Frick Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 4, 1969

175 N.L.R.B. 233 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

F RICK CO
Frick Company and International Union , United
Automobile , Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (UAW). Case
6-CA-3740
April 4, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, ANDZAGORiA
On December 13, 1968, Trial Examiner George J.
Bott issued his Decision in the above-entitled case,
finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was
engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in
the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter,
the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief, and the
General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Trial
Examiner's Decision as well as an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Frick Company,
Waynesboro, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
' We agree with the Trial Examiner ' s rejection of the Respondent's
contention that adding the number of strikers who had abandoned the
strike to the number of replacements for strikers gave it an objective basis
for doubting the Union's majority status In addition to the reasons cited
by the Trial Examiner for his conclusion, it may also be noted that, even
in the absence of unfair labor practices , there is no presumption that an
employee's return to work during a strike demonstrates a rejection of the
union as his bargaining representative See Palmer Asbestos and Rubber
Corp , 160 NLRB 723, 730 Moreover , in such circumstances, sinkers are
still part of the unit as long as they have not been replaced, and , even if
replaced, they are part of the unit for the first 12 months of the strike See
Pioneer Flour Mills, 174 NLRB No 174 Finally, in view of the
Respondent ' s unfair labor practices , it is apparent that replacements who
were hired after July 9, 1965, replaced unfair labor practice strikers, and
are, therefore , not includable in the unit if the strikers whom they replaced
have not been offered reinstatement after the strike was ended.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
233
GEORGE J. BOTT, Trial Examiner: This proceeding,
with all parties represented, was heard on October 8,
1968, at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, on the complaint of
the General Counsel issued on September 11, 1968,' and
the answer of Frick Company, herein called Respondent
or Company The issue involved is whether Respondent
improperly withdrew recognition from the Union in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act.
Subsequent to the hearing, all parties filed briefs which I
have considered.
Upon the entire record in the case,' and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1 THE RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS
Respondent is a Pennsylvania corporation with a plant
in Waynesboro, Pennsylvania, which is the only plant
involved herein, where it is engaged in the manufacturing
of refrigeration equipment. During the 12-month period
preceding the issuance of the complaint, the Respondent
shipped to points outside the State of Pennsylvania from
its Waynesboro plant, goods valued in excess of $50,000. I
find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act.
11 THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of the Act.
III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Basic Findings of Fact
On April I, 1965, after a brief strike, Respondent
entered into a written agreement with the Union
recognizing it as the exclusive bargaining agent for
Respondent's approximately 525 production and
maintenance employees for a period of l year.
Contract negotiations began on April 5 and continued
through May 14, 1965. On May 17, an impasse in
bargaining having been reached, the Union struck to
enforce its contract demands. All but four of the unit
employees left work during the strike, but thereafter some
employees returned to work each week. There were 12
bargaining sessions before the strike, and a few shortly
thereafter called by Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service. A lapse in bargaining then occurred while the
strike continued until the Union asked for additional
meetings in February 1966.
On November 16, 1965, while the strike was still
current, the General Counsel issued a complaint against
Respondent in Case 6-CA-3379, alleging violations of
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. After a hearing, a
Trial Examiner's Decision, and exceptions, the Board, on
November 16, 1966, adopted the findings of the Trial
'The charge on which the complaint is based was filed by the Union on
September 22, 1966
'General Counsel ' s unopposed motion to correct the transcnpt in certain
particulars is hereby granted
175 NLRB No. 39
234 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Examiner and found, with respect to the allegation of
refusal to bargain under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, that
the parties had bargained to an impasse and Respondent
had not refused to bargain with the Union as alleged The
Board also found, however, that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) by removing strikers from its payroll
because they had been absent for 7 days under
Respondent's rule, and by denying them earned vacation
pay by treating strike absence as unexcused absence. The
Board also found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(I)
of the Act during the strike by threatening employees with
forfeiture of vacation benefits if they continued striking
and did not return to work by a certain time, by making
other illegal threats to them to cause their return to work,
and by engaging in surveillance. The Board, in agreement
with the Trial Examiner, found that "Respondent by its
deliberate unlawful course of conduct beginning on July 9,
soon after the last negotiation session on July 7,
aggravated its differences with the Union and created new
and serious impediments to the settlement of the strike
with the results that the strike, economic in origin, was
prolonged and consequently converted into an unfair labor
practice strike as of July 9."'
On January 27, 1966, while the strike was still on,
Respondent wrote the Union and advised it that it was
terminating the recognition agreement as of April 1, 1966
Despite this notification, after the Union wrote the
Company on February 18, 1966, asking for a meeting to
"explore the possibility of a settlement of our
differences," and after additional correspondence, the
parties met on March 25, 1966, for contract negotiations.
During the March 25, 1966, meeting there was
discussion of a settlement of the strike and of the pending
unfair labor practice charges, the Union taking the
position that the strike was an unfair labor practice strike,
and the Company maintaining that it had bargained in
good faith The Company also asked the Union to submit
its contract demands and proposals in writing so that the
Company could submit counterproposals Attorney Rice,
for the Company, asked the Union what its wage demand
was, and the Union countered by inquiring about a
pension plan Rice asked how much the Union thought
should be set aside for a pension plan, and the Union
replied that the parties should first discuss its provisions,
not its cost At the end of the meeting, Rice indicated that
the Company had "money available" to improve certain
of its offers. The parties agreed to meet again on March
31, 1966
At the March 31, 1966, meeting, the Company offered
the Union a 12-cent-per-hour across-the-board wage
increase and an additional 5-cent-per-hour contribution to
a pension fund. The company negotiator advised that the
Company wished to make the increase effective
immediately because another employer in the area had
granted a similar increase, but he also stated that the offer
did not preclude further negotiations on wage or pension
increases He said he would offer the Union "our pension
plan" in "the near future." The negotiator for the Union
replied that the Union wished more time to consider the
wage and pension offer. At the conclusion of the meeting
the Union tendered to the Respondent its written contract
proposals. The parties agreed to meet again on April 4,
1966.
At the beginning of the April 4 meeting, Bothe, who
was the Union's chief negotiator, asked whether the
'Fuck Company , 161 NLRB 1089, 1111, enfd as modified N L R B v
Fnck Company , 397 F 2d 956 (C A 3)
Company had read the Union's proposals, and Rice
replied that he had, but said he understood that the main
purpose of this meeting was to discuss the employer's
wage offer Bothe said that it was not being rejected and
was still under consideration The Company stated that it
was going to put the wage increase into effect immediately
because of the increase recently given by another
employer.' Rice also stated that "the Company will go
over the entire contract and advise" the Union of its
position. At the end of the meeting he repeated that "We
will be in touch with you in the near future as to our next
meeting to discuss the contract."
The fourth and last meeting of the parties took place
on April 28. Previous to this session, the Union had
terminated the strike on April 6, and the striking
employees were being reinstated in groups according to
the Company's production scheduling Rice opened the
April 28 meeting by asking the Union "to explain the
areas" of its proposed contract, and he promised to
"prepare a counterproposal when we get more information
from you " The parties discussed some of the Union's
contract proposals The grievance procedure, for example,
was discussed and Respondent made some suggested
changes in it. Notes of the meeting in evidence taken by
company representatives show no real or precise
agreement on any major clauses, and it is clear that there
was no agreement on wages or pensions Rice asked the
Union for its position on these money items, and he was
told only that, "We are not frozen " During the meeting
Rice stated that "there was nothing more that they could
do today" for "the Company wanted to get more
information, particularly actuarial advice." He added that
the pension was a "major area of negotiations and the
amount of the pension will have an effect on the rest of
the articles of the contract " Rice concluded by stating
that the Company would be in touch with the Union,
probably in the middle of the following month when it had
received information from its actuaries
On May 25, 1966, the Union wrote the Company and,
after noting that the Company had indicated in the last
meeting that it intended to consult an actuary regarding
the pension plan, asked if the Company had the
information and was ready for a meeting
On June 1, 1966, the Respondent's attorney replied to
the Union's inquiry about a meeting. Among other things,
Rice noted that the Trial Examiner in the earlier case had
issued his decision finding that the Company had not
bargained in bad faith. He stated that "in view of the
pending unfair labor practice charge as filed by your
Union and the present status of the pending litigation, it is
now uncertain as to whether or not your Union represents
a majority We have more than 450 working in the Plant
and over 400 were working when the strike was called off
by the Union. The Company does not now believe that
your Union represents a majority of the employees in an
appropriate unit." In view of those facts, Rice concluded,
he saw "nothing to be gained by further meetings at this
time "
The Union protested the Company's position in a letter
to it on July 1, but, on July 11, the Company replied and,
repeating its earlier position in more detail emphasizing
that it was "firmly convinced that the UAW does not
represent the majority," declined to meet with the Union.
The Company did put the wage increase into effect and there was an
allegation about it in the complaint, but this was dropped by amendment
at the hearing in this case
FRICK CO. 235
During the strike which began on May 17, 1965, and
lasted until April 6, 1966, many strikers returned to work,
and the Company also hired a substantial number of
replacements. It appears from the uncontradicted
testimony of Hoff, Respondent's Director of Industrial
Relations, that when the March 25 bargaining meeting
took place, 202 strikers had returned to work and, in
addition, there were 239 replacements for strikers working
in the plant, making a total of 441 unit employees. By
April 4, the figure for strikers returned remained at 202,
and there were now 236 replacements. By June 1, when
Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union, there
were 202 strikers employed who had returned before the
end of the strike and 101 who had been reinstated after
the strike ended. In addition, there were approximately
225 new employees working.
The above statistics are unquestioned, but there is a
dispute about the time in relation to Respondent's unfair
labor practices during the strike when most of the strikers
came back to work. According to the Board's decision in
the first case, Respondent committed its first unfair labor
practice which came to the attention of the strikers on
July 9, when Respondent advised them about forfeiture of
vacation pay. Hoff testified that of the 202 strikers who
returned 75 percent of them had returned before July 1.
However, Craig, International Union representative who
was in charge of the strike, testified that in his judgment
only about 40 of the 202 returnees returned before the
Company sent out its July 8 letter regarding vacations. I
credit Craig. Hoff admitted that he was guessing and had
not checked company records. Craig was not only more
certain, but he was in a better position to know and
remember, for he was in charge of the strike and the
picketing, and was also responsible for strike benefit
disbursements. I find that the great majority of strikers
who returned to work during the strike did so after the
middle of July 1965.
B. Analysis, Additional Findings, and Conclusions
Respondent's position essentially is that it met and
negotiated with the Union many times prior to June 1,
1966, and having reached an impasse withdrew recognition
from and refused to meet further with the Union, because
it had a good-faith doubt that the Union did not represent
a majority of its employees'
1. Impasse
In the earlier case against Respondent, the Trial
Examiner found that the parties had arrived at an impasse
on wages by May 14, 1965, when Respondent announced
a unilateral wage increase of 12 cents per hour, and that
this unilateral act did not occur in a context of a refusal
to bargain in violation of the Act The Trial Examiner
also found, of course, that Respondent's whole course of
conduct in the bargaining area was not in bad faith. The
Union and the General Counsel concede, therefore, that a
bargaining impasse existed between the Union and the
Company up to February 18, 1966, when the Union wrote
Respondent and asked for a meeting to explore the
possibility of a settlement of their differences. The Union
was still the bargaining representative, despite the
existence of an impasse, and the passage of a substantial
period of time since the last meeting would have broken
'The complaint was amended at the hearing by striking "April I," as the
date of alleged refusal, and substituting "June I "
the impasse in any case."
In any event, the Union and the Company did meet for
collective bargaining on March 25, 1966, and in this first
meeting the Respondent indicated that it had more money
available for economic items than it had before. This, it
seems to me, was a substantial change in the position of
one of the parties, which would suggest a real possibility
of breaking the previous deadlock.'
In the second meeting on March 31, the Union
presented written contract proposals as requested by the
Company in the previous meeting. Unless the Respondent
had made this suggestion in bad faith, which no one
contends, it was still considering the possibility of position
shifts on both sides Moreover, in line with its earlier
suggestion in the economic field, at this meeting the
Company proposed an additional contribution of 5 cents
per hour to the pension fund.
The third meeting on April 4, rather than suggesting an
impasse, evidences some open mindedness on both sides
The Union repeated that its contract proposals were not
final or unchangeable, and the Company indicated that it
was not yet prepared to make a complete counterproposal,
and promised to get in touch with the Union for another
meeting. When the April 28 meeting was concluded, some
agreement in some areas had been reached, and the
Company had agreed to submit additional
counterproposals and to supply information to the Union
as to what benefits a 10-cent-an-hour contribution to the
pension fund would buy. This information would be
available in the next meeting. The parties shook hands
and agreed to meet again.
Although the economic package, that is to say, wages
and pensions, was always the principal issue dividing the
parties, and although in the last series of meetings
described above the Union had neither accepted or
rejected the Company's wage and pension proposals, I am
convinced on the basis of the facts set forth that the
situation existing in bargaining on April 28 was not such
as to justify the Employer's asserted belief that progress
was hopeless and that further discussions were a waste of
time.' Not only had the Company raised its pension
contribution another 5 cents over its earlier offers, it had
promised to provide information obtained from its
actuaries as to the benefits that 10 cents an hour per
employee would provide. The records in this case and the
earlier one show that pensions were an important issue to
the Union, and so the change of position in this area
strongly indicates that the parties not only were not
frozen, but did not believe or act like they were.
Finally in regard to impasse, I am persuaded, as the
General Counsel and the Union contend, that
Respondent's defense in this area, set up for the first time
in its answer , is an afterthought When the Company did
not get in touch with the Union with actuarial information
as promised, the Union wrote the Company and asked
about it. Respondent replied and noted that it had not yet
obtained the information needed. It also questioned the
Union's majority and refused to meet When the Union
protested the Company's refusal, Respondent reiterated its
position in another letter to the Union, but in neither
letter breaking off bargaining did Respondent suggest that
'Central Metallic Casket Co 91 NLRB 572
'In the first case, the Trial Examiner found that during bargaining,
Respondent "remained unpersuaded that it should grant more than its
original offer of 12 cents an hour on wages and 5 cents an hour on
pensions "
'This was the testimony of Hoff and Miller for the Company
236 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
further talks would be useless because of an impasse?
I find that none existed."
In reaching this conclusion I have not ignored the
testimony of Respondent's negotiators that they believed
they had reached an impasse Hoff testified that
bargaining was broken off and no further meetings held
for three reasons. He listed impasse, doubt of the Union's
majority and the expiration of the original recognition
agreement The last is irrelevant, of course, for the
Union's right to recognition flows from the Act, not from
employer consent Hoffs assessment of the situation as
hopeless from a bargaining point of view, even if
objectively arrived at, is contrary to the facts which I have
found and also inconsistent with his own notes on
bargaining on which many of these findings are based.
Similarly, I have also considered whatever difficulty in
bargaining may have resulted from the abrasive, personal
remarks of one of the Union's negotiators, uttered in the
last meeting Here again, these comments, frustrating as
they may have been, do not outweigh the factors which I
have found indicate openmindedness and some progress in
negotiations
2 The Union's majority and the Company's
doubt of it
The Union was recognized by the Company on April 1,
1965, as the exclusive bargaining representative of
employees in an appropriate production and maintenance
unit. The Union's majority status in an appropriate unit
as of April 1, 1965, was admitted by the Respondent and
found by the Board in the earlier case '° One of the
reasons given by Hoff for withdrawing recognition from
the Union was an asserted belief that the Union no longer
represented a majority. According to Hoff, this belief was
based on the makeup of the employee complement as of
June 1, 1966 At that time, Respondent had 225 "new
hires" or replacements for strikers on its payroll, and 202
old employees who had engaged in the strike of May 17,
1965, but who had crossed the picket line and returned to
work In addition, the Company had recalled 101 striking
employees after the strike was ended These figures made
a total of 528 employees in the bargaining unit on June 1.
Respondent, apparently conceding that a bargaining
relationship rightfully established either by certification or
recognition must be permitted to exist for a reasonable
period to give it a chance to succeed, and that an
employer may question a union's majority after a
certification year only if he has reasonable grounds to
support his asserted good faith belief that the union no
longer represents a majority," points out that an employer
may base his good-faith doubt about the status of the
union upon mathematical calculations of returning
strikers, replacements and employees still on strike.':
Respondent develops its position by arguing that since
"new hires" or replacements were not members of the
Union, and the presumption is that the employees who
abandoned the strike no longer supported the Union, 427
employees in a unit of 528 on June l could be considered
as not favoring the Union Respondent concludes that
these simple mathematical computations demonstrate that
over 50 percent of Respondent's employees as of June 1,
1966, did not support the Union.
`Cf American Ship Building Co v N L R B , 380 U S 300, 303, Dallas
General Drivers Warehousemen and Helpers , Local Union No 745, 1 B T
v NLRB,355F2d842,845(CADC)
"161 NLRB 1089, 1102
Charging Party and General Counsel accept
Respondent's statement of the law and some of its
mathematics, but they add that the Board has also held
that where the majority question is raised by an employer
in a context of unremedied unfair labor practices, the
question of whether the employer had reasonable grounds
for believing that the union had lost its majority is
irrelevant, for employee disaffection with the bargaining
agent would be deemed attributable to such unfair labor
practices." Aware of these principles, Respondent says
that even if we accept Union Representative Craig's
testimony that only 40 strikers went back to work before
July 9, 1965, which was the day the strike was converted
into an unfair labor practice strike by Respondent's
actions in regard to vacations for strikers, nevertheless 40
plus the 239 replacements for strikers is still a majority of
employees who did not support the Union on June 1,
1966, when recognition was withdrawn, regardless of the
magnitude of the unfair labor practices committed by
Respondent in the summer of 1965.
Respondent's numbers, while not inaccurate on their
face, need analysis Most, if not the large majority, of the
strikers, as Craig testified credibly, came back to work
after July 8, 1965 Respondent had 239 replacements by
June 1, 1966, but there is no evidence, and it is extremely
unlikely, that Respondent had 239 replacements on its
payroll at any time in 1965 In the earlier case, the Trial
Examiner found, and the Board and Court agreed, that
after the strike began on May 17, 1965, Respondent
committed an unfair labor practice by removing strikers
from its payroll "as a quit effective May 24," another
unfair labor practice in letters to employees on July 8
threatening them with loss of vacation pay if they did not
return to work by July 14, and another by actually
effecting a forfeiture in vacation pay in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act because employees did not
return to work. The Trial Examiner also found that these
unfair labor practices continued into August 1965 in that
Respondent's supervisors also engaged in coercive conduct
during that period designed, as were Respondent's threats
regarding vacation pay, to persuade employees to abandon
the strike Some of Respondent's conduct during the
strike, in the Trial Examiner's view, "constituted attempts
to deal with the striking employees directly rather than
through their Union, the majority representative." He
concluded that Respondent "by its deliberate unlawful
course of conduct beginning on July 9, soon after the last
negotiation session on July 7, aggravated its differences
with the Union and created new and serious impediments
to the settlement of the strike with the results that the
strike, economic in origin, was prolonged and
consequently converted into an unfair labor practice strike
on July 9 "
Two things at least follow from this analysis of
Respondent' s statistics and the findings of unfair labor
practices in the original case One, there were not enough
strikers who had returned to work or replacements on
July 8 or 9 to support the belief that the Union had lost
the support of a majority in the unit. Two, serious unfair
"Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664, 672, Kimbrough
Trucking Co , 160 NLRB 954, 957-958, Universal Gear Corporation, 157
NLRB 1169, Palmer Asbestos & Rubber Corporation , 160 NLRB 723,
730
"Celanese Corporation of America, supra. Neuman Transit Co. Inc,
138 NLRB 659, Midwestern Instruments , Inc , 133 NLRB 1132
"Franks Bros Company v N L R B. 321 U S 702, 705, The Little
Rock Downtowner, inc , 168 NLRB No 18, C & C Plywood Corporation
and Veneer , Inc , 163 NLRB No 136
FRICK CO. 237
labor practices, such as threats regarding and actual
deprivation of vacation benefits,' undercut the Union and
impeded a settlement of the strike A corollary of this is
that if the strike had been settled at an early date and not
prolonged by Respondent's unfair labor practices, which
were aimed at causing disaffection among the strikers and
which still remained unremedied in June 1966, there may
never have been 202 stnkers who abandoned the strike
and returned to work or 239 replacements for strikers. In
this connection it may be fairly inferred that defections
and replacements were directly related to the serious
character of Respondent's unfair labor practices
Respondent's mathematics, therefore, is contaminated by
Respondent's unfair labor practices, and cannot serve as
the kind of objective consideration needed15 to support an
asserted good-faith belief that a union has lost its
majority.
While I agree with Respondent, and no one suggests to
the contrary, that the existence of any unfair labor
practice should not automatically foreclose an employer
from raising the majority question, I find on the basis of
the considerations mentioned, including the findings in the
earlier case, that the rule in Celanese and C & C Plywood
Corporation applies here, and that since Respondent is
attempting to question the Union's majority in a context
of serious unremedied unfair labor practices, its raising of
the issue is not in good faith. I conclude that by
withdrawing recognition from the Union on June 1, 1966,
and by refusing at all times thereafter to recognize and
bargain with the Union as exclusive representative of
employees in the appropriate unit, notwithstanding that
Respondent did not have a good-faith doubt of the
Union's majonty status, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 16
embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1 The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees at the
Respondent's Waynesboro, Pennsylvania, plant, including
shop clerical employees, inspectors, leaders who are not
supervisors as defined in the Act and factory and plant
janitors, excluding timekeepers, farm machinery and saw
mill parts retail sales and store employees, refrigerator
engineer trainees, pattern makers and their apprentices,
other office clerical employees (including office clerical
employees of the production control department),
technical employees (including employees of the
engineering and drafting department), watchmen and
guards, professional employees and supervisors as defined
in the Act constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of
collective bargaining within the meaning of the Act
4 At all times since March 30, 1965, and continuing to
date, the Union has been the exclusive representative for
the purpose of collective bargaining of all the employees
in the aforesaid unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of
the Act
5. By refusing to bargain with the Union, as found
above, on June 1, 1966, and thereafter, Respondent
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, which have been found to constitute unfair labor
practices, occurring in connection with the operations of
Respondent described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent engaged in
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act, it will be recommended that Respondent
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Since it has been found that Respondent refused to
bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of
the employees in the appropriate unit described herein, it
will, therefore, be recommended that Respondent be
ordered to bargain collectively, upon request, with the
Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in
the appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached,
"N L R B v Great Dane Trailers, Inc, 338 U S 26, 32
"Laystrom Manufacturing Co, 151 NLRB 1482, 1484, enforcement
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case,
it is recommended that Respondent, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain with the Union as the exclusive
representative of its employees in the appropriate unit
found herein.
(b) In any other like or related manner, interfering
with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise
of their rights to self-organization; to form, join, or assist
any labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, to engage in
concerted activities for the purposes of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain
from any and all such activities
2 Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Bargain with the Union, upon request, as the
exclusive representative of the employees in the
appropriate unit found herein with respect to wages,
hours, and other conditions of employment, and if an
understanding is reached embody such understanding in a
signed agreement.
(b) Post at its plant in Waynesboro, Pennsylvania,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix.""
denied 359 F 2d 799 (C A 7) "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board the
"Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664, C & C Plywood words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Corporation and Veneers, Inc, 163 NLRB No 136, The Little Rock Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
Downtowner, Inc, 168 NLRB No 18 event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of the United States
238 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Copies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional
Director for Region 6 shall, after being duly signed by the
Respondent, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof,
in conspicuous places, and be maintained by it for a
period of 60 consecutive days, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that such
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within
20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.1e
Court of Appeals , the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order" shall be substitued for the words
"Pursuant to a Decision and Order "
"in the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify our
employees that
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain
collectively with International Union, United
Automobile , Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW), as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees in the
following appropriate unit-
All production and maintenance employees at our
Waynesboro , Pennsylvania , plant, including shop
clerical employees inspectors , leaders who are not
supervisors as defined in the Act , and factory and
plant janitors , excluding timekeepers , farm machinery
and saw mill parts retail sales and store employees,
refrigerator engineer trainees, pattern makers and
their apprentices, other office clerical employees
(including office clerical employees of the production
control department), technical employees (including
employees of the engineering and drafting
department), watchmen and guards, professional
employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce the employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization, to form, join or assist
unions, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities
for the purposes of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from such
activities, except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring union membership
as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with the
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(UAW), as the exclusive bargaining representative of all
employees in the appropriate unit as found above, and,
if an understanding is reached, embody such
understanding in a signed agreement.
Dated By
FRICK COMPANY
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1536 Federal
Building, 1000 Liberty Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
15222, Telephone 412-644-2969