Frankel, Michael

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 9, 2020

13658326 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/658,326 10/23/2012 Michael Frankel 1296-002 4262
39600 7590 01/09/2020
SOFER & HAROUN LLP.
215 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1301
NEW YORK, NY 10016
EXAMINER
JESSEN, DEREK
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3622
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/09/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte MICHAEL FRANKEL
____________________

Appeal 2019-000631
Application 13/658,326
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JAMES B. ARPIN, and
DANIEL N. FISHMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–8. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as the inventor
Michael Frankel. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed subject matter (emphasis,
formatting, and bracketed material added):
1. A system for collecting and distributing
advertisements from clients to subscribers based on an event or
attribute of the subscribers, said system comprising:
[A.] a client interface, for receiving communications
from a plurality of clients, said communications including a
plurality of advertising contents;
[B.] a client database, said client database configured to
store said advertising contents;
[C.] a processor coupled to said client interface and said
client database,
[i.] wherein said processor is configured to receive
[a.] at least one distribution demographic
parameter for each of said advertisement
contents defined by said clients, and
[b.] at least one distribution timing
parameter also from said clients for each of
said plurality of advertising contents,
regarding the distribution of advertisement
contents to any one of a plurality of subscribers
based on defined profiles and attributes of said
subscribers,
[ii.] said distribution demographic parameter and
said distribution timing parameter storable in
said client database;
[D.] a subscriber interface, coupled to said processor
configured to receive communications relating to a plurality of
said subscribers resulting in said subscribers being sent one or
more client advertising contents; and
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[E.] a subscriber database connected to said processor
and said subscriber interface which stores profile data for each
of said subscribers provided by one or more third parties, said
profile data including at least one demographic parameter
associated with a date and with said subscriber wherein said
demographic parameter associated with a date is provided by a
third party to said system without the input of said subscriber,
and
[F.] wherein said processor is configured to review a
present date and compare against distribution timing parameters
for said advertising contents and to distribute said
advertisement contents having said present date as a
distribution timing parameter to one or more subscribers having
matching said distribution demographic parameters associated
with said advertising contents.
REFERENCES2
The Examiner relies upon the following references:
Name Reference Date
Woolard US 2008/0288360 A1 Nov. 20, 2008
Eldering AU 2004201746 B2 May 27, 2004
REJECTION3
A.
The Examiner rejects claims 1–8 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because “the
claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. Specifically,
claims 1–8 are directed toward at least one judicial exception without

2 All citations herein to patent and pre-grant publication references are by
reference to the first named inventor only.
3 All citations to the “Final Act.” are to the Final Action mailed on
October 17, 2017.
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significantly more” (Final Act. 2), i.e., the claimed invention is directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–4.
We select claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant does not separately argue claims 2–8. Except for our ultimate
decision, we do not discuss the § 101 rejection of claims 2–8 further herein.
B.
The Examiner rejects claims 1–8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Woolard and Eldering. Final
Act. 5–8.
We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this rejection.
Appellant does not argue separate patentability for claims 2–8. Except for
our ultimate decision, we do not address the § 103 rejection of claims 2–8
further herein.
OPINION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner has erred. We concur with the conclusions
reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following points.
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
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In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
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attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme
Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula
in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part
of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO § 101 Guidance
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised
guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO’s January 7, 2019
Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84
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Fed. Reg. 50 (“2019 Memorandum”).4 Under that guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) (see 2019 Memorandum Step 2A – Prong One) any judicial
exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e.,
mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity
such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) (see 2019 Memorandum Step 2A – Prong Two) additional
elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).5
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.

4 The Office issued a further memorandum on October 17, 2019 (the
“October 2019 Memorandum”) clarifying guidance of the January 2019
Memorandum in response to received public comments. See https://
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf.
Moreover, “[a]ll USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency
management, expected to follow the guidance.” January 2019 Memorandum
at 51; see also October 2019 Memorandum at 1.
5 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Memorandum - Section III(A)(2).
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See 2019 Memorandum Step 2B.
C. Examiner’s § 101 Rejection - Alice/Mayo - Steps 1 and 2
C.1. 2019 Memorandum Step 2A – Prong One
Applying the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines that
claim 1 recites an abstract idea:
Independent claim 1 is directed toward a method of
collecting and distributing advertisements. While claim 1 is
directed toward a statutory category of invention, the claim
appears to be directed toward a judicial exception, namely the
abstract idea of collecting information and displaying certain
results of the collection analysis. . . .
Claim 1 recites in part a system for collecting and
distributing advertisements comprising
receiving communications from a plurality of clients, said
communications including a plurality of advertising contents;
storing said advertising contents;
receiving at least one distribution demographic parameter
for each of said advertisement contents defined by said clients,
and at least one distribution timing parameter also from said
clients for each of said plurality of advertising contents,
regarding the distribution of advertisement contents to any one
of a plurality of subscribers based on defined profiles and
attributes of said subscribers, said distribution demographic
parameter and said distribution timing parameter storable in said
client database;
receiving communications relating to a plurality of said
subscribers resulting in said subscribers being sent one or more
client advertising contents; and
storing profile data for each of said subscribers provided
by one or more third parties, said profile data including at least
one demographic parameter associated with a date and with said
subscriber wherein said demographic parameter associated with
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a date is provided by a third party to said system without the input
of said subscriber, and
reviewing a present date and comparing against
distribution timing parameters for said advertising contents and
to distribute said advertisement contents having said present date
as a distribution timing parameter to one or more subscribers
having matching said distribution demographic parameters
associated with said advertising contents.
Such limitations are considered to set forth the abstract
idea because the claims are directed toward a method of
collecting information, analyzing it, and providing certain results
of the collection analysis which has been found by the courts in
Electric Power Group to be an abstract idea in and of itself.
Final Act. 2–3 (emphases added).
C.2. 2019 Memorandum Step 2A – Prong Two
Further applying the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines
claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
[T]he claimed invention does not represent a technological
improvement in the operation of the claimed system for
collecting and distributing advertisements from clients to
subscribers.
Ans. 5.
C.3. 2019 Memorandum Step 2B
Applying the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines:
The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient
to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception
because the additional computer elements, which are recited at a
high level of generality, provide conventional computer
functions that do not add meaningful limits to practicing the
abstract idea.
Final Act. 2.
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Claim 1 does not include additional elements that are
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception because the additional elements when considered both
individually and as an ordered combination do not amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea. The claim recites the
additional limitations of a processor, a database and an
interface which are generic computer components that perform
the generic functions of displaying and executing instructions.
Generic computer components recited as performing generic
computer functions that are well-understood, routine and
conventional activities amount to no more than implementing the
abstract idea with a computerized system. Generic computer
implementation does not provide significantly more than the
abstract idea.
Final Act. 4 (emphasis added).
It is the Examiner’s position that . . . storing data is a well-
understood, routine and conventional function of electronic
recordkeeping as defined by the Supreme Court in Alice.
Ans. 4.
It is the Examiner’s position that . . . receiving data [is a] well-
understood, routine and conventional function[] of receiving data
over a network as defined by the Federal Circuit in Ultramercial.
Ans. 4.
D. Appellant’s § 101 Arguments & Panel’s Analysis
D.1. 2019 Memorandum Step 2A, Prong 1
The Examiner correctly determines that claim 1 “recites in part a
system for collecting and distributing advertisements” including the
following limitations:
[A.] receiving communications from a plurality of clients,
said communications including a plurality of advertising
contents;
[B.] storing said advertising contents;
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[C.] receiving at least one distribution demographic
parameter for each of said advertisement contents defined by said
clients, and at least one distribution timing parameter also from
said clients for each of said plurality of advertising contents,
regarding the distribution of advertisement contents to any one
of a plurality of subscribers based on defined profiles and
attributes of said subscribers, said distribution demographic
parameter and said distribution timing parameter storable in said
client database;
[D.] receiving communications relating to a plurality of
said subscribers resulting in said subscribers being sent one or
more client advertising contents; and
[E.] storing profile data for each of said subscribers
provided by one or more third parties, said profile data including
at least one demographic parameter associated with a date and
with said subscriber wherein said demographic parameter
associated with a date is provided by a third party to said system
without the input of said subscriber, and
[F.] reviewing a present date and comparing against
distribution timing parameters for said advertising contents and
to distribute said advertisement contents having said present date
as a distribution timing parameter to one or more subscribers
having matching said distribution demographic parameters
associated with said advertising contents.
Final Act. 2–3 (formatting and bracketed material added).
Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s determination. In short,
the Examiner correctly determines that claim 1 recites a method directed to
the idea of collecting and distributing advertisements (i.e., commercial
interaction); and a commercial interaction is one of certain methods of
organizing human activity identified in the 2019 Memorandum, and, thus, an
abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
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D.2. 2019 Memorandum Step 2A, Prong 2
Having determined that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we next turn
to whether claim 1 is directed to that abstract idea, or instead integrates the
judicial exception into a practical application.
Appellant contends:
Regarding the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the JE
(Judicial exception) rejection may be overcome by establishing
that the claim includes at least one non-conventional additional
element and that such element provides a particular improvement
over the prior art, which is apparent by comparison with the prior
art, and that such improvement is attributable to the additional
non-conventional element of claim 1 (i.e. the claim includes
significantly more than an abstract idea).
. . .
One element of claim 1 claims the feature of - a subscriber
database connected to said processor and said subscriber
interface which stores profile data for each of said subscribers
provided by one or more third parties, said profile data including
at least one demographic parameter associated with a date and
with said subscriber wherein said demographic parameter
associated with a date is provided by a third party to said system
without the input of said subscriber.
Such an element is described for example in paragraphs
[0010, [0040] and [0049] of the specification. See also page 8 of
December 21, 2016 Amendment as well as the below comments
over the prior art.
Owing to such a claimed system component of claim 1 and
the associated novel data structure that is implemented thereby,
Applicant submits that when taken alone as well as when taken
in context of the entirety of claim 1, are improvements over the
prior art, with such improvement directly contributing to the
comparative advantage of the present system over prior art
systems. This both qualifies this claim in a manner to overcome
the § 101 judicial exception rejection.
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Appeal Br. 11–12.
Appellant’s contention is not persuasive. Appellant’s claim 1 does
not include a novel data structure as no particular data structure is recited.
Rather, claim 1 only recites the content of the data to be stored (i.e.,
information about the subscriber) not the data structure being used for that
storage. Unlike the “specific type of data structure” improvement disclosed
and claimed in Enfish, Appellant’s claimed “subscriber database” is
disclosed as a structurally non-particular element defined by the information
stored therein.
A subscriber database 28 similarly containing all of the
data required for system-subscriber relationships, and
advertisement functions, including but not limited to storage of
basic address and contact profile information of the subscribers,
as well as attribute and event information for receiving pushed
advertising ( described in detail below), as well as any data
required to collect payment from clients 12 generated from
completed purchases and/or clicks and/or views and/or other
actions by subscribers 14.
Spec. 12, second full paragraph.
We determine that, unlike Enfish, Appellant claims the computing
device without specifying how the computing device operates. Rather, the
computing device achieves a result without further detail. The client
interface, client database, subscriber interface, subscriber database, and
processor are recited so generically (no details whatsoever are provided
other than that they are a client interface, client database, subscriber
interface, subscriber database, and processor) that they represent no more
than mere instructions to apply the judicial exception on a computer. These
limitations also can be viewed as nothing more than an attempt generally to
link the use of the judicial exception to the technological environment of a
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computer. When viewed in combination, the additional elements in this
claim do no more than automate the commercial interaction, using the
computer components as a tool. While this type of automation improves
collecting and distribution of advertisements, there is no change to the
computers and other technology that are recited in the claim as automating
the abstract ideas, and, thus, this claim cannot improve computer
functionality or other technology. Accordingly, the claim as a whole does
not integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application, and
the claim is directed to the judicial exception. In order to transform a
judicial exception into a patent-eligible application, the additional element or
combination of elements must do “more than simply stat[e] the [judicial
exception] while adding the words ‘apply it.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72).
We agree with the Examiner that, as to claim 1, “the claimed
invention does not represent a technological improvement in the operation of
the claimed system.” Ans. 5. In view of Appellant’s Specification, and
consistent with the Examiner’s determinations, we conclude that claim 1
does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
Specifically, we determine claim 1 does not recite:
(i) an improvement to the functioning of a computer;
(ii) an improvement to another technology or technical field;
(iii) an application of the abstract idea with, or by use of, a
particular machine;
(iv) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing; or
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(v) other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the
use of the abstract idea to a particular technological
environment.
See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). We agree with the Examiner that
claim 1 does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application
and is directed to a judicial exception.
D.3. 2019 Memorandum Step 2B
The Examiner correctly determines that claim 1 “recites the additional
limitations of a processor, a database and an interface which are generic
computer components that perform the generic functions of displaying and
executing instructions.” Final Act. 4.
Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s determination. We agree
that the Examiner correctly determines that in addition to the abstract idea,
claim 1 recites only well-understood, routine, conventional elements/
combination of elements previously known in the industry. In view of
Appellant’s Specification, and consistent with the Examiner’s
determinations, we determine that beyond the abstract idea, the claims do
not recite:
(vi) a specific limitation other than what is well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field or
unconventional steps that confine the claim to a particular
useful application.
See MPEP § 2106.05(d).
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E.
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103.
E.1.
Specifically, Appellant contends:
As described in the prior Amendments, the present
arrangement provides an arrangement that is a “push” system to
deliver advertisements to a select group/pool of subscribers
based on a set of timing and demographic parameters generated
by the clients (businesses). This is better than the prior art “pull”
method discussed in the background/prior art section.
Appeal Br. 13.
Appellant’s contention is not persuasive because Appellant does not
explain the relevance of “the prior art ‘pull’ method discussed in the
background/prior art section” to the § 103 rejection before us. To the extent
that Appellant is contending that the references cited by the Examiner do not
teach a push method, we disagree. The Woolard reference (¶¶ 31, 32, 34,
39) employs a “‘blind’ basis” method that meets Appellant’s definition of a
push method.
In marketing terminology, this method represents a push method
where gifts/offers/sales/information are pushed to the customer
or potential customer based on an event specific to the customer
or potential customer. Thus, unlike the above options, the
present arrangement not only has the ability to reach customers
who have not directly contacted the advertising business, but it
can target said advertisement to the potential customers based on
specific attributes of those recipients (e.g. their birthday) based
on them having opted into the present system.
Spec 3.
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E.2.
Appellant also contends:
Additionally, as claimed in claim 1 and described in the
specification, the present arrangement can push advertising
content to subscribers without any input from them at all, for
example, via a third party entering their profile information. For
example, a third party can send birthday gifts/advertisements to
friends and family by registering them with the subscriber
database.
Appeal Br. 13–14 (emphasis added).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention. The contention is
not commensurate with the scope of the claim language. We do not find
“without any input from [the subscriber] at all” is a requirement in claim 1.
Claim 1 is not explicitly so limited, nor does Appellant explain how claim 1
would be inherently so limited, nor do we find alternative language that
would similarly mandate the argued limitation. At most, claim 1 requires
“at least one demographic parameter associated with a date and with said
subscriber . . . is provided by a third party to said system without the input of
said subscriber.” Claim 1 does not preclude the subscriber from also
providing input. That this is the proper reading of Appellant’s claim 1 is
shown by the “subscriber 14 provid[ing] additional profile information to
system 10 for storage at subscriber database 26.” Spec. 14.
E.3.
Appellant further contends:
The Examiner argues that it would have been obvious for
one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified the teachings of
Woolard with Eldering. A closer look at Eldering reveals this to
not be the case, as Eldering’s system is not combinable with
Woolard’s, nor would it be desired by Woolard’s system to make
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such a combination, and in some cases, would actually be
detrimental to Woolard’s.
Appeal Br. 14.
Ultimately, it is a key feature of Woolard that advertisers
be able to target specific users based on specific attributes. In
the case of Eldering, such a system is not possible nor is
Eldering’s method for obtaining information from a 3rd party able
to be applied to Woolard as such information would be useless
and, in fact, detrimental to Woolard’s system.
As such, the references cannot be combined as suggested.
Appeal Br. 18.
The Examiner responds to Appellant’s argument and expands his
reasoning as follows:
[T]he secondary reference of Eldering is simply being used to
show that demographic properties are collected then provided by
a third party as opposed to being provided by the first party, and
the data provided by third party is simple Substitution of One
Known Element for Another To Obtain Predictable Results.
Nothing in the prior art teaches that the proposed modification
would have resulted in an ‘inoperable’ process or undesirable
properties as suggested by Applicant. The suggested
combination of the Woolard and Eldering references would not
require a substantial reconstruction and redesign of the elements
shown in Woolard, nor would the combination change in the
basic principle under which the Woolard construction was
designed to operate. The Woolard reference would simply carry
out the process with the demographic data provided by the third
party with the predictable result that the offer is targeted based
on the provided demographic data.
Ans. 7–8.
Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s expanded reasoning.
Therefore, as to Appellant’s assertion, we are unpersuaded for the reasons
set forth by the Examiner in the Answer.
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CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–8 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–8 as unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–8 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–8 as unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103 is affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis/References Affirmed Reversed
1–8 101 Eligibility 1–8
1–8 103 Woolard, Eldering 1–8
Overall
Outcome

1–8
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED