Gelita USA Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Dec 21, 2007

18-CA-018406 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 21, 2007)

JD(ATL)—40—07
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
ATLANTA BRANCH OFFICE
GELITA USA INC.
and Case 18-CA-18406
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,
LOCAL 1142
GELITA USA
Employer
and CASE 18-RC-17500
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,
LOCAL 1142
Petitioner
Florence I. Brammer, Esq., for the Government. 1
Jay M. Smith, Esq., for the Union.2
Eric W. Tiritilli, Esq., for the Company.3
DECISION
Statement of the Case
WILLIAM N. CATES, Administrative Law Judge. This unfair labor practice
case involves interference with employee rights and an acceleration of the designated
resignation date of an employee from June 6, 2007 to May 27, 2007. The Representation
case involves Objections filed by the Union/Petitioner on June 6, 2007, to conduct

1 I shall refer to Counsel for General Counsel as Counsel for the Government or Government.
2 I shall refer to Counsel for the Charging Party/ Petitioner as Counsel for the Union or the Union.
3 I shall refer to Counsel for the Company/ Employer as Counsel for the Company or Company.
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affecting the results of a National Labor Relations Board (Board) conducted election4
held on May 31, 2007, among certain employees5 of the Company/Employer at its
Sergeant Bluff, Iowa location. The Representation case also involves the single
challenged ballot of Heidi Young6 which is sufficient to affect the results7 of the election.
Young’s ballot was challenged by the Board Agent conducting the election because the
Employer contended she was not employed by the Employer on May 31, 2007, the date
of the election. The Petitioner contends Young was eligible to vote because she would
have been employed by the Employer on May 31, 2007, but for the Employer’s
acceleration of her voluntary termination, which was to have been effective on June 6,
2007.
On August 22, 2007, the Regional Director for Region 18 of the Board issued a
Report on Challenged Ballot and Objections, Order Directing Hearing, Order
Consolidating Cases, and Notice of Hearing. The Regional Director noted the
acceleration of Young’s termination is the subject of an unfair labor practice allegation in
the unfair labor practice case and other of Petitioner’s objections are co-extensive with
certain other unfair labor practice allegations set forth in the unfair labor practice
complaint. Accordingly, the Regional Director ordered the cases consolidated for trial. I
heard these cases in trial in Sioux City, Iowa, on October 11, 2007.
The unfair labor practice case originates from a charge, filed by United Food and
Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1142, (Union) on June 12, 2007, and
amended on August 20, 2007, against Gelita USA Inc. (Company). The prosecution of
this case was formalized on August 21, 2007, when the Regional Director for Region 18
of the Board, acting in the name of the Board’s General Counsel, issued a Complaint and
Notice of Hearing (complaint) against the Company.
The complaint, as amended, alleges the Company, during the month of May 2007,
interfered with, restrained and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, (Act) thus violating
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Specifically, it is alleged the Company violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, during the specified time, by its supervisors and/or agents,
interrogating employees regarding how they intended to vote in the upcoming union
election; promising employees it would be able to resolve any problems the employees
had with their current working conditions if they abandoned their pursuit of Union
representation; and, in a posted notice to its laboratory employees threatened they would
receive no job protection if they engaged in an economic strike on behalf of the Union

4 The election was held pursuant to a Stipulated Election Agreement approved on May 9, 2007, by
the Regional Director for Region 18 of the Board.
5 The stipulated unit is as follows: “All full-time and regular part-time Quality Assurance/Quality
Control laboratory employees, including the QA/QC Assistant assigned to the Quality
Assurance/Quality Control Laboratory Department at the Employer’s 2445 Port Neal Industrial
Road, Sergeant Bluff, Iowa facility, excluding management employees, and guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
6 Heidi Young is the employee whose resignation was accelerated, allegedly, for unlawful reasons.
7 Six votes were cast for the Petitioner and six votes against the Petitioner with the one challenged
ballot that of Heidi Young.
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should the employees select the Union to represent them. It is also specifically alleged
the Company violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by on or about May 27, 2007,
accelerating the termination of employee Heidi Young (Young), who had given notice of
her intent to resign her employment with the Company effective June 6, 2007.
The Company, in a timely filed answer to the complaint, denied having violated
the Act in any manner alleged in the complaint.
The parties were given full opportunity to participate, to introduce relevant
evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to file briefs. I carefully
observed the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified. I have studied the whole
record, the post trial briefs, and the authorities cited therein. Based on more detailed
findings and analysis below, I conclude and find the Company violated the Act
substantially as alleged in the complaint.
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction, Labor Organization Status, and Supervisor/Agency Status
The Company is a Delaware corporation with an office and place of business in
Sergeant Bluff, Iowa, where it is, and has been, engaged in the manufacturing of gelatin
products. During the twelve months ending August 21, 2007, a representative period, the
Company purchased and received at its Sergeant Bluff, Iowa, location goods and
materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Iowa. The
evidence establishes, the parties admit, and I find, the Company is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.
The parties admit, and I find, the Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
It is admitted that Company Managing Director Rob Mayberry (Director
Mayberry), Human Resources Vice President Jeff Tolsma (VP Tolsma), Human
Resources Consultant Kim Dellinger (Consultant Dellinger) and Laboratory Manager
Dean Wood (Supervisor Wood) are supervisors and agents of the Company within the
meaning of Section 2(11) and (13) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. Background
The Company is a German owned world wide organization. The only facility
involved herein is the Sergeant Bluff, Iowa location. The Company manufactures gelatin
primarily for the pharmaceutical and photographic industries with some production for
smaller “niche type” industries. The gelatin manufactured at the Company is from cattle
bones and porcine or pig skins. The Company’s product goes to its customers basically as
a raw material in granular form. The pharmaceutical industries utilize the granular
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gelatin to manufacture medical capsules and the photographic industries utilize the
gelatin in the processing of film. The Company’s 200 plus production and maintenance
employees at its Iowa location are represented by the Union. It is the approximately 13
Iowa laboratory employees that we are concerned with here and those employees
engaged in an organizing campaign at the Company in May 2007. There are two testing
areas in the laboratory department namely the microbiological and physical testing areas.
There are some additional testing areas such as a chemical testing area. The
microbiological, physical and chemical testing by the laboratory employees is to ensure
the quality of the properties that comprise the gelatin and to determine how the gelatin
can be used in customer mixes which is the final product.
Laboratory Technician Desiree McCaslen (McCaslen) and a co-worker contacted
a representative of the Union in late March or early April 2007, about setting up a
meeting to address issues and concerns among the laboratory employees. An initial
“meet and greet” session with a Union representative was thereafter arranged. Prior to
the first meeting McCaslen and others handed out flyers to all laboratory employees
announcing the meeting. Two or three meetings followed the initial meeting which
culminated in the Board conducted election of May 31, 2007. McCaslen served as an
observer for the Union at the election.
B. The Posted Notice
1. Complaint Allegation
It is alleged at paragraph 5(a) of the Complaint that during the month of May
2007, the Company in a posted notice in the laboratory department, threatened employees
they would receive no job protection if they engaged in an economic strike on behalf of
the Union, should employees select the Union to represent them.
a. Notice language
The Notice posted in the laboratory reads;
IF THE UNION GETS IN and CALLS A STRIKE what would
you and your family do if you were faced with bills incurred
during a strike!
Economic Strikers Get….
NO pay checks
NO unemployment compensation
NO job protection if replaced
Vote NO Union
It is the “No job protection if replaced” portion of the notice that the Government
alleges is an inaccurate statement of the law and violates the Act.
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Laboratory technicians Vicki Claassen (Claassen) and McCaslen testified the
notice was posted in the laboratory in May 2007 with Claassen specifying it was posted
on “our dry erase board in the hall, in the walkway of the lab right when you walk in.”
Other flyers addressing strikes were also posted along with the above notice.
b. Company’s evidence on the notice
The Company acknowledges it placed a one-page poster in the laboratory area
entitled, “If the Union Gets in and Calls a Strike” for one or two days in May 2007. Vice
President Tolsma testified he gave a Power Point presentation to the laboratory
employees on May 22, 2007, titled “Strike Information.” The Power Point presentation,
which Tolsma did not stray from, discussed, among other things; how strikes came about;
how strikes hurt everyone; how employees on strike do not get paid by the Company;
how economic strikers could be replaced; how if a strike succeeded and damaged the
Company some employees may lose their jobs anyway; how the Union might pay strikers
but the amount might be less than employees needed; how employees could work even
during a strike; that there are economic strikes and unfair labor practice strikes; and, how
an employer may operate during a strike.
2. Discussion and Conclusions Regarding the Notice
It is undisputed the Company posted a notice in a prominent place in its
laboratory department for a day or so in May 2007, that stated in part; “Economic
Strikers Get . . . No job protection if replaced.” The Government argues this posting, on
its face, unlawfully conveys to employees the threatening message that should they select
union representation, and should that representation lead to an economic strike, they
would have “No job protection if replaced.” The Government acknowledges that an
employer, such as the Company herein, may address the subject of striker replacement of
economic strikers without fully detailing their protected rights so long as the employer
does not threaten that as a result of a strike employees will be deprived of their rights in a
manner inconsistent with established Board law. The Government contends the
Company has stepped outside what it may lawfully say and made an unlawful threat
herein.
The Company contends the permissibility of its assertion in the posted notice is
supported by longstanding Board precedent. The Company asserts it does not violate the
Act by truthfully informing employees they are subject to permanent replacement in the
event of an economic strike. The Company further asserts it is not required to fully detail
the protections an economic striker may have when addressing striker replacements so
long as it does not threaten that as a result of a strike employees will be deprived of their
rights in a manner inconsistent with Board law. The Company argues no such unlawful
statements were set forth in the posting at issue.
Section 8(c) of the Act permits an employer to make predictions regarding the
consequences of union representation, including strikes, provided its remarks are not
accompanied by a threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. Eagle Comtronics,
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Inc., 263 NLRB 515 (1982) is the leading case defining the extent of an employer’s
obligation, on informing employees of the consequences of an economic strike, that may
result in their being replaced or incurring other hardships. Stated differently, the Board in
Eagle Comtronic, Inc., considered the extent of an employer’s obligation (on informing
employees that they may be permanently replaced or suffer other consequences in an
economic strike) to provide an accurate picture of employee rights under Laidlaw.8 In
Eagle Comtronics, Inc. (515-516) the Board held:
The issue posed in this case is the degree of detail required of an
employer who informs employees that they are subject to replacement in
the event of an economic strike. It is well established that, when
employees engage in an economic strike, they may be permanently
replaced.5 Of course, ‘permanent replacement’ does not mean that a
striking employee is deprived of all rights. Specifically, striking
employees retain the right to make unconditional offers of reinstatement,
to be reinstated upon such offers if positions are available, and to be
placed on a preferential hiring list upon such offers if positions are not
available at the time of the offer.6 However, the Board has long held that
an employer does not violate the Act by truthfully informing employees
that they are subject to permanent replacement in the event of an economic
strike. The Board has held that such comments do not constitute
impermissible threats under Section 8(a)(1), or objectionable conduct in an
election.7 Unless the statement may be fairly understood as a threat of
reprisal against employees or is explicitly coupled with such threats, it is
protected by Section 8(c) of the Act. Therefore, we conclude that an
employer may address the subject of striker replacement without fully
detailing the protections enumerated in Laidlaw, so long as it does not
threaten that, as a result of a strike, employees will be deprived of their
rights in a manner inconsistent with those detailed in Laidlaw. To hold
otherwise would place an unwarranted burden on an employer to explicate
all the possible consequences of being an economic striker. This we shall
not do. As long as an employer’s statements on job status after a strike are
consistent with the law, they cannot be characterized as restraining or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act.8
[Footnotes ommitted]
The Board in Unifirst Corp., 335 NLRB 706 (2001) further discussed an
employer’s rights (free speech) and its obligation to present accurate, though not
complete, information when addressing the rights of economic strikers by stating “an
employer may, for example, inform employees that they ‘could’ be permanently replaced,
without telling them that they would retain employment rights.” The Board in Unifirst
Corp. went on to note:

8 Laidlaw Corp., 171 NLRB 1366 (1969), enfd. 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S.
920 (1970).
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Further, Eagle Comtronics by its own terms applies to statements that are
unaccompanied by threats.5 The decision articulates the Board’s policy of
resolving in the employer’s favor any ambiguity occasioned by a failure to
articulate employees’ continued employment rights when informing them
about permanent replacement in the context of an economic strike.
Where, however, ambiguous comments about striker replacement are part
and parcel of a threat of retaliation for choosing union representation. . . .
any ambiguity should be resolved against the employer. [Footnotes and
citation omitted]
So long as an employer’s statements on job status after an economic strike are
consistent with the law, even thought all rights are not fully explained, such statements
are permissible and do not violate the Act. River’s Bend Health & Rehabilitation
Services, 350 NLRB No. 16 (June 29, 2007).
I find, in agreement with the Government, the Company’s statement that if the
employees selected union representation which led to an economic strike they would
have “NO job protection if replaced” cannot be reconciled with the employees’ rights
under Laidlaw. There is no question but that the Company may address economic strikes
and striker replacement without outlining in detail each and every right an economic a
striker may have, but it may not, as is the case here, threaten they have “no” job
protection if replaced. Employees would have, for example, preferential recall, rehire
and reinstatement rights which certainly constitutes some job “protection.” The
Company’s poster clearly conveys to the ordinary employee that if he or she engages in
an economic strike and is replaced the employee has no job protection whatsoever.
Accordingly, I find the Company threatened employees they would receive no job
protection if they engaged in an economic strike in violation Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
I reject the Company’s contention that because the poster in question was just one
of many it provided concerning economic strikes and striker rights that overall the
Company conveyed accurate information to its employees regarding economic strikes.
While there is no contention that other of the Company’s postings or Vice President
Tolsma’s Power Point presentation on strikes exceeded the bounds of the permissible
such does not somehow negate the threat contained in the posting at issue.
C. The Interrogation
1. Complaint Allegation
It is alleged at paragraph 5(b) of the complaint that on or about May 22, 2007,
Company Consultant Dellinger, interrogated employees regarding how they intended to
vote in the upcoming Union election.
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a. The Government’s evidence regarding the interrogation
Employee Young testified that on May 22, 2007, Consultant Dellinger came into
the microbiology laboratory around 3 p.m. where she and co-worker Claassen were.
According to Young, Dellinger asked “how we were doing with all this stuff.” Young
responded it really wasn’t any concern to her. Young said Consultant Dellinger
commented “Well, you have friends here that you care about.” Young acknowledged she
did and said “Yes, so obviously I will vote how they want me to vote.” Young testified
that as Dellinger left the room she commented people could not even look her in the eye
anymore.
Claassen recalled Dellinger asking she and Young “do you guys have your minds
made up about this?” Claassen responded she was unsure. Claassen testified she assumed
what Dellinger meant by her question so she told Dellinger she was “taking all the
information in right now.” Claassen testified Young said the results would not affect her
since she would not be there so she would just vote as her friends wanted her to.
b. Company’s evidence regarding the interrogation
Consultant Dellinger said she visited the laboratory on a daily basis in the month
of May 2007. She did so to answer any questions the employees might have, explaining,
“if they had any questions about what was going on, that we could address those right
away.” On her May 22, 2007 visit, she spoke with employees Young and Claassen.
Dellinger could not recall exactly what was said but added she was “uncomfortable” on
that occasion because it was “really the first that I’d been in to have a direct conversation
with a person in the lab and could not gain eye contact.” Dellinger denied asking any
employee how they may vote in the union election. Dellinger explained she had over 20
years experience in human relations and was very careful when she spoke with
employees and followed written advice from the Company’s lawyers. Dellinger further
explained she had been involved in other union type activities and knew that in her
position she had to be very careful what she said to employees. Dellinger said that on
one occasion in the laboratory she told a laboratory employee she could not ask how the
employee was going to vote and did not want to know but she needed to make sure all
questions of the employees had been answered.
2. Discussion and Conclusions
I credit the essentially mutually corroborative testimony of Young and Claassen
regarding the May 22, 2007 meeting, which Dellinger acknowledged, including the fact
the employees would not make eye contact with her making her uncomfortable. I am
also mindful Dellinger could not recall specifics of her exchange with the employees on
the occasion. I find Dellinger inquired of Young and Claassen how they were doing with
all this stuff and if they had their minds made up about this.
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The Company contends Dellinger’s inquiry, even if made, was nothing more than
communication protected by Section 8(c) of the Act. The Company contends neither the
words themselves nor the context in which they were uttered suggest an element of
coercion or interference. Simply stated the Company asserts the Section 8(c) protected
and un-coercive comments of Dellinger, as attributed to her by Young and Claassen, can
not constitute an unfair labor practice.
The Government, on the other hand, argues that asking employees if they have
their minds made up may appear on the surface to be less intrusive than asking them how
they are going to vote, but, that the net intent and effect are the same. The Government
asserts the overall circumstances herein makes clear the questioning by Dellinger, as
credited above, tends to restrain, coerce and/or interfere with employees rights
guaranteed by the Act.
I note certain guiding principles before I address this allegation of interrogation.
Interrogation is not, by itself, a per se violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The test for
determining the legality of employee interrogation regarding union sympathies is whether
under all the circumstances the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain, coerce, or
interfere with rights guaranteed employees by the Act. Under this totality of
circumstances approach consideration is given to; whether the interrogated employee is
an open or active supporter of the union, the background surrounding the interrogation,
the nature and purpose of the information sought, the identity of the questioner, the place
and/or method of the interrogation, and the truthfulness of any reply by the questioned
employee. Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176, 1177 (1984), enfd. sub. nom. H.E.R.E
Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). The above factors are not to be
mechanically applied but rather are to be useful indicia that serve as a starting point for
assessing the totality of the circumstances. That the interrogation might be courteous and
low keyed instead of boisterous, rude, and profane does not alter the case.
I am fully persuaded Dellinger’s questioning of Young and Claassen on May 22,
2007, constituted unlawful interrogation that tended to restrain, coerce and interfere with
the employees’ protected rights. It is clear Dellinger’s questions concerned the Union
when she asked about all this “stuff” and if they had their minds made up. Dellinger
went to the laboratory daily during the month of May when the Union campaign was
going on. She went to specifically address questions the employees might have regarding
the union organizing of the laboratory employees. On the May 22, 2007, occasion she
asked questions rather then answering them. That Dellinger’s inquiry involved the Union
is clear. When Dellinger reminded Young she had friends at the Company she cared
about and Young responded she did and would vote as they wanted her to vote made
clear the inquiry was really about the Union. Dellinger did not correct, object to, or
protest Young’s response that indicated the “stuff” and having their “minds made up”
referred to the Union. When Young responded that it really did not concern her,
Dellinger did not let it rest there but rather pursued it further reminding Young she had
friends there she cared about trying to get Young to be more responsive about her and her
co-workers union sympathies. Dellinger, a high management official with the Company,
advanced no legitimate reason for her inquiries. Under all the circumstances, and as
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stated earlier, I am fully persuaded Dellinger’s inquiries reasonably tended to restrain and
coerce employees and as such violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and I so find.
D. May 30 Meeting Conducted by Supervisor Wood
1. Complaint Allegation
It is alleged at paragraph 5(c) of the complaint that on May 30, 2007, during a
meeting with laboratory employees, Supervisor Wood, promised employees the
Company would be able to resolve any problems employees had with their current
working conditions if they abandoned their pursuit of Union representation.
a. Government’s evidence regarding the meeting
Laboratory Technicians Claassen and McCaslen were present at and testified
regarding the May 30 laboratory employee meeting conducted by Supervisor Wood.
According to Claassen, Wood first explained the laboratory was understaffed and his
first goal would be to have it fully staffed. Second, Wood explained that with the change
in supervision in the laboratory department the employees had not had a chance to know
or observe his supervisory skills or procedures. Claassen said Supervisor Wood asked
the employees to give him six months and if after six months they were not satisfied with
the way things were going “then [they] could go back to the Union.”
McCaslen testified it was the first time an immediate level supervisor had sat
down with the employees “and explained the economic hardships the Company was
going through with the change in the market.” McCaslen further testified:
He explained; you know, that the Company was trying and that they were
making changes by moving him into the lab, and that he felt he could do
an adequate job of making these changes if we gave him more time,
because, at that time he’d only been in there a few weeks and again
expressed his concerns that he felt we should hold off on the union
election. I think he asked for maybe like a six month time frame.
b. Company’s evidence on the meeting
Supervisor Wood testified that when he spoke with the laboratory employees on
May 30, 2007, he simply wanted to explain to them what was going to happen the next
day at the union election. Wood testified, “I wanted everyone to be clear and understand
what the process was and how it was actually going to physically work.” Wood said he
also spoke about his being placed in the laboratory and told the laboratory employees
about the economic conditions at the Company as he understood them. Wood said those
were the “main points” of his speech. Wood specifically denied telling the employees
they would be able to resolve any problems they had with their current working
conditions if they abandoned their pursuit of union representation. According to Wood
11 or 12 of the laboratory technicians were present for the meeting. Wood utilized
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“bullet point” type notes in giving his talk to the employees. Wood could not recall if
staffing levels came up in the meeting but acknowledged getting proper coverage in the
laboratory had been a problem for him.
2. Discussion and Conclusions
I credit Claassen’s and McCaslen’s testimony regarding the May 30, 2007,
laboratory employee meeting conducted by Supervisor Wood. I do so for a number of
reasons. First, they both appeared to be telling the truth as best they could recall.
Second, their testimony was essentially the same. Third, Supervisor Wood, while unable
to remember if staffing was mentioned in the meeting clearly recalled staffing was a
major concern for him during the short time he had been in charge of the laboratory. In
light of the fact staffing was of such concern for Wood, it is highly likely he discussed it
at the meeting as testified to by Claassen. Fourth, Wood did not deny the specific
comments about the meeting that Claassen and McCaslen attributed to him.
The Government contends Supervisor Wood’s comments violate the Act because
he unlawfully promised to resolve the employees current working conditions if the
employees abandoned their pursuit of union representation. The Company contends the
comments, even if made by Wood, were simply generalized expressions asking for “more
time” or “another chance” and were within the limits of permissible campaign
propaganda.
Generalized expressions by employers are legally permissible in union
campaigns. The Board in National Micronectics, 277 NLRB 993 (1985) found no
violation of the Act where the employer confessed it had neglected matters in the past
and asked for a second change to make things better. The Board held such to be
generalized expressions (“another chance” “more time”) and permissible. In Noah’s New
York Bagels, 324 NLRB 266 (1997) the Board found no violation where the employer’s
president, in part, in a speech one day before an election, said the employer had “rapid
growth” and “clearly made . . . mistakes” but suggested “the best way to overcome our
mistakes is for us to work together, without the intervention of a third party . . . please
vote to give us a second chance to show we can do it,” and added, if they didn’t meet the
employees expectations the union would be there.
I find Wood’s comments exceeded permissible generalized expressions. Wood
noted the department was unstaffed and explained his first goal would be to fully staff the
department. Simply stated Wood clearly made a promise to remedy a specific problem
which was understaffing. Wood pointed out to the employees that other specific changes
had recently been made, namely, that he had been moved into the department as the new
supervisor. He indicated he felt he could do an adequate job of carrying out other
changes as well. Wood’s comments, along with specific chances noted or promised,
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as promises to resolve employee problems if they
abandoned their pursuit of union representation.
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E. Young’s Accelerated Departure
1. Complaint Allegation
It is alleged at paragraph 6 of the complaint the Company, on or about May 27,
2007, accelerated the termination of employee Heidi Young, who had given notice of her
intent to resign her employment effective on June 6, 2007, because she engaged in
activities on behalf of the Union and to discourage employees from engaging in those
activities and to prevent Young from voting in an upcoming election for May 31, 2007, in
Case 18-RC-17500. It is alleged the Company’s actions violate Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act.
a. The Government’s evidence regarding Young’s departure
Young, who holds a Masters Degree in Forensic Science, did some of her
undergraduate studies at a local college in Sioux City, Iowa. While pursuing her studies
Young worked at the Company as a paid intern for three months each summer during
2003, 2004 and 2005. Each of those summers Young worked in the Quality
Assurance/Quality Control Laboratory (laboratory department or laboratory) where she
was supervised the first summer by Jeff Abell, the second summer by Ron Peter and the
third summer by Michael Belkin. The laboratory manager during most of that time was
Carol Ostendorf. (Manager Ostendorf or Ostendorf).
In April 2007, Young made application for full time employment with the
Company and was interviewed and hired by QA/QC Manager Ostendorf. Young
explained during the interview that if job opportunities came about for something
forensically related she would accept such an offer. In fact Young told Ostendorf during
her interview she actually had a job interview scheduled in her field of expertise.
Young’s first day of full time employment with the Company was April 9, 2007.
On or about April 25, 2007, Young was offered and accepted employment with the
Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory as a DNA Analyst in Madison, Wisconsin. Young
applied with the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory before she started full time
employment with the Company. Young opined the job in Wisconsin better suited her job
skills.
On about April 26, 2007, Young notified QA/QC Manager Ostendorf of her
acceptance of employment elsewhere and advised Ostendorf her last day of employment
with the Company would be June 6, 2007. Young testified Ostendorf at first seemed
“flustered” saying “no, you cannot leave” but made no comment about her proposed June
6, departure date. Young testified in fact no one in management, between late April and
May 23, 2007, mentioned her proposed departure date of June 6.
During her tenure at the Company, Young served as a laboratory technician in the
microbiology section of the Quality Assurance Quality Control Department where she
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performed tests to ensure bacteria was not present or growing in the gelatin produced by
the Company. Of the 12 employees in the laboratory, Young was a friend of co-
laboratory technician McCaslen prior to working at the Company and became a friend of
laboratory technician Claassen at work. The three technicians ate together and took
breaks together. Young testified they discussed work complaints two or three times per
week and that Supervisor Peter had been present in the area when they had some of their
work related discussions.
Young testified she and McCaslen were working together on May 23, 2007, but
she [Young] was “very frustrated” doing her job that day. Young explained her
frustration resulted from the fact a co-worker, Trish Peterson, “just kept following [her]
around like [she] didn’t know how to do stuff.” While still frustrated someone, and
Young wasn’t sure who at the time, asked how her day was going. Young responded, “I
can’t wait to get out of here.” Young was so “flustered” she did not even see who asked
the question but later learned it was Consultant Dellinger. Young did not hear Dellinger
make any response and she could not recall using any profanity in the exchange. Young
acknowledged, however, it was possible she said “hell” that she was “frustrated.” Young
went on to acknowledge “when I’m mad, I … tend to use profanity.”
Laboratory technician McCaslen testified about the occasion when Young had “an
alleged outburst” in the laboratory. McCaslen testified Young had just returned from a
bathroom break “pretty upset because of a confrontation she had had with a fellow co-
worker, Trish Peterson.” McCaslen tried to calm Young down “a little bit” when
Consultant Dellinger came into the area and asked how it was going. McCaslen said she
was too busy to respond but that Young replied “I can’t wait to get out of here.”
Dellinger responded “well that’s too bad” and left.
Co-worker Claassen testified Young said “I’m so frustrated, I can’t wait to get out
of this place.” Claassen first testified no profanity was used but on cross-examination said
she could not recall if an obscenity was used but that Young could have.
Later that same day [May 23] Consultant Dellinger came back to the laboratory
and asked Young to accompany her to Supervisor Wood’s office. Those present in
Wood’s office were Wood, Young and Dellinger. Young testified Dellinger said “[w]e
are going to accommodate your needs, and your last day will be May 27th.” Young asked
why, and asked if it was because the Company did not want her to vote. According to
Young, Dellinger responded only with “O”. Young told them she was not stupid and told
Consultant Dellinger she was “screwing her/lab employees over” and the Company
“didn’t care about their employees whatsoever.” Young said a “lot” more but could not
recall what else she said. Young did request to speak with Supervisor Wood alone.
Dellinger left to see if a check had been cut for Young. Young told Wood she was sorry
and Wood said he did not know what was going on and had no control over it.
McCaslen testified she was kind of nosey and watched as Young went to Wood’s
office and as Young returned from the office. McCaslen said Young was “beet red and
crying” and they then discussed what had taken place.
JD(ATL)—40—07
14
At about mid-afternoon that same day Young asked Supervisor Wood if she
should show for work on May 28, 2007, if she had not heard anything by the end of her
current work shift. However, at approximately 4 p.m. that afternoon Young was given a
hand delivered letter from Consultant Dellinger that stated:
As discussed, we have accepted your resignation as tendered. Your last
day at GELITA USA will be May 27, 2007. You will be paid through
June 6, 2007. Included with your last check will be any accrued unused
vacation.
When Young read the letter she became “very upset” and asked Supervisor Wood “to get
Kim Dellinger down here so I could talk to her and Desiree McCaslen would be present
with me in this meeting.” When Consultant Dellinger arrived Young told her “this letter
is a lie.” Dellinger asked how and Young told her she did not accept resignation on May
27 that she was being forced into that date. Young told Dellinger she had never been so
“disrespected” by a human resources department.
McCaslen testified she was present as Young “pleaded her case” with Wood and
Dellinger, and, when Young expressed her desire to work until June 6 because she did
not want to sit at home. According to McCaslen, Supervisor Wood and Consultant
Dellinger, both explained to Young that most companies paid employees off when they
gave notice but that was their last day at work. McCaslen told them she had been there
five years and had never seen it done that way. Young asked if she would have to work
that Saturday and Sunday and was told she would unless she could get someone to cover
for her.
McCaslen testified she was one of the “biggest complainers” in the laboratory
department because she “always felt overworked or underappreciated.” McCaslen said
she complained on a daily basis to Supervisor Peter but was never disciplined for doing
so. McCaslen explained, for example, that when Supervisor Peter gave out pay checks
each Friday she always said, “Oh, please tell me that’s my pink slip.” McCaslen said
Peter thought her comments to be a joke “and between us it kind of was.” She also said
when Supervisor Peter would ask how things were going she would say, “I think I’m
going to quit right now and you can finish this for me.” Nothing was ever done to
McCaslen for her comments.
b. The Company’s evidence regarding Young’s departure
Consultant Dellinger testified she did not know Young personally but only as an
employee of the Company who started full time with the Company April 9, 2007.
Dellinger was on vacation when Young submitted her resignation with her proposed
departure date of June 6, 2007. After returning from vacation Dellinger talked with
Young about her newly accepted position in Madison and stated Young “was very
excited about it” “that it was in forensics which is what she wanted to do and what she
JD(ATL)—40—07
15
had studied.” Dellinger said after Young submitted her resignation she continued to work
at her same duties, shift, position and pay.
Dellinger spoke with Young in the laboratory on May 23, 2007, and noted
employee McCaslen also was in the area. Dellinger initiated the conversation by asking
how things were going. According to Dellinger, Young responded that “she couldn’t
wait to get the hell out of here.” Dellinger said she recalled Young’s exact words
because Young “was very frustrated … you could tell in her face and in her actions, I
mean, that she was frustrated and upset.” Dellinger was “taken aback” by Young’s
comments.
After the encounter in the laboratory department Dellinger telephoned Vice
President Tolsma and also spoke with Director Mayberry about Young’s comments.
Dellinger said she spoke with her superiors because Young’s “frustration and … wanting
to get away from there made [her] very concerned.” Dellinger also said she talked with
her superiors because it was no secret that at the time they were “going through a union
campaign” but that she “felt strongly that it was time to let Heidi [Young] go with the –
with the attitude that she had displayed to me.” Dellinger explained that work performed
by the laboratory technicians is very important to the Company because “[e]verything
that goes out to our customers has to go through the laboratory to be tested.” Dellinger
said the decision was a difficult one regarding whether to have Young leave earlier than
requested “because we didn’t want it to be for any reason other than it was the right thing
to do for the employee and for the Company.”
Dellinger said Tolsma and Mayberry were not generally involved in every
disciplinary decision but this was one she did not wish to make on her own. The
managers’ final decision was to accelerate Young’s resignation date, but to ensure she
was treated fairly, the Company would pay Young through her requested June 6, 2007
date. Dellinger explained that when an employee was very frustrated and upset “[i]t just
has a ripple effect out to all of the other people that you work with.” Dellinger said she
wrote Young on May 24, 2007, at Young’s request, accepting her resignation.
Dellinger testified she never at any time observed Young wearing Union buttons,
pins, hats or anything that would indicate her support for the Union nor did Young ever
tell her she favored the Union.
Vice President Tolsma testified he was in Germany at the time of the events
surrounding Young but was telephoned by Dellinger and given an overall summary of the
situation. Tolsma was apprised of Young’s short tenure with the Company, that she had
obtained employment elsewhere in her field of study and that she wanted “to get the hell
out of here.” Tolsma agreed with Dellinger’s recommendation to accelerate Young’s
departure date saying; “Fine, given the situation, you know, we can accommodate that.”
Tolsma said it was not common practice, but the Company had, on occasion,
accelerated the termination of other employees. Tolsma explained that about three years
ago former Director of Information Technology, Joan Pyer, told him and her immediate
JD(ATL)—40—07
16
supervisor, she could not work a certain way and he told her she was resigning with that
being her last day. Tolsma said that when Vice President of Production, Carl Sitzman,
resigned in January or February 2007, he granted Sitzman’s request to leave his
employment early. Tolsma also testified about a situation that happened four or five
years earlier involving Environmental Engineer James Haigh, who at the time was on a
performance improvement plan. Tolsma said Haigh told him he could not work for his
superior because his supervisor was not an engineer. Tolsma said he simply told Haigh
“we’ll accept your resignation, and your last day is today.”
2. Discussion and Conclusions
The Government contends the Company accelerated the termination date for
Young, a valued employee with a strong work ethic, because of her concerted protected
activity of making a statement to management that evinced pro-Union voting intentions,
and to have her off the Company’s payroll and not eligible to vote in the Board conducted
election for the laboratory employees.
The Company contends Young’s final day of work was accelerated not because of
any union or concerted activity but simply because of her statement to a management
official that she could not wait to get the hell out of the Company. The Company asserts
it was only as a direct result of Young’s desire to leave as soon as possible that it elected
to permit Young to do just that and was not based on animus towards the Union.
Before examining this case under the Board’s dual motivation test or analysis, it is
helpful to determine exactly what Young said when she announced she could not wait to
leave her employment with the Company. I find Young said, “I can’t wait to get the hell
out of here” when asked by Consultant Dellinger on May 23, 2007, how her day was
going. I am not unmindful that Young, McCaslen and Claassen all could not recall
Young using any profanity. However, Young said it was possible she said “hell” that she
was “frustrated” and acknowledged that when she was “mad” she tended to use profanity.
McCaslen said Young was “pretty upset” that morning because Young had a
“confrontation” with a “co-worker” and she, McCaslen, was trying to calm Young down
“a little bit.” Although Claassen could not recall if Young used profanity she
acknowledged Young could have. The evidence establishes and Young’s demeanor on
the witness stand reinforces, a finding that Young was at times frustrated, upset, angry
and in need of being calmed down a bit at work. When Young was upset, which appears
to have been often, she admittedly used profanity. I am fully persuaded she used the
word “hell” when she said she could not wait to get out of the Company. I turn now to
the dual motive analysis.
To establish a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, the government must prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that an individual’s protected activity was a
motivating factor in the employer’s action. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980),
enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). Once the
government makes this showing, the burden of persuasion then shifts to the employer to
prove its affirmative defense that it would have taken the same action even in the absence
JD(ATL)—40—07
17
of the protected conduct. To sustain its burden the government must show that the
employee was engaged in protected activity, that the employer was aware of that activity,
that the activity or the employee’s union affiliation was a substantial or motivating reason
for the employer’s action, and, there was a causal connection between the employer’s
animus and its challenged conduct or decision. The government may meet its Wright
Line, supra, burden with evidence short of direct evidence of motivation, i.e. inferential
evidence arising from a variety of circumstances such as union animus, timing or pretext
may sustain the government’s burden. Furthermore, it may be found that where an
employer’s proffered non-discriminatory motivational explanation is false, even in the
absence of direct evidence of motivation, the trier of fact may infer unlawful motivation.
Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966); Fluor Daniel,
Inc., 304 NLRB 970 (1991). Motivation of union animus may be inferred from the
record as a whole, where an employer’s proffered explanation is implausible or a
combination of factors circumstantially support such inference. Union Tribune Co. v.
NLRB, 1 F.3d 486, 490-492 (7th Cir. 1993). Direct evidence of union animus is not
required to support such inference. NLRB v. 50-White Freight Lines, Inc., 969 F.2d 401
(7th Cir. 1992). If it is found an employer’s actions are pretextual, that is, either false or
not relied upon, the employer fails by definition to show it would have taken the same
action in the absence of the protected conduct and it is unnecessary to perform the second
part of the Wright Line analysis. Limestone Apparel Corp., 255 NLRB 722 (1981), enf.
705 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1982), Metropolitan Transportation Services, 351 NLRB No. 43 at
slip op. p. 3 (September 29, 2007).
The first burden the Government must meet is to establish Young engaged in
protected activity. Young, McCaslen and Claassen talked two or three times per week
about work related complaints sometimes in the presence of Supervisor Peter. McCaslen
contacted the Union setting in action the events which led to the Board conducted
election. Consultant Dellinger interrogated Young and Claassen about whether they had
made their minds up about this “stuff” leading Young to respond she was not going to be
there so it did not matter to her. This “stuff,” as more fully described elsewhere herein,
referred to the Union campaign and election. Dellinger did not leave Young’s response
alone but reminded Young she had friends there and should care about them. Young
obliged Dellinger telling her she would vote however her friends wanted her to vote.
Young’s friends included McCaslen, thus leading Consultant Dellinger to conclude
Young would support unionization in keeping with the desires of her friends. It was well
known McCaslen supported the Union. McCaslen testified, for example, she had met
with Dellinger many times regarding work related issues in the laboratory. McCaslen
said she and Consultant Dellinger had a “good open relationship” and that they “talked
frequently.” McCaslen recalled that Dellinger told her in late May 2007, in the
laboratory that she was “worried” “that you will end up with less after negotiations than
you have now.” Thus not only did Young engage in protected activities but the Company
knew of them, in part, from Dellinger’s unlawful interrogation of Young and by Young’s
association with others Dellinger knew to support the Union.
Young’s termination date was accelerated one day after she was unlawfully
interrogated by Dellinger revealing her pro-Union inclinations. Specifically the
JD(ATL)—40—07
18
Company raised no objection to Young’s proposed June 6, 2007, departure date from the
time she announced her resignation on April 26, 2007, until one day after Dellinger
unlawfully interrogated her on May 22, 2007, at which time Young revealed her apparent
support for the Union.
The Company’s contention Young’s comment “she couldn’t wait to get the hell
out of here” brought about her accelerated departure as an accommodation to her, and for
no other reason, does not withstand examination. The Company seized upon Young’s
comment, as a pretext, to accelerate her departure date so as to make Young ineligible to
vote in the Board conducted election. First, others complained about working conditions
but had no action taken against them for doing so. Laboratory employee McCaslen
admitted she was one of the “biggest complainers” in the laboratory department
complaining daily as “overworked or under appreciated,” but was never disciplined for
her complaints. McCaslen told Supervisor Peter, on occasions when he handed out
payroll checks, to please tell her it was her pink slip and in response to his inquiries about
how things were going she would tell him she was going to quit and he could finish her
work. Peter, as her laboratory supervisor, took no action against McCaslen for her
statements of dissatisfaction, yet the Company seized upon Young’s one flare-up and
accelerated her departure date. I note the Company had no policy regarding profanity in
the work place on which it might attempt to justify its offense at Young’s use of the term
“hell” in her comments.
The Company had no established past practice of accelerating resigning
employees’ proposed departure dates. Vice President Tolsma testified it was not a
common practice to accelerate dates but nevertheless gave three examples where
departure dates were accelerated. One example was of a former Director of Information
Technology who stated she could not work a certain way and was told by Tolsma she was
resigning immediately. The person was a management official not a laboratory employee
and she was in essence fired by being told she was resigning immediately. The second
example involved a Vice President of Production who specifically requested an
accelerated departure date. The third example involved an environmental engineer, who
was on a performance improvement plan, who told Tolsma he could not work for his
assigned supervisor, because the supervisor was not an engineer. Tolsma accepted his
resignation that day. These are not analogous to Young’s situation nor do they offer any
justification for the Company’s actions against Young rather it simply highlights the
pretextual nature of the Company’s acceleration of Young’s departure date.
The pretextural nature of the Company’s actions toward Young is further
demonstrated by the fact Consultant Dellinger had discussions with the highest levels of
management, even those outside the country, but failed to consult with or provide early
notice to Young’s immediate Supervisor, Wood. Dellinger acknowledged that Vice
President Tolsma and Director Mayberry were not generally involved in disciplinary
decisions but she “felt strongly that it was time to let Heidi [Young] go with . . . the
attitude that she displayed to me” and she said it was no secret about the Company “going
through a union campaign”. It appears quite clear Dellinger knew she was not following
JD(ATL)—40—07
19
past practice involving this highly educated laboratory employee but also knew it was
time to remove Young from the payroll in light of the upcoming union election.
Further evidence of the pretextural nature of the Company’s actions is
demonstrated by Dellinger’s stated concern that Young’s frustrated and upsetting
comments would send “a ripple effect out to all of the people” she worked with. I note
after Young had been told of her accelerated departure date she was asked to work,
unsupervised, for two additional work days. If the Company truly was concerned that
Young’s continued presence in the laboratory would be detrimental to the workforce it
would not have insisted she work additional days or, if not, find on her own a
replacement for herself those additional work days. The laboratory was understaffed at
the time.
I find the Company accelerated Young’s departure date for unlawfully motivated
reasons violating Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The Government’s prima facie case has not
been rebutted, as the reasons advanced by the Company are pretextual.
Conclusions of Law
1. By, since on or about May 2007, interrogating its employees about their
union activities and support for the Union; promising employees to resolve any problems
employees had with their current working conditions if they abandoned their pursuit of
union representation; and, threatening employees they would receive no job protection if
they engaged in economic strikes on behalf of the Union, should employees select the
Union to represent them, the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. By on May
27, 2007, accelerating the termination of employee Heidi Young, who had given notice of
her intent to resign her employment with the Company on June 6, 2007, the Company
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
2. In as much as these unfair labor practice violations are coextensive with
the Union’s Objections to the election, the Objections are sustained and the election
should be set aside.
3. The ballot of Heidi Young should be opened and counted. A new tally of
ballots should be prepared and, depending on the outcome of the election, an appropriate
certification should issue. If the outcome shows that a majority of the valid votes counted
is in favor of union representation the Union would obviously withdraw its objections in
favor of a Certification of Representative. On the other hand, if the revised tally shows
that a majority of the valid votes counted was against unionization, a new election should
be conducted based on the Union’s Objections.
Remedy
Having found the Company has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find it
must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. Although the Company discriminatorily accelerated
JD(ATL)—40—07
20
the termination date of its employee Heidi Young from June 6 to May 27, 2007, I shall
not recommend that she be made whole or reinstated because she was paid through her
voluntary resignation date and voluntarily left the Company for other sought after
employment. I do, however, recommend the Company be ordered, within 14 days of the
Board’s Order, to remove from its files any reference to the unlawful acceleration of
Young’s departure date, and, within 3 days thereafter, notify her in writing it has done so.
I also recommend the Company be ordered, within 14 days after service by the Region, to
post an appropriate “Notice to Employees” in order that employees may be apprised of
their rights under the Act and the Company’s obligation to remedy its unfair labor
practices.
With respect to the Representation case, I recommend that a revised tally of
ballots be issued after counting the ballot to be opened. In the event that a majority of the
votes are for the Union, it is recommended that a Certification of Representative be
issued. In the event, however, that a majority is cast against union representation, it is
recommended that a new election be held.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue
the following recommended
ORDER
9
The Company, GELITA USA INC., it officers, agents, successors, and assigns
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating its employees about their union activities and support
for the Union; promising employees to resolve any problems employees had with their
current working conditions if they abandoned their pursuit of union representation; and,
threatening employees they would receive no job protection if they engaged in economic
strikes on behalf of the Union, should employees select the Union to represent them.
(b) Accelerating the termination date for employees because they
engaged in union and/or other protected activities and to prevent them from voting in a
scheduled Board conducted representation election.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies
of the Act:

9 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD(ATL)—40—07
21
(a) Within 14 days of the Board’s Order, remove from its files any
reference to its acceleration of Heidi Young’s departure date from the Company, and,
within 3 days thereafter, notify her in writing that this has been done and that such will
not be used against her in any manner.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Regional Director of Region 18
of the National Labor Relations Board, post at its Sergeant Bluff, Iowa, facility copies of
the attached notice marked “Appendix.”10 Copies of the Notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 18 after being signed by the Company’s authorized
representative shall be posted by the Company and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced or
covered by any other material. In the event that during the pendency of these
proceedings the Company has gone out of business or closed the facilities involved in
these proceedings, the Company shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of
the Notice to Employees, to all employees employed by the Company on or at any time
since May 22, 2007.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional
Director for Region 18 of the National Labor Relations Board sworn certification of a
responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Company has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the proceeding in Case 18-RC-17500 be
severed and remanded to the Regional Director for Region 18 for further action
consistent with this decision.
Dated, Washington, D.C., December 21, 2007.
_________________________
William N. Cates
Associate Chief Judge

10 If this order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the
notice reading, “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD”
shall read: “POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”
JD(ATL)—40—07
22
JD(ATL)—40—07
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by the Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered
us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees about their union activities and/or support for United
Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 1142 or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT promise our employees we would be able to resolve any problems employees
had with their current working conditions if they abandoned their pursuit of union representation.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that they would receive no job protection if they
engaged in economic strikes on behalf of the Union, should employees select the Union to represent them.
WE WILL NOT accelerate the termination date of employees, who have tendered their
resignations, because of their union or concerted protected activities or to prevent them from voting in a
Board conducted election.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days of the Board’s Order, remove from our files any reference to our
acceleration of Heidi Young’s departure date from our Company and, WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter,
notify her in writing that this has been done and that her accelerated departure will not be used against her
in any manner.
GELITA USA INC.
Employer
Dated:______________________ By:______________________________________
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the
National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want
union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To
find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain
information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
300 Second Avenue South, Towle Building - Suite 790, Minneapolis, MN 55401-2221
(612) 348-1757, Hours: 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE.
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER
MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (612) 348-1770)