Frankson Furniture MFG. Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 22, 1953

104 N.L.R.B. 1111 (N.L.R.B. 1953)

FRANKSON FURNITURE MFG CORP 1 1 1 1
FRANKSON FURNITURE MFG. CORP. and ROBERT W.
COBBETT, SR. Case No. 1-CA-1302. May 22, 1953
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 27, 1953, Trial Examiner James A. Corcoran
issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled pro-
ceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain
unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and
desist therefrom as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate
Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner further found
that the Respondent had not engaged in other unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint and recommended the
dismissal of the complaint in those respects. Thereafter,
the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report
and a supporting brief.
The Board' has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds no prejudicial error was committed.2
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered
the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the
entire record in this case, and hereby adoptg the findings,3
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner,
insofar as they are consistent with this Decision and Order.
1. The Trial Examiner found that Robert W. Cobbett, Sr.,
was not discriminatorily discharged in violation of Section 8
(a) (3) of the Act. In the absence of exceptions to this deter-
mination, we hereby adopt it without further comment.
2. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and
thus violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. We rely on the
following acts and conduct, in combination: (a) The questioning
of employees Morgan and Sayward by Foreman Hehl as to
whether they had received union-membership cards; (b) the
statements of Foremen Hehl and LeMay to employees threaten-
ing reprisal and loss of benefits in the event of unionization
1 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel- [Mem-
bers Houston, Styles, and Peterson].
iThe Respondent asserts that the length of the cross-examination of its witnesses by
the Trial Examiner is evidence of bias on his part. The Trial Examiner conducted the
hearing in this case with fairness and 'impartiality and there is no basis for any finding
of bias or prejudice on his part against the Respondent.
9The Intermediate Report contains certain inaccuracies, none of which affects the Trial
Examiner's ultimate conclusions, or our concurrence therein Accordingly, we note the
following corrections: (1) In the discussion of the requests for union-membership cards
the Trial Examiner quotes Foreman Hehl as saying, "J. J. would like to look at it," and
as being asked to "go out and get one for him." The record indicates that he said, "J. J
would like to see one," and was asked to "go out and get one " (2) In discussing surveil-
lance, the Trial Examiner states that 5 representatives of the Respondent were at the
location of the union meeting. As the record is insufficient to support a finding as to the
supervisory status of 2 of the 5 persons referred to by the Trial Examiner, the Board
has considered only the presence of the 3 admitted representatives of the Respondent in
connection with this aspect of the case.
104 NLRB No. 154.
283230 0 - 54 - 72
1112 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of the plant;4 and (c) the surveillance of the union meeting
held on September 15, 1952, at Effingham, New Hampshire,
by representatives of the Respondent.5
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section
10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Frankson
Furniture Mfg. Corp., West Ossipee, New Hampshire, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Questioning employees concerning their union organiza-
tional activities; keeping under surveillance union meetings,
employees, and representatives of the Union engaged in union
activities; threatening to close the plant and to deprive em-
ployees of existing employee benefits if the Union should
become their collective-bargaining representative.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist
any labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such
activities except to the extent that such rights may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3)
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board
finds will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its plant at West Ossipee, New Hampshire,
copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix
A."6 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for the First Region, shall, after being signed by
Respondent's representative, be posted by Respondent immedi-
4tely upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty (60)
consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for the First Region, in
writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it
alleges that the Respondent discriminated with regard to the
4 Tyrrell County Lumber Company, 101 NLRB 155.
5 Falls City Creamery Company, 101 NLRB 692.
In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and order" the words
"Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
FRANKSON FURNITURE MFG. CORP. 1113
discharge of Robert W. Cobbett , Sr., be, and it hereby is,
dismissed.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of
the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL NOT question our employees concerning their
union organizational activities ; keep under surveillance
union meetings , our employees , or representatives of the
union engaged in union activities ; or threaten to close our
plant or to deprive employees of existing employee
benefits if the union should become their collective-
bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization , to form labor organiza-
tions, to join or assist any labor organization , to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
or to refrain from any or all such activities except to
the extent that such rights may be affected by an agree-
ment requiring membership in a labor organization as
a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8
( a) (3) of the Act.
All our employees are free to become or refrain from
becoming or remaining members of any labor organization,
except to the extent that the right to refrain may be affected
by a lawful agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment.
FRANKSON FURNITURE MFG. CORP.,
Employer.
Dated .................. By ...................................................
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date
hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
1114 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Intermediate Report
Upon a charge filed by Robert W. Cobbett , Sr., an individual worker , referred to hereinafter
by his family name , the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board , hereinafter
called respectively the General Counsel and the Board, on January 12, 1953, issued a com-
plaint against the Frankson Furniture Mfg. Corp ., hereinafter called the Respondent , alleging
that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and ( 3) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, hereinafter called the Act Copies of the complaint and the charge upon which the com-
plaint was based, together with the notice of hearing thereon, were served upon the Respondent
and Cobbett.
The complaint alleged in material substance that the Respondent ( 1) on or about August 29,
1952, discharged Robert W. Cobbett , Sr., an employee , because he joined or assisted the
United Construction Workers, United Mine Workers of America , hereinafter called the
Union, and otherwise engaged in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection , and has at all times since , failed and refused to reinstate
the said named employee; (2) from on or about August 1, 1952, to date of complaint, has
interrogated its employees concerning their union affiliations and warned its employees to
refrain from assisting, becoming members of, or remaining members of , the Union; and
(3) has kept under observation and surveillance the meeting places, meetings , and activities
of the Union or the concerted activities of its employees for the purpose of self-organization
or improvement of working conditions.
In an answer, the Respondent admitted certain allegations of the'complaint, but denied the
commission of any unfair labor practices
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Center Ossipee, New Hampshire, before me as
duly designated Trial Examiner. All the parties participated in the hearing and were afforded
full opportunity to be heard , to examine and cross - examine witnesses , to introduce evidence
bearing upon the issues, submit oral argument, and to file briefs. The General Counsel moved,
without opposition, to amend the pleadings to conform to the proof with respect to matters
of form not affecting the cause of action stated in the complaint. The motion was granted.
The Respondent moved for dismissal of the complaint at the conclusion of presentation of
evidence. Decision was reserved on such motion and it is disposed of in the findings and
conclusions set out below. All parties waived oral argument on the evidence. The General
Counsel and the Respondent have filed briefs which have been read and considered
On the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses , I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is and at all times herein mentioned has been a New Hampshire corpora-
tion with its principal office and place of business located in West Ossipee, New Hampshire,
where it manufactures wood furniture . In the course and conduct of its business the Re-
spondent during the year preceding the complaint, purchased materials having a value
exceeding $50,000, of which materials exceeding in value $10, 000were transported in
interstate commerce from outside the State of New Hampshire. During the same period,
the Respondent caused large quantities of its finished product having a value in excess of
$100,000 to be manufactured , approximately 50 percent of which was sold , transported,
and distributed in interstate commerce to points outside the State of New Hampshire
The Respondent admits and I find that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The United Construction Workers, United Mine Workers of America, is a labor organiza-
tion admitting to membership employees of the Respondent.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The alleged discriminatory discharge
Early in August 1952 , the Union began organizing activity at this plant by distributing
union literature and membership cards at the gate entrance . Cobbett received such a card
FRANKSON FURNITURE MFG. CORP. 1115
and mailed it in. Upon being told by a fellow worker that it had not been received, about the
second week in August, he accepted from such worker another membership card, signed it
in the shop and returned it to such worker. Cobbett testified that during August he talked
about the Union at noontime groupings, discussed it with workers opposed to it, and that he
believed only 1 or 2 other workers were more active than he was in the organizing effort
Cobbett started working for the Respondent about March 8, 1952, and was discharged on
August 29, 1952 His first job was on a planer, an unskilled job, at 80 cents per hour, then
later working with another man on a stripper, and subsequently being assigned to operate,
individually, a back knife machine. His pay was increased to 85 cents per hour in the week
ending June 7, 1952.
His statement as to procedure on discharge, which I credit, is to the effect that at quitting
time on Friday, August 29, 1952, his foreman, John Kohler, gave him his paycheck to such
date, and stated to him, "I was all done on account of losing too much time on being sick "
Cobbett did not say anything Nothing was said at the time regarding his union activities
He denies ever having received any warning from the foreman that his further absences
would cause discharge. The Respondent contends that his consistent absence from his job
was the only basis of his discharge.
Cobbett relates an incident in connection with his signing of the second union card in the
shop He held the card up against a platform to fill it in and sign, and as he turned around
he saw either Foreman Kohler or Subforeman Arthur Jordan, who had come up behind him,
standing about 2 or 3 feet away from him Such person did not say anything, but turned around
and walked away Kohler in his testimony denies any knowledge of the incident Jordan did not
testify and no proof of his supervisory status was offered. I credit the honest testimony of
Cobbett as to the happening of the event as related, despite his inability to remember or
determine definitely which person was present, explained by Cobbett as saying that at the
time the incident made no impression on him. Of course, either of the persons named would
have had rightful occasion to be walking around the shop or be close to him without having
any ulterior purpose It is significant that this happened over 2 weeks before the discharge
and was not the basis of any action taken at the time of occurrence I do not accord it any
weight as an integral factor in his subsequent discharge.
The testimony of Cobbett and also that of several witnesses of Respondent, indicates that
the organizing campaign and the Union was a paramount type of conversation around the plant
for several months, even long after his termination of service. Cobbett testified to a further
incident of his discussing the Union with other workers at lunchtime in the millyard (which
was also the backyard of the home of Foreman Kohler) but it has not been established that
such gathering, discussion, and Cobbett's participation in it, was seen, heard of, or known of,
by the Respondent.
Considerable testimony was presented relative to the passing by Cobbett of a union-
membership card to another employee, Gordon West, in the auto of the latter , at the millyard
entrance on the morning of the day of the discharge of Cobbett. The act, allegedly done in
the presence of Hattie Sargent, a coworker opposed to the Union, is supposed to have stirred
the ire of the latter leading to an argument with Cobbett'1 West did not testify. Hattie Sargent
did and corroborated testimony of Cobbett as to the giving of the card to West. She was set
and nervous in testifying, but I do not believe untruthful It appears she had a conversation
later during the same day of the card incident with Hazel Rolfe and had told her about having
an argument or fight with Cobbett. Sargent further says that Foreman Hehl, whom she knows,
asked her during such day "what she was upset about" and that she informed him that "we
had a little argument ," but she does not remember if she told him who the argument was
with or if he asked her. 2 Despite some inconsistencies in the testimony regarding it, I accept
that this incident did happen on the morning of the day of the discharge of Cobbett, but fail
to see that from the testimony adduced, any knowledge of it can be imported to the Re-
spondent, and I find that it was not the basis of or a factor in the discharge of Cobbett on
the same date
i Cobbett himself was somewhat confused stating at one point, "I passed it out to him
not too many days before that" (apparently meaning the day of discharge). Hazel Rolfe,
a coworker and rider, who apparently left the car at another plant entrance before arrival
at the millyard entrance, testified she definitely heard Cobbett ask West regarding taking
a union card and offering him one, but it was one night on the way home.
2Her written statement given to a Board investigator on September 24, 1952, definitely
said that the person she told regarding the card incident was not a foreman. It is noted
also that Hehl is not her regular foreman.
1116 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Bearing on the assigned reason of absenteeism for the discharge, it is clear that for the
first few months of employment Cobbett was a good worker, and his lost-time record then
did not become too noticeable a matter to produce any action. However, following the vacation
period, the first week in July 1952, to the date of discharge on August 29, 1952, Cobbett only
worked full time in 2 weeks out of the ensuing 8 weeks It appears there was always sufficient
work in the plant to keep him employed full time The testimony of Foreman Kohler, Super-
intendent Knox, and also that of Cobbett, shows moreover, that in addition to the lost time
shown on the time records in evidence, Cobbett frequently had to stop work for appreciable
time periods and rest in the plant. His absences, and particularly his unavailability for work
when in the plant, were embarrassing and costly to the Respondent. As for instance, when
employed on the stripper, a machine which must be kept working continually to keep the
balance of plant workers operating, it would become necessary to draw a worker from some
other work operation or place, to replace him Comparisons of his absences with those of
P. Thurston and D. Thurston, other workers, showed that they had absence records approxi-
mately equal to that of Cobbett, over his entire period of employment. No discharge action
was taken against them. The explanation of the foremen as to the absence of the Thurstons
was similar, that although each had disabilities producing absences, they were skilled
workers, with years of service, hard to replace, who gave a full day's work when, in the plant,
and not having to stop or leave in the daily course of work, differing from Cobbett largely
in such latter respects. I credit the testimony of Foremen Hehl and Kohler in such regard.
The raise in wages given to Cobbett at the end of May 1952, despite his absences prior to
such time, which was about the time he was shifted to a more skilled operation on the
stripper, does not impress me as indicating that the Respondent was not interested in
attendance as a factor in considering the status of an employee. As bearing on the policy
of the Respondent relative to discharges for absenteeism , it was clearly demonstrated
through the employee termination records produced covering a considerable period of time
and a number of workers, that the Respondent frequently terminated services of workers
for poor attendance and absence records. Under a loosely conducted system of recording,
these termination records were prepared and kept solely for the information and guidance
of the plant superintendent in matters of rehiring. $
I credit the testimony of Foreman Kohler regarding his determination to effect the termi-
nation of services on the previous Friday, August 22, after discussion with Superintendent
Knox, forestalled by his going to Kentucky for emergency family reasons, and put into effect
by him after further discussion with Knox, at the close of the week in which he returned to
plant, and in which he found Cobbett had again lost time. Cobbett has alleged he was never
warned that his absences would lead to discharge. Foreman Kohler has stated that he did
warn him and it is conceded by Cobbett, that Kohler also counseled him regarding his getting
needed medical attention for his condition. I do not believe it necessary to pass on credibility
in this regard, although good personnel practice might dictate such a course of procedure,
there is no rule, accepted common practice , custom in this plant, or provision of law, that
requires the extending of such a warning notice . The giving or lack of giving of notice may
be significant in certain instances, but I do not believe it has any important application
herein.
The Respondent has definitely and emphatically denied any knowledge of the union activities
of Cobbett . From the foregoing, I find there is no proof that Cobbett's union activity came to
the attention of the Respondent , nor of circumstances that could justify such an inference.
The record in reality permits nothing more than a mere suspicion of discrimination in
discharge being indulged . Such is not sufficiently substantial to support a findini and amounts
to no more than a scintilla as regards the required quantum of evidence . Even if it be
assumed that Respondent believed or suspected that Cobbett was active in the Union, there
is insufficient evidence to warrant a finding of discrimination . On the other hand, I find that
the Respondent did show by substantial evidence that the assigned basis of discharge did have
a tangible and acceptable basis and was not any mere pretext offered to conceal the real
reason. I find that the General Counsel has not sustained his burden of proof as to the union
eI credit the testimony of O. Knox, plant superintendent, that the notation in red pencil
"lost too much time" as the cause of termination appearing on such termination sheet of
Cobbett, ' corresponding in general with the reason advanced by Kohler in effecting the
discharge, was actually placed thereon by Knox shortly after the actual event of discharge.
4Citizens News Co., 33 NLRB 511, 134 F. 2d 970 (C. A. 9); Eastern Coal Co., 79 NLRB
1165, 176 F. 2d 131 (C. A. 4); Peoples Motor Express, 74 NLRB 1597, 165 F. 2d 903 (C.
A. 4).
FRANKSON FURNITURE MFG. CORP. 1117
activity of Cobbett being the reason for his discharge , and that the Respondent has shown by
a preponderance of the evidence that the discharge of Cobbett was not for union activity but
arose out of and was based on his continued lost-time record.
B. Alleged violations of Section 8 (a) (1)
Employees Morgan and Sayward have each testified to inquiries made by Foreman Hehl,
on the day following the first distribution of union-membership cards in early August 1952.
The question to each was the same , namely if he had received one of the union cards, in-
forming them also that "J. J. would like to look at it."6
Hehl has testified he was instructed by the boss (Knox , plant superintendent ) to "go out and
get one for him." There is nothing to indicate why these two employees were selected for the
inquiry . Regardless of what underlying motive may have animated the questioning , the proce-
dure and interrogation in itself constituted an invasion by the Respondent of the privacy of the
individual " in an area guaranteed to be exclusively the business and concern of his employ-
ees."6 It is not necessary to ascertain in each instance just what effect the inquiry produced
As the Board consistently has held that any interrogation is a violation per se of the Act and
has again reaffirmed such position ,' I find that these incidents of interrogation constituted
interference with the enjoyment by these workers of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7
of the Act and that by such interrogation of its employees , the Respondent violated Section
8 (a) (1) of the Act.
Foreman Hehl has admitted in his testimony that he asserted as his opinion in conversation
with his workers, at a time while the union drive was on, that " I didn ' t think that the plant
would operate if the Union came in." Foreman LeMay testified he told Jack Jones, an em-
ployee , on an undisclosed date but probably in September or October 1952, that "I didn't
think we'd get the Xmas bonus , because of the fact that I didn 't think , in my own estimation,
that we'd have the plant running if the Union came in."
These two specified instances with the same general thought expressed at a time following
the distribution of union-membership cards and in an acknowledged period of great union
activity, are more than mere isolated instances , separated over a long period of time.
Uttered by conceded supervisory officials and indicating the withdrawal of existing privi-
leges , they are deemed to be threats of reprisal , tending to discourage and interfere with
union activity and membership rights protected under the provisions of Section 7. I find that
such above acts of interference were in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
A meeting of the Union was held on September 15, 1952, at the Black Horse Inn, located at
Effingham , New Hampshire . Circulars announcing it, addressed to all employees of the
Respondent Company , were distributed at the plant . Some of the supervisory officials re-
ceived them . Foremen Kohler and LeMay , and Harry Damon , Jr., office manager , all con-
cededly supervisors , went by auto to the place of the meeting , and A. Connors and A . Jordan,
stated to be subforemen , were also at the same point in a car, apparently cruising around.
The meeting was attended by workers of this Company , as clearly appears from the testimony
of Kohler and LeMay , who were able to recognize some of them in even the alleged poor
exterior lighting, and also through their seeing and meeting some employees in the union
meeting hall. Damon also admitted recognizing an employee, walking under the street light,
while he remained parked in his car opposite the Black Horse Inn entrance.
Kohler , LeMay, and Damon , three of the supervisory officials , have testified they went to
the union meeting just out of curiosity . They insist none was instructed to go to the meeting,
and the only discussion they subsequently had with any higher company official was allegedly
as to the humorous aspects of Kohler and LeMay being requested to leave the union meeting
when it was ascertained they were foremen , after having been invited to go in by a union
representative . I find it very difficult to credit their testimony in such latter regard, or as
to the motivating factor taking them to the union meeting . Kohler and LeMay had been parked
in their car opposite to the union meeting place at the Black Horse Inn for 10 or 15 minutes
before entering the union hall, and Damon had preceded them at such place by some 15 or 20
minutes and had remained in his car parked at a point where he could observe those entering
the union meeting.
The Trial Examiner, accompanied by the parties , viewed the premises and location of the
Black Horse Inn at the request of the General Counsel and with the consent of the Respondent.
5J. J. Conners , president of the Company.
6 Standard -Coosa-Thatcher Company, 85 NLRB 1358.
'Syracuse Color Press, Inc., 103 NLRB 377.
1118 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Although not accepting the descriptive term of "isolated " as used by the General Counsel
as being accurately descriptive of it , as it was located at the junction of two fairly well
traveled roads, with lighting about, and stores and dwellings nearby, it was certainly demon-
strated to be at a location off the regular path for any ordinary travel of these supervisory
officials . In fact, none of them had ever been to the Black Horse Inn before and have not gone
there since. I cannot accept that mere coincidence brought these five representatives of the
Respondent to this unusual location at approximately the same time of night. Not even the
curiosity urge would ordinarily operate with such clock-like regularity. Curiosity which
impels supervisory officials to leave their own hearth , journey appreciable distances in a
car at night to unusual places, solely for the purpose of observing union meetings, is in
itself an evidence of activity prohibited to the Respondent and his agents . The very presence
of supervisory officials on such an occasion under the circumstances indicated constitutes
surveillance . 8 In such conduct I find the Respondent interfered with, restrained , and coerced
its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed under Section 7 , and engaged in unfair
labor practice in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in connection
with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above , have a close , intimate,
and substantial relation to trade, traffic , and commerce among the several States and tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices,
through acts of interference , restraint , and coercion , it will be recommended that the
Respondent cease and desist therefrom.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act..
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The Respondent did not violate Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act in the discharge of Robert
W. Cobbett, Sr., on August 29, 1952.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
8Cummer-Graham Co., 90 NLRB 722; N. L. R. B. v. Clark Bros. Co. Inc., 163 F. 2d
373 (C. A. 2). N. L. R. B. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 146 F 2d. 454 (C. A. 4).
MAGIC CHEF, INC. and LOCAL NO. 1, INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL, Peti-
tioner. Case No. 14-RC-2123. May 25, 1953
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Walter
A. Werner, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings
made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are
hereby affirmed.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the
Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case
to a three-member panel [Members Houston, Murdock, and
Styles].
104 NLRB No. 151.