Gaetano A. Trovato, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 24, 2005
01a52919 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 24, 2005)

01a52919

08-24-2005

Gaetano A. Trovato, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Gaetano A. Trovato v. United States Postal Service

01A52919

August 24, 2005

.

Gaetano A. Trovato,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A52919

Agency No. 1H-321-0091-03

Hearing No. 150-2005-0002X

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal with this Commission from a February 11,

2005 agency decision which implemented the January 26, 2005 decision of

an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) finding no discrimination.

Complainant, a mail processor, alleged in his complaint that the agency

discriminated against him on the basis of sex (male) when: (1) on July 24,

2003, and thereafter, complainant reported that he was sexually harassed

by a female co-worker (Person A) and no action was taken by the agency;

and (2) complainant was issued a letter of warning, dated September

23, 2003.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of the

investigative report and requested a hearing before an AJ. The AJ issued

a decision without a hearing (summary judgment) finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination based on sex. The AJ found that complainant failed

to demonstrate that similarly situated employees not in complainant's

protected classes were treated differently under similar circumstances.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after

the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment

is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's

race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, religion, or in

reprisal is unlawful. To establish a prima facie case of harassment,

a complainant must show that: (1) s/he belongs to a statutorily

protected class; (2) s/he was subjected to harassment in the form of

unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class;

(3) the harassment complained of was based on the statutorily protected

class; and (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment

and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the

work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

work environment and (5) some basis exists to impute liability to the

employer, i.e., supervisory employees knew or should have known of the

conduct but failed to take corrective action.

In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), the Supreme

Court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477

U.S. 57, 67 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's

employment. The Court explained that an "objectively hostile or abusive

work environment [is created when] a reasonable person would find [it]

hostile or abusive:" and the complainant subjectively perceives it

as such. Harris, supra at 21-22. Thus, not all claims of harassment

are actionable. Where a complaint does not challenge an agency action or

inaction regarding a specific term, condition or privilege of employment,

a claim of harassment is actionable only if, allegedly, the harassment

to which the complainant has been subjected was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's employment.

The record reveals that on February 11, 2003, Person A reported that

complainant had been staring at her and that she found complainant's

staring uncomfortable.<1> The record also reveals that on February 19,

2003, complainant was called into his supervisor's office to discuss

Person A's allegations. The record reveals that Person A reported

that on July 2, 2003, complainant stared at her while she was working.

The record reveals further that on July 3, 2003, complainant reported

that Person A was staring at him. The record discloses that on July 8,

2003, Person A was called into her supervisor's office and was told that

complainant was now alleging that she was harassing him. The record

also reveals that complainant alleged that Person A stuck her middle

finger at a male co-worker (Person B) every day and that he witnessed

the alleged actions of Person A.

The record contains the affidavit of complainant, the affidavit of

complainant's supervisor who was the supervisor of Distribution Operations

(DO) and the affidavit of the manager of DO.

Complainant stated in his affidavit that on February 20, 2003, Person A

sexually harassed him by displaying a drawing of a penis on her machine

where he could see it and which embarrassed him. Complainant also

stated that the drawing was removed after it was brought to management's

attention. The affidavit discloses that complainant alleged that Person

A stared at him five times on July 24, 2003, for 10 to 20 minutes each

time and that after the fourth time, he reported Person A's conduct

to a supervisor. The affidavit also reveals that on September 9, 2003,

complainant alleged that Person A stared at him for 10 minutes and he

reported the incident. Complainant also stated that when he reported

the incidents on February 20, July 24, and September 9, 2003, he was

moved to other working areas. Complainant's affidavit does not reflect

that the staring incidents in July and September were sexual in nature.

In his affidavit, complainant identified Person A as an individual who

was treated more favorably than he was with regard to discipline.

In his affidavit, complainant's supervisor stated that on July 3,

2003, complainant provided him with a written statement in which he

alleged that Person A had subjected him to non-sexual harassment.

The supervisor also stated that, a day prior, on July 2, 2003, Person

A provided him with a written statement alleging that complainant was

subjecting her to non-sexual harassment. He stated that an investigation

was conducted and both complainant and Person A were directed to work in

separate areas of the building and to conduct themselves appropriately.

The supervisor stated that on September 9, 2003, complainant provided him

with a statement alleging that Person A was continuing the non-sexual

harassment and that he indicated that he interviewed complainant and

Person A. The supervisor stated that he was not aware of the incident of

alleged sexual harassment on July 24, 2003, or any other claim of sexual

harassment, prior to his receiving the questionnaire for completion of

the affidavit. He also stated that he had issued a letter of warning

to Person A.

In his affidavit, the manager of Distribution Operations stated that on

July 24, 2003, complainant reported to him that Person A was staring at

him, that he asked the supervisor in the work area to investigate the

incident and that Person A was told to stay away from complainant.

The record reveals further that a letter of warning, dated September 22,

2003, was issued to Person A for failure to follow instructions when

she engaged in staring at complainant, although she was instructed to

discontinue the conduct. Person A was given a letter of warning on

September 23, 2003, for failure to follow an instruction when he stared

at complainant contrary to instruction.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that grant

of summary judgment was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of material

fact exists. Considering the evidence in the a light most favorable to

complainant regarding his claim of sex-based harassment, the Commission

cannot find that the incidents that allegedly occurred, were so severe or

pervasive so as to have altered the conditions of complainant's employment

by creating a hostile work environment. Regarding claim 2, we find that

complainant has also failed to establish a prima facie case of sex-based

discrimination because complainant has failed to show that similarly

situated employees not in his protected class were treated more favorably.

The record shows that Person A, a female, received a letter of warning

for engaging in conduct similar to that in which complainant had engaged.

Even were we to assume that complainant established a prima facie case

regarding claim 2, we find that the agency articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its issuance of the letter of warning to

complainant, i.e., complainant's failure to follow an instruction.

Complainant failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's reason was mere pretext to mask unlawful discrimination.

Further, construing the evidence to be most favorable to complainant,

complainant failed to present evidence that any of the agency's actions

were motivated by discriminatory animus toward complainant's protected

class.

The agency's finding of no discrimination is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 24, 2005

__________________

Date

1Person A's supervisor also supervised

complainant.