respondent's reaction to
that resolution, described in section N, above, vividly points up (1) the Respondent's
utilization of its direct approach to employees to undercut the Union's bargaining
position, authority, and prestige; (2) its reliance on that approach as a substitute for
genuine bargaining; and (3) the inhibiting impact of that approach on its bargaining
frame of mind.
Thus, as has been seen-see section N, above-the Respondent immediately reacted
to the convention resolution by interjecting itself into an area, recognized by law to be
exclusively one for internal union regulation and of no legitimate employer con-
cern.132 Bypassing the Union, it contacted IUE local officials directly in an effort
to persuade them to alter the time fixed for the balloting and the question to be voted
on. To induce acceptance of its proposals and gain employee support therefor, it
offered, inter aria, to pay for employee time lost in voting and, at some places, for
voting facilities and employee transportation. At the same time, the Respondent
loosed a virulent attack on the Union's election plans and on the motives and
integrity of the IUE top leadership, containing in part misrepresentations of fact. The
tactic of attacking the motives of the IUE leadership had been decided upon as a
communications approach long in advance of the negotiations. Considered in the
context of accompanying events, the Respondent's aforesaid conduct was, I am per-
suaded, motivated by a deliberate purpose to undermine the authority and prestige
of the union leadership as an aid to the Respondent's direct "selling" bargaining
approach. It constituted, I find, a further reflection of an attitude inconsistent with
good-faith recognition and dealing with the Union.133
When, on September 8, the negotiations recessed for the IUE convention, there
had been only seven meetings with the Respondent's offer on the table. Under the
schedule earlier agreed upon, meetings were to resume on September 20 and con-
tinue to the end of the month. The Respondent made no claim then, nor does it now,
than an impasse in negotiations had been reached by September 8, nor would such a
claim, if made, be valid.134
Before meetings resumed on September 20, however, the Respondent, in further-
ance of its campaign to induce employees to vote for acceptance of its offer, took
steps to announce to employees, even before it announced to the Union, that its full
iai Tex-Tan, Inc., 134 NLRB 253, 274; Crater Lake Machinery Co., 131 NLRB 1106;
cf. Harcourt and Company, Inc., 98 NLRB 892, where the Board found such conduct
violative of 8(a) (1) but not of 8(a) (5).
=Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 113 NLRB 1288, 1294, affd 356 U.S. 342.
IM See N.L.R B. v. Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company, 118 F. 2d 874, 881, 882
(C.A. 1) ; N.L R.B. v. Fitzgerald Mills Corporation, 313 F. 2d 260, 268 (CA. 2).
334 At the time of the recess, the Union's bargaining position was still fluid, and it con-
tinued to remain so after negotiations were resumed. It is noted that the Respondent,
following the recess, publicly criticized the Union for not continuing negotiations during
the convention, even though the recess had been agreed to when the schedule of meetings
had originally been set up. Moreover, it was not until after the September 8 meeting
adjourned that the Respondent submitted informally its vacation-holiday options. The
Respondent during the negotiations did not actually assert an impasse until October 19.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 277
offer was now on the table and that as a matter of company policy the Respondent
would not "up" its offer because of a strike or threat of strike "... it never has in the
past, and it won't now."
To give support to the declarations already being made to employees, the Respond-
ent hastened to announce to the Union, almost as the first order of business when
negotiations were resumed on September 20, that its offer was now "final" and would
not thereafter be altered, a declaration of position which it thereafter continually
reiterated during the negotiations and duly reported to employees. To impress further
on employees the credibility of its assertions as to the finality of its bargaining stand,
the Respondent on the same day authorized its operating managers to make effective
for nonrepresented employees, as of September 12, the wage increases provided for
in the Respondent's basic offer to all unions, and to announce the establishment of
other benefits that were to become operative on October 2. Two days later the
Respondent, substantially conceding but ignoring the Union's objection that its action
would inhibit negotiated modifications, authorized the announcement to nonrepre-
sented employees of the pension changes that were not to be operative in any event
until the end of the year. As found above, the Respondent's decision to accelerate the
announced establishment for nonrepresented employees of the terms of its 1960
basic offer was an integral part of its program to influence IUE employees to vote
for acceptance of the Respondent's offer. The inhibiting effect of that action will be
pointed out later.
After the IUE convention, no less than before and during the convention, the
Respondent continued to flood the employees with a constant stream of communica-
tions plugging the merits of its bargaining positions. In some instances it advanced
arguments not only more full but different from those presented to the union negotia-
tors at the bargaining table, a circumstance found herein to constitute the clearest evi-
dence of bargaining bad faith.135 General Electric Co. v. Gojack, supra. The
employee communications after the convention, as well as throughout the balance
of the negotiations, stressed particularly (a) the finality of the Respondent's offer
and the futility of further negotiations; (b) the Respondent's firm policy not to
enlarge its offer because of a strike or threat of strike, regardless of its duration;
(c) the asserted "selfish," "irresponsible," and "political" motives of the IUE leader-
ship; and (d) the asserted jeopardy to employee jobs that would flow from any
enlargement of the Respondent's offer or from a strike. As found above, the constant
repetition of the theme referred to in (d), above, and the manner of its presentation,
were such as to reflect a conscious and deliberate purpose to play on employees'
fears and insecurities. The Respondent was careful, generally speaking, to couch its
warnings of job jeopardy in the form of predictions that cannot be classified as unlaw-
ful in themselves. But the record reflects a number of instances 135 where the warn-
ings were such as to be intrinsically coercive.137 Considered in the context of accom-
panying events, the aforesaid communications program reveals that the Respondent's
purpose was not simply to keep employees informed of its views on bargaining and
related issues, as it professes. It reflects beyond that, I find, a deliberate design to
undermine employee faith and confidence in the Union's leadership and in the efficacy
of the collective-bargaining process. It is difficult to reconcile such an effort outside
the conference room with an attitude of good-faith recognition and dealing at the
bargaining table.
There can be little doubt from the totality of its conduct that the Respondent was
determined-certainly after the resumption of meetings on September 20-merely to
go through the motions of bargaining in the conference room and to rely entirely on
135 See particularly ERM Stevens' remarks to Schenectady employees on September 21
and comments thereon, reported in section N, 6, above.
'° See, e g., Waterford letter to employees, dated September 16, re strike bringing about
a reversal of promotions, downgradings, etc. (section N, 6) ; foremen warnings to em-
ployees at Lynn, re danger of GE top management closing down Lynn plant entirely if
a strike ensued (section N, 6) ; letters of Oakland plant manager to striking employees,
dated October 7 and 14 (section P, 3) ; Lynn letter to employees, dated October 14
(section P, 3).
's' See International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (NE CO
Electrical Products Corp.) v. N.L.R.B., 289 F. 2d 757, 763; Haynes Stellate Company, 136
NLRB 95; Texas Industries, Inc., etc., 139 NLRB 365. It is noted that the com-
plaint does not allege any independent interference, restraint, and coercion by, virtue of
the communications. The finding made above is relevant only to the Respondent's 8(c)
defense to be considered infra.
278 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the effectiveness of its direct "sales" approach to employees to resolve the bargaining
issues in its favor . Indeed, the Respondent virtually stated as much when in its union
news bulletin , dated September 21, it declared:
And so the real scene of negotiations shifts from New York to all IUE-
represented plants. The eventual outcome will be decided there-quite
properly-quite soon.
The Respondent in its brief stresses that it did not announce the finality of its
offer until after the Union's negotiating committee had made apparent its intention to
strike the Respondent at the end of the contract term if the Respondent did not
improve its offer in material respects . The point the Respondent seeks to make is not
entirely clear . 138 However , the Respondent appears to suggest that the announced
finality of its offer, as well as the campaign it waged largely on that basis to reduce
employee support for strike action, was, no less than the strike threat , a legitimate
bargaining pressure tactic from which no inference of bad faith may be drawn. Else-
where in its brief , the Respondent points to the rule of the Insurance Agents' case,
supra, that bad faith in negotiations cannot be inferred alone from economic weapons
designed to exert pressure in collective bargaining . It argues that if "disruptive"
pressure tactics of the kind the union in Insurance Agents' engaged in do not support
a refusal-to-bargain charge, then the Respondent 's "protected " tactics in this case
certainly cannot . The Insurance Agents' case, however, provides the Respondent
with a weak crutch on which to lean.
In Insurance Agents' there was no claim of bad faith in the actual negotiations.
The sole question there was whether the union's pressure tactics, without more, were
sufficient to spell out an 8 (b) (3) violation . The Court's holding was a narrow one
(at 490) :
The scope of § 8 (b ) ( 3) and the limitations on Board power which were the
design of § 8(d ) are exceeded , we hold, by inferring a lack of good faith not
from any deficiencies in the Union's performance at the bargaining table by
reason of its attempted use of economic pressure but solely and simply because
tactics designed to exert economic pressure were employed during good faith
negotiations.
In N.L .R.B. v. Benne Katz, etc., 369 U.S. 736 , 747, the Supreme Court explained
its holding in Insurance Agents' as follows:
We held that Congress had not in § 8(b)(3), the counterpart of § 8(a )(5), em-
powered the Board to pass judgment on the legitimacy of any particular weapon
used in support of genuine bargaining . But the Board is authorized to order
cessation of behavior which is in effect a refusal to negotiate , or which directly
obstructs or inhibits the actual process of discussion , or which reflects a cast
of mind against reaching agreement.
In the instant case, we are concerned not with the legitimacy of the communica-
tions and related conduct as such, but with the manner in which they influenced the
Respondent's bargaining attitude in the negotiations themselves . As will presently
be shown, the record in this case clearly supports a finding that the pressure tactics
employed by the Respondent-even assuming their legality otherwise-not only
tended to but did result in "deficiencies in [its] performance at the bargaining table"
that "obstruct [ed] and inhibit [ed]" good-faith bargaining . It is to a consideration of
that aspect of this case that I now turn.
(7)
Note has already been made of the importance the Respondent attaches to main-
taining its credibility with employees for the success of its direct marketing approach
to bargaining.
The Respondent's course of conduct was such as to make its continued credibility
dependent largely upon intransigence in the negotiations once it presented its offer
to the Union , and certainly so once it announced to employees the finality of its bar-
gaining position.
'as It is evident of course that a threat of strike does not, any more than a strike itself,
suspend the obligation to bargain in good faith. Pecheur Lozenge Co . v. N.L.R.B., 209
F. 2d 393 (C.A. 2).
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 279
Thus, the Respondent adopted and publicized to employees a bargaining policy
under which it committed itself "voluntarily " to include in its original offer everything
of substance shown by its research to be "right"; to stand firm on that offer except to
correct factual errors disclosed by new information ; and to reject the give-and-take
procedures of trading and compromise as a method of resolving bargaining issues.
The Respondent emphasized under that declared policy that it would in no event
make a change in its offer it believed not "right" simply to avert a strike or threat of
strike-or , to state the same concept differently, though the Respondent does not
formulate it this way, simply to reach an accord. Prior to the presentation of its
offer, the Respondent through its communications to employees had already expressed
with respect to practically all the Union's significant bargaining demands its firm con-
viction that they were not "right." With the presentation of its offer to the Union,
the Respondent mounted , and thereafter maintained , an elaborate sales promotional
campaign to impress upon employees the correctness of its offer as opposed to the
Union's competing demands, emphasizing also that it had gone in its offer as far
as it reasonably could without endangering the future of its business and the security
of employee jobs. Then, at a time when the negotiations still had more than 2 weeks
to run before the end of the old contract , the Respondent announced to employees
the finality of its bargaining position , redeclaring at the same time its firm policy not
to yield concessions because of union aggression . Simultaneously, as a tactical meas-
ure designed to persuade employees that it meant what it said, the Respondent accel-
erated the effectiveness for nonrepresented employees of its basic offer. To have
enlarged its offer to the Union thereafter would give the lie to its declarations to unor-
ganized employees , and to others as well, that it was company policy "to do right
voluntarily," and that a union could obtain no added benefits it would not otherwise
grant.
The Respondent thus locked itself into a position where it could not deviate signifi-
cantly from its original offer without impairing the credibility with employees that it
considered so basic to its employee relations and the success of its bargaining
techniques.
A willingness to deal with a spirit of cooperation and to maintain a state of mind
open to persuasion and to the possibility of altering or modifying on a give-and-take
basis positions previously asserted is of the essence of good-faith bargaining. But
the course the Respondent took was one that could only lead, once its offer'was
presented , as in fact it did, to a rigidity in its bargaining attitude that is wholly at
variance with such good -faith concepts . And particularly was this so once the
Respondent elected to place its bargaining position in a deep freeze by declaring to
employees the irrevocable finality of its offer.
The Respondent argues that its course of conduct did not preclude changes in its
bargaining position even after the announcement of finality to employees , because it
still lay within its power to make them . I suppose that this is so theoretically, but
not as a practical matter. For example, the Respondent was scarcely likely to con-
sider in good faith union proposals for significant modifications in its offer in early
September while engaged in "selling" the offer directly to employees via the elaborate
communication program it had earlier prepared , as one that had been carefully
designed to meet their "needs and desires " And it was even less likely, after declar-
ing to employees in mid-September the finality of its bargaining position and building
on that foundation its campaign to persuade employees of-the futility of strike action,
to weaken the force of its campaign by any action that might show it did not mean
what it said . I do not doubt that if the Respondent 's attempts to gain direct employee
support had met with solid resistance and a lengthy strike, the Respondent might have
forsaken considerations of prestige for considerations of expediency and retreated
from its earlier declared course. But it was highly improbable that the Respondent
would risk impairment of its valued credibility with employees by retreat , except as
a last resort and only after a strike of some duration , a strike which under such cir-
cumstances would itself frustrate statutory policy. And in the meantime, the
Respondent's bargaining frame of mind was bound to remain constricted by factors
impeding the possibility of genuine negotiations.
The foregoing circumstances , I find , support an inference that the Respondent by
reason of its calculated course of conduct so made itself a captive of its own bargain-
ing policies as to substantially inhibit and obstruct good-faith negotiations.
On this record , however, it is unnecessary to rely on inference alone to reach
that conclusion.
280 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It will be recalled-see section 0, above-that at the meeting of September 28,
after the Respondent had rejected a "within-the-framework" compromise proposal by
Union Committeeman Jandreau, Jandreau inquired whether there was any possibility
of the Company "changing its position one iota." Moore stated in reply there was
not, explaining, inter alia:
... after telling the employees before they went to vote that this [offer] was it,
we would look ridiculous to change it at this late date... .
Moore did not dispute the Union's charge that the Respondent had in effect shut out
its potentiality for bargaining mobility because of what it had told the employees.
He reiterated: -
I said two things-one, that everything we think we should do is in the proposal
and we told our employees that, and we would look ridiculous if we changed now.
Hilbert's subsequent colloquy with Jandreau at the same meeting-quoted at length
in section 0, above-is even more illuminating. It leaves little doubt that the
Respondent (1) was closely adhering in the 1960 negotiations to the constrictive
tenets of its "fair firm offer" approach, and (2) considered itself chained to that
approach for reasons of prestige because of its policy declarations to employees and
others. This is apparent from Hilbert's statement of "three possible reasons," wherein
he asserted in substance that: (1) If the Respondent were to change its offer at that
time, it would appear as if the Respondent had intentionally held something back
from its original offer and, as a result, "we would look foolish in the eyes of the
employees and others"; 139 (2) a change might have been allowable if the Respondent
"made a serious error, an inadvertent error in the offer," but the Respondent had "no
evidence of that," and (3) if the Respondent were to change its offer just to avoid
a strike, "then we would look even more foolish in the eyes of our people and the
country."
There would have been no reason for the Respondent to have looked "ridiculous"
or "foolish" to employees by changing its offer, were it not for the fact that through
its policy and other declarations to employees it had made its credibility and prestige
dependent upon intransigence in the negotiations.
The statements of Moore and Hilbert at the September 28 meeting thus support
and confirm the validity of the "locking in" inference stated above.
-(8)
I come now to the Respondent's Section 8(c) defense.140 The Respondent contends
that 8(c) by its terms precludes the Board from in any way considering its employee
communications as "evidence" to support, directly or indirectly, the alleged unfair
labor practice violations. For reasons stated below, I do not agree.
Preliminarily, it must be emphasized again that the legality of the communications
or the right of the Respondent to communicate to employees is not the issue involved.
The Respondent's communications have been considered here only as part of the
totality of its conduct reflecting on the state of mind with which it entered into and
participated in the negotiations.
The absolutist view the Respondent takes of Section 8(c) is at odds with the
legislative history of that section, with the main body of Board and court precedents
that relate to it, and with the effectual administration by the Board of the legislative
objectives entrusted to it. It is perfectly obvious, to begin with, that Congress could
not have intended a strictly literal construction of Section 8(c) which would bar
employer expressions from being considered under any circumstances for their pro-
bative bearing on unfair labor practices not concerned with the legality of the expres-
sions themselves. Certainly, no one would contend, for example, that an employer's
arguments to a union in the course of bargaining, or to employees where individual
or direct bargaining is directly in issue, must be ignored in deciding whether Section
139 Both Hilbert and Moore at the same meeting made clear that they did not consider
that any significant changes had been made in the offer up to that point. Hilbert declared,
"The whole thing has been crystallized for a month now; Mr. Carey, and it has been on
the table." Moore stated, "We didn't wait until the last day to put forth a proposal,
Mr. Jandreau. It was on the table on August 30 and it is all on the table now."
140 Section 8(c) in pertinent part reads as follows:
The expressing of any views, argument or opinion, or the dissemination thereof . . .
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice . . . If such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 281
8(a)(5) has been-violated. The legislative history of Section 8(c)-discloses that
Congress' primary purpose in providing that noncoercive expressions should not "be
evidence of an unfair labor practice" was to prevent the Board from continuing the
practice it had theretofore allegedly followed of linking employer speech with wholly
unrelated conduct so as to make one or the other illegal.141 Senator Taft in his
analysis of Section 8(c) left no doubt that Congress did not intend that section to
be so applied as to "make incompetent evidence which would ordinarily be deemed
relevant and admissible in courts of law." 142 The Supreme Court has given approval
to that view, expressly where noncoercive speech is found to have been used in
furtherance of an unlawful purpose,143 implicitly in other situations.144 Various
courts have stated that Section 8(c) was intended to do no more than restate the
principles embodied in the first amendment.145
. It is quite clear of course that where, as here, a respondent's state of mind is in
issue, it can only be established by circumstantial evidence. What he says, as well
as what he does, including his expressions of views, if they are relevant manifestations
of his state of mind, constitute competent evidence bearing on that issue, falling
within the category of admissions.146 Thus, in Section 8(a)(3) cases, the Board,
with court approval, frequently considers an employer's closely related expressions
of views, argument, or opinion, although finding them privileged under Section 8(c),
as evidence bearing on the issue of his motive in effecting the discharge.147 Com-
munications to employees protected under Section 8(c) have also been held compe-
tent evidence in other unfair labor practice situations, where a respondent's state of
mind or attitude tends to explain or elucidate the conduct complained of.148 They
are no less so in the situation here involved.149
Here, the Respondent's communications program was more than closely related to;
it formed an integral part of its declared approach to bargaining. Consideration of
that program is clearly essential to an understanding of the Respondent's bargaining
frame of mind. To give but one example, the Respondent's attitude at the bargaining
table, as reflected by Moore's and Hilbert's statements on September 28, reported
shortly above, cannot be interpreted or evaluated except against the backdrop of
the communications program.
It must further be noted that many of the statements contained in the communica-
tions were declarations of positions, rather than expressions of views, argument, and
opinion in a strict sense. Included within that category are the Respondent's state-
ments concerning its "fair, firm offer" approach, the finality of its bargaining position,
and its firm policy not to yield more because of a strike or threat of strike. Declara-
tions of that kind, while not coercive, can scarcely be classified under any reasonable
view as the type of expressions 8(c) was designed to exclude from evidentiary consid-
eration if otherwise relevant to the alleged unfair labor practices. Further, as found
above, the Respondent's communications were not entirely free from coercive state-
ments, and in some instances held out offers of benefit. The Respondent's communica-
tions program, moreover, was closely, integrated with other conduct, such as its
solicitation of employees to express to company management their views on bargain-
141 See Senator Taft's analysis, 2 Leg. Hist. 1541, 1624 ; see also S. Rept. 105,
80th Cong., 1st seas., 23-24 (1947), 1 Leg. Hist. 429-430; H. Conf. Rept. 510,
80th Cong; 1st sess.'45 (1947), 1 Leg. Hist 549; Psttsburgh S. S. Company v. N.L.R.B.,
180 F. 2d 731, 735 (C.A. 6).
142 2 Leg. Hist. 1541. Senator Taft cited as an example "statements which might be
deemed admissions under ordinary rules of evidence."
10 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, et al. (Samuel Langer)
v. N.L R B , 341 U S. 694, 705.
144 N L.R.B. v. United Steelworkers of America, CIO (Nutone Inc ), 357 U.S. 357. Com-
pare the Court's opinion, particularly at 364, with Chief Justice Warren's dissent. And
see Note, 57 Mich. L.R 615 (1959).
145 N.L R.B. v. LaSalle Steel Company, 178 F. 2d 829, 835 (C.A. 7) ; N.L R.B..v. Kropp
Forge Co., 178 F. 2d 822,- 828,; N.L.R.B., v. -Bailey Company (East Side Branch), 180
F. 2d 278, 280 (C.A. 6) `
1453 Wlgmore, Evidence, §11725, 1731, 1732 (3d ed.).
147 See Baker Hotel of Dallas, Inc., 134 NLRB 524, 528-529, enfd. 311 F. 2d 528
(CA. 5) ; Southern Desk Company, 116 NLRB 1168, 1177, enfd. 246 F. 2d,53 (C.A. 4) ;
Edward Brothers, Inc, 95 NLRB 1451, 1452, footnote 2
148 See, a g., N L.R.B. v Power Equipment Co., 313 F. 2d 438, 441 (C.A. 6).
148 Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International Association, AFL-CIO (Prudential
Ins. Co.), supra, separate opinion of, Frankfurter, J. at 506, quoted in subdivision (1),
of this analysis.
282 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ing issues, the direct interrogation of employees on such matters, efforts to make
separate arrangements with local unions relating to the time and wording of the
"strike" votes, the acceleration of the effective date of its basic offer for nonrepre-
sented employees, proffers of separate strike-truce terms to certain local unions, etc.
The record as a whole fairly supports an inference that the Respondent's entire course
of conduct, of which its communications program was an integral part, was aimed
at evading its good-faith bargaining obligations. The law is well settled that neither
the first amendment nor 8(c) extends its immunity to speech that merges into and
is used in furtherance of a course of conduct designed to violate a statute 150
(9)
The findings made in this analysis support a substantial inference that the Respond-
ent entered into and participated in negotiations with a frame of mind antithetical
to good-faith bargaining. As found in subsection (5) hereof, the course the Respond-
ent took on substantive issues during the negotiations was not such as to overcome
that inference. Other circumstances shown by factual findings, not yet alluded to
in this analysis, serve substantially to buttress the inference of bargaining bad faith.
Thus, the Respondent's refusal to furnish the Union with relevant and necessary
information, discussed at length in section U, 2, above, goes beyond establishing
an independent violation of Section 8(a)(5). It also strongly supports a finding of
overall bad faith.151 The Respondent's refusal to furnish the information was inti-
mately bound up with its attitude, also revealed by other evidence, that its offer was
not open to serious challenge, once presented. The fact that the Respondent had
been cooperative in supplying information prior to the start of negotiations, and did
after the end of the negotiations furnish some of the requested information, serves
only to underscore its take-it-or-leave-it attitude during the critical part of the
negotiations.
The Respondent's conduct in bypassing the Union as national bargaining agent
in an effort to deal directly with NE locals on strike-truce terms-as to which con-
cluding findings were made in section U,3, above-also bears significantly on the
Respondent's overall bargaining attitude. Manifestly, the Respondent' s action in
derogation of the Union's status and authority was incompatible with simultaneous
good-faith dealing with the Union at the bargaining table. Moreover, the Com-
pany's contemporaneous efforts through its massive communications program, which
included misrepresentations of fact,152 to discredit the IUE leadership in the eyes
of employees, and otherwise to drive a wedge between the Union and its members,
supply added support for the findings earlier made relating to the Respondent's
reliance on its communications as a substitute for genuine bargaining.
As previously stated, good-faith bargaining contemplates, inter alia , a willingness
on the part of negotiating parties "to discuss freely and fully their respective claims
and demands, and when these are opposed to justify them on reason." The findings
made in the sections of this report dealing with the negotiating sessions , particularly
those following the presentation of the Respondent's offer, disclose unmistakably that
the Respondent's bargaining behavior fell short of that standard. Thus, on August 31
-only 1 day after its offer was presented-the Respondent in effect served notice on
the Union that it would be futile for the Union even to attempt to persuade it to alter
its fixed positions on three of the Union's principal demands-continuation of the
cost-of-living escalator, SUB, and the union shop.153 Thus, too, the Respondent at
various times registered impatience with the Union's efforts to have it justify its bar-
gaining positions, and at times, when asked to do so, either refused or shifted to other
reasons which it stated in terms so vague or arbitrary as to stifle further meaningful
discussion. Specific reference is made to the findings in sections H, K, and 0, above,
pointing up various instances where the Respondent justified its positions on the
basis of costs, but, when asked for specifications, either brushed aside the Union's
160 Ciboney, et al. v. Empire Storage and Ice Company, 336 U.S. 490, 498, 502; N.L.R B
v. Virginia Electric Power Co., 314 U S. 469, 478; International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers v. N.L.R.B., supra ; N.L.R.B. v. Kropp Forge Co, supra . See also Fitzgerald
Mills Corporation, 133 NLRB 877, 882.
im Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation , 101 NLRB 360, 366; Kohler Co., 128
NLRB 1062, 1085, enfd . 300 F. 2d 699 (C.A.D.C.).
152 See, particularly , reference in section P, 1, above, to Schenectady communications in
which the Respondent falsely represented that the offer being made to the Schenectady
local had earlier been made to Carey and rejected by him.
Asa See Duro Fittings Company, 121 NLRB 377.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 283
request, or, quickly shifting ground , declared that it did not bargain in terms of costs
but on the basis of "level of benefits ." Reference is also made to the findings in sec-
tion K, above , relating to the Respondent 's refusal to provide the Union with details
concerning other wage settlements on which it had asserted it had relied in part in
fashioning its wage offer , and its ultimate position that it did not have to justify its
wage offer since it bargained "on what is the appropriate thing to do and the level of
benefits." A particularly glaring example of the Respondent's avoidance of justifica-
tions is to be found in the varying positions it took on the Union 's request to move up
the effective date of the increases in guaranteed monthly pensions -discussed at length
in section 0, above.154
The record contains other indicia of the Respondent's bad-faith approach to bar-
gaining. Thus, as shown in section 0, above, the Respondent at the eve of the strike
rejected the Union's request for a reduced committee , three on each side, to attempt
to work out differences so as to avoid a strike. The rejection alone is of little signifi-
cance , but the reason given for it is, namely, that the Respondent believed that bar-
gaining should take place only before the full IUE negotiating committee and "in
full view of the pubic ." The Respondent 's insistence on "gold fish bowl" bargaining
is an added indication that it was infinitely more concerned with publicizing its posi-
tions directly to employees than with making an earnest effort to explore the possi-
bilities of finding common ground . The Respondent 's refusal on October 14, to
produce its pension plan language until full agreement was reached on other docu-
ments previously presented , and, more important , its refusal on October 19 to put on
the table the complete agreement it was prepared to sign unless and until the Union
first expressed its unqualified acceptance of the Respondent 's proposals , constitute,
I find , further evidence of bad faith . Quite clearly , the Union was entitled to see the
definitive contract language the Respondent planned to submit-and which the
Respondent had indicated it already had prepared-before, not after, committing
itself to final acceptance of the Respondent 's proposals . For, until such language
was produced , the Union could not know what, if any, additional issues might remain
open for resolution through the process of collective bargaining .155 Finally, the
Respondent's flat refusal, not satisfactorily explained , to enter into a strike settlement
agreement labeled as such, or one bilateral in form, and its insistence upon substitut-
ing a "letter of intent," provides , I find , a further reflection of its bad-faith approach
to bargaining . 156 It discloses the Respondent 's determination to adhere to the end
to its basic bargaining philosophy , that employees must be made to understand that
what it did it did "voluntarily " and that union belligerence could not force it to make
concessions of any kind , even to settle a strike.157
(10)
In conclusion, I find on the totality of the Respondent 's conduct at and away from
the bargaining table, without , however, giving conclusive weight to any separate
element, that the Respondent on and after June 13, 1960-as alleged in the com-
plaint-refused to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as the authorized
representative in national negotiations of the employees in the appropriate units
referred to in the complaint , thereby violating Section 8(a) (5) and ( 1) of the Act.
Iss The example cited also points up the Respondent's intransigent attitude generally.
Note specifically Moore's repudiation at the September 21 meeting of Hilbert's earlier
promise to "consider" the Union ' s proposed pension plan change , by his declaration that
the Company was not "taking anything under advisement for later consideration."
yes Indeed , as events proved, the Respondent 's refusal to provide contract language prior
to the strike settlement prevented the Union from knowing precisely the position the
Respondent would take on two issues which became a matter of controversy during the
postsettlement period.
156 This finding is limited to the Respondent's refusal to enter into a strike settlement
agreement as a matter of policy , so declared to the mediators and the Union . Contrary to
the contention of the General Counsel and the Union , however, I find that the Respondent did
negotiate with the Union as to terms and conditions that were to govern the return of
strikers.
1i7 The Respondent 's expressed willingness to allow the Union to initial its "letter of
intent" does not alter this conclusion . It is doubtful that the Respondent seriously ex-
pected the Union to subscribe to the letter , considering some of its content which would
have reflected adversely on the Union . Moreover , even if the Union had done so it would
not have altered the character of the letter as a unilateral declaration of company policy
for which the Union was entitled to no credit.
284 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
W. The strike as an unfair labor practice strike
On all the evidence, I find that the strike which began on October 2, 1960, and
extended to October 22, 1960, was caused and prolonged in substantial part by, the
Respondent's unfair labor practices in unlawfully refusing to bargain with the
Union.158
X. The discriminatory refusal to reinstate strikers
As found in section T, above, the Respondent at its Augusta, Georgia, plant refused
on October 24, 1960, to reinstate the 20 employees named in Appendix A, all of
whom it had replaced while they were out on strike, notwithstanding their uncondi-
tional offer to return to work. As the strike was an unfair labor practice strike, the
aforesaid employees were entitled to reinstatement on request to their former or
substantially equivalent positions.159 It is found that the Respondent, by denying
them such reinstatement, violated Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act.160
The complaint also alleges that the Respondent at Augusta, Georgia, independently
violated Section 8(a)(1), by reason of the letter sent four striking employees on
October 5, 1960. Although the question is close, Board precedents appear to support
the General Counsel's claim that the particular phrasing of the letter was such as to
be coercive within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1').161 However, the Respondent
corrected the letter promptly after its attention was called to the illegal phrasing,
and before any action was taken against the employees. Because of such mitigating
circumstances, and also bearing in mind that the coercion inherent in the original
letter could have been the result of inartfully chosen language rather than deliberate,
design , and that this was the only instance of its kind in some 115 IUE bargaining
units covering some 70,000 employees, I do not think that the violation alleged is
such as to call for a separate unfair labor practice finding and a remedial order based
thereon. Consequently, I shall recommend dismissal of the independent 8 (a) (1)
allegation based on the October 5 letter.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the Respondent's operations as set forth in section I, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY 162
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
188 General Drivers and Helpers Union, Local 662 , International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, etc. (Rice Lake Creamery Co.) v N.L.R.B, 302 F. 2d 908, 911 (C.A.D.C.) ; N.L.RB.
v. Stackpole Carbon Company , 105 F. 2d 167, 175-176 (C A. 3), cert. denied 308 U.S. 605;
N.L R B. v. Remington Rand, Inc, 94 F. 2d 862, 872 (C.A. 2).
150 Mastro Plastics Corp., et al v. N.L.R.B., 350 U.S. 270, 278
100It is noted that one employee, J. L Cline, who was offered employment on Novem-
her 4, 1960, conditioned on his ability to pass a physical examination, was not rehired
because of his inability to pass the examination. The unlawful discrimination against
Cline had, however, earlier occurred when he was denied reinstatement. The Respondent
did not generally require returning strikers to pass physical examinations. It is to be
assumed that the requirement was imposed on Cline and the two others offered re-
employment after October 24, because the Respondent treated them as if they were
being reemployed, rather than as returning unfair labor practice strikers entitled as a
right to reinstatement. Accordingly, the same remedial order will be provided,for Cline
as for the others.
161 G. & S. Electric Co., 130 NLRB 961, 966-967; National Gas Company, 99 NLRB 273,
281 ; United States Cold Storage Corporation, 96 NLRB 1108, 1109
162 After oral argument, the General. Counsel submitted a proposed order with accom-
panying comments, and the Respondent and the Union submitted written comments relat-
ing to the proposed order. The aforesaid documents have been considered and are filed
in this proceeding as extensions of the parties' briefs.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 285
It has been found that the Respondent, at its Augusta, Georgia, plant, discrim-
inatorily refused reinstatement to the employees listed in the attached Appendix A
on October 24, 1960.. It will accordingly be recommended that the Respondent
offer each of such employees-except W. A. Chalker and Lonnie M. Usry-immediate
and full reinstatement to his former or a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges.163 It is further recommended
that the Respondent make each of the employees listed in Appendix A whole for
any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination from October 24,
1960, until the date of the Respondent's offer of full reinstatement or earlier
grant thereof, in a manner consistent with Board policy as set forth in F. W. Wool-
worth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest as provided in Isis Plumbing & Heating
Co., 138 NLRB 716.
With respect to the 8(a)(5) violations found, it is not believed that the circum-
stances of this case require an affirmative order in addition to the cease-and-desist
order provided for, except with regard to the furnishing of information, and this only
to the extent that the Union's request for. relevant and necessary information has
not already been complied with.
With respect to the cease-and-desist provisions of the Recommended Order relating
to the refusal-to-bargain remedy, certain clarifying comments are in order. First:
The Recommended Order is not to be construed as disturbing the appropriate unit
findings made in the representation proceedings referred to in Appendix A, as
amended, attached to the complaint. Second: The Recommended Order assumes
that the Respondent will continue to engage in national level or multiunit bargaining
with the Union on a consensual basis. The Respondent has indicated no desire to
withdraw from that arrangement. Whether in the light of the historical pattern of
bargaining, the Respondent may withdraw in the future, and insist upon entire sep-
arate bargaining on a unit-by-unit basis, and, if so, at what time and under what
circumstances it may appropriately do so, is a matter not decided here. The purpose
of this Order is to remedy the violation that has occurred, not to anticipate other
contexts which may arise in the future as to which determination may be required
of questions not specifically litigated in this case. Third: It is not the purpose of
this Order to enlarge or limit the subjects that are to be assigned respectively to
national level or to local level bargaining. These are matters to be hammered out
by the parties themselves in negotiations, subject, however, to the requirements of
good-faith bargaining, taking into account among other considerations, but not neces-
sarily giving controlling weight to, the pattern of bargaining as it has evolved over
the course of years. -
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSION OF LAW
1. General Electric Company is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2)
of the Act, and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
2. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, and
its constituent locals, listed in Appendix A, as amended (General Counsel's Exhibit
No. 5), of the complaint, are, and have been at all times material herein, labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The various certified units of the Respondent's employees referred to in
Appendix A, as amended, of the complaint, constitute units appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times material herein, the IUE and its constituent locals named in
Appendix A, as amended, of the complaint, herein collectively referred to as the
Union, have been and are now the exclusive bargaining representatives of the
employees in the units referred to in said Appendix, within the meaning of Section
9(a) of the Act.
5. By failing and refusing on and after June 13, 1960, to bargain collectively in
good faith with the Union in national level negotiations, the Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) and
(1) of the Act.
169 If the Respondent, following the reemployment of Chalker and Usry, did not reinstate
their seniority and other rights and privileges, the requirement of the Recommended Order
In that respect shall apply to them also. If any other employee listed in Appendix A has
already been offered or granted such full reinstatement, no additional offer need be made
as to him.
286 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
6. By refusing on October 24, 1960,-to reinstate, upon their unconditional request,
the employees named in the attached Appendix A, who had engaged in concerted
activities as unfair labor practice strikers, the Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in this proceeding, I recommend that the Respondent, General
Electric Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing-in national level bargaining-to bargain collectively in good faith
with the IUE (through its General Electric Conference Board), (a) on behalf of the
IUE as the certified representative of employees of the Company in appropriate bar-
gaining units represented on the IUE-GE Conference Board for purposes of national
level bargaining with the Company, and (b) on behalf of IUE constituent locals which
(i) are certified representatives of employees of the Company in appropriate bargain-
ing units, (ii) are represented on the IUE-GE Conference Board for purposes of
national level bargaining with the Company, and (iii) have duly authorized the IUE
(through its GE Conference Board) by virtue of union constitutional requirement or
otherwise to bargain on their behalf with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other terms and conditions of employment.
(b) Failing or refusing, upon request, timely to furnish the IUE with information
necessary or relevant to bargaining issues involved in national level collective
bargaining.
(c) Bargaining directly or attempting to bargain directly-while engaged in
national level negotiations-with IUE locals which are duly represented for the
purposes of national bargaining by the IUE (through its GE Conference Board) con-
cerning subjects then involved in national level negotiations; or offering separately any
such IUE local concerning any such subject more favorable terms and conditions of
employment than offered to the IUE national level negotiators.
(d) Discouraging membership in the IUE, or in any IUE local, or in any other
labor organization of its employees, by refusing to reinstate, upon their unconditional
request, any of its employees engaged in concerted activity as unfair labor practice
strikers.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organiza-
tions, to join or assist the IUE, its affiliated local unions, or any other labor organiza-
tion, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activity, except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the policies
of the Act:
(a) Upon request, furnish to the IUE the following information: (1) the cents per
month premium, per employee, and also for employee dependents, of each insurance
benefit improvement added to the insurance plan provided for in the 1960-63 agree-
ment relating thereto; (2) the estimated monthly average net cost per employee, and
also for employee dependents, to the Company of each such insurance benefit improve-
ment, computed from the cost estimates prepared and maintained by the Company
for its own use in making calculations of that kind; and (3) the estimated average
cost in cents per hour per employee of each added increment in pension plan benefits
provided for in the 1960-63 agreement relating thereto, computed from the cost
estimates prepared and maintained by the Company for its own use in making calcu-
lations of that kind.
(b) Offer to the employees named in the attached Appendix A, except W. A.
Chalker and Lonnie M. Usry, immediate and full reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights
and privileges.
(c) Make whole all the employees listed in the attached Appendix A in the manner
set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy," for any loss of pay each may have
suffered by reason of the Respondent's discrimination against him.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 287
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for
examination and copying , all payroll records , social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amounts of backpay due under the terms of this Recommended Order.
(e) Post at all its plants, installations , and other places of business in the United
States, at which bargaining units represented by the IUE or any of its constituent locals
are located, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B." 164 Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 2, shall, after being duly
signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent immediatly
upon receipt thereof,-and be maintained by it for a period of at least 60 consecutive
days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure
that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt
of this report, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply therewith.165
184 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words, "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice. If the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United
States Court of Appeals, the notice will be further amended by the substitution of the
words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" for the words
"a Decision and Order."
185 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 2, in writing, within
10 days from the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith."
APPENDIX A
Garney Browning James Knight Richard Inglett
W. A. Chalker G. D. Smith Joe Knight
W. R. Cushman Jerry Smith James Kyle
Brooks B. Faircloth Lonnie M. Usry Gerald E. Moody
Thomas Ford Robert Best J. L. Cline
Joe Howell Denny G. Boltin Gene Cline
Charles D. Kennedy Franklin Harper
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Management
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT, in national level bargaining, refuse to bargain collectively in
good faith with International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO, (through its General Electric Conference Board), (a) on behalf of
the IUE as the certified representative of our employees in appropriate bargaining
-units represented on the IUE-GE Conference Board for purposes of national
level bargaining with us, and (b) on behalf of IUE constituent locals which (i)
are certified representatives of our employees in appropriate bargaining units,
(ii) are represented on the IUE-GE Conference Board for purposes of national
level bargaining with us, and (iii) have duly authorized the IUE (through its GE
Conference Board), by virtue of union constitutional requirement or otherwise to
bargain on their behalf with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
and other terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse, upon request, timely to furnish the IUE with
information necessary or relevant to bargaining issues involved in national level
bargaining.
WE WILL NOT, while engaged in national level negotiations, bargain directly,
or attempt to bargain directly, with IUE locals which are represented for the
purposes of national bargaining by the IUE (through its GE Conference Board)
concerning subjects then involved in national level negotiations ; nor will we,
with regard to any such subject, offer any such IUE local separately more favor-
able terms and conditions of employment than we have offered the IUE national
negotiators.
775-692-65-vol. 150-20
288 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the IUE, or in any IUE local, or in
any other labor organization of our employees, by refusing to reinstate, upon
their unconditional request, any of our employees engaged in concerted activity
as unfair labor practice strikers.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization , to form, join, or
assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing , to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from engaging in any
or all such activities, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, furnish the IUE with information relating to the per
employee costs of the improvements in our insurance and pension plans provided
for in the 1960-63 agreement relating thereto.
WE WILL offer the following empoyees at our Augusta, Georgia, plant full
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions , without
prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges:
Robert Best Gerald E. Moody Thomas Ford
Denny G. Boltin J. L. Cline Joe Howell
Franklin Harper Gene Cline Charles D. Kennedy
Richard Inglett Garney Browning James Knight
James Knight W. R. Cushman G. D. Smith
James Kyle Brooks B. Faircloth Jerry Smith
WE WILL make whole the foregoing employees , and also Lonnie M. Usry and
W. A. Chalker for any loss of pay suffered by each as a result of the discrimina-
tion against him with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By--------------------------------------------(Representative ) ( Title)
NOTE.-We will notify any of the above -named employees presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon applica-
tion in accordance with the Selective Service Act after discharge from the Armed
Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, Fifth floor,
Squibb Building, 745 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, Telephone No. Plaza
1-5500, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions.
S. D. Warren Company and International Association of Ma-
chinists , AFL-CIO; International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, AFL-CIO; United Brotherhood of Carpenters &
Joiners of America , AFL-CIO; and International Brotherhood
of Firemen and Oilers , AFL-CIO. Case No. 1-CA-4513. De-
cember 16, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon charges duly filed on March 9, 1964, by International Associ-
ation of Machinists, AFL-CIO ; International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers, AFL-CIO; United Brotherhood of Carpenters &
Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; and International Brotherhood of
Firemen and Oilers, AFI.-CIO (hereinafter called the Unions or the
150 NLRB No. 32.