GANOR, Shlomo COHEN.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 1, 20202019001816 (P.T.A.B. May. 1, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/349,648 01/13/2012 Shlomo COHEN GANOR P-75634-US 1080 49443 7590 05/01/2020 Pearl Cohen Zedek Latzer Baratz LLP 1500 Broadway 12th Floor New York, NY 10036 EXAMINER PRESTON, JOHN O ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3691 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/01/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Arch-USPTO@PearlCohen.com USPTO@PearlCohen.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ________________ Ex parte SHLOMO COHEN GANOR ________________ Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 Technology Center 3600 ________________ Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JASON J. CHUNG, and DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals the Non-Final Rejection of claims 1–3, 8–13, 18–22, 24, and 25.2 An Oral Hearing was held on April 24, 2020. A transcript of the hearing will be made of record in due course. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, NICE Ltd. is the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1. 2 Claims 4–7, 14–17, and 23 are canceled. Appeal Br. 17, 19, 22. Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 2 INVENTION The invention relates to correlating transaction events over a transaction lifecycle. Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention and is reproduced below: 1. A method, implemented using one or more processors and associated memories, for correlating transaction events, the method comprising: receiving at a correlation engine comprising a processor incoming transaction events, each event identifying actions executed at a plurality of different types of source systems and having an event identifier, each source system comprising a processor and being selected from a computer; an automated teller machine; and a point of sale system; assigning to each transaction event, using the correlation engine processor, a correlation configuration set having an identifier, based on one or more of: the source system executing the action identified by the transaction event; and the data type of the event; each correlation configuration set including a set of one or more equivalence relations, each equivalence relation comprising an equivalence relation identity value function producing a string comprising one or more of a first set of parameters of an input event; and a relation identity equality function which determines if events match based on approximate and non-exact criteria applied to a second set of event parameters; determining, using the correlation engine processor, for each transaction event one or more corresponding identity keys, each identity key comprising: the identifier of the correlation configuration set selected for the transaction event, an identity value produced by an equivalence relation identity value function for the correlation configuration set selected for the transaction event, and an identifier for the equivalence relation identity value function used to produce the identity value; Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 3 using the processor, grouping transaction events in a map such that different events having exactly matching identity keys are grouped, determining which transaction events are correlated as being associated with the same payment transaction using a relation identity equality function for each set of grouped transaction events having the same identity key to determine if grouped events match approximately and non-exactly differing within a predetermined range for a subset of event parameters; using the processor, determining for a payment transaction whether or not to trigger a flag or alert when possibly fraudulent data is detected due to the change in the amount of payment across grouped transaction events; and outputting a list of the correlated transaction events over a lifecycle of the same payment transaction. Appeal Br. 16–17 (Claims Appendix) (emphases added). REJECTION The Examiner rejects claims 1–3, 8–13, 18–22, 24, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent ineligible subject matter. Non-Final Act. 4–9. ANALYSIS A. Principles of Law An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 4 Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 5 abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of 3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p df). Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 6 internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also Update at 1. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the Update, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55. Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 7 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. C. The Examiner’s Conclusions and Appellant’s Arguments The Examiner concludes the present claims recite certain mental processes that can be performed using pen and paper. Non-Final Act. 4; Ans. 8. Appellant argues that the present claims recite an improvement to the technology of organizing and controlling transactions. Appeal Br. 7–9, 13– 14 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Spec. ¶¶ 3, 15, 16); Reply Br. 2–5; Supp. Appeal Br. 2–4. Appellant further argues the present claims are necessarily rooted in computer technology to solve problems specifically arising in that realm. Appeal Br. 10–11 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Appellant argues the present claims do not preempt any abstract idea. Appeal Br. 7, 9, 13. Appellant argues that the present claims are not in the prior art and, thus, have not been performable previously by a computer or a human. Id. at 12. Appellant argues the present claims recite a non- conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional elements, which results in an inventive concept. Id. at 7, 9, 11–13 (citing BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). We disagree with Appellant. D. Discussion 1. Step 2A, Prong 1 Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question that we resolve pursuant to the 2019 Revised Guidance. We conclude the emphasized Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 8 portions of claim 1,5 reproduced above (see supra at 2–3), recite concepts that can practically be performed in the human mind because the present claims require taking transaction events input from disparate sources, performing a unique and specific ordered series of operations on the input, and providing a useful output based on that transformed data. We also conclude the present claims are analogous to the claims in FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089 (2016). In FairWarning, the Court held that collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse and notifying a user when misuse is detected is a mental processes, which is an abstract idea. Id. at 1094–95, 1097. According to the 2019 Revised Guidance, concepts that can practically be performed in the human mind fall into the category of mental processes. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Moreover, such mental processes are a type of abstract idea. See id. Additionally, we conclude the present claims recite commercial interactions (including sales activities or behaviors) because the present claims require taking transaction events input from disparate sources, performing a unique and specific ordered series of operations on the input, and providing a useful output based on that transformed data. According to the 2019 Revised Guidance, commercial interactions (including sales activities or behaviors) fall into the category of certain methods of organizing human activity. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. 5 Claim 1 is reproduced above with emphases. Appellant does not argue claims 1–3, 8–13, 18–22, 24, and 25 separately. Appeal Br. 6–15. We, therefore, group those claims together and refer to those claims as the “present claims.” Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 9 Moreover, those certain methods of organizing human activity are a type of abstract idea. See id. Because the present claims recite mental processes or commercial interactions, which are abstract ideas, we proceed to prong 2. 2. Step 2A, Prong 2 The additional elements of the present claims do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea for the following reasons. Appellant does not identify persuasively how the Specification sets forth an improvement in technology. The Update addresses how we consider evidence of improvement that is presented to us. The Update states: the evaluation of Prong Two requires the use of the considerations (e.g. improving technology, effecting a particular change treatment or prophylaxis, implementing with a particular machine, etc.) identified by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, to ensure that the claim as a whole “integrates [the] judicial exception into a practical application [that] will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Update, 11 (emphases added). The Update further states: [d]uring examination, the examiner should analyze the “improvements” consideration by evaluating the specification and the claims to ensure that a technical explanation of the asserted improvement is present in the specification, and that the claim reflects the asserted improvement. Generally, examiners are not expected to make a qualitative judgment on the merits of the asserted improvement. If the examiner concludes the disclosed invention does not improve technology, the burden shifts to applicant to provide persuasive arguments supported by any necessary evidence to demonstrate that one of ordinary skill Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 10 in the art would understand that the disclosed invention improves technology. Any such evidence submitted under 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 must establish what the specification would convey to one of ordinary skill in the art and cannot be used to supplement the specification. For example, in response to a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an applicant could submit a declaration under § 1.132 providing testimony on how one of ordinary skill in the art would interpret the disclosed invention as improving technology and the underlying factual basis for that conclusion. Id. at 13 (emphasis added). We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the present claims an improvement to the technology of organizing and controlling transactions. Appeal Br. 7–9, 13–14 (citing McRO, 837 F.3d at 1299; Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1327; Spec. ¶¶ 3, 15, 16); Reply Br. 2–5; Supp. Appeal Br. 2–4. In this case, the Examiner concludes that the present claims do not recite an improvement to technology, but rather are improvements to a business or financial problem. Non-Final Act. 2; Ans. 7–8, 10. Consequently, we focus on any evidence Appellant cites as discussed in the Update. Here, although Appellant identifies paragraphs 3, 15, and 16 of the Specification, those paragraphs merely describe correlating transactions whose parameters change over time to detect fraud (i.e., mental processes or certain methods of organizing human activity), which fall within the category of an abstract idea as discussed supra, not an improvement to technology. Appeal Br. 7–9, 13–14 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 3, 15, 16). Paragraphs 3, 15, and 16 of the Specification are unlike the technological improvements in McRO. The subject claim considered by the McRO court concerned a method for automatically animating lip synchronization and facial expressions. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1303. The McRO court concluded the Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 11 subject claims did not recite an abstract idea because the computer animation used a structure of limited rules that reflected a specific implementation which an animator would not likely have utilized. Id. at 1316. Thus, the claimed invention in McRO used “limited rules in a process specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result” over “existing, manual 3-D animation techniques.” Id. Unlike the claims of McRO, the present claims do not recite an improvement to technology; instead, the present claims focus on an improvement to the abstract idea itself. Similar to Appellant’s citation to McRO, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s citation to Enfish. Appeal Br. 7–9, 13–14; Reply Br. 3–5. In Enfish, the Federal Circuit considered how the invention in Enfish was superior to the technology in the prior art. That is, the court considered “the specification’s emphasis that ‘the present invention comprises a flexible, self-referential table that stores data,’” “[t]he specification also teaches that the self-referential table functions differently than conventional database structures,” and “traditional databases, such as ‘those that follow the relational model and those that follow the object oriented model’ are inferior to the claimed invention.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337 (interior citations omitted). Moreover, in Enfish “‘[t]he structural requirements of current databases require a programmer to predefine a structure and subsequent [data] entry must conform to that structure,’ [and] the ‘database of the present invention does not require a programmer to preconfigure a structure to which a user must adapt data entry.’” Id. Based on the foregoing, the court determined the claims “achieve[d] other benefits over conventional databases, such as increased flexibility, faster search times, and smaller memory requirements.” Id. Unlike the claims of Enfish, the present claims Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 12 do not recite “a specific improvement to the way computers operate, embodied in the self-referential table.” Id. at 1336. Instead, the present claims recite an abstract idea as discussed supra, in § I.D.1. or at best, improving an abstract idea—not a technological improvement. The Specification indicates the additional elements (i.e., “engine,” “processor,” “source systems,” “computer,” “automated teller machine,” “point of sale system,” and “memory”6) recited in the present claims are merely generic computer components used to implement the abstract idea. Spec. ¶¶ 19–22, 24, 28. Further, the generic computer components, individually or in combination, do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Additionally, “a claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). “[U]nder the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility . . . .” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). We further disagree with Appellant’s argument that, similar to DDR Holdings, the present claims are necessarily rooted in computer technology to solve problems specifically arising in that realm. Appeal Br. 10–11. The subject claim considered by the DDR court pertained to a visitor of a host’s website clicking on an advertisement for a third-party product displayed on the host’s website, the visitor is no longer being transported to the third 6 This feature is recited in claims 11 and 21, but not recited in claims 1 and 22. Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 13 party’s website. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. In DDR, instead of losing visitors to the third-party’s website, the host website can send its visitors to a web page on an outsource provider’s server that (1) incorporates “look and feel” elements from the host website and (2) provides visitors with the opportunity to purchase products from the third-party merchant without actually entering that merchant’s website. Id. at 1257–58. In contrast to the claims of DDR, the present claims do not recite incorporating “look and feel elements” from a host website and providing visitors with the opportunity to purchase products from a third-party merchant without actually entering the merchant’s website. Appellant’s argument that the present claims do not preempt any abstract idea does not persuade us that the claims are eligible. Appeal Br. 7, 9, 13. Although preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its absence does not demonstrate patent eligibility. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1098. For claims covering a patent-ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully addressed and made moot” by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). With regard to Appellant’s argument that the present claims recite features that were not known previously because there is no prior art rejection (Appeal Br. 12), Appellant improperly conflates the requirements for eligible subject matter (§ 101) with the independent requirements of novelty (§ 102) and non-obviousness (§ 103). “The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188– Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 14 89; see also Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that, “under the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility”). 3. Step 2B We find that the abstract idea is implemented with additional elements that are well-understood, routine, and conventional. The Specification also supports the Examiner’s determination in this regard because it explains that “engine,” “processor,” “source systems,” “computer,” “automated teller machine,” “point of sale system,” and “memory” are generic components. Spec. ¶¶ 19–22, 24, 28. Appellant’s Specification indicates these additional elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional components because it describes them at a high level of generality and in a manner that indicates that they are sufficiently well-known. Id. Moreover, the additional elements recited in the present claims, analyzed individually or in combination, do not result in the claim, as a whole, amounting to significantly more than the judicial exception. An inventive concept “cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (explaining that, after determining a claim is directed to a judicial exception, “we then ask, ‘[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?”’ (emphasis added, brackets in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78)). Instead, an “inventive concept” is furnished by an element or combination of elements that is recited in the claim in addition to the Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 15 judicial exception and sufficient to ensure the claim as a whole amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself. Alice, 573 U.S. at 218- 19 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73); see BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that the Supreme Court in Alice “only assessed whether the claim limitations other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it was directed were well-understood, routine and conventional,” (emphasis added)). We also disagree with Appellant’s argument that the present claims recite a non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional elements, which results in an inventive concept. Appeal Br. 7, 9, 11–13 (citing BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Appellant’s arguments fail to identify any additional element or particular combination of elements that allegedly are unconventional, non-routine, or not well-understood. See Appeal Br. 7, 9, 11–13. We cite paragraphs in support of our finding that the generic computer components were well-understood, routine, and conventional components performing conventional computer operations. Spec. ¶¶ 19–22, 24, 28. Moreover, in BASCOM, the claims were directed to “a filter implementation versatile enough that it could be adapted to many different users’ preferences while also installed remotely in a single location.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1348–51. The inventive concept was “the installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user” that “gives the filtering tool both the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server.” Id. at 1350. Thus, when considered as an Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 16 ordered combination, the court concluded the claims provided “an inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.” Id. Here, the present claims recite an abstract idea using additional elements that are generic computer components as discussed supra, in §§ I.D.1. and I.D.2. or at best, improving an abstract idea—not an inventive concept for the reasons discussed in § I.D.2. Appellant does not argue claims 2, 3, 8–13, 18–22, 24, and 25 separately, but asserts the § 101 rejection of those claims should be withdrawn for at least the same reasons as argued for independent claim 1. Appeal Br. 6–15. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of: (1) independent claims 1, 11, 21, and 22; and (2) dependent claims 2–3, 8– 10, 12, 13, 18–20, 24, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to make, in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). CONCLUSION No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–3, 8–13, 18–22, 24, 25 101 Eligibility 1–3, 8–13, 18–22, 24, 25 Appeal 2019-001816 Application 13/349,648 17 AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation